convenient, or equally useful to society."* According to the meaning I annex to the phrases, "principles of nature," and "laws of nature," (and which I have already† endeavoured to shew is the proper meaning of the expression,) this last conclusion of Mr. Hume's involves a contradiction in terms.

I have hitherto touched only upon those advantages of marriage which are obvious to the most careless inquirer, and which could not fail to force themselves on the notice of men in the most rude and ignorant ages. If I were to enter more deeply into the subject, and to consider it in connexion with the happiness of human life, with the preservation of morals, and with the progressive improvement of the species, volumes might be written without exhausting the subject. Much might also be said on the connexion of this institution with the subject of population, not only as an arrangement absolutely necessary for preserving undiminished the prolific powers of the other sex, but as no less indispensable (even in the present state of society) for rearing children with success, amidst the diseases and dangers of infancy. Of this a judgment may be formed from the barrenness of those connexions where the circumstances of the parents do not allow them to bestow that care on their offspring to which affection and duty prompt in more favourable situations. "The tender plant," to borrow the words of Mr. Smith, "is produced, but in so cold a soil and so severe a climate, soon withers and dies."‡

What then would the consequences be, in the present state of things-I shall not say of the abolition of marriage--but of any considerable relaxation in the ideas of men concerning the sacredness of this connexion, and the duties which it imposes ?

These different considerations, which I must content myself with barely hinting at, illustrate sufficiently the wisdom of that advice which Plato (notwithstanding his own paradoxes on the subject) gives to his Legislator, when he directs him to take his stand from the institution of marriage, and for the better

* [Essays, Vol. I.]

[See above, Vol. I. p. 186, seq.; Vol. II. p. 5, seq.; Vol. III. p. 158, seq.]

[Wealth of Nations, Book I. chap. viii. Vol. I. p. 120, 10th edit.]

ordering of his commonwealth, to begin where that also begins, the arrangement of the conjugal union.* Agreeably to the same idea, this union is beautifully called by Cicero, "the Seminary of the republic." "Cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi: prima societas in ipso conjugio est; proxima in liberis; deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis, et quasi Seminarium reipublicæ.”†

The stress which these two eminent philosophers and the other political writers of antiquity have so justly laid on the institution of marriage, has been appealed to in support of an absurd opinion already mentioned, that it is altogether an invention of human policy. But marriage (as I hope sufficiently appears from the foregoing observations) is the result (in the first instance) of that order of things which nature herself has established; and the proper business of the legislator is here, as in other cases, limited to the task of seconding and enforcing her recommendations, by checking the deviations from her plan which are occasioned by the vices and follies of individuals. The fact is precisely similar with respect to Property. The idea of property is not created by municipal laws. On the contrary, one of the principal circumstances which suggested the necessity of laws and magistrates, was to guard against those violations to which the property of the weak was found to be exposed amidst the turbulence of barbarous times. It is with great propriety, therefore, that Horace classes these two objects of law together, the preservation of property and the protection of the marriage bed;-objects, however, which so far from being the creatures of municipal institutions, may be justly considered as the chief sources from which municipal institutions have taken rise.

Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges,

Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter."

They are indeed the two great pillars of the political fabric, and whatever tends to weaken them, threatens, we may be assured, the existence of every establishment essential to human

* [See De Legibus, Libb. IV. and VI.] Taylor, [Elements, &c.] p. 264.

+[Officia, I. xvii.]

[Sermones, I. iii. 105.]

happiness. If in some of the preceding remarks, therefore, I may be thought to have expressed myself with an unnecessary diffuseness, the importance of the subject, contrasted with the tendency of some late speculations concerning it, will, I trust, be a sufficient apology for the space which I have allotted to an article which has been so often exhausted by the ingenuity both of ancient and of modern writers.

One particular question connected with the institution of marriage affords, (it must be owned,) when we abstract altogether from the precepts of revelation with respect to it, a fair field for argument,-Whether marriage ought to be considered by the legislator, merely as a civil contract, liable, like other civil contracts, to be dissolved by the mutual consent of the parties? My own opinion on this point may be anticipated from what I have already said, but it would encroach too much on our time, to explain particularly the principles on which it is founded. I must content myself, therefore, with referring to a short Essay On Polygamy and Divorce, by Mr. Hume, in which the argument is stated with equal conciseness and force. The manner, too, in which the subject is treated by this eminent writer, is peculiarly adapted to those politicians who have argued for a liberty of divorce, as he disclaims all regard to what he is pleased to call the common superstitious notions concerning the nature of marriage, and founds his reasonings entirely on considerations of political expediency.

