payment of bonds issued by another corporation, can. not retain the property, and claim the bonds were invalid as being overissued, in violation of Civ. Code, § 309, prohibiting the contraction of debts beyond the subscribed capital stock.-SMITH V. FERRIES & C. H. RY. CO., Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 710.

28. CORPORATIONS-Foreign Corporations-Service of Process.-In determining whether an agent of a for. eign corporation upon whom federal process is served is a "managing agent" of the corporation, within the meaning of a State statute providing for such service, the court will give full consideration to decisions of the State court construing the statute.-UNION AssoCIATED PRESS V. TIMES PRINTING CO., U. S. C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 83 Fed. Rep. 822.

29. CORPORATIONS — Rights of Equitable Owner of Stock. Neither by the general rule nor under the decisions of the State courts of Connecticut is the beneficial owner of stock in a corporation precluded from asserting his right thereto by the mere fact that he has permitted it to stand on the books of the corporation in the name of another, as against an attaching creditor of the nominal owner.-NEW YORK COMMERCIAL CO. V. FRANCIS, U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 769.

As

30. CORPORATION SUCCEEDING PARTNERSHIP sumption of Contracts. —A partnership, which was acting as agent for a foreign mortgage company in making farm loans, made an agreement with such company to collect such loans without charge in addition to the commissions received in making the loans, and to foreclose the mortgages taken, when necessary, without charge for attorney's fees. The partnership was succeeded in business by a corpora tion formed by the partners, who were its officers and directors, which assumed the balance due from the partnership to the mortgage company on ac count, and continued the business during the ensuing five years without further agreement, collecting money, and foreclosing numerous mortgages for which no charge was made in its monthly reports: Held, that the corporation must be held to have adopted the agreement made by the partnership with reference to such services, and could not, after such a lapse of time, assert a right to compensation therefor.-NORTH AMERICAN LOAN & TRUST Co. v. COLONIAL & U. 8. MORTG. CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 796.

81. CORPORATIONS-Transaction with Stockholders.A person who might, at the inception of a corporation, be deemed the promoter, cannot, after the corporation has been in existence, organized, and operated by a board of directors for more than a year, be considered as such, so as to then hold him to a promoter's fiduciary liability in dealing with the corporation.-Rus. SELL V. ROCK RUN FUEL GAS Co., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 21. 32. COUNTIES Deposit of Funds.-Where county funds are deposited in a bank, and the bank fails, the county, in a contest over the distribution of the assets of the bank, is not entitled to a lien on these as. sets in preference to the individual depositors.-GLYNN COUNTY V. BRUNSWICK TERMINAL CO., Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 604.

33. COUNTIES-Organization-Settlements of County Boards. When boards of county commissioners have made adjustment and settlement of matters growing out of the organization of a new county, such settlement and adjustment will not be disturbed, in the ab. sence of a showing of fraud or mistake.-CANYON COUNTY V. ADA COUNTY, Idaho, 51 Pac. Rep. 748.

34. CreditorS' SUITS-Pleading.-A creditors' bill, alleging the return unsatisfied of an execution issued on plaintiff's judgment before the filing of the suit, sufficiently shows that at that time the debtor was not the owner of sufficient unexempt property to satisfy the judgment.-WHITESIDE V. HOSKINS, Mont., 51 Pac. Rep. 739.

35. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Larceny-Other Crimes.-To identify two cattle sued by defendants with the cattle

charged to have been stolen by them, evidence that two other cattle sold by them at the same time were stolen property taken from persons other than the prosecutor, and at or about the same time as the others, but which evidence did not show that they were taken at or about the same place, was inadmissible.PARKER V. UNITED STATES, I. T., 43 8. W. Rep. 858.

36. CRIMINAL LAW Incest - Daughter.-The word "daughter," as used in an indictment for incest, means an immediate female descendant, and not an adopted daughter, step-daughter, or daughter-in-law. -PEOPLE V. KAISER, Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 702.

37. CRIMINAL LAW-Instruction-Credibility of Witnesses. In a criminal case it is error to instruct the jury that they are the sole judges of the weight of the testimony and of the credibility of the witnesses, and that they may, if they think proper, disregard the testimony of any witness, if for any reason they be lieve such testimony is untrue.-RYLEE V. STATE, Miss., 22 South. Rep. 890.

