sumption of fact for the reason that it may be rebutted. By other courts the question of the presumption of payment from the lapse of time is said to be one of fact and law, and cannot be determined. by the court until the evidence on the point is before it. This presumption is an artificial and arbitrary rule of law, which gives to the evidence a technical efficacy beyond its simple and natural force and operation. The presumption of payment is not a bar to an action on the original contract, and the burden of proof on the creditor is not to establish a new contract, or promise, as when a debt is barred by the statute of limitations, but to show by competent evidence that the debt or judgment has not been paid.?

148. Effect of Presumption.-The presumption of payment is conclusive in the sense that where it appears that the requisite time has elapsed and no countervailing evidence is given, neither the court nor the jury is at liberty to find that the debt was not paid; but it is not conclusive in the sense that the plaintiff may not introduce evidence to disprove the fact which by force of law the lapse of time establishes. Some courts hold that after the lapse of the prescribed period of time, the presumption of payment is conclusive where the creditor has been during the period inactive, or there has been no recognition of the liability of the debtor.10

2. Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. R. 726.

Note: 3 A. S. R. 515; 18 A. S. R. 884.

3. Lewis v. Schwenn, 93 Mo. 26, 2 S. W. 391, 3 A. S. R. 511.

4. Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

Notes: 64 A. S. R. 732; 68 A. S. R. 883; 90 A. S. R. 659.

5. Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711.

6. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 502; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 68 A. S. R. 883; 90 A. S. R. 659.

7. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

8. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19

Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 135 A. S. R. 110.

9. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States. 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 287, 8 Am. Dec. 562: Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 18 A. S. R. 879; 64 A. S. R. 732; 68 A. S. R. 899.

10. Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151, 5 S. Ct. 1181, 29 U. S. (L. ed.) 336; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894; Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578, 135 A. S. R. 107, limiting McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala. 75, 70 Am. Dec. 529; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Charleston Dist. v. Steedman, Harp. L. (S. C.) 287, 18 Am. Dec. 652. And see infra, par. 157 et seq.

149. Presumption as Merely Defensive. The law formerly was that the statute of limitations could be used only as a shield and not as a sword, but this view has been very much modified, and a limitation title may be used as a means by which to reclaim the possession of land as well as a means of defense, and there is an inclination among some courts to take the same view of the presumption of payment.11 Generally, however, the presumption of payment cannot be availed of as a weapon of attack in a case involving the rights to land, and it has been determined that while the presumption is available as a defense in a proceeding to enforce payment of the purchase money, yet the vendee in possession is not entitled to the benefit of the presumption in a proceeding in which he asks for affirmative relief.19 While the weight of authority supports the rules stated, there is very good authority maintaining the view that the presumption of payment arising from lapse of time is available to defeat an action of ejectment brought by a vendor against his vendee on the ground that the vendee had failed to pay the purchase price.13

150. Debts Affected by Presumption.-It may be stated generally that the presumption of payment arising from the lapse of time is applicable to every debt, no matter how solemn the instrument may be by which the debt is evidenced.14 Specifically, the presumption has been applied to debts arising on simple contracts generally,15 to stock subscriptions,16 notes,17 leases, 18 legacies,19 taxes, 20 contracts for the sale of land,1 fiduciary debts of every character due from a trustee to his cestui que trust, and obligations arising out of agency. It is also applicable to sealed instruments or specialties, including

12. Note: Ann. Cas. 1913A 508. 13. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505.

14. Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 882.

18. Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309.

19. Note: 18 A. S. R. 883.

20. Notes: 18 A. S. R. 884; 90 A. S. R. 659.

1. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505 and note.

2. Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151, 5 S. Ct. 1181, 29 U. S. (L. ed.) 336; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 Notes: 54 A. S. R. 594; 68 A. S. R. So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894. 899; 135 A. S. R. 110.

15. Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153.

16. Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894.

17. Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 Vt. 682, 15 Atl. 353, 6 A. S. R. 144, 1 L.R.A. 216.

3. Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520, 14 S. Ct. 189, 37 U. S. (L. ed.) 1167; Roberts v. Armstrong, 1 Bush (Ky.) 263, 89 Am. Dec. 624.

4. Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153.

Notes: 6 A. S. R. 811; 10 L.R.A. 454.

judgments, bonds, recognizances,' and sealed notes. A question has been sometimes raised whether the doctrine of presumption arising from the lapse of time and total neglect to take any measures to enforce a claim could properly be applied to the case of a mortgage of real estate; and in some of the earlier English cases the doctrine is advanced that the common law presumption applicable to bonds, judgments, etc., arising from a delay of twenty years to enforce the same, does not apply in the case of a mortgage, because the legal estate is in the mortgagee, and the mortgagor is a mere tenant at will, and his possession is therefore the possession of the mortgagee. But this doctrine was repudiated by Lord Thurlow, and the cases of debts secured by mortgages are placed on the same footing with other demands, and held liable to be defeated by the same presumptions arising from lapse of time. And this presumption of the payment of a mortgage or release of an estate is often made against what is believed to be the very fact, for the purpose of quieting a long adverse possession, and to prevent virtual fraud, by the setting up of dormant title long since supposed to have become extinct.10

151. Debts within Statute of Limitations.-The courts have frequently said in discussion that the presumption applies only to debts not embraced by the statute of limitations,11 but there appears to be no good reason why a defendant may not avail himself of the presumption of payment, if it is applicable, although the action is brought on an obligation covered by a statute of limitations.12 And

5. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, Dec. 384; Barker v. Jones, 62 N. H. 4 S. Ct. 426, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 466; 497, 13 A. S. R. 586; Wanmaker v. Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. L. 685, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. Dec. 748; Jackson v. Wood, 12 Johns. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 (N. Y.) 242, 7 Am. Dec. 315; Bailey L.R.A. 454 and note; Hummel v. Lilly, v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. Am. Dec. 309. R. 879.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 883.

6. Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309: Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

Notes: 88 Am Dec. 590; 18 A. S. R. 880.

7. Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879.

8. Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827 and note; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

9. Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; Howland v. Shurtleff, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 26, 35 Am.

Notes: 23 Am. Dec. 755; 18 A. S. R.

881.

And see MORTGAGES, Vol. 19, pp. 457-458.

10. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

11. Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Smithpeter v. Ison, 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 203, 53 Am. Dec. 732; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 13 A. S. R. 586; 54 A. S. R. 594; 1 L.R.A. 628.

12. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 58 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592.

it is held that the presumption of payment applies and precludes recovery on a debt which by reason of the defendant's absence from the state is not barred by a statute of limitations.13 It has also been held that a new statute of limitations which prescribes that the time. of limitation should begin to run on a particular day as to all causes of action which existed on that day does not prevent a defendant. from interposing the defense that the obligation was paid by reason of the lapse of time, although under the statute it was still enforceable.14

152. Time Necessary to Raise Presumption.-The length of time which is required to elapse before the presumption of payment will arise is different in different jurisdictions. As a general rule, however, twenty years is the period adopted,15 though it is variously fixed at sixteen years, 16 fifteen years, 17 and sometimes ten years.18

153. Lapse of Time for Less Period as Evidence.-The presumption of payment never arises from lapse of time alone, short of the period fixed by law.19 In a given case, if there are no circumstances tending to aid the presumption of payment, and the presumption does not arise for want of the necessary time, it would be the duty of the court so to instruct the jury and withdraw it from their

13. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Dec. 732; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, Kan. 392, 42 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 43 Am. Rep. 618; Jameson v. Rixey, 592; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. 46 Am. Rep. 153. R. 726.

