15 years, he caused to be served on Mrs. John Golling -i. e., Mary Golling-the then owner of the land, a notice of which Exhibit A, attached to the bill of complaint, is a true copy, which said notice was not in the form required by law, but which nevertheless correctly described the land in question and included therein the following statement on which Mary Golling and her grantees had a right to rely, to wit: 'If payment as aforesaid is not made, the undersigned will institute proceedings for the possession of the land.' "Second, because said land was lawfully bid in by the State of Michigan for taxes of 1900 at the annual tax sale of 1903, and became and was the absolute property of the State of Michigan as State tax land, being so held by the State of Michigan until the purchase from the State of Michigan by the said defendant some time subsequent to July 1, 1905, and that the said defendant could not hold possession adverse to the State of Michigan, nor gain any rights by possession so held while the title was in the State of Michigan, any title which he may have gained prior to sale to the State by adverse possession or otherwise being cut off and extinguished by the said sale to the State aforesaid." Evidence introduced at the hearing on behalf of plaintiff tended to show that the 40 acres in question. was unoccupied, uninclosed, wild land at the time of the hearing, and no testimony was introduced on behalf of defendant to the contrary. It was held in Griffin v. Kennedy, 148 Mich. 583 (112 N. W. 756), that: "After the expiration of his right to redeem from a regularly conducted sale at which the State has purchased-and that is the case with the land in question -it (the State) owns and can dispose of the land as it pleases; and this is true though the former owner of the land continues in possession, for he is in possession without the right of possession." If the owner of the record title in possession is cut off by a sale of the estate, it is clear that a mere tres passer can acquire no rights to possession which survive such sale. Subsequent to the sale the defendant acquired no right to possession because of his failure to serve the statutory tax notice. Powell v. Pierce, 168 Mich. 427 (134 N. W. 447), and cases cited. The decree is affirmed. KUHN, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred with BROOKE, J. OSTRANDER, J. (dissenting). It was held in Pike v. Richardson, 136 Mich. 414 (99 N. W. 398), that the personal service of notice provided for in the tax law then in force was a service completed by filing a return; that the period for redemption after notice began when return of service of the notice was made. In other words, it found that the legal effect of the notice under the law then in force and in the form then provided by the law was precisely the effect indicated in the form introduced into the law by the amendment of 1905. The legal effect of the notice given in the case at bar was precisely the same as if the form of notice had corresponded with the amended law. How can it be said, then, that the law was not complied with by the giving of the notice? One form of notice promises and secures the same rights as the other. In my opinion, the notice was good, and the decree should be reversed. STONE, J., concurred with OSTRANDER, J. PERSON, J., did not sit. DURHAM v. FEENEY. 1. FALSE IMPRISONMENT-EVIDENCE NANCES MUSKEGON CHARTER ORDI ARREST-POLICE OFFICER. In an action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment on the charge of soliciting for prostitution, the provisions of the charter of the city in relation to the duties of police officers, and the ordinance for the violation of which plaintiff was arrested, were admissible in evidence. 2. SAME-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS. Plaintiff's statement in the police court on the next morning after her arrest, in the nature of an admission, was admissible to show her understanding of the purpose of her conduct on the night of her arrest. 3. SAME-EVIDENCE-REPUTATION-CHASTITY-DAMAGES. Plaintiff having claimed damages because of injury to her reputation, evidence tending to show that her reputation for chastity was bad was admissible as bearing on the question of damages. 4. SAME ARREST-POLICE OFFICERS- QUESTION FOR JURY. Where a question of fact was raised by the evidence as to whether plaintiff was violating the terms of an ordinance in the presence of the officer making the arrest, the issue should have been submitted to the jury.1 Error to Muskegon; Sullivan, J. Submitted October 5, 1916. (Docket No. 54.) Decided March 30, 1917. Case by Ruth Durham, a minor, by next friend, against William Feeney for false imprisonment. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed. 'Generally, as to liability of officer for making arrest, see notes in 51 L. R. A. 193, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 71; L. R. A. 1916F, 403. On evidence of character, in an action for false imprisonment, see note in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 755. Charles B. Cross and Willard J. Turner, for appellant. R. R. Gale, for appellee. MOORE, J. This action was brought for illegal arrest and false imprisonment. At the time of the occurrence which gives rise to this suit defendant was one of the police officers of the city of Muskegon, and claims he made the arrest for the violation by the plaintiff in his presence of one of the ordinances of the city. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant was guilty, that their only duty was to fix the amount of damages. Plaintiff recovered a judgment for $135 and costs. The case is here for review upon writ of error. The questions involved are discussed under the following heads: (1) Error in rulings on evidence. (2) Prejudicial language of the trial court. We should consider the case from the viewpoint of the defendant. It is his claim that complaint had been made of the conduct of plaintiff and her companion in soliciting men for the purpose of prostitution; that upon the night in question a complaint of that character had been made to the police department by the humane officer of the city; that defendant, accompanied by the humane officer and another man, all in plain clothes, saw the plaintiff and another young woman of about her own age on the street. We quote from the officer's testimony: "I left the office that night and went down to the corner of Terrace street and Western avenue where I met Mr. Healy. We went from there down Terrace street, as far as Market; turned around the corner at the Chamberlain Hotel; walked down Market street * * * towards the post office. When we got about back of Vanderwerp's store there we passed Ruth Durham and Tillie Larson. * * As we passed by one of them said, coughing, 'Hello there, kid.' We passed them then, and we stopped on the corner by Fisk's cigar store, and the girls walked by us over to the post office, and I followed them over, and I asked Ruth what she meant by that, the way they saluted us when we went by. Ruth said, 'I told her not to do that; that you were officers, and that we would get in trouble.' I further questioned her and asked her if she made a business of stopping people and soliciting them on the streets, * * * and she said, 'Yes.' I said, 'Did you just pick this gentleman up that you have got with you now?' and she said, 'Yes.' I asked her if she knew him. She said, 'No,' she didn't know the name, and I said, 'When was the last time you picked anybody up?" She said, 'Last night.' I said, 'Where did you have him last night?' She said 'In the Schoenberg block,' and Tillie was inside the post office at the time. "The Court: There was no man there with her at the time you spoke to her? "A. Yes, there was. "Q. Talking to her? * * * "A. Why he was standing right with them. He was with them all the time going up Market street. When we got over to the city hall I took the girls in the office across from the police headquarters and afterwards took them down in the women's department and locked them up there. I am on duty nights and was at that time. My hours are from 6 in the evening until 6 in the morning. I leave at 6 in the morning. The justices of the peace are in their offices in the city hall from 9 a. m. until 12 and from 1:30 to 5 in the afternoon, and they are not in again until 9 the next morning." The other two men testified to substantially the same state of facts. Both of the young women were witnesses, and denied the statements made by the officer and his witnesses. The defendant attempted to show that the next morning after the arrest the two women were taken |