STORY (TOPMOST), in the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122), ss. 83, 85, sch. 1, need not necessarily mean a room enclosed by four vertical walls, but includes floors built in a sloping roof. Foot v. Hodgson (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 160. Some local Acts-e.g., Hastings Improvement Act, 1885 (c. cxcvi.)—contain a special definition to make this clear. STREET, in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 34, means "not only a roadway over which passengers and vehicles might pass, but also that which in popular language is part of the street, namely, the houses on both sides." Baker v. Mayor of Portsmouth (1878), 3 Ex. D. 9, 160. 99 in Public Health Act, 1875 (c. 55), "must receive the popular meaning existing at the time when the Act passed. With regard to the width, it is the width between the houses. With regard to the depth, it is what may be called the area of ordinary user existing at that time, and nothing beyond or below it." Per Brett, M.R., in Wandsworth L. B. v. United Telephone Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 914. in s. 149, means the public highway, whether footway or carriage way. in s. 157, means a roadway with buildings on each side, discontinuous or not. "includes any highway or other public place, whether a thoroughfare or not." 52 & 53 Vict. c. 44 (Protection of Children), s. 17. See definitions in Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847; Telegraph (NEW). A roadway beside which buildings have for the first SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF DUTIES, in 8 Anne, c. 7, s. 17, applies to any articles, whether taxed at the time of the passing of that Act, or subsequently. Att.-Gen. v. Saggers (1814), 1 Price 182. 66 SUBMISSION, in the Arbitration Act, 1889 (c. 49), s. 27, "unless the contrary intention appears," means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not." 66 SUCH.-There is no special rule as to the way in which words of reference, like "such" or "same," should be understood when used in statutes. "It is an ordinary rule," said Blackburn, J., in Eastern Counties Ry. v. Marriage (1861), 9 H. L. C. 32, at p. 37, not so much of law as of the grammatical construction of the English language, that words of relation prima facie refer to the nearest antecedent." The word "idem," it is said by Lord Coke in Inst. 20 b, "semper proximo antecedenti refertur." But, said Channell, B., at p. 43, "no meaning of this sort has been give to the word 'such,' and the notion of confining the reference made by the use of that word to the particular use described in the immediate antecedent has not been followed, even where, by so confining the words, no violence would have been done to the context, nor any repugnancy have arisen." So, Lord Coke, in his reading of the Statute of Marlbridge, 2 Inst. c. 6, s. 6, when commenting upon the words "per hujusmodi fraudem," says, "By these words is to be understood 'such in mischief and such in inconvenience, and therefore all other fraudulent feoffments tending to the same end are within the statute'. . . . and so is this word [such] oftentimes taken in other statutes." Thus, in Re Betts' Patent (1862), 1 Moore P. C. N. S. 49, it was held that the word "such" in the proviso to s. 25 of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83 (which enacted that, "provided always no letters patent for any invention for which any such patent shall have been obtained in any foreign country. . . ."), "referred to the entire description of the patents mentioned in the foregoing part of the section," and not merely to the lastmentioned of them. (Cf. Re Blake's Patent (1873), L. R. 4 P. C. 537.) And in Stone v. Mayor, &c., of Yeovil (1876), 2 C. P. D. 99, it was held that, when by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, s. 9, it is enacted that "the compensation to be paid for any lands to be purchased or taken from any party under any disability or incapacity . . . . and the compensation to be paid for any permanent damage or injury to any such lands, shall," &c., the words "such lands" related to "any lands belonging to parties under disability." SUFFER, in a statute creating an offence, includes cases in which the act forbidden is done through the negligence or by the connivance of the person charged, although direct knowledge by him of the contravention of the statute is not proved. Bond v. Evans (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 249. is the same as "permit" in the Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94), ss. 13, 16, 17. (Same case.) SUIT DEPENDING, used in 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 54, s. 1, is not used in the technical sense of lis pendens, and "is not to be understood in any other than its ordinary and popular sense." Sherwood v Ray (1837), 1 Moore P. C. 395. OR PROCEEDING, in Charity Trusts Act, 1853, s. 17, does not apply (1) to actions brought to enforce common law rights in contract or tort, such as an action for wrongful dismissal by the master of a charity school; nor (2) to suits intended only to obtain equitable relief in respect of common law rights. Bowen, L.J., in Rendall v. Blair (1890), 45 Ch. D. 139. [The words are "suit, petition, or other proceeding."] SUITS.