right of way not being a way appurtenant, incident to an estate in land, in-
hering in it, and going by transfer with it, but being a right of way in gross.
not assignable or inheritable, even by words in the deed to that effect. Hall
v. Armstrong, (Conn.) 113.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 15-23; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 4; TOLLS AND TOLL-

GATES.

WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. See EVIDENCE, 17, 18.

WHARVES.

See WATERS AND WATER-Courses, 1-3.

WIDOW. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 14, 24-26.

WIFE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

WILL.
Execution.

1. WITNESS-HUSBAND-WIFE A LEGATEE-R. L. § 2046-Act of 1884, No. 109.
A will executed, and presented for probate, prior to the statute of 1884, was
void, when one of three witnesses to it was the husband of one of the lega-
tees. Giddings v. Turgeon, (Vt.) 711.

2. STATUTE NOT RETROSPECTIVE-WILL. HOW PROVED.

A statute which changes the rules of evidence relating to the execution of
wills does not have a retrospective operation. A will must be proved as the
law required at the time of its execution. Id.

Probate-Contest.

3. DECLARATIONS OF TESTATRIX AS EVIDENCE-Undue InfLUENCE.

The declarations of a testatrix, whether made before or after the execution
of the will, respecting the conduct of the proponent towards her, are not com-
petent evidence of undue influence. In re Pemberton, (N. J.) 770.

4. DECLARATIONS-DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY-EVIDENCE-WILL.

The declarations of a testatrix that she had no will, and intended to divide
her property among her children equally, are not competent to show that she
did not make the will which is offered for probate. Id.

Construction.

5. LAW WHEN WILL TAKES EFFECT.

Wills must be construed with reference to the law as it existed when they
took effect. Comegys v. Jones, (Md.) 567.

6. "MALE ISSUE," INTERPRETATION OF-EJECTMENT.

A testator devised land to his daughters for life, and, at the death of the sur-
vivor of them, "to the male issue then living of my said son, Richard, their
or his heirs and assigns, in fee; but, if no such issue shall then be living, in
such case I give the same unto all the children of my said daughters, Cathe
rine and Sarah, and my said son, Richard, their heirs and assigns, in equal
parts, according to the number of them." Testator's son, Richard, was not
married at the time of testator's death, and the daughters died unmarried and
without issue. An action of ejectment having been brought by one of Rich-
ard's daughters, as heir to her son, against her two brothers, held, that the
words "male issue" in the will denoting the whole class of male descendants.
whether descended through males or females, and the plaintiff's son coming
within that class, she was therefore entitled to recover his share. Wistar v.
Scott, 105 Pa. St. 200, followed. Wistar v. Gillilan, (Pa ) 815.
7. PERSONAL PROPERTY-CHOSES IN ACTION.

Testator bequeathed to his son W. "all my personal property in the city of
Philadelphia, excepting securities of every kind and building association
stock." He was, at the time of his death, a member of a partnership in the
city of Philadelphia, and there was due his estate therefrom a certain sum of
money. Held, that this sum did not pass by this bequest; that it was the in-
tention of the testator to use the term "personal property" in its restricted
sense; and that he did not intend to include therein any debts or demands
due him. Sloan's Appeal, (Pa.) 350.

8. LIFE-ESTATE-POWER OF DISPOSITION.

Where, in a devise, the quantity of the estate of the taker is expressly de-
fined to be for life, and words adapted to the creation of a power of disposal,

without restriction as to the mode of execution, are added, the superadded words will be construed to be the mere gift of a power of disposition. Lienau v. Summerfield, (N. J.) 660.*

9. LIFE-ESTATE.

A testator devised and bequeathed all his property unto his widow. "giving her full power and authority to sell the whole or any part of my said real estate, and execute deed or deeds therefor; and in case any of my estate be left after the death of my said wife, I order it to be divided as follows, " etc., among his children. Held, that the widow took but a life-estate in the realty, and that so much of the proceeds of the real estate sold by the widow as was not used by her was estate of the decedent "left," and that his children were entitled thereto. Follweiler's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 581, followed. Brockley's Appeal, (Pa.) 210.*

10. LIFE ESTATE-POWER OF APPOINTMENT BY WILL.

W. M. died, leaving a will disposing of his property as follows: "I give and bequeath all my property, both real and personal, that I die possessed of, both in the state of New Jersey and the city of New York, (after my funeral expenses and debts shall be paid,) to my wife, Elizabeth Richards, to use or dispose of in any manner that she may think proper during her life-time, and at her death may by will dispose of the same between my children and grandchildren as she may think proper The wife, E. R., directed by will that her executors should sell all her estate, both real and personal, within one year from the date of her decease, and charged the estate with the payment of her debts and a legacy, and divided the remainder into six equal shares: three shares to her daughters, or to their respective descendants; and the other three shares to her grandchildren, or their respective descendents. Held, that the gift by the husband is for life merely, with a power of appointment by will, and an estate for life only passes; that the wife was not at liberty to exclude any of the children or grandchildren, but was bound to give each child and each grandchild a portion, and that the executors of the wife have no power to sell. Wright v. Wright, (N. J.)855.

11. CONTINGENT REMAINDER.

Prior to the act of 1862, (chapter 161,) where there was a devise to A., and if he dies without issue then to B., A. took the fee, and the devise over was void because the contingency was too remote. Comegys v. Jones, (Md.)567. 12. CONDITION-ACCEPTANCE.

