post in a public street. At the trial the judge dismissed the complaint, upon the tender of the reins from defendant to plaintiff, upon the ground de minimis non curat lex. The court of errors and appeals held that this was error. In approving of this New Jersey decision, at about the time it was rendered, we used the following language: "The question would seem to be peculiarly within the province of a jury to determine, on the whole case, whether a given act ought to have been accepted as a joke or can be taken seriously as a tort. On the one hand, a jury coull probably be trusted to do justice in a case in which, under the trumped up protection of a prac tical joke, a person had committed a grievous assault or destroyed valuable property. On the other hand, a jury would be likely to award only nominal or trifling damages to a person who, having by his own acts provoked playful retaliation, suddenly says, 'I won't play."-New York Law Journal. A UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW. The establishment of a federal bankruptcy law was proposed by twelve different bills introduced in the first session of the fifty-fourth congress. Aside from a consideration of the relative merits of these bills, the need of a uniform law of bankruptcy is apparent. It is necessary for the assistance of debtors, the protection of creditors, and the furtherance of national commercial interests. Few, indeed, deny the necessity; State bankruptcy statutes are inadequate, because they cannot under the federal constitution deal with debt existing outside the limits of their respective States. Honest debtors, therefore, who wish to pay their creditors fairly and then to start fresh, are prevented perhaps by one obdurate creditor in another State who will not agree to the composition offered. Creditors, on the other hand, have no protection against fraudulent preferences on the part of debtors living in other States; so that from both points of view the commercial equilibrium of the nation is disturbed. The constitution of the United States gave congress power to pass a national bankruptcy law; and the exercise of this power was thought as much a matter of course as the exercise of the power to establish a judicial system. The event has not equalled the expectation; and although several laws have from time to time been passed, the nation has during the greater part of its existence been without a federal law of bankruptcy. The first law was passed in 1800, only to be repealed three years later. The second act, in 1841, followed the panic of 1837-38, and was repealed thirteen months after becoming a law. The third act had a longer life; it was passed in 1867, and remained in force eleven years. In June, 1878, it was repealed; and no law has since then been enacted. These bankruptcy acts, it is to be noted, in every case came into existence in times of great financial depression. The present time also is one of depression; in fact, the depression has been the greatest that the country has known since 1874; and the immediate need of a bankruptcy law is pressing. It must not be supposed, however, that the need is temporary; hard times do not create the necessity, they merely accentuate it. The former acts were repealed because of defects in their machinery, not because when business revived they were no longer needed.. The need still remains for an equitable law, perfect in its details, which may become a permanence.-Harvard Law Review. THE RIGHT TO OVERRULE A BAD DECISION. The proposition that a judicial precedent establishes a law, and the emphatic declaration that "tampering with or overruling previous decisions is fraught with dire consequences to the very liberty of the people" is said (by a newspaper report) to have been made in a recent address by Hon. Henry Wollman, of Kansas City. If this means (as, in the brief and perhaps inaccurate report, it seems to mean) that a court has no power to overrule any prior decision, however bad, it: can by no means be admitted. Possibly it is only meant to emphasize the impolicy and harm of unnecessary judicial fluctuation. The exact binding force of a precedent is not easy to define. It should have weight, but not enough to crush reason. Bouvier says: "The courts find it necessary to overrule cases which have been decided contrary to principles." Kent says (Com. Vol. I., p. 477) that such decisions "ought to be examined without fear and revised without reluctance, rather than to have the character of our law impaired and the beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of error." Instability of the law is unfortunate, but in some degree it is necessary to growth. If the rule of stare decisis made precedents absolutely unchangeable the past errors of the courts would hopelessly fetter the judicial reason. If every Judicial conclusion had been like "a law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not," our jurisprudence, which is the living growth of centuries, would have been a curious conglomerate of fossilized rules, both good and bad. Even if a "judicial precedent establishes a law," may not the power which made the law repeal it? The true attitude of a court toward a precedent is much like that toward a legislative act, although the grounds of attack are not the same; the law previously established, either by court or legislature, should be sustained unless clearly bad, and perhaps even then if it has become a rule of property. To overthrow a precedent is a delicate matter; it should never be done in a doubtful case; but the power to do it is plain, and it is of inestimable value.