LEASE.

See Liens, 1.

LEGACIES.

LEGACIES-POWER TO DEDUCT DEBTS OF LEGATEE
-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-The probate court has power to
deduct the debts of an insolvent legatee from the legacy bequeathed
to him by the testator in the distribution of the estate, and in mak-
ing such deduction it is immaterial whether or not such debts are
barred by the statute of limitations. (Lietman v. Lietman, 374.)

LETTER OF credit.

See Guaranty, 2.

LEX LOCI AND LEX FORL

See Conflict of Laws, 3.

LIBEL.

1. LIBEL-INNUENDO.-THE OFFICE of an innuendo, in an
action for libel, is to aver a meaning of the language published.
(Squires v. State, 904.)

2. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-SUFFICIENCY OF.-An in-
dictment for libel, alleging that the publication of a certain instru-
ment was libelous, under the statute, in two respects, namely, that
the libelee, being a candidate for office was dishonest, and therefore
unworthy of such office; and that he had been guilty of an act
which, though not a penal offense, was disgraceful to him as a
member of society, and which would naturally bring him into con-
tempt among honorable persons, is sufficient, though it has no
innuendo or explanatory allegations, if it contains allegations of
inducement, and the instrument set out therein does not require
any explanatory averment to ascertain its libelous character, or
against whom directed. (Squires v. State, 904.)
in-

3. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-INSTRUCTIONS.-If an
dictment for libel contains two propositions, one libelous and the
other not, the former should be submitted to the jury, under appro-
priate instructions, but they should be instructed to ignore or dis-
regard the latter proposition. (Squires v. State, 904.)

4. LIBEL INDICTMENT FOR-CHARGE OF DISHONESTY
AGAINST CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE-WHEN INSUFFICIENT.
A publication concerning a candidate for office is not libelous unless
there is an imputation of dishonesty such as goes to his personal
Integrity, and which renders him unfit to be trusted with official
duties. Hence, an indictment for libel cannot be sustained where
the matter charged is that the candidate was unfaithful to the party
which had nominated him; and that, while he was such nominee,
he was secretly conniving with an opposing party for its support,
for this does not indicate such a want of personal honesty as would
render him unworthy of holding an office, though it does suggest
a want of such high moral principle as should actuate a party's
standard bearer. (Squires v. State, 904.)

5. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-CHARGE OF DISGRACE-
FUL ACT BY CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE-WHEN SUFFICIENT.
A charge, in an indictment for libel, that the prosecutor, who was
a candidate for office, had written and signed a secret circular.
abnegating the principles of his own party, and professing a belief
in the principles of an opposing party, and had sent the same

abroad to certain persons, thus treacherously seeking their support
in his election, places him, if the circular was true, in the attitude
of a hypocrite and a traitor. Such a charge is therefore a libel, for
it is calculated to bring him into disgrace and reproach among gen-
tlemen, and should justly subject him to the contempt of all honor.
able persons. (Squires v. State, 904.)

6. LIBEL.-NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS of false and de-
famatory matter are not privileged merely because made in good
faith as a matter of news. (Trebby v. Transcript Pub. Co., 330.)

7. LIBEL-MATTER PER SE LIBELOUS.-A written publica-
tion characterizing one as a "disreputable person," and charging him
with having maliciously published in a newspaper a known false
report tending to injure the credit of the city in which he lives, is
libelous per se, unless privileged or justified, and the jury must be
so instructed. (Trebby v. Transcript Pub. Co., 330.)

8. LIBEL-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.-The publica-
tion in a newspaper of a nonofficial resolution of a city council,
wholly outside the scope of its duty, and containing matter libelous
per se, is not privileged, either absolutely or conditionally. (Trebby
v. Transcript Pub. Co., 330.)

9.

LIBEL-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS ARE those
made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has, or
honestly believes he has, a duty to a person having a correspond-
ing interest or duty, and which contains matter which but for the
occasion upon which it is made, would be defamatory and action-
able. (Trebby v. Transcript Pub. Co., 330.)

10. LIBEL BY NEWSPAPER-GOOD FAITH-MISTAKE.-In
an action to recover for a newspaper libel, the question of good faith
of defendant, and whether the falsity of the published article was
due to his mistake of the facts, is for the jury to determine, unless
the evidence to establish the defense is undisputed, and there is
no reasonable ground for drawing different conclusions therefrom.
(Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 363.)

11. LIBEL-THE RETRACTION OF A LIBELOUS NEWSPA-
PER ARTICLE required by statute to constitute a defense, must
clearly refer to and admit the publication of the article complained
of, and directly, fully, and fairly, without any uncertainty, evasion
or subterfuge, retract the alleged false and defamatory statements
therein. (Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 363.)

