On the day when he was injured, Redner was directed by the superintendent of the Faber Company to go from the Faber factory to the Winship factory and letter a trunk. For this purpose he crossed Meadow street, and after completing his work, and while returning, he slipped and fell on the ice or snow in the street and thereby received the injuries which resulted in his death.

It is said on the part of the appellants that Redner's injuries did not arise out of his employment, and that his accident resulted from an ordinary street risk which was common to all pedestrians in the street. I think we have decided to the contrary on the question of law involved. In Matter of Grieb v. Hammerle (222 N. Y. 382) a cigarmaker after working hours, while passing the factory in which he was employed during the day, saw a light in the factory and he went upstairs where the light was. There he found his employer tying up some boxes of cigars. Grieb was accustomed to make delivery of cigars during working hours and his employer asked him to deliver the boxes to a customer who had ordered the same. Grieb consented, received the boxes and the bill therefor. He then left the factory and on his way downstairs he fell and was killed. We held that Grieb's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. That case goes quite as far in establishing liability as we are asked to go in this case.

In Matter of Grieb the court cited with approval the decision of the English courts in the case of Dennis v. White & Co. (1917 App. Cas. 479). Dennis v. White & Co. was a case where the employee was injured while traveling in a public street, and in that respect more closely resembles the present case than Matter of Grieb. Both parties to the present appeal cite as authority for their arguments the English cases. Those cases are not in complete harmony as to the employer's liability on what are called street risks. Dennis v. White & Co. is a late case and the court said:

"If a servant in the course of his master's business has to pass along the public street, whether it be on foot or on a bicycle, or on an omnibus or car, and he sustains an accident by reason of the risk incidental to the streets, the accident arises out of as well as in the course of his employment. The use of the streets by the workman merely to get to or from his work of course stands on a different footing altogether, but as soon as it is established that the work itself involves exposure to the perils of the streets the workman can recover for any injuries so occasioned."

That is a satisfactory statement of the law. In the present case the superintendent of the Faber factory directed Redner to go from his factory to the Winship factory and for this purpose he crossed Meadow street. After completing his work, and while returning across the street, he fell on the ice or snow and received his injuries. Within the principle of the cases cited, the award of compensation to his widow was proper.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. HIS COCK, Ch. J., CARDOZO, POUND, CRANE and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. Order affirmed.

A salesman sent to collect a bill slipped on the street and injured himself. The Commission held his case in abeyance pending the above decision of the Court of Appeals in the Redner case and

awarded him compensation two weeks after such decision: Meyer v. Meyer & Lange, S. D. R., vol. 17, p. 576, Bul., vol. 3, p. 217, May 29, 1918.

If an employee's duties consist in, or are connected with, street construction and cleaning, accident to him incidental to such duties is unquestionably compensatable as in Putnam v. Murray, opinion in which is given in Bulletin 87, pages 115-117, and in Antonio v. Rogers & Haggerty, S. D. R., vol. 13, p. 521, Mar. 8, 1917; 179 App. Div. 950, July 3, 1917.

23. FALL WHILE UNDER EXPOSURE TO UNUSUAL RISK

An employee may fall because of loss of consciousness or selfcontrol. If his work involves precarious position on a high place, as in building work, or proximity to dangerous machinery, the results of the fall are much more liable to be serious than the results of a fall at ground level or upon an open floor. A fall may be due to dizziness or to disease. Dizziness may be due entirely to high position and in such case accident originating from it is clearly compensatable, as the Appellate Division has held in its opinion in Santacroce v. Sag Harbor Brick Works, Bulletin 81, page 49. In cases of injury from falls apparently due to loss of consciousness, the Appellate Division, unanimously and without opinion, has affirmed awards in O'Rourke v. McNulty Bros., Case No. 68116, Mar. 8, 1918; 186 App. Div. 925, Nov. 13, 1918; Marland v. Smith and Pearson, S. D. R., vol. 18, p.558, Bul., vol. 4, p. 35, Nov. 12, 1918; 188 App. Div. 942, May 7, 1919; and Barath v. Arnold Paint Co., Case No. 1138, Jan. 25, 1918; 185 App. Div. 920, Sept. 26, 1918; App. Div.

Nov. 12, 1919. In the O'Rourke case a plasterer fell from a scaffold said to have been less than ten feet high; in the Marland case a foreman fell from a stoop three feet high; in the Barath case a painter fell while descending from a scaffold at quitting time. In these cases the insurance carriers argued that the accidents were not compensatable because the falls were due to epilepsy, apoplexy and dizziness from other cause than high position, while the Attorney-General argued that they were compensatable because the falls were due to vertigo from the height, slipping or stumbling

and, even if due to disease, were compensatable because of the unusual risks of position. The Commission has held that falls made more serious by the specially dangerous position of the employees falling are compensatable even when loss of self-control is due entirely to disease or weakness. It has awarded compensation to a laundress whose fainting caused her to burn her hand upon an iron heater: Daly v. Wallach, S. D. R., vol. 15, p. 596, Feb. 4, 1918; and to a brickyard employee whose epilepsy caused him to fall from a platform: DeVos v. Rochester Brick & Tile Co., S. D. R., vol. 16, p. 531, Bul., vol. 3, p. 218, May 28, 1918. The conclusions of Commissioner Sayer adopted by the Commission hold that fall from platforms, not epilepsy or dizzy spell, was proximate cause of the injuries in the DeVos and Marland cases.