-Case and Comment. RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT LAWS. Some recent amendments of the United States patent laws which will go into effect on January 1, 1898, are just now attracting attention. Hitherto there has been but one barrier to the issue of a patent by our government to a man who had proved that he was the original inventor. If the article in question had been in public use or on sale for two years or more before the man sent his application to the patent office, then he could not receive a patent. The public use and sale would naturally be considered as evidence of his having abandoned all claim to exclusive rights. The natural interpretation of the facts would be that the man did not consider himself the rightful owner, or else was willing to give the public the benefit of his ideas without charge. One the new provisions of the law is that if a notice of an invention appears in print and specifies who is the author of it, the application for a patent must be made inside of two years; otherwise it is assumed that he abandons all claims. This is a perfectly just requirement. It often happens that a half a dozen men invent the same thing. If the first man who thinks of it does not push the matter, either for lack of money or because he lacks the necessary spirit of enterprise, why should not some of the other men have a chance to go ahead and take out a patent? A man who neither matures and markets a new invention himself, nor lets any one else do so, is a dog in the manger. Consequently Uncle Sam must draw the line somewhere, and he draws it at two years. He does not say that the application must be filed in two years after the idea first occurs to a man, but within two years after a printed description appears. Such a period gives a man ample time to secure, by advertising, such financial aid as can be obtained in that manner. The exact language of the revised statute is as follows: "Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve. ment thereof, not known or used by others in this country before his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, for more than two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this country for more than two years prior to his application, may, upon payment of the fees required by law, and other due proceedings had, obtain a patent therefor."-New York Tribune. CORRESPONDENCE. ORAL ABUSE AS A Ground oF DIVORCE. Since the publication of my article (46 Cent. L. J. 8), my attention has been called to a decision published since the former was written. Freeborn v. Freeborn, 168 Mass. 50, which certainly is very gallant toward the wife. She had lived contentedly with her husband for many years, but of late had become "nerv. ous" and "afflicted by physical troubles on account of her age," and very frequently used strong terms of reproach toward him, such as "idiot," "know-noth ing," "brute," "vile wretch," "fool," accused him of a want of ambition, which would lead him to be "a Harvard professor instead of a mere schoolmaster," and enable him to have "nice furniture," and of not having "sense enough to know when he was insulted." These choice expressions were in the presence of third persons, and so affected the husband's health that he lost sleep and his school work was disturbed. At length he separated from her, making ample provision for her maintenance. Then she wanted to come back to plague him some more, but he would not have her, and sued for divorce on the ground of cruelty. He was entirely blameless. She was strongly attached to him and affectionate, and had no desire to injure him, but she was ambitious for his success in life, and desired to "sting his feelings." The court affirmed the action of the trial court in denying an absolute divorce, probably thinking that the wife would get over her "ambition" on her return to health with advancing age. IRVING BROWNE. BOOKS RECEIVED. Sayles' Annotated Civil Statutes of the State of Texas. By John Sayles and Henry Sayles, of Abilene, Texas. Volumes I and II. St. Louis, Mo.: The Gilbert Book Co. 1897. Principles of the Law of Consent, with Special Refer ence to Criminal Law, Including the Doctrines of Handbook of the Law of Evidence. By John Jay Mc Kelvey, A.M., LL.B., of the New York Bar, Author of "Common Law Pleading," etc. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1898. HUMORS OF THE LAW. In a hog-stealing case in a Georgia justice court the judge asked the prisoner what he had to say for him. self. He hesitated a moment, then stepping forward, said: "I stole dat hog, jedge-yo' honner-but I wants you ter make de sentence light, kase he got 'way fum me no less dan six times, an' I sprain two legs en' one arm fo' I finally kotched him en' got him on de fire!" A case was on trial in one of the border counties in which the testimony of a colored witness was impeached by proof of his bad reputation. To rebut this evidence a Kentucky gentleman was called to support the negro. We give question and answer of the examination: "Colonel, are you acquainted with the witness, Tom Jones, who has testified in this case?" "Acquainted with Tom? Why, sah, Tom was born on our plantation. I know'd him when he was a little pickaninny, sah; know him as well as I know my own folks." "Are you acquainted with his general reputation?" "Reputation!" broke in the Colonel. "Reputation, sah-Tom's a nigger, sah-a nigger's got no reputa tion, sah-but Tom's a purty fair nigger, sah." "Stand aside, Colonel." Curran, the Irish advocate, was one day examining a witness and, failing to get an answer, said: "There is no use in asking you questions, for I see the villain in your face." "Do you sir?" said the man with a smile. "Faix, I never knew before that my face was a looking glass." On another occasion he was out walking with a friend who was extremely punctilious in his conver sation. The latter hearing a person near him say curosity for curiosity, exclaimed: "How that man murders the English language!" "Not so bad as that," replied Curran, "he has only knocked an i out." Pow. 1. ADMINISTRATION - Foreign Administrator ers.-A foreign administrator of one who conveyed land retaining a vendor's lien has no authority without an order of the probate court to compromise the debt due from the grantee to the estate, since the power of the administrator in such respect is controlled by Rev. St. 1895, art. 1987, which requires an order of the probate court granting.permission to do so before such authority exists.-SMITH V. PATE, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 312. 2. APPEAL FROM JUSTICE-Liability on Bond. - Where a judgment was rendered by a justice of the peace against several defendants, and an appeal bond was duly filed and approved, purporting to be in favor of all of said defendants, and thereupon said action was transferred to the district court, and there disposed of as on appeal, the surety on said bond cannot avoid his liability thereon by showing that the party who caused it to be filed only intended to appeal for himself.MOORE V. MULVANE, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 569. 3. ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS AttachmentsPriority-Execution.-On an issue as to whether there had been an execution and delivery of a deed of assignment to the assignee, and an acceptance by him, prior to the levy of a certain attachment, an instruction that the jury might consider such facts and testimony as they deemed proper was misleading, as it conveyed the idea that the jury had the right to select only such evidence as they deemed proper, when it was their duty to consider all the facts bearing on the disputed question.-CALISHER V. MATHIAS, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 265. Pre 4. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS sentation of Claims.-Under section 10 of the act concerning voluntary assignments, providing that creditors shall present claims to the assignee within three months after publication of notice of the assignment, one who fails to do so cannot participate in dividends until after payment of all claims presented within that time, though the claim be contingent on events to happen after the presentation.-RASSIEUR V. JENKINS, Ill., 48 N. E. Rep. 976. 5. ATTACHMENT-Bond to Discharge.-Bond given by defendant in attachment to satisfy and perform the judgment "on the proceedings of the attachment in this case" does not allow of recovery thereon till judg ment adverse to defendant on the attachment branch of the case, and is distinguished by the qualifying words from the bond on which Code, § 221, authorizes discharge of the attachment.-BRASHEARS V. WEBB, Ky., 43 S. W. Rep. 417. 6. ATTACHMENT obtained an attachment against defendant corpora Conflicting Attachments.-A bank tion's property, second to that of plaintiff. Its presi dent stated that it had renewed notes against defendant on the strength of plaintiff's representations that he was going to enhance defendant's capital stock by paying to it a certain sum of money: Held, that the bank's contention that plaintiff's lien should be postponed to the extent of such sum could not be determined under Rev. St. 1889, § 570, providing that the court may determine all controversies which may arise between different attachment plaintiffs in relation to the property, and the priority and validity of the dif ferent attachments, or may postpone one attachment to another, or make such order as justice may require.