60. INSURANCE-Place of Contract.-Where a policy of life insurance was originally a Rhode Island contract, the fact that after it had lapsed a beneficiary under it, who resided in Massachusetts, made an applica. tion for its revival, and conducted negotiations there. for on her part, and received back the revived policy, and paid the premiums, in the latter State, did not render the policy, as revived, a Massachusetts contract; it appearing that the insured still remained the only party contracting with defendant company, and that she continued a resident of Rhode Island until her death.-BOTTOMLEY V. METRopolitan LiFE INS. CO., Mass., 49 N. E. Rep. 438.

61. JUDGMENT-Collateral Attack.-A judgment of confirmation of an assessment, reciting that the commissioners appointed to make the assessment have complied with law in certain particulars, is a finding of facts by the court, giving it jurisdiction, which cannot be collaterally attacked.-YOUNG V. PEOPLE, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 503.

62. JUDGMENT-Erroneous Judgment Entry.-A judg. ment entered in favor of Joel H. Bailey, Henry J. Davis and Elton B. Gifford, composing the firm of "Joel J. Davis & Co.," is not invalid, though the firm name was "Joel J. Bailey & Co."-BAILEY V. CRITTENDEN, Tex., 448. W. Rep. 404.

63. JUDGMENT-Foreign Judgments-Validity.-A default judgment between citizens of a foreign country, rendered by a court of that country having general jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject matter, is valid and enforceable here, though the defendants, being out of that country at the time, were not personally served.-OUSELEY V. LEHIGH VALLEY TRUST & SAFE DEPOSIT CO., U. 8. C. C., E. D. (Penn.), 84 Fed. Rep. 602. 64. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-A judgment on the merits in a State court, in an action to recover for a personal injury on the ground of negligence, is a bar to a second action in a federal court by the same plaintiff against the same defendant to recover for the same injury, and grounded on defendant's negligence in respect to the same occurrence, though additional acts of negligence are charged.-COLUMB V. WEBSTER MFG. CO., U. S. C. C. of App., First Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep.

592.

65. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-Where the original petition and an amendment made thereto, construed together, set out a claim of indebtedness upon an itemized account, and also upon promissory notes given for such account, and the court trying the case without a jury specially finds in defendant's favor as to liability upon the notes, but makes no special find. ing as to liability on the account, but renders a general judgment for costs in defendant's favor, such judgment will be held to be inclusive of the issues as to the indebtedness upon the account, and to bar an action subsequently begun to recover thereon.-JOHN V. FarWELL CO. V. LYKINS, Kan., 52 Pac. Rep. 99.

66. JUDGMENT- Res Judicata.-An order of the county court refusing judgment for one installment of a special assessment is conclusive on an application for a judg. ment for a subsequent installment of the same assessment on the same property, where the finding in the first proceeding was that the ordinance on which the assessment was based was invalid.-MARKLEY V. PEOPLE, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 502.

67. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Crops-Lien of Execu. tion. Where the owner of land proposes to another person to rent him land, and agrees to take therefor so much money, or a part of the crop, and such person accepts neither proposition, but enters upon the land and makes a crop thereon, he is a tenant, and not a cropper. Being a tenant, the title to the crops made by him is vested in him, and not in the landlord; and as against a claim of title by the landlord, or those claiming in privity with him, the crops are subject to execution against the tenant.-TAYLOR V. CONEY, Ga., 28 8. E. Rep. 974.

68. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Double Damages for Wrongful Distress.-To authorize the recovery of

double damages for a distress for rent not due, the petition must recite the statute, or conclude to the damage of the plaintiff contrary to the form of the statute.-GARNETT V. JENNINGS, Ky., 44 S. W. Rep. 382. 69. LIMITATIONS-Laches.-The statute of limitations does not run in favor of one collecting money under foreclosure of mortgage where the mortgage provided that all money derived from the foreclosure should be held by him as trustee for the bondholder, so long as he asserts no claim hostile to the bondholder, though no demand for the money is made.-JONES V. HENDER. SON, Ind., 49 N. E. Rep. 443.

