TABLE 3.-FLOUR AND GRAIN RECEIVED BY LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD.

TABLE 4.-FLOUR AND GRAIN SHIPPED BY LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD.

In tables 1 and 2 the imports and exports of grain have been deduced from the board of trade reports. The reduction to bushels from those reports has been made by allowing for sacks of wheat, rye, oats, and barley, two bushels each, and for corn sacks one bushel.

An examination of these tables and a comparison with tables 3 and 4, (Louisville and Nashville Railroad statistics,) reveals the fact that the grain figures as furnished by the board are unreliable. For example: We learn from table 2 that in the year 1871-72 the total wheat shipped was 255,105 bushels.

Table 4 shows 677,304 bushels shipped over the Nashville Road alone. To be sure the years do not end at the same time, but the two months of July and August will not account for the difference, especially when we notice the records for the year following. Again, a comparison of the different printed reports of the board of trade will show other discrepancies.

For example: In the board of trade report for 1869, page 127, the exports of barley for 1868 amount to 16,921 sacks, (or bags.) This item is reported (on page 64, published report of board of trade for 1867-'68) as 42,763 bushels, where it first appears. The imports of barley (page 127, report for 1868-69) for the same year (1867-68) are quoted as 36,995 bags or sacks. The same item for the same year is quoted in the previous year's report (page 64) as 118,985 bushels. We can hardly reconcile these quotations except on the theory of a sack of varying capacity (2 to 34 bushels) to be used in one way with imports and another with exports.

These things show the difficulties one meets with in compiling statistics from Louisville data, and are mentioned as a warning against tables 1 and 2, the only full statistics we possess upon the desired point of information.

Tables 3 and 4 are presented with more confidence, although they cover but part of the ground. They are accurate as far as they go. From interviews with the grainmen I learn that about 3,408,000 bushels of grain were handled at Louisville during

1875.

Schedule IV. Quantity of grain, live animals, and provisions shipped from Louisville by river into States south of the Ohio River during 1874.

Answer. There are no records of river shipments. (See remarks under question 2.) The records of the board of trade cease with November, 1873. Neither the grain-dealers nor the stock-yards keep any records of their yearly transactions, so that from neither source is this answer obtainable. An approximation might be collated in from four to six months. The provision-dealers are so numerous and so many changes have taken place since 1874 that practically it would be impossible to obtain the desired information.

Schedule V. Statement of average rail-ra tes for the transport of merchandise from Louisville to four important points in the South not on any navigable river or affected by water transportation during each month of 1875.

Answer. Points selected: Atlanta, Ga., Meridian, Miss., Jackson, Tenn., an Dallas, Texas.

*The Jeffersonville, Madison and Indianapolis rates to Dallas, given in the lower line of the table, were only for December.

The rates given in table 1 are taken from the published tariffs of the Louisville and Nashville Road and its connections. A copy of each tariff of this road for 1875 is herewith inclosed. (See Exhibit E.) Meridian is taken because although not a large point, it is an important one, being in the center of a large cotton-producing region and at the junction of three railroads. It has four rail outlets, and ships heavily of the "fleecy staple."

From the tariffs mentioned above the rates to other southern points may be determined and compared, if desirable.

To Atlanta we have but one outlet, viz, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The Louisville, Paducah and Southwestern Railroad takes freight for Jackson, Tenn., and Meridian, Miss., but it adheres to the rates made by the Louisville and Nashville and Great Southern Railroad, so that practically we have no competition to these points. To Dallas, Tex., we may ship via Louisville and Nashville and connections to New Orleans, Morgan Line to Galveston, Galveston, Houston and Henderson Railroad to Houston, and thence via Houston and Texas Central or International and Great Northern and Texas Pacific to Dallas, or via Ohio and Mississippi or Jeffersonville, Madison and Indianapolis and Vandalia to Saint Louis, thence Missouri, Kansas and Texas and Houston and Texas Central, or Saint Louis and Iron Mountain and Texas Pacific to Dallas. Even this competition gives us but a slight difference in rates, as the second able shows.

APPENDIX No. 17.

THE LAW OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS TO SECURE PUBLICITY AND UNIFORMITY IN RAILROAD ACCOUNTS.

[CHAP. 185.]

AN ACT to secure greater publicity and uniformity in the accounts of railroad corporations.

Be it enacted, &c., as follows:

SECTION 1. The board of railroad commissioners shall, before the first day of September, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, prescribe a system upon which the books and accounts of corporations operating railroads or street-railways shall be kept in a uniform manner.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the board of railroad commissioners, from time to time in each year, to examine the books and accounts of all corporations operating railroads, or street-railways, to see that they are kept on the plan prescribed under authority of the preceding section; and statements of the doings and financial condition of the several corporations shall be prepared and published at such times as said board shall deem expedient.

SEC. 3. The board of railroad commissioners is hereby authorized to employ, at a compensation not exceeding twenty-five hundred dollars a year, to be paid as provided in sections seventeen and eighteen of chapter three hundred and seventy-two of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and seventy-four, a person skilled in the methods of railroad accounting, whose duty it shall be, under the direction of said board, to supervise the method by which the accounts of corporations operating railroads, or street-railways, are kept.

SEC. 4. On the application in writing of a director, or of any person or persons owning one-fiftieth part of the entire paid-in capital stock of any corporation operating a railroad, or street-railway, or the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of such corporation equal in amount to one-fiftieth part of its paid-in capital stock, the board of railroad commissioners shall make an examination into the books and financial condition of said corporation, and shall cause the same to be published in one or more daily papers in the city of Boston.

SEC. 5. The board of railroad commissioners shall further have, at all times, access to the list of stockholders of every corporation operating a railroad, or street-railway, and may, in their discretion, at any time, cause the same to be copied, in whole or in part, for their own information or for the information of persons owning stock in such corporation.

SEC. 6. A corporation refusing to submit its books to the examination of the board of railroad commissioners, or neglecting to keep its accounts in the method prescribed by said board under authority of this act, shall be liable to the penalties provided in section one hundred and seventy-four of said chapter three hundred and seventy-two of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and seventy-four, in the case of the neglect or refusal to make a report or return.

Approved April 26, 1876.

APPENDIX No. 18.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SCCALLED GRANGER CASES, MARCH 1, 1877.

The Supreme Court of the United States, on March 1, decided the so-called Granger cases, the first one being that of Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott, plaintiffs in error, rs. The People of the State of Illinois, in error to the supreme court of the State of Illinois.

Mr. Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court:

"The question to be determined in this case is whether the general assembly of Illinois can, under the limitations upon the legislative power of the States imposed by the Constitution of the United States, fix by law the maximum of charges for the storage of grain in warehouses in Chicago and other places in the State having not less than 100,000 inhabitants, in which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of different owners is mixed together, or in which grain is stored in such manner that the identity of the different lots or parcels cannot be accurately preserved. It is claimed that such a law is repugnant

"First. To that part of section 8, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States which confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.'

"Second. To that part of section 9 of the same article, which provides that 'no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another.'

"Third. To that part of the 14th amendment which ordains that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

We will consider the last of these objections first. Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The courts ought not to declare one to be unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. If there is doubt, the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained. The Constitution contains no definition of the word 'deprive' as used in the 14th amendment.

THE EFFECT OF USAGE.

"To determine its signification, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the effect which usage has given it when employed in the same or like connection. While this provis ion of the amendment is new in the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the power of the States, it is old as a principle of civilized government. It is found in Magna Charta and, in substance, if not in form, in nearly or quite all the constitutions that have been from time to time adopted by the several States of the Union. By the fifth amendment it was introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the powers of the National Government, and by the fourteenth as a guarantee against any encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citi zenship by the legislatures of the States. When the people of the United Colonies separated from Great Britain, they changed the form but not the substance of their government. They retained for the purposes of government all the powers of the British Parliament, and through their State constitutions or other forms of social compact, undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for the common good and the security of life and property. All the powers which they retained they committed to their respective States, unless in express terms or by implication reserved to themselves. Subsequently, when it was found necessary to establish a national government for national purposes, a part of the powers of the States and of the peoples of the States was granted to the United States and the people of the United States. This grant operated as a further limitation upon the powers of the States, so that now the governments of the States possess all the powers of the Parliament of England, except such as have been delegated to the United States or reserved by the people. The reservations by the people are shown in the prohibitions of the constitutions. When one becomes a member of a society he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual, not affected by his relations to others, he might retain.

"WHAT A 'BODY POLITIC' IS.

"A body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts, is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good. This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, (Thorpe vs. the R. and B. Railroad Company, 27 Vt., 143.) but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself and so use his own property as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim, sic u'ere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this source came the police powers, which, as was said by Chief Justice Taney in the license cases, (5 How., 583,) are nothing more nor less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty. That is to say, the power to govern men and things. Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens, one toward another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects, and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the fifth amendment in force Congress in 1870 conferred power upon the city of Washington to regulate the rates of wharfage at private wharves, the and the

sweeping of chimneys and to fix the rates of fees therefor, weight and quality of bread, (3 Statutes, 587, section 7;) and in 1848 to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers," (9 Statutes, 224, section 2.) From this it is apparent that down to the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment it was supposed that the statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendinent does not change the law in this particular. It simply prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation.

WHERE THE POWER OF THE REGULATION RESTS.

"This brings us up to inquire as to the principles upon which this power of regulation rests, in order that we may determine what is within and what without its operative effect. Looking, then, to common law, from whence come the rights which the Constitution protects? We find that when private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only. This was said by Lord Chief-Justice Hale more than two hundred years ago in his treatise "De Portibus Maris," and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest he in effect grants to the public an interests in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to the control."

After quoting Lord Hale as to ferries, wharves, and wharfingers, and the decision of the supreme court of Alabama, because the court thought they found in them the principle which supports the legislation they were examining, the opinion continues as follows:

"Enough has already been said to show that when private property is devoted to a public use it is subject to public regulation. It remains only to ascertain whether the warehouses of these plaintiffs in error and the business which is carried on there come within the operation of this principle. For this purpose we accept as true the statements of fact contained in the elaborate brief of one of the counsel of the plaintiffs in error.

66 WHAT THE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS SHOW.

"From these it appears that the great producing region of the West and Northwest sends its grain by water and rail to Chicago, where the greater part of it is shipped by vessel for transportation to the seaboard by the Great Lakes, and some of it is forwarded by railway to the easteru ports. Vessels to some extent are