38. DAMAGES-Negligence-Contributory Negligence. -Code, § 2589, provides that a personal representative may sue for the death of his testator or intestate if the latter could have maintained an action if it had not caused death, etc.: Held, that the damages recoverable are entirely punitive, and evidence of loss of services, or mere pecuniary loss, and evidence of mental suffering by parents of a deceased child, are immaterial.-ALA BAMA G. S. R. Co. v. BURGESS, Ala., 22 South. Rep. 913. 39. DEED Acknowledgment of Married Woman.-A substantial, and not a literal, compliance with the stat ute in the certificate of acknowledgment to a convey. ance of real estate by a married woman, is all that the law requires.-NORTHWESTERN & PACIFIC HYPOTHEEK BANK V. RAUCH, Idaho, 51 Pac. Rep. 764.

40. DEED-Certificate of Acknowledgment.-If the acknowledgment of a married woman to a deed or other instrument is correctly made, but defectively certified, such certificate of acknowledgment may be reformed by judgment of the district court, under the provisions of title 6 of chapter 3 of the Civil Code, so as to make the certificate correctly state the acknowl edgment.-BUNNELL & ENO INV. Co. v. CURTIS, Idaho, 51 Pac. Rep. 767.

41. DEED-Description.-If a direction or course given in a deed is impossible or senseless, it must be omitted or disregarded; and, if the other calls or parts of the description are sufficient to identify the land conveyed, the deed, must be sustained.-BROSE V. BOISE CITY RAILWAY & TERMINAL CO., Idaho, 51 Pac. Rep. 753.

42. DEEDS-Resulting Trust.-The fact that a deed, absolute on its face, was made only as security for a loan, may be shown by parol, and the deed will be re garded as a mortgage, from which the real owner of the property may redeem.--VANDERHOVEN V. ROMAINE, N. J., 39 Atl. Rep. 129.

43. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-Decree of Distribu tion. The fact that trustees of a legacy have been au thorized by the court to receive in lieu of the legacy certain other property in no way affects the right of the court of probate in making a distribution under the will.-GOAD V. MONTGOMERY, Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 681. 44. DEVISE-Ademption.-A devise of two particular ground rents, in trust, with provision, "Should said ground rents, or either of them, be paid off at any time. I order and direct my executors to invest the proceeds, and hold the same on the same trusts," does not carry a ground rent purchased by the testator with part of the principal of one of said ground rents paid testator after execution of the will.-HARSHAW V. HARSHAW, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 89.

45. DIVORCE-Community Property.-When a decree of divorce is entered, and no order is made concerning community property, the husband and wife become tenants in common of land in which they had a com munity interest.-SOUTHWESTERN MFG. Co. v. SWAN, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 813.

46. DIVORCE-Separation from Bed and Board-Evidence. The separation from bed and board, prelimi. nary, under our law, of the decree dissolving the mar. riage, cannot be based on the mere general statement of witnesses that the defendant spouse has ill treated the other, or that their living together is insupportable. It is for the court, on proof of the acts or con. duct of the defendant spouse constituting the alleged ill-treatment, to determine whether the cause for the separation exists.-OGDEN V. HEBERT, La., 22 South. Rep. 919.

47. DOWER-Vested Rights.-1 Rev. Laws 1825, p. 333, providing that the widow shall not "be entitled to dower in any lands, tenements or hereditaments until all just debts due or to become due by her deceased husband have been paid," has no bearing in favor of anyone except a creditor of the estate to whom a debt is owing; and a breach of warranty or of a covenant against incumbrances does not create such a debt as would bar a widow from asserting dower in land con. veyed by her husband without her joining.-BARTLETT V. BALL, Mo., 43 S. W. Rep. 783.

48. ELECTION-Contested Election Proceedings.-Rev. St. 1895, art. 1383 et seq., authorizing an appeal or writ of error to be taken from judgments rendered in "civil cases," do not apply to a contested election proceed. ing under the statute, as it is not a civil case.-BUCK. LER V. TURBEVILLE, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 810.

