5. RAILROAD COMPANIES-LIABILITY FOR DEATH
FROM WRONGFUL ACT-EXPOSURE OF INTOXICATED PAS-
SENGER TO DANGER.-If a railroad company negligently car
ries a passenger, known by it to be in an imbecile and helpless con-
dition from intoxication, past his station and to the next station,
where he is put off the train, against his wishes, late, on a danger-
ously cold and stormy night, at a place where there is no accommo-
dation for passengers, except a depot, from which he is ejected by
the company's agent into the night, while quietly waiting for a train
to take him back to his destination, whereby his death is caused by
exposure to the storm, the company is liable to his widow for his
death. (Haug v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 727.)

DEATH-EVI-

6. DAMAGES-NEGLIGENCE CAUSING
DENCE - POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE BENEFITS — CONJEC-
TURES-SPECULATIONS.-In an action to recover damages for a
death caused by the defendant's negligence, brought by a sister
and brother of the deceased, all the parties being adults, the law
simply measures the injury complained of by the loss it has caused,
or will cause, in dollars and cents, and, where there is no proof
of actual injury, the jury, in estimating the damages, are not at
liberty to consider the mere possibility of future benefits to the
complaining parties, but must be guided solely by the evidence
introduced, and not indulge in conjectures or speculations not sup-
ported by the evidence. (Burk v. Arcata etc. R. R. Co., 52.)

7. DAMAGES-NEGLIGENCE CAUSING DEATH-EVI-
DENCE-COLLATERAL HEIRS-PROBABLE LOSS.-In an ac-
tion to recover damages for a death caused by the defendant's negli-
gence, brought by a sister and brothers of the deceased, all the par-
ties being adults, the plaintiffs cannot recover more than nominal
damages without proof of probable loss. The mere fact that the
plaintiffs are collateral heirs of the deceased is not evidence of prob-
able loss, and, where there is no evidence of pecuniary damage,
nominal damages only can be recovered. (Burk v. Arcata etc. R. R.
Co., 52.)

See Appeal, 15; Cemeteries, 1-3; Eminent Domain, 4-13; Insurance,
49; Setoff, 1-3; Trespass, 1, 2.

DEBT.

See Attachments, 2; Constitutions, 4; Executors and Administra-
tors, 1-4, 9, 10, 12; Fraudulent Conveyances, 6, 8, 9; Husband
and Wife, 1; Legacies.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

1. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-PROVISION FOR PAYMENT
OF DEBT-INDEMNITY-RIGHTS OF CREDITOR.-A creditor,
for the satisfaction of his debt, may, in equity, avail himself of
any subsisting provision made by his insolvent debtor for its pay-
ment; and an appropriation or pledge of property by the debtor,
for the purpose of indemnifying against the debt any person liable
for it, is equitably equivalent to a provision for its payment. (Hunt
v. New Hampshire Fire etc. Assn., 602.)

-

MORT-

2. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. - PREFERENTIAL
GAGES AND SECURITIES given by an insolvent debtor are valid
if free from fraud in fact, except in insolvency proceedings. (Dy-
son v. St. Paul Nat. Bank, 358.)

See Insurance, 24; Receivers, 3; Sales, 7.

DEEDS.

1. DEEDS-DELIVERY-PLEADING.-An

allegation in 8
pleading that a deed was executed and recorded is equivalent to
an allegation that it was delivered. (McReynolds v. Grubb, 448.)

2. DEEDS-PRESUMPTION OF DELIVERY.-If a deed is ex-
ecuted and recorded, no formal delivery is necessary, as delivery,
in such case, is presumed. (McReynolds v. Grubb, 448.)

See Husband and Wife, 4-7; Infants, 1-3; Trusts, 1-3.

DEFINITIONS.

DEFINITIONS.—“DISGRACE" means cause of shame or re-
proach; that which dishonors; a state of ignominy, dishonor, or
shame. (Slawson v. State, 914.)

"Boarder." (Meacham v. Galloway, 886.)
"Civil death." (Estate of Donnelly, 62.)

"Guaranty." (London etc. Bank v. Parrott, 64.)

"House." (Favro v. State, 950; Williamson v. State, 901.)
"Immediate notice." (Solomon v. Continental Ins. Co., 707.)
"Letter of credit." (London etc. Bank v. Parrott, 64.)
"Ordinary care." (Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 380.)

DESCENT.

1. THE RIGHT OF INHERITANCE is a civil right existing only
by virtue of the law, and the legislature may make the deprivation
of this right a portion of the penalty to be imposed for the commis-
sion of a crime. (Estate of Donnelly, 62.)