70. LIMITATIONS-Nuisance.-If a structure is not necessarily and of itself a permanent and continuing nuisance, but only becomes such in consequence of some supervening cause, which produces special injury at different periods, a separate action lies for each injury thus occasioned, and the statute of limitations begins to run against such cause of action only from the time of its accrual.-CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA V. LOMBARD, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 994.

71. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.-Under Code Proc. 1870, § 96, providing that the limitations of actions prescribed therein shall not apply, where the right of action has already accrved, a bond and mortgage executed before the adoption of the Code, but with no payments due thereon until after the Code had gone into effect, is within the Code.-JENNINGS V. PEAY, S. Car., 28 S. E. Rep. 949.

72. MASTER AND SERVANT-Defective Machinery.-A personal injury case proceeded on the theory that plaintiff, employee, was injured while operating a stone planer, which was defective because a belt was too loose to raise the cross-head without being tempo. rarily tightened by pressure. Plaintiff was instructed to apply this pressure, when needed, by an iron bar held in his hands. When not in use the belt ran on an idler, and was mechanically shifted to the tight pulley. The special verdict found that plaintiff was injured while pressing on the belt as it ran on the idler, but did not find that this was part of his duty: Held, that plaintiff could not recover.-PHILLIPS V. ROMONA OOLITIC STONE CO., Ind., 49 N. E. Rep. 467.

73. MASTER AND SERVANT-Warning of Danger.-The habitual disregard of a notice warning employees of danger may have the effect of suspending or waiving the notice.-MCNEE v. COBURN TROLLEY TRACK CO., Mass., 49 N. E. Rep. 437.

74. MECHANICS' LIENS.-Defendant completed a pipe line, and then planned to construct a canal, of six times greater capacity, to run from the river to the head waters of the pipe line, and then to follow the line of the pipe line for a considerable distance, after which he intended to take up the pipe line, but he constructed the canal only to said head waters: Held, that the canal, as built, was a completed structure, within Code Civ. Proc. § 1183, entitling a furnisher of materials therefor to a mechanic's lien thereon without claiming a lien on the pipe line.-PACIFIC ROLLING MILL CO. V. BEAR VALLEY IRR. CO., Cal., 52 Pac. Rep.

136.

75. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Priority Over Mortgage.-When a building contract was made, a bank held a mortgage on part of the premises of which the contractor had no knowledge. Subsequently the bank took a new mortgage, of which the amount of the old mortgage formed a part, without the knowledge of the contractors. The balance of the money secured by this mortgage was used by the owner of the premises in paying the contractors: Held, that the bank had no equity to have its mortgage declared superior to the mechanic's lien. -EASTON V. BROWN, Mass., 49 N. E. Rep. 433.

76. MECHANICS' LIENS-Property Affected.-Plaintiff, employed by lessees of adjoining buildings, cut a door. way between them, and fitted a bar to the floor and walls, the bar being the lessor's property. He also furnished materials, which he used in papering and painting parts of the buildings: Held, that after the

lessees had forfeited their lease, plaintiff could not en. force a mechanic's lien, as Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2133, 2134, provide that if the persons who caused a building to be constructed or repaired owned less than the fee in the land, only his interest therein is subject to a mechanic's lien.-STENBERG V. LIENNEMANN, Mont., 52 Pac. Rep. 84.

77. MORTGAGES-Defenses-Bona Fide Purchasers.That the notary who took the acknowledgment of a mortgage was disqualified by reason of interest cannot be set up in defense to the mortgage in the hands of a bona fide purchaser of the notes secured, where there was nothing on the face of the instrument, or known to him collaterally, to give notice of such infirmity.JARVIS CONKLIN MORTGAGE TRUST CO. v. WILLHOIT, U. S. C. C., E. D. (Tenn.), 84 Fed. Rep. 514.

78. MORTGAGES Rescission for Fraud.-A foreign mortgage company, through correspondents acting in its behalf, made a loan on a farm, and two years later accepted a deed for the land in satisfaction of the debt. When the loan was made the land was examined for the company by its local correspondent, and also a general examiner, both of whom were familiar with the value of lands in the vicinity. When the convey. ance was taken an examination was made by another general representative: Held, that under such facts the company could not maintain a suit against the mortgagor and a former mortgagee, who received the proceeds of the loan, for a rescission, on the ground of a conspiracy between them to defraud it by means of overvaluation.-HAWKINS V. BRITISH & A. MORTG. Co. OF LONDON, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep. 526.