12. LIBEL-RETRACTION-BURDEN OF PROOF.-If in an
action for newspaper libel, the defense is, that the article was pub-
lished in good faith, and that the defendant published a full and
fair retraction as provided by statute, the burden of proof is upon
him to establish such defense. (Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 363.)
13. LIBEL BY NEWSPAPER-RETRACTION.-If, in an action
for newspaper libel, the defense of a retraction is set up, the ques-
tion whether the published retraction was full and fair, as required
by statute, is ordinarily one of law for the court. (Gray v. Times
Newspaper Co., 363.)

14. LIBEL-RETRACTION-WHAT IS NOT.-A published re-
traction of an original libelous newspaper article which does not re-
fer thereto, nor admit, nor even suggest, that the defendant ever
published it, or that he desires to or does retract it, or that he ever
had any part in giving publication to the defamatory statements, is
not a fair and full retraction, as required by statute, and is not a
defense to an action for libel founded on the original libelous article
nor does such retraction bar the recovery of compensatory damages.
(Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 363.)

LIENS.

1. LIENS-PRIORITY OF-LEASE AND CHATTEL MORT-
GAGE.-A lien for rent created by lease to become operative against
personal property afterward to be brought upon the leased premises,
but not yet capable of description, because not segregated, from a
stock of goods of which it forms a part, is inferior to the lien of a
chattel mortgage on such property, executed after it was placed
upon the premises, and with notice of the lien attempted to be cre-
ated by the lease. (New Lincoln Hotel Co. v. Shears, 524.)

2. LIEN ON RENTS FROM PROPERTY.-A lien upon property
does not attach to the rents derived from the property, unless
specifically included. (Heller v. National Bank, 212.)

3. LIENS-EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY ON.-The insolvency
of the mortgagor or debtor cannot operate to expand the lien held
by mortgagee or creditor, because mere insolvency can, of itself,
in no instance, amplify a lien, whose existence and extent depend
wholly upon the terms of the contract creating the lien. (Heller v.
National Bank, 212.)

See Corporations, 4, 8, 11; Insurance, 12, 20; Trusts, 6; Vendor and
Purchaser, 3-5.

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-CONTRACT WITH CORPO-
RATION-SHAREHOLDER'S LIABILITY.-If a corporation em-
ploys an attorney at law to defend an action brought against it, its
liability upon the contract is "created" when the services have been
fully performed, and not at the time of the employment. Hence,
where the liability of a shareholder in such corporation is dependent,
under the statute, upon the amount of stock owned by him at the
time the liability was "incurred," the liability of one who was a
stockholder when the services in question were rendered, is not
barred by the statute of limitations until the expiration of the statu-
tory period from the time that the liability was created. (Johnson v.
Bank of Lake, 17.)

See Guaranty, 6; Legacies; Rape, 3.

MANDAMUS.

1. MANDAMUS TO CONTROL OFFICIAL DISCRETION.—
Mandamus does not lie to compel an officer to exercise his official
discretion in favor of a claimant of exemptions and to turn over to
him on demand his property seized under a writ of attachment.
(Oliver v. Wilson, 784.)

2. MANDAMUS TO CONTROL OFFICIAL DISCRETION.-
Mandamus does not lie to compel a ministerial officer to act in a
particular manner in any case where the officer's action or nonac-
tion depends upon the exercise of official discretion. (Oliver v. Wil-
son, 784.)

DEMAND

3. MANDAMUS-CITY TREASURER-ILLEGAL
APPROVED BY CITY COUNCIL.-The duty of a city treasurer is
to pay only legal demands against his funds. He cannot, therefore,
be compelled, by mandamus, to pay a warrant issued for the value
of lumber and materials sold to the city by a member of the city
council, although the demand has been allowed by the city council,
for such a claim is not a legal one, and its allowance by the council
does not give it any validity not otherwise possessed. (Berka v.
Woodward, 31.)

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-CHANGE OF DOMICILE
FOR DIVORCE PURPOSES.-To effect a change of domicile for
the purpose of obtaining divorce, not only must the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile be actual, but to the factum of
residence there must be added the animus manendi. (Magowan v.
Magowan, 645.)

2. DIVORCE-CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECREE AS TO RESI-
DENCE.-If a plaintiff in an action for divorce is required by stat-
ute to have been a bona fide resident of the state in which the
action is brought for a fixed period of time, in order to enable him
or her to maintain the action, the ascertainment by the court of the
fact of such residence necessarily precedes a consideration of the
merits of the case, and the determination of that question is final,
not only in the courts of that state, but in every other jurisdiction
where the validity of the judgment comes in question, unless such
determination has been procured by fraud, but, if it has been so
procured, it is without extraterritorial effect, and the decree must
be treated as void in another state. (Magowan v. Magowan, 645.)
See Parent and Child, 1.