49. EVIDENCE-Res Gestæ.-In an action for damages for injuries caused by the falling of an elevator, statements of the elevator boy as to the cause of the fall, made after the plaintiff had been taken from the elevator, formed no part of the res geste.-LISSAK V. CROCKER ESTATE CO., Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 688.

50. EXECUTION-Exemptions-Proceeds of Life Insurance Policy.-The proceeds of a life insurance policy, after it has been paid to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured, is not exempt from being applied to the payment of the debts of the said benefi. clary by garnishment or other legal process, under chapter 163, Laws 1895.-REIGHART V. HARRIS, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 788.

51. EXECUTION-Satisfaction.-Where an execution is levied upon the property of the defendant, and at a sale had in pursuance of the levy the property brings a sum equal to, or greater than, the amount due upon the execution, such sale satisfies the judgment; and the process is thenceforth functus officio, whether marked "Satisfied" or not.-JINKS V. AMERICAN MORTG. CO. OF SCOTLAND, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 609.

52. FEDERAL COURTS-Jurisdiction-Citizenship.-A white person, a citizen of the United States, who, by intermarriage with an Indian, becomes by adoption a member of the Cherokee Nation, does not thereby cease to be a citizen of the United States, but such adoption ousts the jurisdiction of the federal court over suits between the adopted member and other members of his tribe, and confers exclusive jurisdic tion thereof on the tribal courts; andja subsequent nnauthorized naturalization of such person does not affect his legal status.-RAYMOND V. RAYMOND, U. S. C. O. of App., Eighth Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 721.

53. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Party Walls.-Under Ann. Code, § 2434, providing that an estate in land for a term of more than one year cannot be conveyed, except by a conveyance in writing, signed and delivered, parties cannot, by a parol contract, agree that a wall to be built equally on land belonging to each of them in severalty shall be the sole property of one.-WEEMS V. MAYFIELD, Miss., 22 South. Rep. 892.

54. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Burden of Proof.Where an alleged fraudulent purchaser of a stock of goods brings replevin against an attaching creditor of the vendor, and a fraudulent Intent on the part of the vendor is shown, the burden is on plaintiff in replevin to show, by other evidence than notes alleged to evi. dence the debt for which the goods were sold, that the sale was for a bona fide and adequate consideration.FOSTER V. HAGLIN, Ark., 43 S. W. Rep. 763.

55. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Chattel Mortgage.A chattel mortgage upon a stock of merchandise, taken in good faith to secure a valid debt of greater amount than the value of the goods, is not fraudulent per se because the note described in the mortgage is payable in installments running through a period of 35 months after the date of the mortgage.-SYMNS GROCERY Co. v. SMITH, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 803.

56. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Instructions.-In the trial of an action by a creditor to set aside and cancel a fraudulent conveyance, it was inaccurate, and there. fore erroneous, to charge that if the debtor made the conveyance with intention to "delay, hinder and defraud" his creditors, it would be void. The acts void. ing the conveyance should have been stated disjunctively. Stating them conjunctively imposed upon the creditor a greater burden than the law does.-EVANS V. COLEMAN, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 645.

57. GARNISHMENT-Liability of Garnishee.-A garnishing plaintiff can recover judgment against the gar nishee upon such demands only as the defendant could himself enforce by suit against the garnishee. A judg. ment in favor of the garnishing plaintiff against the garnishee, based upon mere contract relations of the latter to the defendant, where there has been no breach of contract which would give the defendant the right to recover, is therefore erroneous.-BUTLER V. BIllups, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 615.

58. GUARANTY-Notice of Acceptance.-An offer of a continuing guaranty, executed by the guarantor at the special request of the agent of the person to whom the guaranty is addressed, and delivered to such agent, who accepts same, and agrees to make advances thereon to the person for whose benefit the guaranty is executed, requires no further notice of acceptance in order to bind the guarantor.-FERST V. BLACKWELL, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 892.

Conditions

60. INSURANCE Estoppel-Waiver.-A policy of fire insurance issued by defendant to plaintiff upon merchandise stipulated that the policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed thereon, should be void "if (any usage or custom of trade or manufacture to the contrary notwithstanding) there be kept, used or allowed, on the above described prem. ises, gasoline," and that no representative of the company should have power to waive any provision ex. cept, in certain cases, by indorsement. In an action on the policy it was alleged in the reply that while plaintiff, a dealer in stoves, had been in the habit, according to general custom, of bringing a small quantity of gasoline to his store from time to time to illustrate the operation of gasoline stoves, this practice and custom were well known to defendant's agent who took the application and issued the policy, and also, both before and after its issue, to the local board of underwriters of which defendant or its agent were members: Held that, under the terms of the policy, these facts could not operate against the defendant either as estoppel or waiver.-FISCHER V. LONDON & L. FIRE INS. CO., U. S. C. C., D. (Ky.), 83 Fed. Rep. 807. 59. HOMESTEAD Bringing within City Limits.Plaintiffs set apart a four-acre block as their rural homestead, under Rev. St. art. 2403. They divided the block into three lots inclosed by fences, and erected a house on each lot, and lived in one of the houses, and rented the others, applying the rentals to their sup. port: Held, that the whole block was exempt to them as a homestead, though it became included within the limits of an adjacent city, where the city extended its boundary lines without their consent.-WILDER V. Mc. CONNELL, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 807.

building in which they were contained fell, the burden is on the insurer to prove as a defense that it fell be. fore the fire.-WESTERN Assur. Co. OF TORONTO v. J. H. MOHLMAN Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 811.

pair a wrong he had done the girl, yielded a reluctant and passive consent to the performance of a marriage ceremony,-held, that a case is not presented which justifies a court of justice in annulling the marriage which was thus brought about.-COLLINS V. RYAN, La.,

62. INSURANCE Policy showed that an insurance policy was in the possession of the agent who wrote it, but no notice was served on him to produce it; and although he testified that he did not know where it was, and could not find it, he did not show that he had made a bona fide, diligent search for it in the place where it was most likely to be: Held, that secondary evidence as to the contents of the policy was inadmissible.-PHOENIX ASSUR. Co. OF LONDON V. MCARTHOR, Ala., 22 South. Rep. 903.

63. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-Invalid Contract.-A contract entered into between a railroad company and a ticket broker, whereby the latter was enabled to sell tickets to individuals, over the company's lines leading from this to another State, at less than the estab lished rate for the sale of tickets by its regular agents between the same points, and for the same accommodations, is in violation of the act of congress "to regu. late commerce," approved February 4, 1887.-RALEIGH & G. R. Co. v. SWANSON, Ga., 28 8. E. Rep. 601.

64. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease of Life Estate.-A lease for a term of years of land in part of which, as shown by the lease, the lessor had only a life estate, is not terminated by his death, possession of the premises during the term of the lease being guarantied; all covenants being made binding on executors, administrators, and assigns, and the guaranty being made good by instrument executed by the remainder-men. -LAKE ERIE GAS, COAL & COKE Co. v. PATTERSON, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 68.

65. LIBEL Identity of Plaintiff.-In an action for libel, plaintiff's identity as the party intended is suffi. ciently established, in the absence of proof to the contrary, when he testifies that his name is the same, and that he was employed by the same company at the time, as alleged in the libelous statement, and that he had been accosted on the street by a gentleman, who referred to him as the person mentioned in the statement.-INTERNATIONAL FRATERNAL ALLIANCE OF BALTIMORE CITY V. MALLALIEU, Md., 39 Atl. Rep. 93.

66. LIBEL AND SLANDER · Privilege.-In a suit on a life insurance policy, the defense was that the insured was still living. The company alleged a conspiracy on the part of the plaintiff and her husband, the insured, to defraud the company, and that plaintiff and her attorneys "have no knowledge or information whatever of the death of [insured], but have alleged that [insured] is dead, for the sole purpose of carrying out the agreement, conspiracy, and fraud herein before set out:" Held libelous and not privileged.-UNION MUT. LIFE INS. Co. V. THOMAS, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 803.

67. LIFE INSURANCE-Assignment of Policy-Waiver. -The secretary of a life insurance company directed an assignee of a policy to communicate with the com. pany's general agent in regard to his assignment and notice to the company, and the assignee then sent the policy and assignments to said agent's office by mes. senger. The papers were presented to a clerk, who examined them, and appeared to make entries in a book, and then returned the papers to the messenger: Held, that whether there was a waiver of a provision in the policy that the company would take no notice of any assignment till it had been furnished with a duplicate or certified copy thereof, was for the jury.— CORCORAN V. NEW YORK MUT. LIFE INS. Co., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 50.

68. MARRIAGE-Annulment - Duress.-The proof dis closing that the relations of the defendant insisted upon the plaintiff marrying her, believing that he had seduced and ruined her, and that to marry her was his duty under the circumstances; and further, that the plaintiff, upon due consideration of the pressure which was brought to bear upon him, and of his duty to re

69. MORTGAGES After-acquired Property Condi. tional Sales.-Machinery constituting the complete steam plant and motive power of a street railroad, when placed in its power house, becomes an integral part of the property, as a railroad system, and passes under a mortgage, previously executed and recorded, covering the entire road and plant, constructed and to be constructed, though such machinery was placed in the building under a contract by which the seller re served title until full payment was received therefor, which payment has never been made.-PHOENIX IRON WORKS Co. v. NEW YORK SECURITY & TRUST CO., U.S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 757.

70. MORTGAGES Foreclosure-Redemption.-A stat ute which authorizes the redemption of real property sold under foreclosure of a mortgage, where no right of redemption previously existed, or which extends the period of redemption beyond the time formerly allowed, cannot constitutionally apply to a sale under a mortgage executed before its passage.-PARIS V. NORDBURG, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 799.

71. MORTGAGES Purchase of Tax Certificate.-If a junior mortgagee of real property, which is not worth the amount due on the prior mortgage, pays delinquent taxes thereon, the senior mortgagee cannot se cure a decree in equity restraining him from obtaining a tax deed, without reimbursing him for such pay ment.-ALLISON V. CORSON, U. S. C. C., D. (S. Dək.), 83 Fed. Rep. 752.

72. MORTGAGE LIEN-Merger.-While at law one cannot have a lien on his own property, yet, in order to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity may, and will sometimes, intervene to keep a lien outstanding which otherwise might have been extinguished by a merger of the lien with the title; but, in order to in voke such powers, proceedings to have this done must be instituted in the first instance, and before the prop erty covered by such lien, in a proceeding at law, to which the holder thereof is a party, is subjected to other legal liens.-BEARDEN V. CARTER MERCHANDISE Co., Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 678.

73. MORTGAGES Stipulation for Attorney's Fee.The stipulation that the fees of the attorneys of the mortgage creditors shall be due in case the note, after maturity, is put into the hands of the attorney, is valid. -HANSEN V. THEIR CREDITORS, La., 22 South. Rep. 923. 74. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-False Imprisonment.A municipal corporation is not liable, in an action for false imprisonment, for damages alleged to have been occasioned to the plaintiff by reason of his imprison ment under a judgment rendered against him by a municipal court for the violation of an ordinance, and this is true though such judgment may have been ir regular, erroneous, or even void.-BARTLETT V. CITY OF COLUMBUS, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 599.

75. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Incorporation-Jurisdiction. It must so appear that a petition signed by a majority of the electors of an unincorporated town or village, accompanied by proof that it had been pub lished as required by law, was presented to the board to give it jurisdiction to act; and a city government based upon an order of the board without such juris dictional facts so appearing may be a corporation de facto, but not de jure.-KANSAS TOWN & LAND CO. v. ALLEN, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 804.

76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Legislative Authority. -The fact that a city, in erecting a dam for its water supply across a stream, is acting under legislative a thority, is no defense to an action for damages brought against the city, by the owner of land along which the stream runs, for injuries to his land caused by the erection of the dam.-MAYOR, ETC. OF BALTIMORE V. MERRYMAN, Md., 39 Atl. Rep. 98.

-

77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Policemen Negli. gence. A city is not answerable in damages for the negligence of its officers while exercising its police power.-STINNETT V. CITY OF SHERMAN, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 847.

78. MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS-Special Assessments. -The cost and damages occasioned by an expensive wall embankment, erected in a street for the sole purpose of giving access thereto to certain private prop erty, cannot be assessed against other private property abutting on such street.-IN RE WICK ST., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 3.

79. NEGLIGENCE Contributory Negligence.-No one is entitled to relief from the consequences of neglecting to exercise ordinary care for his own protection and safety, because failure to do so arose from an emergency brought about by his own act in voluntarily placing himself in a situation of peril.-BRISCOE V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 638.

80. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCEProximate Cause.-In an action against a natural gas company it appeared that plaintiff was driving, in the night, along a highway; that one wheel scraped an iron gas pipe, which, it was alleged, defendant had permitted to remain on the wagon track; that the mare he was driving took fright, and kicked over the cart; that plaintiff's knee was badly injured, probably by a kick by the mare: Held, that the question whether defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the Injury was for the jury.-POTTER V. NATURAL GAS CO., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 7.

81. NUISANCE Evidence. The owner of a livery stable so constructed that, when used with proper care and caution, it would not reasonably cause such phys. ical discomfort of persons of ordinary sensibility, tastes, and habits, living in an adjoining house, as to constitute a nuisance, is not liable to the owner of such house.-METROPOLITAN SAV. BANK OF BALTIMORE CITY V. MANION, Md., 39 Atl. Rep. 90.

Dissolution

82. PARTNERSHIP Contracts Parol Evidence. On the dissolution of a partnership, the partners effected an absolute settlement, and determined the amount to which each was entitled. The retiring member conveyed to the other his entire interest, and the remaining member, by the same writ ten instrument, assumed the liabilities, and agreed to pay the retiring partner the balance due him, according to certain terms therein expressed, for which he at the time made his notes. In an action on one of such notes, it appeared that the writings referred to contained no ambiguities, but were plain and certain; and no fraud, accident, or mistake was claimed: Held, that parol evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of such writings.-YOCUM V. CARY, I. T., 43 S. W. Rep.

756.

83. POWER OF ATTORNEY-Execution.-A donee of a power may execute it by an instrument which does not refer to the power itself; and the execution will be valid when it appears, from the instrument or the attending circumstances, that the act was done by virtue of and with the intention to act under the power conferred.-HILL V. CONRAD, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 789.

84. PROCESS-Summons-Amendment.-When a summons commanding the defendant to answer on the first day of the next spring term of the court, correct in other respects, contained the unnecessary clause, "which will be on March 25, 1895," when the term com. menced on the 1st day of April, it was error, and an abuse of discretion, to refuse to allow the summons to be amended by striking out said clause, and to dismiss the action.-LOWENSTEIN V. GAINES, Ark., 43 S. W. Rep.

762.

85. RAILROAD COMPANY-Collision of Cars of Different Lines.-Act April 4, 1868 (P. L. 58), § 1, declaring that when any person shall be injured while lawfully employed on the road of a railroad company, of which company he is not an employee, his right of action against it shall be such only as he would have if an employee of it, has no application to the case of a con

ductor of one street car company injured while in his car on the track of his company by collision with the car of another company, caused by the negligent attempt of the motorman of the latter to cross in front of his car.-WETZEL V. PHILADELPHIA TRACTION CO., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 1.

86. RAILROAD COMPANY-Fires on Right of Way.-The fact that a railroad company supplies its engines with the most approved apparatus for preventing the emis. sion of sparks, and that its engines are operated with skill, does not relieve the company from liability for fires caused by negligently permitting combustible material to accumulate along its right of way.-TUT. WILER V. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. Co., Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 597.

87. RAILROAD COMPANY - Injuries -Negligence.-At public crossings, the rights of a railroad company and persons upon the highway are mutual, co-extensive and reciprocal, qualified only by the prior right of way of a moving train.-SOUTHERN RY. Co. v. TORIAN, Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 569.

88. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads-CrossingStreet railways may diverge from the street for a short distance to avoid grade crossings.-PENNSYLVANIA R. Co. v. GLENWOOD & D. ELECTRIC ST. RY. Co., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 80.

89. RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-Boundary.-A lawful entry, appropriation and exclusive occupancy for 21 years by a railroad company for a right of way, of land not exceeding the width of the lawful limit, settle the boundary of the easement, there being no monuments or survey to indicate the extent of the original taking. -ZAHN V. PITTSBURGH, ETC. RY. Co., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 24.

90. RECEIVERS.-The appointment of a receiver is a harsh remedy, and one to which, in such cases, resort should not be had, except where the interests of creditors are exposed to manifest peril.-DOZIER V. LOGAN, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 613.

91. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Citizenship. - Whether a cause is removable to the United States circuit court as a controversy between citizens of different States, must be determined from the face of the record, i. e., the original petition and the one for removal.-DUNCAN V. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. Co., La., 22 South. Rep. 924.

92. RES JUDICATA.-In a judgment in a case between these parties, upon one note of a series of three given at the same time to secure one entire debt, but payable in one, two and three years, it was determined that the defendant was surety thereon, and was released by a material change in the contract made by the plaintiff company and the principal makers: Held, that the judgment is conclusive in this action upon the other notes of the series. -PERU PLOW & WHEEL Co. v. WARD, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 805.

93. RES JUDICATA.-A defense in replevin being that there were fraudulent representations, whereby title to the goods did not pass to plaintiff, fraud is an issue, so that judgment for plaintiff bars a suit by defendant to enjoin the judgment on the ground of such fraudu. lent misrepresentations, though new and additional evidence is introduced.-RAUWOLF V. GLASS, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 79.

94. SALE-Breach of Warranty-Damages.-The dam. ages sustained where defendants purchased from plaintiff, under a contract of sale, subject to the warranties declared under Civ. Code, §§ 1768 1771, two car loads of hams, which proved unmerchantable, and which defendants were compelled to sell at reduced prices, would be, where the contract price was not all paid, the difference between the amount the hams should have sold for if up to the standard agreed upon and the price actually realized, less the balance due on the contract price together with the cost of freight and smoking, which charges defendants were to pay.SILBERHORN Co. V. WHEATON, Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 689.

95. SALES-Damages. For failure to deliver to the buyer drugs shipped to a certain place, there to be de.

livered to him, damages in loss of time spent by the buyer in preparing for, and awaiting the arrival of, the goods, including the expense of hiring a certain doctor in preparation therefor, the loss being limited to the time elapsing between the arrival of the goods at the place for their delivery and the beginning of an action to recover therefor, are not too remote.-MOFFETTWEST DRUG Co. v. BYRD, I. T., 43 S. W. Rep. 864.

96. SALES-Evidence-Depositions.-An unsigned or der sheet, containing a description of certain goods to be used in constructing defendant's house, which was made out by plaintiff's agent at the time the verbal transaction regarding the delivery of the goods took place between the agent, defendant and the contractor building the house, is admissible, as part of the res geste, to show what actually did take place.-WATSON V. WINSTON, Tex., 43 8. W. Rep.1852.

97. SEALS.-There is no distinction between actual seals and scrolls, so far as constituting a writing a specialty, and either may be affixed to the signature.BRADLEY SALT Co. v. NORFOLK IMPORTING & EXPORTING CO., Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 567.

98. SHERIFF-Civil Process-Escape of Prisoner.— Under a city charter which provides that the sheriff of the city shall be liable to the same suits or penalties for neglect of duty as sheriffs by law now are, and that the city shall be liable for the defaults of its sheriff in his office, where such sheriff negligently permits the escape of one arrested under a civil process placed in his hands the measure of damages for which the city is liable is the actual loss which the aggrieved party has suffered by reason of the default.-SWAN V. CITY of BRIDGEPORT, Conn., 39 Atl. Rep. 110.

99. SLANDER-Privileged Communications.-A statement made by a member of a council in discussing a claim which was in judgment against the borough, charging the claimant with having committed perjury in another matter foreign to the one under discussion, is not a privileged communication, and no proof of ex. press malice is necessary, - MCGAW v. HAMILTON, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 4.

100. TAXATION-Capital Stock of Corporation-Basis of. In appraising the capital stock of corporation for taxation, the average selling price of the shares of stock during the tax year should be taken as the basis, and not the average amount paid in by the shareholders on their stock during the year.-COMMONWEALTH V. PEOPLE'S TRACTION CO., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 42.

101. TRESPASS-Recovery of Judgment Against CoTrespasser.-A plea by defendant in an action for trespass, that the plaintiff had theretofore recovered a judgment against a co trespasser, is sufficient, without averring that the judgment had been satisfied.-PETTICOLAS V. CITY OF RICHMOND, Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 566.