2. CONFLICT OF LAWS-DESCENT.-If both the real and the
personal estate of an intestate, as well as his domicile, at the time
of his death, are within a state, the laws of such state must govern
in the descent and distribution of all of his property. (Eddie v. Ed-
die, 765.)

See Civil Death, 2.

DEVISE.

See Wills, 1-6.

DISTURBING RELIGIOUS WORSHIP.

See Criminal Law, 4, 5.

DOMICILE.

See Marriage and Divorce, 1.

EJECTMENT.

EJECTMENT-TENANT FOR YEARS-HOLDING OVER-
NOTICE.-The owner of agricultural lands may, without notice,
maintain an action of ejectment against a tenant for years who
holds over, without the plaintiff's consent, after the expiration of the
term. (Kuhn v. Smith, 79.)

See Real Property.

ELECTIONS.

ELECTIONS-NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES-POWER
OF CONVENTION TO DELEGATE NOMINATION TO COMMIT-
TEE.-A political convention may delegate its power, and confer

upon a designated committee authority to nominate a candidate for office, who, when so nominated, is entitled to file a certificate of nomination in accordance with the election law, and, upon paying the prescribed fee, to have his name placed upon the official ballot and to be voted for as the regular nominee of the party represented by such convention. In such case, the certificate of nomination may be executed by the chairman and secretary of the nominating committee. (White v. Sanderson, 334.)

ELEVATORS.

See Landlord and Tenant, 1, 2

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. EMINENT DOMAIN-RAILROAD TAKING LAND OF GAS COMPANY.-A railroad company will not be permitted to condemn for an additional track a portion of the land of a gas company necessary for the latter's present and future use, where such taking is merely for the convenience and economy of the railroad company. (Scranton etc. Co. v. Northern etc. Co., 798.)

2. EMINENT DOMAIN.-A FRANCHISE IS PROPERTY, and, as such, may be taken by a corporation having the right of eminent domain. (Scranton etc. Co. v. Northern etc. Co., 798.)

3. EMINENT DOMAIN-TAKING PROPERTY ALREADY DEVOTED TO A PUBLIC USE.-To justify the taking of a franchise by a corporation having the right of eminent domain, the necessity must not be simply a question of economy or convenience, but must arise from the very nature of things, and be so absolute that, without it, the grant itself will be defeated. (Scranton etc. Co. v. Northern etc. Co., 798.)

4. EMINENT DOMAIN-CHANGE IN GRADE OF STREET— DAMAGES FOR.--Where property has been injured by a change in the grade of a street, or other act, the damages which the owner is entitled to recover are the difference between the value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury is inflicted. (Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 835.)

5. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES-FUTURE PROFITS. Where property is taken or injured under the power of eminent domain, consequential or speculative damages cannot be allowed, and future profits of the plaintiff's business are not to be considered for any purpose whatever. (Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 835.)

6. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN PAYMENT.-Where the claim for damages to property under the power of eminent domain is so excessive and unreasonable as to justify the defendant in refusing to pay, no allowance can be made for damages by reason of a delay in payment, since the delay is due solely to the unreasonable demands of the plaintiff. (Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 835.)

EXPENSES.

7. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES-FUTURE In estimating damage caused to property under the power of emiment domain, no consideration can be given to circumstances occurring after the completion of the injury; hence, in a proceeding to recover damages to a baseball park caused by a change in the grade of a street, the jury cannot take into consideration estimated an nual profits, or the cost of changes and improvements made in the park three years after the street had been graded. (Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 835.)

8. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES TO SEPARATE PIECES
OF PROPERTY.-Where a person owns property abutting on a
street upon which a public improvement is being made, and later
acquires property adjoining the first piece, but abutting on other
streets, which property is used separately and distinctly from the
first piece, the two properties will not be considered as one in a pro-
ceeding to assess damages for injuries caused by the erection of the
public improvement, and damages will be confined to the property
fronting on the street upon which the improvement is being made.
(Gibson v. Fifth Ave. etc. Bridge Co., 795.)

9. EMINENT DOMAIN-MEASURE OF DAMAGES UNLAW-
FUL USE.-If, in estimating the value of property taken for a
public use, it is shown that its rental value has been inflated by
an unlawful use, such rental value, to the extent of the inflation,
must be discarded as evidence of the value of the property. (Mc-
Kinney v. Nashville, 859.)

10. EMINENT DOMAIN-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-In esti-
mating the value of property taken for a public use, it is the
market value which is to be considered, and, in estimating such
value, all of the capabilites of the property and all of the legiti-
mate uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted
are to be considered, and not merely the condition it is in and the
use to which it is at the time applied by the owner. (McKinney v.
Nashville, 859.)

11. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES WHO MAY RECOVER.
A petition to assess damages to land by the diversion of the water
supply, caused by taking an easement in the land for the construc-
tion of a sewer, may be maintained by the owner after he has con-
veyed the premises, and after his vendee has recovered damages
for the taking of the easement, where the damages occasioned by
the diversion of the water were excepted from the conveyance.
(Penney v. Commonwealth, 312.)

12. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES RECOVERABLE.-Where
an easement in land is taken, under a statute which provides that
all damages sustained by any person by the taking of his land shall
be paid for, the amount in damages is not limited to the value of
the land or easement taken, but damages to the remaining land,
such as the destruction of crops and the drainage of wells in the
construction of the work for which the land is taken, can be recov-
ered, even though after the completion of the work the water re-
turned to the soil and the wells as it was before, and the damage
was only temporary. (Penney v. Commonwealth, 312.)

13. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES.-Under a statute allowing
all the damages done to a party by reason of sewer improvements,
whether any of his property is taken or not, injury to a landowner
by draining his well may be recovered for. (Bickford v. Hyde Park,
320.)

EQUITY.

EQUITY-RIGHT OF ONE TO ACT FOR MANY.-If the
questions to be litigated are of common interest to a large number
of persons, and it is impracticable to bring them all into court, one
or more may proceed in equity for the benefit of all. (Pencille v.
State Farmers' etc. Ins. Co., 326.)

See Appeal, 7; Corporations, 15; Husband and Wife, 13; Negotiable

Instruments, 7.

ESTOPPEL.

1. ESTOPPEL BY NEGLIGENCE.—A person is not estopped by
negligence, as a matter of law, from asserting his ownership of

bonds, which he has intrusted, for safekeeping only, to brokers whose business it is to buy and sell securities, where the bonds were not intrusted to them in that capacity, and where a sale by the brokers could only be accomplished through the commission of a felony. (Scollans v. Rollins, 284.)

2. CRIMINAL LAW-ESTOPPEL.-The prosecution, in a crim、 inal case, cannot invoke against the accused the doctrine of estoppel. (Bailey v. State, 540.)

See Husband and Wife, 7; Infants, 6; Insurance, 27, 29, 46; Negotiable Instruments, 1, 2, 8; Vendor and Purchaser, 7.

EVIDENCE.

1. EVIDENCE-CONFESSION OF A CRIMINATIVE CHARACTER-PROPER WARNING — ISSUE OF INSANITY.—A confession or statement of a defendant, while in jail, may be given in evidence against him on the issue of insanity, regardless of any previous warning that what he says may be used in evidence against him, except where the confession or statement is of a criminative character in connection with the crime for which he is to be tried, in which case the confession or statement cannot be used against the defendant in the absence of a proper warning. (Barth v. State, 935.)

2. EVIDENCE CONFESSIONS PROPER WARNINGDOUBT AS TO TIME.-A confession made by one under arrest is not admissible, though he was warned by the officer to whom the confession was made that it could be used against him, where it does not appear how long after such warning the confession was made, and that it might have been one, two, or three weeks, for it cannot be assumed, under such circumstances, that the defendant was, at the time he made the confession, impressed with the idea that what he then said could be used in evidence against him, or that he knew that he was then making it under the conditions that had previously been stated to him by the officer. (Barth v. State, 935.)

CONFESSIONS

3. EVIDENCE PROPER WARNING NECESSITY OF.-A confession made by a person under arrest is not admissible in evidence against him in the absence of a proper warning that it can be so used. The warning given must be in substantial compliance with the statute, though it is not necessary that the confession should immediately follow the warning. (Barth v. State, 935.)

4. EVIDENCE CONFESSIONS · PROPER WARNING REASONABLE TIME.-If a confession by one under arrest is not made directly after the warning given, of its legal effect, it must, to be admissible, be made within such reasonable time thereafter as to indicate that the defendant yet remembered and was impressed with such warning, and that he made the confession under a due apprehension of its legal effect, to wit, that it could be used in evidence against him. (Barth v. State, 935.)

5. EVIDENCE-CONFESSION TO THIRD PARTY AFTER WARNING BY SHERIFF-ADMISSIBILITY OF.-A confession made by one under arrest to a third party, long after a warning given by the sheriff to the defendant, that anything he might say could be used in evidence against him, is not admissible in evidence, where there was no other warning subsequent to that given by the officer, for the court cannot presume against the defendant that he then had the warning given him by the sheriff in mind, or that he knew that such warning was operative as to statements made by him to another person than the sheriff, who gave the caution. (Barth v. State, 935.)