is another material distinction in respect to public and private statutes. The courts of justice are bound, ex officio, to take notice of public acts without their being pleaded, for they are part of the general law of the land, which all persons, and particularly the judges, are presumed to know. Public acts cannot be put in issue by plea. Nul tiel record cannot be pleaded to a public statute; the judges are to determine the existence of them from their own knowledge. (a) But they are not bound to take notice of private acts, unless they be specially pleaded, and shown in proof, by the party claiming the effect of them. In England the existence even of a private statute cannot be put in issue to be tried by a jury on the plea of nul tiel record, though this may be done in New York under the Revised Statutes. (b)

that if the grant was declared to be made ex certa scientia et mero motu, they were to be construed beneficially for the grantee, according to the intent expressed in the grant, and according to the common understanding and proper signification of the words. Alton Wood's case, 1 Co. 40, b. In the case of Sutton's Hospital, (10 Co. 27,) the doctrine was, that a grant for a charitable purpose is taken most favorably for the object, and that the usual incidents to a corporation are held to be tacitly annexed to the charter.

And if the royal grant was not in a case of mere bounty or donation, but one founded upon a valuable consideration, the stern rule never applies, and the grant is expounded as a private grant, favorable for the grantee, or rather according to its fair meaning, for the grant is a contract. See a clear and full view of the ancient law on the construction of royal grants, by Mr. Justice Story, in his opinion in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 589-598. See, also, infra, vol. ii. 556.

In addition to the restrictions which the common law has imposed upon the operation of private statutes, they are usually laid under special checks by legislative rules, or by law, as to the notice requisite before a private bill can be introduced. See the notice requisite on the application to the legislature of New York for private purposes, N. Y. R. S. 3d edit. vol. i. p. 161. The constitution of New York (art. 7, sec. 9,) requires the assent of two thirds of the members elected to each house, to every bill appropriating public moneys or property for private purposes.1 So the legislature of North Carolina is prohibited by their constitution, as amended in 1835, from passing any private law, without thirty days previous notice of application for the law. The caution, checks, and course of proceedings, in the English parliament, on passing private bills, are detailed at large, and with great precision and accuracy, in May's Treatise upon the Law and Proceedings of Parliament, pp. 383–460.

(a) The Prince's case, 8 Co. 28, a.

(b) Dwarris on Statutes, 520. Trotter v. Mills, 6 Wendell, 512.

1 This provision of the constitution of 1821, is not continued in the constitution of 1846. See arts. 3d and 7th of the present constitution of New York for the provisions affecting the passage of acts of the legislature.

Rules for tation of

The title of the act and the preamble to the act are, the interpre strictly speaking, no parts of it. (a) They may serve to statutes. show the general scope and purport of the act, and the inducements which led to its enactment. They may at times, aid in the construction of it; (b) but generally they are loosely and carelessly inserted, and are not safe expositors of the law. The title frequently alludes to the subject matter of the act only in general or sweeping terms, or it alludes only to a part of the multifarious matter of which the statute is composed. The constitution of New Jersey, in 1844, has added a new and salutary check to multitudinous matter, by declaring (c) that every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title. So also in New York, by the revised constitution of 1846, art. 3, § 16, no private or local bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. The title, as it was observed in United

States v. Fisher, (d) when taken in connection with other *461 parts, may assist in removing ambiguities where the

intent is not plain; for when the mind labors to discover the intention of the legislature, it seizes every thing, even the title, from which aid can be derived. So the preamble may be resorted to in order to ascertain the inducements to the making of the statute; but when the words of the enacting clause are clear and positive, recourse must not be had to the preamble. Notwithstanding that Lord Coke (e) considers the preamble as a key to open the understanding of the statute, Mr. Barrington,

(a) The King v. Williams, 1 W. Blacks. Rep. 95. Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62. (b) Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. 23, 24, b. Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Blacks. 465, 500. (c) Art. 4, sec. 7. (d) 2 Cranch, 386.

(e) Co. Litt. 79, a.

1 Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine C. C. 584.

2 The constitutions of Ohio, Missouri, Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Georgia, and other states, contain a similar provision. It has been decided, in the latter state, that so much only of every statute as contains matter different from what is expressed in the title will be void. Mayor of Savannah v. State, 4 Geo. 26. The purpose of the requirement is, that neither the legislature nor the public may be misled by the title; and statutes are to be reasonably construed with a reference to this intent. Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mayor, 4 Seld. 241; Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb, 615, 640; Conner v. Mayor, 1 Seld. 285; Davis v. State, 7 Maryl. 151; Belleville R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20.

in his Observations on the Statutes, (a) has shown by many instances, that a statute frequently recites that which is not the real occasion of the law, or states that doubts existed as to the law, when, in fact, none had existed. The true rule is, as was declared by Mr. J. Buller and Mr. J. Grose, in Crespigny v. Wittenoom, (b) that the preamble may be resorted to in restraint of the generality of the enacting clause, when it would be inconvenient if not restrained, or it may be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clause, if it be doubtful. This is the whole extent of the influence of the title and preamble in the construction of the statute.' The true meaning of the statute is generally and properly to be sought from the body of the act itself. But such is the imperfection of human language, and the want of technical skill in the makers of the law, that statutes often give occasion to the most perplexing and distressing doubts and discussions, arising from the ambiguity that attends them. It requires great experience, as well as the command of a perspicuous diction, to frame a law in such clear and precise terms as to secure it from ambiguous expressions, and from all doubt and criticisms upon its meaning.