MAXIMS.

FICTIONS OF LAW ARE INDULGED TO WHAT EXTENT
-MAXIM.-All fictions of the law were created to enable the court
to do justice. In fictione juris semper aequitas existit. But where
the indulgence of a legal fiction will work injustice, its just limit has
been found. A court will never allow it to work wrong and in-
justice. (Estate of Walker, 40.)

MECHANICS' LIENS.

-

1. MECHANIC'S LIEN COVENANT AGAINST REPUG-
NANT CLAUSES.-A clause in a building contract positively pro-
hibiting all liens is valid, and is not repugnant to a further clause
requiring the contractor to show by sufficient evidence that the
premises are free of all liens before payments could be demanded,
this latter clause being inserted only as a protection against possible
liens which might be filed without regard to the contract. (Com-
monwealth etc. Co. v. Ellis, 816.)

2. MECHANIC'S LIEN-COVENANT AGAINST-WHO MAY
FILE.-Under a clause in a contract which provides that no liens
shall be filed "by any subcontractors, or any other person," the prin-
cipal contractor is not entitled to file a lien. (Commonwealth etc.
Co. v. Ellis, 816.)

3. EXEMPTIONS-LIENS FOR LABOR OR MATERIALS.—A
constitutional provision that all property exempted by law from seiz-
ure and sale shall be liable to seizure and sale for any debt incurred
to any person for work done or materials furnished in the construc-
tion, repair, or improvement of such property, is self-executing, and
its direct effect is to make property which is exempt from seizure
and sale for other debts liable for the debts enumerated to the same
extent and in the same way as if no exemption law existed. (Nick-
erson v. Crawford, 354.)

AND

LABOR-LOGGING

OPERA-

4. LIENS-SUPPLIES
TIONS. The lien of a person who performs labor and furnishes
supplies in furtherance of a general lumbering operation of cutting
and hauling logs is not limited to the particular logs drawn by his

own team, but may be enforced against those cut in the general log-
ging operations, and not drawn by him. (Hopkins v. Rays, 554.)

See Homesteads, 6.

MERGER.

See Judgments, 13.

MILITIA.

1. MILITIA-MILITARY CODE-COURT-MARTIAL-CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW.-The provisions of a state military code author-
izing the trial, in times of peace, of members of the state militia by
court-martial for a violation of the reasonable rules and regulations
of such code, and their punishment, if found guilty, by fine or im-
prisonment, are constitutional and valid. (State v. Wagener, 369.)
2. MILITIA-VIOLATION OF MILITARY CODE NOT CRIM-
INAL OFFENSE.-The rules and regulations of the Minnesota mili-
tary code are merely disciplinary in their nature, designed to secure
higher efficiency in the military service, and a violation of them does
not constitute a "criminal offense" within the protection and mean-
ing of constitutional provisions requiring presentment or indictment
by a grand jury in order to hold to answer for a criminal offense.
(State v. Wagener, 369.)

3. MILITIA—“TROOPS"-"STANDING ARMY."-The active
militia of the state, the members of which, when not engaged at
stated periods in drilling or training for military duty, pursue their
usual vocations subject to call for military duty when public exigen-
cles require it, are neither "troops" within the meaning of article 1,
section 10, of the federal constitution, nor a standing army within
the meaning of section 14 of the bill of rights of the Minnesota state
constitution. (State v. Wagener, 369.)

CLOSED ON ITS FACE.-A lien, whether it be a mortgage or a
judgment, need not disclose on its face that it is for purchase
money, if, in point of fact, it was given for purchase money. (Com-
monwealth etc. Co. v. Ellis, 816.)

2.

MORTGAGE-PURCHASE MONEY.-Where the delivery of
a deed to the mortgagor and a delivery of the mortgage to the mort-
gagee are concurrent and simultaneous acts, and the money for
which the mortgage was given was in actual fact a part of the pur-
chase money paid for the property, such mortgage is a purchase
money mortgage, and is entitled to priority in distribution. (Com-
monwealth etc. Co. v. Ellis, 816.)

3. MORTGAGES-PAYMENT-REVESTING OF TITLE. The
payment or satisfaction of a debt secured by mortgage operates,
ipso facto, to revest the title in the mortgagor without a reconvey-
an (Schilling v. Darmody, 892.)

4. MORTGAGES-REDUCTION FOR FRAUDULENT REPRE-
SENTATIONS.-In an action to foreclose a purchase money mort-
gage, the mortgagor may claim a reduction of the mortgage debt
if the quantity of the land covered by the mortgage has been
fraudulently represented to be greater than that actually conveyed,
and such representations have induced the purchase. Such defense