charges, and the absolutely untenable nature of their projects, should be repeatedly given to the world. The bandied phrases, also, of some circles, and so favorite with some prints, of the "bars and bolts" of churches, "human dogmas," "man-made creeds," etc., should be carefully analyzed, and answered, as occasions may offer. The young, and the misguided of every age, should be informed, and often reminded of it, that the appellations, so invidious and frightful when applied to ordinary confessions of faith, can be as properly applied to any speech, opinion, or preaching of men, whatever, that varies one jot or tittle from the precise phraseology of the Bible. Let them, for instruction's sake, hear the repeated retort, "human preaching," "man-made sermons," etc. For so says the preacher, who "moreover was wise:" "Answer a fool according to his own folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit." Let them be prompted to throw off the shackles of sound, or a name; for the great "decree" of the apostles at Jerusalem was a dogma (8óyua, Acts 16: 4); and so all the commands of the "lively oracles;" and so all the wise sayings of pious men of every age, though not tending, as some think a dogma must, to "reject the commandments of God."

ARTICLE II.

CRITICISM OF RHETORIC.

By Prof. H. N. DAY, of Western Reserve College, Ohio.

We are thoroughly conscious in our own minds, that it is with no vain conceit of effecting, in the humbler department of rhetorical science and art, what Kant, by his Critic of the Pure Reason, effected in that most noble province of mental science, that we have borrowed a hint from that celebrated work, for the plan and title of the present article. Yet convinced, as we are, that as a sense of want is the condition of

all efficient activity for man, so a clear perception and determination of the precise nature and source of the want, is the prerequisite for the successful regulation of that activity to procure the supply, we have been unavoidably driven upon this track in an endeavor to contribute something to the advancement of this important and interesting art. Not that we, by any means, expect or intend to establish, in these few pages, the principles on which an art of rhetoric must be constructed, in all their fullness and completeness. Our design is simply to suggest some particulars in which our present systems of rhetoric, indeed the prevailing views of this art, appear to us to be defective. Our eyes will, accordingly, be directed mainly to the present condition of rhetoric; and the suggestions we shall offer, while we shall abstain from all extended criticism upon individual writers, will yet be taken from the historical point of view.

We conceive that it is time to look for a reconstruction of this art on a more firm and unquestionable philosophical basis. The want is felt extensively in our schools and seminaries of learning, indicating that the human mind has made that advancement in the kindred sciences and arts, which is needful for such a more perfect reconstruction. The present condi tion, too, of those kindred sciences, seems to call for the effort. Human intelligence, in all the various departments of its development, whether in science or in art, is, so to speak, subject to the laws of concrete growth. Philosophy and art, as the product of an organic mind, does not perfect first one branch, and then begin at another; and so on, successively, in all its ramifications, into a full-branched tree. Root, branch, and twig, wait, to a certain extent, for each other; rather develope themselves together, and mutually derive aid and nourishment, the one from the other. Rhetoric, indeed, presup poses logic and grammar; as the branch presupposes the root, and the leaf the branch. It is extremely doubtful, nevertheless, whether logic or grammar can arrive at full maturity, without some culture of rhetoric. We shall not, in these preliminary remarks, stop to show this necessary dependence, in

respect to development, of logic and grammar on rhetoric. Our more immediate design, here, is to present the question in its full and proper light. Does not the present condition of these kindred sciences or arts indicate that the time has arrived for a corresponding advance on the part of rhetoric?

We shall have occasion, in the sequel, to look more closely at the relation between these sciences or arts; and shall here assume, that rhetoric, from its very nature, as the art of speaking, that is, of communicating thought by language, presupposes general logic, as the science which teaches the laws by which thought appears in the human mind; as also grammar, or the science which teaches the laws by which the forms of thought, as ascertained and determined by logic, appear in language. Now these presupposed sciences, are, we appre hend, in a so much more mature condition than they were when our present systems of rhetoric were for the most part constructed, that they seem not only to warrant, but also to call for a corresponding advancement of rhetorical art or sci ence.1