-STEPHENSON V. PARKER STATIONERY CO., Mo., 43 S. W. Rep. 380. 183 7. ATTACHMENT - Lien Prior to Levy.-Under Civ. Code, § 212, providing that "an attachment binds the defendant's property in the county which might be seized under the execution against him from the time of the delivery of the order to the sheriff, in the same manner as an execution would bind it; and the lien of the plaintiff is completed upon any property or demand of the defendant by executing the order upon it;" and Ky. St. § 1660, providing that "an execution binds the estate of the defendant from the time it is delivered to the proper officer to execute," the lien, when completed by levy, relates back to the time when the writ was placed in the officer's hands, and is entitled to priority over an intervening assignment for the benefit of creditors.-EXCHANGE BANK OF KENTUCKY V. GILLISPIE'S ASSIGNEE, Ky., 43 S. W. Rep. 401. 8. ATTACHMENT Wrongful Attachment.-In an action for wrongful attachment, plaintiff was not preju. diced by the admission of evidence, in support of the allegations of the answer, that at the time of the attachment, and for a long time prior thereto, plaintiff's assignor had been disposing of its goods at retail, in violation of its charter powers, which authorized exclusively a wholesale business.-ARMSTRONG V. AMES & FROST CO., Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 302. 9. ATTACHMENг-Wrongful Attachment-Damages.In an action for maliciously, and without probable cause, suing out an attachment, the plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees and expenses in defending the attachment, without proof of malice and want of probable cause.-ABOHOSH V. BUCK, Ky., 43 S. W. Rep. 425. 10. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-In any transaction be. tween an attorney and client which is advantageous to the attorney, he is bound to show that it is fair, just, and equitable, and that the client was in a position to deal with him at arm's length.-UNITED STATES V. COFFIN, U. S. C. C., D. (Nev.), 83 Fed. Rep. 337. 11. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT Contracts.-A client agreed to accept the amount her attorney should bid in his own interest for certain property at a public sale under an execution on a judgment in her favor, but without her knowledge, he made an arrangement with the judgment debtor whereby he released the levy, and took the property at an agreed price: Held, that he was liable to his client for the value of the property, not exceeding the amount of her judgment.GAFFNEY V. JONES, Wash., 51 Pac. Rep. 461. 12. BANKS-Contract-Refusal to Pay Checks.-Where a bank agrees with the members of a partnership engaged in buying and shipping stock that it will pay the checks given by any member of said firm for stock bought by them for said partnership, and receive the proceeds arising from the sale of such stock to reim. Lurse them therefor, said bank cannot refuse to pay such checks, and apply the proceeds arising from the sale of such stock to the individual debt of one member of said partnership.-CHANUTE NAT. BANK V. CROWELL, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 575. 13. BANKS Liability of Receiver for Taxes.-Where the assessment and valuation of bank stock for taxes is made before the bank becomes insolvent, such as sessment is fixed and final, and the court, in the absence of fraud, cannot review the valuation, and the shareholders are liable for the amount so assessed.HEWITT V. TRADERS' BANK, Wash., 51 Pac. Rep. 468. 14. BANKS Stockholder as Debtor - Hypothecation of Stock.-A bank charter provided that the shares of capital stock should be personal estate, and transferable, but that the corporation should hold a lien on the shares of any stockholder "who may be indebted to it," and the stock should not be transferred until such debt was paid. A stockholder was indebted to the bank, but afterwards made a note to another creditor, and pledged the stock as collateral security. The debtor became insolvent, and, to give a third creditor the advantage of its charter lien, the bank gratuitously advised such creditor to have the notes held by him discounted by the bank, knowing of the prior hypothecation of the stock: Held that, as against the notes discounted by the bank after the hypothecation of the stock, the pledgee had a prior lien on the stock.-BANK OF KENTUCKY V. BONNIE, Ky., 43 S. W. Rep. 407. 15. BILLS AND NOTES - Evidence of Payment. -In an action by a bank on notes where the only evidence on an issue of payment since suit brought, raised in a plea puis darrein continuance, is the testimony of one de. fendant that he gave to plaintiff's president checks dated ahead from one to six or seven months in pay. ment of all defendant owed him, and that the suit was to stand until the checks were paid, and that the notes were to be retained as collateral, and passed over as fast as the checks were paid, default having been made in the payment of the checks, an instruction to find for plaintiff was properly given.