A. had been employed by B. to work the latter's farm, paying him onethird the annual product, and also paying the taxes. This continued for about three years, when B. died, and in his will devised the farm to A., upon condition that he pay the widow of B. one-third the annual product, and upon her death that he pay the heirs of C. the sum of $1.000. The farm, from the time A. first went upon it, was assessed for taxation in the name of A., and so continued for at out seven years after the death of B.; A. paying the taxes, and paying the widow certain moneys, but not all to which she was entitled. The farm was subsequently sold by the sheriff under a judgment against A. Held, that A. had accepted the devise, and that the purchasers at the sheriff's sale had acquired a good title to the farm. Rape v. Smith, (Pa.) 360.

Legacies.

13. ADEMPTION OF LEGACIES-INTENTION-EVIDENCE.

In the matter of ademption of legacies, whether the advance made was intended as an ademption or not can only be gathered from the circumstances surrounding each individual case; the law in regard to the same being well settled, and the only difficulty being in its application to a given state of facts for which purpose parol evidence may be adduced. Wallace v. Dubois, (Md.) 402.*

14. EXTINGUISHMENT OF DEBT-“ONE FULL AND EQUAL SHARE"-INTENTION. Where a legatee was indebted to his testator, and had given a mortgage therefor on land which had been released from the lien of the mortgage without payment of the debt, the words in testator's will that the debtor should have "one full and equal share" of his estate did not work an extinguishment of the debt. Peter's Appeal, (Pa.) 727.

15. RENOUNCED LEGACY.

One of the specific legatees renounced her legacy. Held, as lapsed and void specific or pecuniary legacies fall into the residue, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, this legacy fell into the residue. Peckham v. Newton, (R. I.) 758.

16. CHARGES-SPECIFIC BEQUEST-GENERAL PECUNIARY LEGACY-GEN. LAWS N. H. CH. 203, § 14.

The common-law rule that a specific bequest or devise will not be charged with the payment of a general pecuniary legacy, unless such clearly appears to have been the testator's intention, is not changed by Gen. Laws, N. H. c. 203, § 14. Davenport v. Sargent, (N. H.) 569.

17. CHARGE ON LAND-PAYMENT.

A testatrix ordered that, if her personal property should be insufficient to pay the legacies mentioned in the will, her executors should sell, at either public or private sale, all her real estate, and apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of those legacies. If any surplus, it was to be paid to three persons mentioned as residuary legatees. The executor rented a house and lot for two years, after which he sold it. Proceeds of sale of real estate and personal property were insufficient to pay general legacies, and executor asks instructions regarding application of moneys received as rent. Held, the legacies being charged upon the land, the tents, issues, and profits are to be applied to the payment thereof. Lyon v. Church of the Redeemer, (N. J.) 661. 18. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

When there is a dispute between an executor and a legatee as to the amount of interest due on a legacy, on account of the expense and delay caused by a long litigation carried on for the protection of the property of the estate, an acceptance by the legatee of a sum less than the one due on the legacy is an accord and satisfaction, if the payment is made upon the express condition that it shall be in full for the balance due, and the money accepted without protest against such condition. Vermont State Baptist Convention v. Ladd, (Vt.) 634.

19. WHEN PAYABLE.

Testator bequeathed to his son A. the sum of $1,000. In a previous clause of his will he had devised certain real estate to his executors to sell and dispose of, and further provided "the said purchase moneys to be used as far as may be needed in the payment of the legacies and annuities hereinafter named;" and in a codicil he gave his executors "power to mortgage any or all of the properties so held in trust by them for the purpose of paying or securing the said legacies, as they may find necessary to do so. Held, that the legacy was not to be paid out of the general personal estate of testator, but out of the fund produced by a sale of said real estate only. Sloan's Appeal, (Pa.) 350. 20. INTEREST.

Legacies, unless otherwise controlled by the will, draw interest after one year from the probate of the will; and the rule is not affected by the fact that the executor is unable to gather in the assets and pay the legacy within the Vermont State Baptist Convention v. Ladd, (Vt.) 634.

year.

21. INTEREST-Demand of PAYMENT.

While it is true, as a general rule, that interest may be demanded upon a legacy from the time it becomes payable, and payment is refused, when a legatee gives no proof of a demand for payment until the meeting of the final audit of the estate, and there was evidence of early controversies and agreements among the heirs which delayed the settlement, no interest is demandable. Ziegler's Appeals, (Pa.) 837.

Testator bequeathed to his wife his household furniture, and also the onethird of his personal estate, and further provided that certain judgments which he held against his wife should not be collected by his executor during the term of his wife's life, but the same should be kept reserved as a lien against her property until after her decease, when they should be collected and distributed. The widow died shortly after. Held, that the executor of the widow

was entitled to receive from the executor of the testator the full amount of the one-third of the personalty, undiminished by the judgments held against her. Finney's Appeŭl, (Pa.) 60.

See CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE USES; CONVERSION; GIFT, 3.

WITNESS.

1. COMPETENCY-ATTORNEY-INSTRUCTIONS AS TO PREPARATION OF Deed. Instructions by a grantor to an attorney drawing a deed are not, ordinarily, privileged communications. Todd v. Munson, (Conn.) 99.

2. CREDIBILITY-INSTRUCTIONS-ERROR.

In an action of damages for injuries arising from the neglect of the defendant, the plaintiff gave testimony as to the extent of his injuries, which was rebutted by the evidence of the defendant. The judge directed the jury that, the falsity being in a material particular, they could not only disregard his evidence, but must look upon it as throwing a suspicion on his whole case, and left the facts to them to decide. Held, that there was nothing in the charge so inadequate or misleading as to demand a reversal. Sharp v. City of Erie, (Pa.) 161.

See EVIDENCE; OATH; WILL, 1, 2.

WRITINGS. See EVIDENCE, 4-9.

WRITS. See ASSISTANCE:; CERTIORARI; ENTRY; MANDAMUS.

WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS.