shall be subject to the revision and control of congress." (a) Inspection laws are not, strictly speaking, regulations of commerce. Their object is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of the country, and to fit them for exportation or for domestic use. These laws act upon the subject before it becomes an article of commerce. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, and health laws, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state, are component parts of the immense mass of residuary state legislation, and over which congress has no direct power, though it may be controlled when it directly interferes with their acknowledged powers. (b) It

(a) Constitution, art. 1, sec. 10. By act of congress of 27th February, 1801, c. 83, the assent of congress was declared to an act of the legislature of Maryland, appointing a health officer for the port of Baltimore, so far as to enable the state to collect a duty of one cent per ton on all vessels coming into the district of Baltimore from a foreign voyage, for the purpose intended in the act. This act of congress is evidence of the restricted sense given to the clause in the constitution cited in the text.

(b) Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 203. In the case of The City of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102, it was decided, that a law of New York, of February, 1824, requiring, under a penalty, the master of every vessel from any port out of the state to report in writing, within twenty-four hours after his arrival, the names, ages and last legal settlement of the passengers, and that the master or owners should give bond with sureties to indemnify the city against the future charges of passengers who were not citizens, was not a regulation of commerce, but of police, and was a constitutional and valid law. The case received a very elaborate discussion; but it is rather difficult, as I apprehend, to exempt the New York law from the character of a regulation of commerce, or to withdraw the case out of the reach of the former doctrines of the court, that the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is, and necessarily must be, exclusive in the government of the United States. In pursuance of the principle of this last decision, it was held, in Norris v. City of Boston, 4 Metcalf's R. 282, that a state law prohibiting the landing of alien passengers, until the owner, master, or consignee of the vessel paid two dollars for each passenger, for the support of foreign paupers, was not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. It was a regulation of municipal police, and not of commerce. So, in the case of Worsley v. Second Municipality of N. O., 9 Robinson's Louis. R. 324, it has been adjudged, that an ordinance of the municipality of New Orleans, imposing a wharfage on all packages landed in or shipped from the

1 An act of Pennsylvania, requiring vessels to take a pilot, under a penalty, held to be constitutional. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. U. S. 299. Tonnage duties cannot, however, be in any wise laid by a state. Alexander v. Wilmington R. R. Co. 3 Strobh. 594. 2 In virtue of its police power, a state may make requirements in respect to navigation within the state, additional to those contained in an act of congress relating to the coasting trade; and the state law is paramount in authority, if it do not conflict with the constitution or any law of the United States. Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492.

has been held, (a) that if congress, in the execution of the power to regulate commerce, should pass a statute controlling state legislation in erecting dams over small navigable creeks where the tide ebbs and flows, it would be valid and binding. But until congress had actually exercised their power over the subject, the state legislation in that case was not considered as repugnant to the power in congress in its dormant state to regulate commerce. It is admitted, however, (b) that the grant to congress to regulate commerce on the navigable waters of the several states, contains no cession of territory, or of public or

limits of the same, was valid, and not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The constitution of the United States never intended to authorize congress to interfere with the laws of the states in relation to wharves and other instruments of trade, and in the preservation of harbors, &c. A contribution to defray the expense of constructing bridges or causeways, or removing obstructions in water-courses, and a retribution for this expense, to be paid by those who are benefited, are not an impost, tax, or duty.

Again, in the case of Howell v. The State of Maryland, before the Court of Appeals, in December, 1845, (3 Gill, 14,) it was decided, that a state tax on the interest in all ships or other vessels, whether in or out of port, owned by persons resident of the state, was a valid tax, and not protected by the act of congress licensing vessels, nor repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States.'

(a) Willson v. The Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Peters's U. S. Rep. 245. Thompson, J., 11 Peters, 149, 150, S. P.

(b) Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. Cir. Rep. 371.

1 The laws of New York, (2 Rev. St. Part I. ch. 14, title 4, sec. 7, p. 445, and Laws of 1844, ch. 316,) authorized the health commissioner to collect from the master of every vessel arriving in the port of New York, $1 50 for the master himself, $2 for every cabin passenger, &c., and directed the money so collected to be appropriated to the Marine Hospital, and to the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, &c. A law of Massachusetts, of 1837, ch. 238, enacted that no alien passenger shall be allowed to land without the payment of $2, for the support of foreign paupers. The validity of these laws came in question before the Supreme Court in February, 1849, in Smith v. Turner, and Norris v. City of Boston, and the laws were declared unconstitutional. The court held that they were regulations of commerce, and that such regulations were exclusively reserved to congress. The chief justice and three judges dissented from the decision, the chief justice considering the laws as part of the pauper system of the state, and not in conflict with any treaty or law of the United States. 7 How. U. S. 283.

(In the last cited cases, Mr. Justice Wayne remarked, that the case of New York v. Miln, (11 Peters, 102,) was erroneously reported as the decision of the court, and that three judges only out of the seven, concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson). See, also, The People v. Brooks, 4 Denio's R. 469.