14. Booker V. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

15. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, 4 S. Ct. 426, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 466; Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734; Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; McCoy v. Morrow, 18 Ill. 519, 68 Am. Dec. 578; Barker v. Jones, 62 N. H. 497, 13 A. S. R. 586; Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. Eq. 685, 23 Am. Dec. 748; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Jackson v. Wood, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 242, 7 Am. Dec. 315; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454 and note; Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827 and note; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879 and note; Smithpeter v. Ison, 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 203, 53 Am.

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 53 Am. Dec. 734; 88 Am. Dec. 590; 6 A. S. R. 811; 13 A. S. R. 586; 18 A. S. R. 881, 883 et seq.; 54 A. S. R. 594; 68 A. S. R. 883, 899; 90 A. S. R. 659; 135 A. S. R. 110; 1 L.R.A. 628.

16. Atkinson V. Dance, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 424, 30 Am. Dec. 422; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345, 91 A. S. R. 769, 58 L.R.A. 694.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 883.

17. Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 Vt. 682, 15 Atl. 353, 6 A. S. R. 144, 1 L.R.A. 216.

18. Note: 18 A. S. R. 884.

19. Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; Adair v. Adair, 5 Mich. 204, 71 Am. Dec. 779; Adlum v. Yard, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 163, 18 Am. Dec. 608; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879; Grafton Bank v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463. 47 Am. Dec. 697.

Notes: 23 Am. Dec. 755; 71 Am. Dec. 785; 18 A. S. R. 880, 885.

consideration.

It is true, however, that time has always been regarded as an auxiliary to other facts and circumstances on questions of payment, possessing more or less importance as the period may have been longer or shorter, and it may in connection with other circumstances establish the fact of payment.1

154. Application of Presumption to State.-When the state comes into its courts, it is subject like all other suitors to the established rules of evidence. It must meet the burden of proof, its evidence must be relevant, material, the best attainable, and must be presented in due order under the regular rules of procedure. In all such respects it stands on the same footing as ordinary litigants. Statutes of limitation do not apply to it, because the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi, though probably in its origin a part of royal prerogative, has been adopted in our jurisprudence as a matter of important public policy. But rules of evidence and legal presumptions are not changed for or against the state as a suitor. A statute of limitation is a legislative bar to the right of action, but the presumption of payment from the lapse of time is not a bar at all, but simply a rule of evidence, affecting the burden of proof. There is no good reason why it should not apply to the state just as other legal rules and presumptions do. And it has been so held, though the contrary view is supported by some authority.

155. Evidence to Strengthen Presumption.-The fact that a creditor during the period when he might have enforced his demand by suit, if he had one, was in indigent circumstances and needed the use of his means is a circumstance tending to fortify the presumption that the demand has been paid or otherwise satisfied, especially when taken in connection with the easy and solvent circumstances of the obligor.5

20. Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879.

1. Dox v. Postmaster General, 1 Pet. 318, 7 U. S. (L. ed.) 160; Adair v. Adair, 5 Mich. 204, 71 Am. Dec. 779; Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Hamil ton v. Hamilton, 18 Pa. St. 20, 55 Am. Dec. 585; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879; Smithpeter v. Ison, 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 203, 53 Am. Dec. 732; Husky v. Maples, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 25, 88 Am. Dec. 588; Walker v. Emerson, 20 Tex. 706, 23 Am. Dec. 207; Grafton Bank v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463, 47 Am. Dec. 697; Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E.

861, 64 A. S. R. 726.

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 53 Am. Dec. 735; 88 Am. Dec. 590; 18 A. S. R. 880, 885.

2. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734 and note (applying presumption in action by the United States); In re Ash, 202 Pa. St. 422, 51 Atl. 1030, 90 A. S. R. 658.

3. Note: L.R.A.1916B 740.

4. Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153.

Notes: 88 Am. Dec. 590; 18 A. S. R. 882; 8 Ann. Cas. 780.

5. Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827. Note: 88 Am. Dec. 590.