24. BITE BY DOG

In Barone v. Brambach Piano Co., full text of opinion in which appears in Bulletin 87, page 263, an engineer stationed in a factory cellar had kept a dog with him for so long a time, a year or more, that the employer's consent to its presence was presumable. The dog bit a boy who was carrying factory materials into the cellar. In holding the compensation law exclusively applicable and reversing judgment in favor of the boy in an action for negligence, the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Fourth Department, said:

BARONE V. BRAMBACH PIANO Co., 101 Misc. 669, Dec. 6, 1917, in part. Plaintiff also urged that the law does not apply because the injury complained of was not sustained by the employee "arising out of and in the course of his employment," as provided by section 10. This subject has been discussed in an elaborate opinion of Mr. Justice Lyon in Matter of Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 169 App. Div. 177. See, also, Matter of Rheinwald v. Builders' Brick & Supply Co., 168 App. Div. 425. The instant case, however, seems to me to be much simpler of solution. There is no doubt that the plaintiff was engaged in performing the duties of his employment at the time he was bitten. The presence of the dog with defendant's implied knowledge and consent was one of the physical conditions of the plant under which the defendant required the plaintiff to perform his duties. The mere fact that the direct cause of the injury was animate rather than inanimate does not alter the result; nor in this view can I see any force in the suggestion that the dog was not especially kept as a watchdog or for some similar purpose (though I think the proof showed that it was so employed). The right of the plaintiff to a recovery does not,

on any theory of which I am made aware, depend upon the comparative usefulness to the employer's business of the immediate cause of the injury. PHILBIN and ORDWAY, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event.

25. FRIGHT FROM FIRE ALARM

Upon a cry of fire in a factory a woman employee fainted and remained unconscious for two hours. In consequence she became choreic. She had been in excellent health and spirits before incurring the fright. The briefs in Appellate Division arrayed numerous precedents for and against affirmation of an award to her. The court affirmed the award unanimously and without opinion: London v. Casino Waist Co., Case No. 60642, Aug. 2, 1917; 181 App. Div. 962, Dec. 29, 1917.

26. REPAIRING MACHINERY

A brickyard employee was repairing his employer's machinery. An iron bar, accidently pushed off a ledge by a co-employee, struck him on the head. The blow paralyzed his side and caused him to become mentally incompetent. The courts affirmed an award to him without opinion: Smith v. Washburn & Co., Case No. 18733, Sept. 6, 1917; 183 App. Div. 911, Mar. 5, 1918; 224 N. Y. Rep. 619, Oct. 22, 1918.

27. EXPERIMENTING WITH MACHINE

Having finished his regular work, a boy employee in a tin can factory lost four fingers while experimenting with a machine. Argument conflicted as to whether in so doing he was violating his employer's rules. The Attorney-General argued that the boy's motive was "to gain experience" and that he "did not want to be seen standing around." The Appellate Division affirmed award for the injury, one justice dissenting, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order and dismissed the claim upon authority of its own decision in the Di Salvio case, text of opinion in which appears above, page 112: Rendino v. Continental Can Co., Case No. 68754, Apr. 19, 1918; 186 App. Div. 924, Nov. 13, 1918; 226 N. Y. Rep. 565, Mar. 11, 1919.

28. ERRAND FOR EMPLOYER

An employee was returning by railroad train from a business errand for his employer. The train colliding with a lumber truck, he went out on the car platform and fell, breaking his arm, while trying to see what was the trouble. Commissioner Sayer advised an award to him declaring that in going to the platform he had done what "any ordinary and reasonable individual would have done": Schmauss v. Dutch & Co., S. D. R., vol. 17, p. 569, Bul. vol. 3, p. 218, May 29, 1918.

29. TAKING SUPERINTENDENT HOME

The superintendent of a building job, having missed his trolley car for home at the close of a day's work, asked an assistant foreman of carpenters who had a motorcycle to run home with him. The assistant foreman was helping to plan the next day's work. He complied with the superintendent's request and started to return to the job. His machine collided with an automobile. A deputy commissioner denied him compensation for injuries due to the collision but the Commission, one Commissioner dissenting, held that his accident had arisen out of and in the course of his employment. It so held upon recommendation of Commissioner Sayer citing Grieb v. Hammerle, 223 N. Y. 382, relative to the position of power and dependence subsisting between superior and subordinate in connection with such a request: Johnson v. Faribault Building Corp., S. D. R., vol. 20, p. 453, July 9, 1919. Text of the opinion in the Grieb case is in Bulletin 87, pages

149-151.

30. TAKING CO-EMPLOYEE TO HIS BREAKFAST

A taxi driver came to work very early on Thanksgiving morning without breakfast. Going home later for the meal, he took a fellow driver along to bring the machine back. He did the driving to his home. The taxi upset and fatally injured his companion. Upon appeal from death benefits appellants urged that the trip of fellow driver was without the employer's consent or advantage. The Attorney-General replied that the acting manager had approved of the trip, that custom had been so to use the cars and