On a superficial view of the question, Mr. Hume confesses, that a liberty of divorce may appear favourable to population, by removing, what is with many a powerful obstacle to marriage, the indissoluble nature of the connexion. It is, however, extremely remarkable, that" at the time when divorces were most frequent among the Romans, marriages were the most rare; and Augustus was obliged, by penal laws, to force men. of fashion into the married state; a circumstance which is scarcely to be found in any other age or nation. The more ancient laws of Rome, which prohibited divorces, are extremely praised by Dionysius of Halycarnassus. Wonderful was the harmony,' says the historian, which this inseparable union of

interests produced between married persons, while each of them considered the inevitable necessity by which they were linked together, and abandoned all prospect of any other choice or establishment.""* It conveys, indeed, a most delightful idea of the domestic manners of the Romans, when we consider a fact about which all their writers are agreed, that Carvilius Ruga, who lived A. U. C. 520, was the first person who divorced his wife. The ground of his separation was her barrenness; a pretext which, when considered merely in a political view, is much less ridiculous than many which at a later period were considered by this people as perfectly valid; and yet we are informed [among others] by Valerius Maximus, that although the divorce stood unimpeached in law, the morality of his conduct was then regarded as very questionable. "Repudium inter uxorem et virum, a condita urbe usque ad vicesimum et quingentesimum annum, nullum intercessit. Primus autem Sp. Carvilius uxorem, sterilitatis causa, dimisit. Qui quanquam tolerabili ratione motus videbatur, reprehensione tamen non caruit: quia nec cupiditatem quidem liberorum, conjugali fidei proponi debuisse arbitrabantur.”1

At a later period of the Roman history, when a new jurisprudence taught that marriage, like other partnerships, might be dissolved by the abdication of one of the associates, the consequences were fatal to the virtues and to the comforts of domestic life. "Passion, interest, or caprice," to borrow the words of Mr. Gibbon," "suggested daily motives for the dissolution of marriage; a word, a sign, a message, a letter, the mandate of a freedman declared the separation; the most tender of human connexions was degraded to a transient society of profit or pleasure. According to the various conditions of life, both sexes alternately felt the disgrace and the injury; an inconstant spouse transferred her wealth to a new family, abandoning a numerous, and a perhaps spurious progeny to the authority and care of her late husband; a beautiful virgin might be dismissed to the world, old, indigent, and friendless." "A specious theory," the same author adds, "is confuted by this + [Decline and Fall, &c., chap. xliv.]

*[Essays, Vol. I. On Polygamy, &c.] 1 Dicta Factaque, &c. II. i. 4.

VOL. VIII.

F

free and perfect experiment, which demonstrates that the liberty of divorce does not contribute to happiness and virtue. The facility of separation would destroy all mutual confidence, and inflame every trifling dispute: the minute difference between a husband and a stranger, which might so easily be removed, might still more easily be forgotten; and the matron, who, in five years, can submit to the embraces of eight husbands, must cease to reverence the chastity of her own person."

Of the profligacy of manners produced at Rome by the facility of divorce, a very striking picture is given by Seneca-" Vices," he observes, "cease to be disgraceful so soon as they become general. What woman now blushes to be divorced, since those of the first rank number their years, not by the names of the consuls, but by those of their husbands? Divorce," he adds, "is the object of marriage, and marriage that of divorce.”1

[SUBSECT. II.—MONOGAMY COMPARED WITH POLYGAMY.] The remarks which have been already made, appear to be sufficient for illustrating the conformity of the institution of marriage to the law of nature, in so far as this can be inferred either from an examination of the principles of our constitution, from the analogy of the lower animals, or from the beneficial effects with which it is attended.

These arguments, indeed, conclude, in general, much more strongly against vague love on the part of the female than of the male; although, if attentively examined, they will be found to suggest powerful motives, both of a moral and political nature, for a reciprocal obligation. The question, however, whether a plurality of wives might not be allowed to the same individual, is so different, in many respects, from that which has been hitherto treated, that although some of the foregoing considerations may be of use, yet the aid of some additional reasonings is necessary, in order to establish the general conclusion.

Polygamy may be conceived to be of two kinds, according as it consists in a plurality of wives, or in a plurality of husbands. Of the latter, (Пoλvavdpía,) modern travellers have furnished 1 De Beneficiis, Lib. III. cap. xvi.-[See Martial, VI. vii.]