102. TRIAL-Special Verdicts. -Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 5141, provides: "A special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only. It must present the facts as established by the evidence, and not the evidence to prove them, and they must be so presented as that nothing remains to the court but to draw from them conclusions of law:" Held, that when neither party has requested a special verdict, and the jury unequivo cally disagree on a general verdict, the court may afterwards submit questions to the jury calling for a special verdict alone, by which the jury finds the facts only.-WILLIAMS V. LOVE, I. T., 43 S. W. Rep. 856.

103. TRUST-Active Trust. A will providing that testator's property be divided in equal shares among his children, with the condition that G "shall only receive the interest of his share, or as much as in times of sickness or accident my executor will give him to meet his wants," creates an active trust as to his share, by reason of the discretion vested in the trustee.-IN RE KREBS' ESTATE, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 66.

104. TRUSTS-Declaration.-An instrument signed by M, and reciting: "By the request of my dear brother, my house is to be sold at my death, and the

proceeds to be divided between" two certain charit able institutions, is a sufficient declaration of trust, as against the heirs of M, as to property which her brother devised to her with such request.-IN RE MCAULEY'S ESTATE, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 31.

105. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Misrepresentation Evidence. Misrepresentation as to value of land, knowingly made by the vendor to the vendee, is not actionable unless the vendee was fraudulently induced to forbear inquiry.-GUSTAFSON V. RUSTEMEYER, Conn., 39 Atl. Rep. 104.

106. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Misrepresentations by Vendors. Where the purchasers of land were given an opportunity to examine it, but neglected to do so, a statement by the vendors that the land was available for building purposes would be merely the expression of an opinion, and not such a misrepresentation as would entitle the purchaser to a rescission of the con tract. WREN V. MONCURE, Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 588.

107. VENDOR AND PURCHASER - Title- Warranty.Where a vendee possessed all the information as to title that was possessed by the vendors, and expressed himself satisfied therewith, and his means of knowl edge was equal to theirs, and he availed himself of it, he cannot have relief for failure of title, although he may have relied on the vendors' representations.HAWKINS V. WELLS, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 816.

108. WASTE-Purchaser at Execution Sale.-A pur chaser of land at execution sale is the absolute owner of the land, and of all right and interest in it, subject only to a right of repurchase outstanding in judgment creditors of the defendant in execution and others, and is not liable to the redemptioner for waste.O'CONNOR V. BANK OF ATTALLA, Ala., 22 South. Rep. 902.

109. WATERS-Navigable Stream- What Constitutes. -The navigability of a river does not depend upon its susceptibility to improvement by high engineering skill, and the expenditure of vast sums of money, but upon its present natural conditions.-UNITED STATES V. RIO GRANDE DAM & IRRIGATION CO., N. Mex., 51 Pac. Rep. 674.

110. WILLS-Charitable Bequests-When Void.-A be quest of the residue of an estate "to be divided among such benevolent, charitable and religious institutions and associations as shall be selected by my execu tors," is not void for uncertainty.-IN RE MURPHY'S ESTATE, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 70.

111. WILLS-Contest-Evidence.-But little weight is to be attached to the opinion of witnesses who state that testator was not competent to transact business, when they show that they had dealings with him at the very time at which they state that he was incom petent.-MESSNER V. ELLIOTT, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 46.

112. WILLS-Residuum-Per Capita.-The residuary clause of a will was as follows: "All the rest and resi due of my estate, real, personal and mixed, I desire shall go to, and be divided in equal parts among, those who would be my heirs-at-law, under the statute of descents and distributions in Virginia, in case I had died intestate:" Held, that the heirs at law inherited under this clause per capita, and not per stirpes.WALKER V. WEBSTER, Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 570.

113. WILL-Unexecuted Will-Validity.-When a person desiring to make his last will called in his family physician and a neighbor, and the latter, in the pres ence of the three, at the dictation of the testator, wrote six clauses of the will, which were read over to and approved by the testator, when, upon being inter rupted, the testator postponed finishing the will until the next day, and on the next day the testator was in no condition to complete the will, and died within a short time, without again being in a condition to com plete it, and it appeared that the provisions of the will, so far as completed, were the final determination of deceased, which remained unchanged until his death, the writing is a good and valid will as to the personal property devised, but void as to the real estate. ORGAIN V. IRVINE, Tenn., 43 S. W. Rep. 768.