It is an established rule in the exposition of statutes, that the intention of the lawgiver is to be deduced from a view of the whole, and of every part of a statute, taken and

compared together. (c) The real intention, when accu- *462 rately ascertained, will always prevail over the literal sense of terms. (d) When the expression in a statute is special or particular, but the reason is general, the expression should be deemed general. (e) Scire leges, non hoc est verba earum tenere sed vim ac potestatem, and the reason and intention of the lawgiver will control the strict letter of the law, when the latter

(a) P. 300.

(b) 4 Term Rep. 793.

(c) Co. Litt. 381, a. Marshall, Ch. J., 12 Wheaton, 332. Mason v. Finch, 2 Scammon's Ill. R. 224.

(d) Thompson, Ch. J., in The People v. Utica Ins. Co. 15 Johnson, 380. Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. R. 92.

(e) 10 Co. 101, b.

1 The value of the preamble as an aid in construing a treaty, is considered in Little v. Watson, 32 Maine R. 214. Its averments are to be regarded as admitted truths.

would lead to palpable injustice, contradiction, and absurdity. This was the doctrine of Modestinus, Scævola, Paulus, and Ulpianus, the most illustrious commentators on the Roman law. (a) When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the objects and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion. (b) These rules, by which the sages of the law, according to Plowden, (c) have ever been guided in seeking for the intention of the legislature, are maxims of sound interpretation, which have been accumulated by the experience, and ratified by the approbation of ages.

The words of a statute, if of common use, are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious, and ordinary signification and import; (d) and if technical words are used, they are to be taken in a technical sense, unless it clearly appears from the context, or other parts of the instrument, that the words were intended to be applied differently from their ordinary or their legal acceptation. (e) The current of authority at the present day, said Mr. Justice Bronson, (f) is in favor of reading statutes according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions, for

.(a) Dig. 1, 3, 17. Ibid. lib. 27, 1, 13, 2. Maledicta interpretatio quæ corrodit viscera texti.-Lord Coke.

(b) 10 Co. 57, b. 3 Co. 7. Plowd. 10, 57, 350, 363. Eyre, Ch. J., in Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Blacks. 490. Marshall, Ch. J., 9 Wheaton, 189.

(c) Plowd. 205.

(d) Story, J., 1 Wheaton, 326. Lord Tenterden, 2 B. & Ald. 522.

(e) Certainty to a certain intent in general, is ordinarily sufficient in the construction of statutes. The words are to be taken in the sense, say the judges in Vermont, that would convey the meaning required, to all men of ordinary discernment alike, and that may be called certain without recurring to possible facts which do not appear. Fairlee v. Corinth, 9 Vermont Rep. 269.

(f) 20 Wendell, 561. In Mallan v. May, 13 Meeson & Welsby, 511, the ordinary rule of construction was declared to be, that words were to be construed according to their strict and primary acceptation, unless from the context of the instrument, and the intention of the parties, to be collected from it, they appear to be used in a different sense, or unless in their strict sense they are incapable of being carried into effect.

'See Barker v. Esty, 19 Vermont R. 131.

the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation.1 A saving clause in a statute is to be rejected, when it is directly repugnant to the purview or body of the act, and could not stand without rendering the act inconsistent and destructive of itself. (a) Lord Coke, in Alton Wood's case, (b) gives a particular illustration of this rule, by a case which would be false doctrine with us, but which serves to show the force of the rule. Thus, if the manor of Dale be by express words given by statute to the king, saving the right of all persons interested therein, or if the statute vests the lands of A. in the king, saving the rights of A., the interest of the owner is not saved, * 463 inasmuch as the saving clause is repugnant to the grant; and if it were allowed to operate, it would render the grant void and nugatory. But there is a distinction in some of the books between a saving clause and a proviso in the statute, though the reason of the distinction is not very apparent. It was held by all the barons of the exchequer, in the case of The Attorney-General v. The Governor and Company of Chelsea Water Works, (c) that where the proviso of an act of parliament was directly repugnant to the purview of it, the proviso should stand, and be held a repeal of the purview, because it speaks the last intention of the lawgiver.2 It was compared to a will, in which the latter part, if inconsistent with the former, supersedes and revokes it. But it may be remarked upon this case of Fitzgibbon, that a proviso repugnant to the purview of the statute, renders it equally nugatory and void as a repugnant saving clause; and it is difficult to see why the act should be destroyed by the one, and not by the other, or why the proviso and the saving clause, when inconsistent with the body of the

(a) Plowd. 565. 8 Taunt. Rep. 13-18. (c) Fitz. Rep. 195. 4 Geo. II.

(b) 1 Co. 47, a.

"It is a rule, (says Burton, J.,) in the construction of statutes, that in the first instance, the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any expressed intention, or any declared purpose of the statute, or, if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency in its different provisions, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." Warburton v. Loveland, 1 Hud. & Brooke, (Irish,) 648. Toldervy v. Colt, 1 M. & W. 264.

2 Townsend v. Brown, 4 Zabr. 80.