-ANGUS V. CHICAGO TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, Ill., 48 N. E. Rep. 946. 16. BILLS AND NOTES-Neglect to Sue Maker-Liability of Assignor.-A vendee of land paid for it as recited in the deed, thus: "One hundred dollars in hand paid, the receipt herein acknowledged, the balance in two land notes. When these notes are collected first party is to pay second fifteen dollars out of them." The holder of the notes brought suit to declare a lien on the land sold, to subject it to the payment of the uncollected portion of the land notes, after foreclosing them, but without first obtaining a personal judgment against their maker: Held, that the holder of the notes could not maintain an action against the assignor without first exhausting all his remedies upon the notes.-SIX V. PRICE, Ky., 43 8. W. Rep. 433. 17. BILLS AND NOTES - Pleading.-Defendant, in his answer, argumentatively denied the execution of the note in suit, but averred the execution of a note of the exact description of the one sued on, and alleged pay. ment: Held to admit execution of the note in suit.MUTZENBURG V. MCGOWAN, Colo., 51 Pac. Rep. 523. 18. BILLS AND NOTES Subsequent Indorser.-In the absence of any agreement affecting the liability of successive indorsers, their liability is determined by the order in which their names appear on the note.CROMPTON V. SPENCER, R. I., 38 Atl. Rep. 1002. 19. BILLS AND NOTES-Waiver of Notice by Indorser. -The indorsers of a note which has upon its back a printed waiver of notice of non-payment, the blanks in which are not filled out, are bound by the waiver, as, if they did not intend to be bound, they should have canceled it.-LOVEDAY V. ANDERSON, Wash., 51 Pac. Rep. 463. 20. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS - Assignee of Stock Usury. Defendant, who owned 16 shares of stock in plaintiff association, desiring to obtain a loan from plaintiff, purchased from other stockholders 24 additional shares, paying to them the calls thereon up to the date of her purchase, and these shares were transferred to her on the books of the company in due course of business: Held, that defendant is entitled to credit for the dues paid on the 24 shares as if she had originally subscribed for them, and paid to the associa tion the dues thereon. MUTUAL SAVING & LOAN ASSN. V. OWINGS, Ky., 43 S. W. Rep. 422. 21. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS Right to Withdraw.-Plaintiff, holding certain shares in the defendant association, contracted a loan from it, and se cured it by her note, a deed of trust, and the assign. ment of her shares. The stock certificate issued to plaintiff contained an agreement authorizing the with. drawal of such shares on certain conditions, and prom. ising to pay, in such event, a sum equal to all installments paid, with interest at 10 per cent. thereon from the date of the several payments. Having fully com. plied therewith, plaintiff gave notice of such withdrawal, and requested that the sum due be applied in payment of such loan. It appeared that the amount dae plaintiff exceeded the sum borrowed: Held, that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment canceling such mote and deed of trust, though the business of such as sociation may have resulted in a loss. PIONEER SAV INGS & LOAN CO. V. PANCOAST, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 281. 22. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS Cars for Colored Per sons. Ky. St. § 801, excepting officers in charge of prisoners from the provisions of the separate coach law, creates an exception in favor of the officer only, and a negro prisoner in the custody of a white officer may be compelled to ride in the car provided for colored persons. - LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. CATRON, Ky., 43 8. W. Rep. 443. 23. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Enticing Tenants.-Ann. Code 1892, § 1068, which declares that, if any person shall willfully interfere with a tenant of another dar. ing the continuance of the tenancy, etc., applies to all persons, and forbids only a breach of civil duty, and is therefore not unconstitutional. - HOOLE V. DORROH, Miss., 22 South. Rep. 829. 24. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Judicial Powers.-Ky. St. §§ 3661, 3662, so far as they attempt to authorize circuit courts to assign or transfer a town or city from one class to another, violates Const. § 156, wherein such power is granted to the legislature alone.JERNIGAN V. CITY OF MADISONVILLE, Ky., 43 S. W. Rep. 448. 25. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Restrictions on Interstate Commerce.-The non-exercise by congress of its power to regulate commerce among the States is equivalent to a declaration by that body that such commerce shall be free from any restrictions. STATE V. DUCKWORTH, Idaho, 51 Pac. Rep. 456. 26. CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY-Bids for Pub. lic Work.-Agreements which, in their operation upon the action of the parties, tend to restrain their natural rivalry and competition in bidding for public work, are against public policy, and void, but a mere honest and open co-operation between two or more persons to accomplish an object which neither could gain if act ing alone is not within the rule against combinations to stifle competition. - HOFFMAN V. MCMULLEN, U. 8. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 372. 27. CONTRACT-Divisible Contract Measure of Dam ages.-A contract to issue, or procure the issuance of, an annual pass, to be renewed from year to year dur ing the pleasure of the promisee, is a divisible con tract, and the measure of damages for the breach thereof is the value of the transportation to such promisee during the years the breach has occurred, and an action may be maintained by the promisee for only such breaches as have occurred at the time of the commencement of the action.-KANSAS & C. P. Rr. Co. V. CURRY, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 576. 28. CONTRACT - Employment-Partnership.-S made an agreement with defendant by which, in considera. tion of past services rendered by 8 to a certain busi ness about to be incorporated as the H Co., defendant sold to him a one-tenth interest in that company and In its assets; and S agreed, for at least 10 years to come, to devote his entire attention to the business of the company. Upon the incorporation of the company, 8 was to receive one-tenth of the stock, subject to for feiture for his breach, and subject to defeasance, as to one-half, in case of his death within five years. The agreement added, "The salary of the said 8 shall be $350 a month:" Held, that the contract was one of employment, and not of partnership, and that defend ant was personally liable for S's salary. - HAMBLY V. BANCROFT, U. s. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 83 Fed. Rep. 444. 29. CONTRACTS-Party Unable to Read.-If one cannot read a contract which he is about to execute, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable person to read and explain it to him before he signs it as it would be to read it himself if he were able to do so, and his failure to obtain a reading and an explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him from repudiat ing it on the ground that he was ignorant of its con tents. One who has received the benefits of a written contract in silence cannot escape its burdens by proof that he did not know and did not inquire what these burdens were when he assumed them. - CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. Co. v. BELLIWITH, U. S. C. C. of App., 30. CORPORATION-Expulsion-Mandamus to Restore. -A member of a private corporation organized for the mutual protection and relief of its members, though unlawfully expelled and excluded from participation in its benefits, is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel it to restore him to membership, because (1) such restoration is not an act specially enjoined by law; (2) he has a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.-FRATERNAL MYSTIC CIRCLE V. STATE, Ohio, 48 N. E. Rep. 940. 31. CORPORATION-Foreign Corporations-State Laws. -A foreign corporation suing on an account need not show, in its petition, that it has filed a copy of its charter in the office of the secretary of State, and pro cured a permit to do business in the state, as required by Rev. St. 1895, art. 745, unless the petition shows that the transaction in suit took place in Texas, since the transaction would be "interstate commerce" if it oc curred outside the State, and the statutes requiring a permit for foreign corporations to do business would not apply.-BRIN V. WACHUSETTS SHIRT Co., Tex., 43 8. W. Rep. 295. 32. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE Insanity. The hypothetical case submitted by the State to an insanity expert need not embrace all the testimony on the subject; defendant, however, having the right to submit a different hypothetical case. -BURT V. STATE, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 344. 33. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE Murder Threats. In a prosecution for murder occurring over a game of cards, testimony of threats made by defendant on the previous day to kill somebody, but not directed in any way toward the deceased, are inadmissible. V. STATE, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 336. GODWIN 34. CRIMINAL LAW-Declarations of Coconspirator. — Declarations by conspirators for the commission of a crime, made after the crime has been fully consum. mated, being inadmissible against a coconspirator for any purpose, a general objection to their admission on the ground of incompetency is sufficient.-STATE V. MAGONE, Oreg., 51 Pac. Rep. 452. 35. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide - Instructions. — On a trial for murder the court charged that while it devolved on the State to prove willfulness, deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought, to convict of murder in the first degree, these need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be deduced from all the facts and circumstances, and if the jury could "satis. factorily and reasonably" infer their existence, from the evidence, it could find defendant guilty of murder in the first degree: Held not erroneous, when read in connection with other instructions, by which defendant was given the benefit of any reasonable doubt.— STATE V. HUNT, Mo., 43 S. W. Rep. 399. 36. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide - Reasonable Doubt.On the question whether the accused or another inflicted the wound resulting in the killing for which the accused is indicted, a charge that the jury must acquit if satisfied that the other, and not the accused, gave the fatal stab, accompanied with a refusal to instruct that, to convict, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused inflicted the wound, is error, especially when the refusal is accompanied with the statement by the trial judge that the charge requested is not the law.-STATE V. HAGAN, La., 22 South. Rep. 832. 37. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Self-Defense.- Where defendant, the owner of a certain house on which rent was due from the lessee, unlawfully attempted to ob tain possession of the house, while armed with a dangerous weapon, by forcing the lessee to leave the premises, by obstructing the chimney, so that the smoke was forced through the house, and by attempt. ing to take and carry away a sash from a window of the house, and, on meeting resistance from the lessee and his son, killed the son, who attacked him, he can. 185 GEDYE not be deemed to have acted in self-defense. 39. CRIMINAL LAW-Indictment Charging two Offenses. -It is not an abuse of discretion in the trial court to sustain a demurrer to an indictment which charges two offenses, punishable by different lengths of imprisonment. -STATE V. REES, Miss., 22 South. Rep. 829. 40. CRIMINAL LAW - Jury. A verdict will not be set aside on account of an affidavit of a juror that he was induced to sign the verdict by a promise that the jury, in its verdict, would recommend defendant to execu.. tive clemency. HENRY V. STATE, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 340. 41. CRIMINAL LAW-Murder-Village Marshal.-Where a village marshal defends a charge of murder on the ground that his duty as such officer made the killing necessary, an instruction that if "the defendant went where the deceased was, and provoked the difficulty, in which he voluntarily entered, he could not excuse the killing on the ground of fear of great bodily harm," is error, as it entirely overlooks the fact that the defendant was called as a peace officer to quell a disturbance.-LYNN V. PEOPLE, Ill., 48 N. E. Rep. 964. 42. CRIMINAL LAW-Quashing Indictment.-An entry in the record sustaining a motion to quash an indictment, but without any further order quashing the indictment, and ordering the prisoner discharged, or ordering him committed to answer another indictment, is not a final judgment, and an appeal will not lie.-STATE V. FRAKER, Mo., 43 S. W. Rep. 389. 43. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape.-Jury are to weigh all the attending circumstances, and from these determine, as a question of fact, the intent with which the accused entered the bedroom of the prosecutrix. The fact that he actually offered no violence, and withdrew when the girl threatened to call assistance, does not, in it. self, establish, in view of the law, the proposition that he meant to persuade, and not to force.-STATE V. UNDERWOOD, La., 22 South. Rep. 831. 44. CRIMINAL LAW-Remarks of Attorney.-In a prosecution for rape, one of the jurors had sat in a previous case of the same kind. In his closing remarks the district attorney referred to the previous case, and said that in that case the defendant had been convicted, although he put up a far better defense than this one, and that the attorney for the defense in this case had assisted in the prosecution in that one: Held reversible error, in view of the fact that the evidence on which the conviction rested was unsatisfactory.BERRY V. STATE, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 826. 45. DEED-Cancellation - Fraud.-A conveyance of land, the consideration of which is certain notes secured by a trust deed, which the party is led to believe are worth their full face value, will be set aside, as fraudulent, where the party procuring the conveyance knew that the notes and deed of trust were made by a fictitious or irresponsible party, upon land situated in another State, of which a fictitious abstract of title was presented, and the land was of little value, and the maker of the deed had no title.-RICE V. SILVERSTON, Ill., 48 N. E. Rep. 969. 46. DEED-Construction.-A deed describes land by locating the corners of the parcel by objects found upon the ground, and also by giving the course and distance from corner to corner. Construed by the calls for distance the deed conveyed 20 acres, but by |