The relation of rhetorical science or art to the products of that art, equally indicates that the time has arrived for a reconstruction of our systems of rhetoric. Rhetoric and eloquence develope themselves together, in mutual dependence. There cannot be expected any perfect eloquence till after rhet oric has received some corresponding development, any more than there can be expected skilful physicians without some progress in the science of medicine. Systems of art, and productions in art, mature themselves step by step, harmoniously together, in the individual mind of the artist, and among men generally. Now the prevailing systems of rhetoric, derive their essential features from ancient eloquence. They have

1 We name here as mere individual indications of this advancement in General Logic, as distinguished from Deductive Logic, and in Grammar, the masterly treatises of Prof. Tappan, on Logic, and of Prof. Latham, on The English Language. These are indexes of the present state of these sciences in our own language; and their appearance gives occasion for hearty congratulation to all the lovers of science.

but very partially, indeed, taken counsel from the new and striking forms which eloquence has assumed in later times. We have the authority of the author of the best, and the most popular work on rhetoric in the language, Dr. Whately, for asserting, that "but little has been added, either in respect of matter or of system, to what the ancients have left us." We need, in illustration, to refer but to one entirely new form, which modern eloquence has assumed, that of the pulpit. For this department of eloquence, Aristotle's famous classification, adopted substantially by most succeeding writers among the Greeks and Romans, although professedly founded on the necessary conditions of all eloquence, and hence to be expected to embrace, not only all actual, but all possible forms of eloquence, makes no provision whatever. Now of all the departments of eloquence, this very one admits, perhaps, most readily, of a rigid reduction to philosophical system, and of being presented in the strictest form of an art. This department, in fact, has been in later times most cultivated; and is now, so far as respects reduction to the strict form of an art, most matured. We apprehend, however, it will be found, that even homiletics, so far, at least, as it has been developed in our own language, has not cast off its leading strings; and is still blindly following, to a great degree, the irrelevant teachings of the ancient rhetoricians.

If now, on all sides, there appear plain and decisive indications, that a reconstruction of our systems of rhetoric is demanded, it will not be deemed an idle or unpromising labor to endeavor to ascertain and establish the necessary principles, on which the work of such reconstruction must proceed. Our specific design, accordingly, in what follows, is to indicate some particulars in which the art of rhetoric, as it now exists, particularly in our own language, may be improved. In order that our remarks may be more clearly understood, we shall present them under the three following general heads, viz.:

1 Elements of Rhetoric, Int. § 2.

the proper subject-matter of rhetoric; the particular aim which it should seek; and the mode of effecting this aim.

I. The subject-matter of Rhetoric. It is most obvious, that until the subject-matter of rhetoric be accurately determined, it must be utterly impossible to construct an art that shall possess any pretensions to philosophical accuracy and precision. And this is the first step to be taken. Until a man knows of what subject he is to treat, he certainly cannot determine with what aim he is to handle it; much less select the means by which this aim is to be accomplished. If the general subject be known, and yet its precise boundaries and limitations be not ascertained and established, the whole work of constructing an art must proceed in blindness, and the result be but confusion and perplexity. What, then, precisely, is the subject-matter of rhetoric? The object we have in view at the present time, will lead us to give an historical, rather than a philosophical answer to this question. We shall accordingly, present the views of leading rhetoricians on this point.

That rhetoric has to do with discourse, in the wider sense of that term, as signifying the expression of thought and feeling in language, all agree. This is far, however, from defining and distinguishing the province of rhetoric. Grammar, logic to a certain extent, poetry, vocal music, have to do with this general subject. How is rhetoric distinguished, so far as respects the determination of the subject-matter, from other, and all kindred arts?

Aristotle defined rhetoric to be the power of perceiving, in any particular subject, whatever can persuade. We are not to suppose, however, that Aristotle, in this, was intending to give an exact and complete definition of rhetoric, by which it shall be distinguished from all other arts or sciences. It is obvious, from the context, that he was aiming to discriminate it only from certain other arts, as medicine, geometry, etc.

1 Rhetoric, B. I. c. 2.

THIRD SERIES, VOL. I. NO. IV.

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