2 States may authorize the construction of bridges over navigable waters within their limits, if their legislation do not conflict with the regulations of congress. Commonwealth v. Prop of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; Jolly v. Terre Haute Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 237; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius, Id. 209; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co. Id. 70.

private property; and that the states may by law regulate the use of fisheries and oyster-beds within the territorial limits, though upon navigable waters, provided the free use of the waters for purposes of navigation and commercial intercourse be not interrupted. (a)1

I have now finished the second general division of Progress of the na- this course of lectures, relating to the government and tional jurisprudence. constitutional jurisprudence of the United States. Though I have considered the subject in a spirit of free and liberal inquiry, as the series of decisions in the federal courts have been brought under examination, I have uniformly felt, and it has been my invariable disposition to inculcate, a

(a) In the case of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters's U. S. Rep. 449, there was no opinion of the court on the question of the internal commerce of the states as to the slave-trade; but two of the judges (Ch. J. Taney and Mr. Justice McLean) declared their opinion to be, that the power to regulate traffic in slaves between the different states, resided in the states separately and exclusively;-that each had a right to decide for itself whether it would or would not allow slaves to be brought within its limits from another state, either for sale or otherwise, and to prescribe the manner and mode of their introduction, and the conditions;-that the constitution did not consider slaves as merchandise, and that the action and regulation of the several states on this subject did not trench upon the power of congress to regulate commerce "among the several states," and could not be controlled by it. It may not be amiss to observe, that in the above case of Groves v. Slaughter, it was held, that the clause in the constitution of the state of Mississippi, of 1832, declaring that the introduction of slaves into that state as merchandise or for sale, should be prohibited after the 1st of May, 1833, was not operative per se, so as to invalidate a contract of sale of a slave introduced in violation of the constitutional provision, and that it was only mandatory upon the state legislature, and required their action to give it effect. The decisions in the state courts of Mississippi were contrary, and they held, that the prohibition in the constitution was a declaration of a principle, and binding as a supreme law, without the addition of legislative sanction, and that a contract of sale of a slave in violation of it was void. This que tion was discussed in a masterly manner by Ch. J. Sharkey, in the case of Brien v. Williamson, 7 How. Miss. 14, decided in the High Court of Errors and Appeals of the state of Mississippi, in March, 1843, in favor of the construction and effect already given to the constitution of that state by the state courts, and in opposition to that given in the case of Groves v. Slaughter. The case of Cotton v. Brien, 6 Robinson Louis. R. 115, is to the same effect as the decision in Mississippi.

1 A law, regulating the use of oyster-beds within the territorial limits of a state, may declare and enforce the forfeiture of a vessel which violates its requirements, though the vessel were enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade under the laws of the United States. Smith v. State of Maryland, 18 How. U. S. 71.

strong sentiment of deference and respect for the judicial authorities of the Union. No point or question of any moment touching the construction of the powers of the government, and which has received an authoritative determination, *440 has been intentionally omitted. There are several important constitutional questions which remain yet to be settled; but if we recur back to the judicial annals of the United States since the year 1800, we shall find that many of the most interesting discussions which had arisen, and which were of a nature to affect deeply the tranquillity of the nation, have auspiciously terminated.

The definition of direct taxes within the intendment of the constitution; the extent of the power of congress to regulate the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies; the power of congress over the militia of the states; the power of exclusive legislation over districts and ceded places; the mass of implied powers incidental to the express powers of congress; such as the power to institute and protect an incorporated bank, to lay a general and indefinite embargo, and to give to the United States, as a creditor, priority of payment, have all received elaborate discussion in the Supreme Court, and they have, to a certain extent, been ascertained and defined by judicial decisions. So, also, the extent of the constitutional prohibitions upon the states not to pass ex post facto laws; and not to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts; and not to impede or control by taxes, or grants, or any other exercise of power, the lawful authorities, or institutions, or rights and privileges depending on the constitution and laws of the United States, has been explored and declared, by a series of determinations, which have contributed, in an eminent degree, to secure and consolidate the Union, and to elevate the dignity and enlarge the influence of the national government.

The power of the President to remove all executive officers in his sound discretion has been settled, not indeed judicially, but perhaps as effectually by the declared sense of the legislature, and the uniform acquiescence and practice of the government. The absolute and uncontrollable efficacy of the 441 treaty-making power has also been definitively establish

ed, after a struggle against it on the part of the house of representatives, which, at one time, threatened to disturb the very foundations of the constitution.

The comprehensive claims of the judicial power, as being coextensive with all cases that can arise under the constitution and laws and treaties of the Union, have, in several instances, been powerfully and successfully vindicated. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, over the judgments and decrees of the state courts, under certain circumstances, was defined with great accuracy and precision in the 25th section of the act of 1789, establishing the judicial courts; and the free and independent exercise of that jurisdiction, so essential to the maintenance of the authority and efficiency of the government of the United States, in criminal as well as in civil cases, has been hitherto happily sustained. The means of enforcing obedience, when not voluntarily rendered, to the decision of this appellate jurisdiction, have not been required to be practically applied; and therefore it is a question which the court has not thought it incumbent on them, as yet, to decide, whether the exercise of that jurisdiction would permit compulsory process to the state courts, with the ordinary methods of enforcing process. The act of congress (a) provided only that on appeal from the judgment or decree of a state court, the writ of error should have the same effect as if the judgment or decree had been rendered or passed in a circuit court, and the proceeding upon a reversal should be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decree, may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution. And, with

respect to other branches of the judicial power, it may * 442 * be generally observed, that the extensive sway of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; the character of the parties necessary to give cognizance to the federal courts; the faith and credit which are to be given in each state to the records and judical proceedings in every other state; the sovereignty of congress over all its territories, without the bounds of any particular state; and the entire and supreme authority of all the

(a) September 24th, 1789, sec. 25.