-See Actions and suits. SUMMARY JURISDICTION (COURT OF), means any justice or justices of the peace or other magistrate, by whatever name called, to whom jurisdiction is given by, or who is authorized to act under, the sections of Acts in England, Wales, or Ireland, and whether acting under Summary Jurisdiction Acts or any of them, or under any other Act, or by virtue of his commission, or under the common law. Int. Act, 1889 (c. 63), s. 13 (11). includes justices acting under the Licensing Acts. SUNDAY is not a dies non in computing time in accordance with an Act of Parliament. "Where," said Hill, J., in Ex parte Simkins (1859), 2 E. & E. 396, "an Act of Parliament gives a specified number of days for doing a particular act, and says nothing about Sunday, the days are consecutive days, including Sunday." But see Peacock v. R. (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 268, note (a). in the Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 61), SUPERFLUOUS LANDS, in 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, s. 127, means Forsdyke v. "land not required for the purposes of the undertaking "—that is to say, not "land not demanded," but "land no longer necessary." Great Western Railway v. May (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 283. In Re Metropolitan Railway and Cosh (1880), 13 Ch. D. 617, it was held that "land" mentioned in this s. 127 "means land properly and ordinarily so called, and does not apply to a mere easement or a slice of land taken horizontally." SWEAR.-See Oath. TAKEN FOR THE purposes of thE WORKS, in Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18), ss. 2, 133, applies to houses purchased outside the limits of deviation and not under the provisions of a private railway Act, but in order to buy off opposition to the passing of the Act. Putney Overseers v. L. & S. W. R. (1891), 1 Q. B. 182. TAXED CART, in 15 & 16 Vict. c. cliv. s. 27, means a taxed cart as defined by 43 Geo. 3, c. 161, sch. D., No. 4, and does not include any cart upon which a tax has been paid. Williams v. Lear (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 285. TEAM, in 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, ss. 35, 46, does not imply, besides horses, a cart or vehicle of some kind. Vide per Curiam (Mellor, J., diss.), Duke of Marlborough v. Osborn (1864), 5 B. & S. 73. TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, in the Technical Education Act, 1889 (c. 76), s. 8, means "instruction in the principles of science and art applicable to industries, and in the application of special branches of science and art to specific industries or employments." It does not "include the practice of any trade or employment, but, save as aforesaid," includes "instruction in the branches of science and art with respect to which grants are for the time being made by the department of Science and Art, and any other form of instruction (including modern languages and commercial and agricultural subjects) which may for the time be sanctioned by that department by a minute laid before Parliament and made on the representation of a local authority that such a form of instruction is required by the circumstances of its district." TELEGRAPH, in the Telegraph Acts, 1863, 1869, is "wide enough to cover every instrument which may ever be invented which employs electricity transmitted by a wire as a means for conveying information." Per Pollock, B., and Stephen, J., in Att.Gen. v. Edison (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 254. TENEMENT, in 8 Hen. 6, c. 7, includes a toll. Wadmore v. Dear (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 224. in 48 Geo. 3, c. 55 (Inhabited House Duty), and 41 Vict. c. 15, s. 13, means a legal house as distinguished from an ordinary house, and includes a set of chambers or a flat. Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Clayton (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 421; Evans and TENEMENT, in the Franchise Acts (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 27, and 48 & 49 Vict. c. 3, s. 5), includes stalls and stands in a market for which rent is paid, if the areas for which the rent is paid are fixed. Hall v. Metcalf (1892), 1 Q. B. 208. 66 TERM, meaning the periods into which the legal year used to be divided, was frequently used before the passing of the Judicature Acts (by which this division of the year was abolished) as a measure for determining the time at which an act should be done," and, consequently, this division of the year (although now abolished) "may continue to be referred to for the same or a like purpose." College of Christ v. Martin (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 18. THIEF.-See Reputed thief. THINGS IN ACTION, as used in 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 44 (iii.).—Meaning of term discussed, Colonial Bank v. Whinney (1885), 30 Ch. D. 261. TIDAL LANDS.-Defined, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 92, s. 3. TIME, when mentioned in a statute, is to be reckoned, said Denman, J., from the first day "any part of which is occupied in the particular business which is to endure for a certain number of days in order to fulfil any requirement of the law." Migotti v. Colvill (1879), 4 C. P. D. 234. For "the doctrine," said the Court in Edwards v. R. (1854), 9 Ex. 631, "that judicial acts are to be taken always to date from the earliest minute of the day in which they are done, stands upon ancient and clear authority." See also Day; Month; Sunday. OF DAY. "The true time at any place," said Pollock, C.B., in TO TIME (FROM).—See Benyon v. Benyon (1890), 15 P. D. 54, 57. TITHES, in 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13, is confined to lay tithes. Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 322. |