79. MORTGAGES - Right of Redemption.-One who makes an absolute deed of property to secure his debt is not barred from asserting his equity of redemption, though, when he made the mortgage, he had in mind the design to defraud creditors.-OVER V. CAROLUS, III., 49 N. E. Rep. 514.

80. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES Parties General Creditors. Mere general creditors are neither necessary nor proper parties to a suit to foreolose a mortgage; and if permitted by the court merely to file an intervening petition, without tendering any issue or asking leave to file an answer or other pleading, such intervener has no standing in court to question the validity of the foreclosure sale.-LOUISVILLE Trust Co. v. LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep. 539.

81. MORTGAGE OF HOMESTEAD.-The joining of the guardian of an insane spouse, under an order of the probate court, with the sane spouse, in a mortgage on the homestead, is not such joint consent as is contem. plated by the constitutional provision relating to incumbering the homestead, and the mortgage is void.LOCKE V. REDMOND, Kan., 52 Pac. Rep. 97.

82. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Interest after Maturity.-Since there is nothing in Act April 24, 1858 (St. 1858, p. 267), providing in sections 35, 37, 38, 40, for an issue of city bonds bearing 6 per cent. annual interest, which, with the principal, is directed to be paid by the treasurer, when due, from the interest and sinking fund therein provided for, to show an intention that interest shall cease upon maturity of the bonds, interest can be col. lected on the bonds after maturity, and a writ of man. date will issue to compel the treasurer to pay such interest.-KENDALL V. PORTER, Cal., 52 Pac. Rep. 143.

83. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Annexation of Territory.-Under Ky. St. § 3665, where the required number of freeholders have remonstrated against the annexation of a new territory a judgment refusing to make the proposed annexation will not be disturbed, where the territory in question consists largely of farming lands, which will not be benefited, unless there is a reasonably clear showing that the want of the territory will hurt the town, though some parts of it, such as a depot and liquor house, should properly be annexed.-TOWN OF WILLIAMSTOWN V. MATTHEWS, Ky., 44 S. W. Rep. 387.

provements-Assignment.-The assignee of a contract with a city for the improvement of a street, having done considerable work in compliance therewith, with full knowledge of the city, was by the latter required to abandon the work and surrender possession of the street, and the city, without his consent, subsequently let the contract for the same improvement to another: Held, that although the original contract may not have been assignable, the city was liable to the assignee for the reasonable value of the work done and the amount necessarily expended in the prosecution of the work. -CITY OF DUNKIRK V. WALLACE, Ind., 49 N. E. Rep. 463.

85. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Defective Sidewalks.Where a city brought a certain highway within its cor porate limits by annexation of the territory through which it passes, it became bound to keep it in a rea sonably safe condition for travel, whether such highway was laid out and opened by the county commis. sioners, or had become such by user.-CITY OF FRANK FORT V. COLEMAN, Ind., 49 N. E. Rep. 474.

86. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Executive FunctionsLeasing Gas Works.-Supplying public places and pri vate citizens with gas for lighting purposes is not a strictly municipal function, but its power in this re spect is conferred on the city as a corporation, and need be exercised at its option only.-BAILEY V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 494.

87. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Guaranty of BondsInjunction.-Taxpayers may sue to enjoin a city from guarantying bonds, though the guaranty would be void in the hands of innocent purchasers.-LYNCHBURG & R. ST. RY. Co. v. DAMERON, Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 951.

88. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements -Damages.-The rule that, when a city undertakes to construct a culvert, it is responsible for its inadequacy, does not apply where the only matter involved is the responsibility of the city for changes in the streets which may so affect the flow of surface waters as to occasion consequential damages to adjacent property. -AICHER V. CITY OF DENVER, Colo., 52 Pac. Rep. 86.

89. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Special Assessments. -An ordinance providing for improvement of a street, and for assessment of benefits, need not show on its face whether it will prove beneficial to the property on which the assessment is levied, under Rev. St. ch. 24, art. 9, § 19, requiring the ordinance to specify the character and description of the improvement.-CUL VER V. CITY OF CHICAGO, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 573.

90. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Sewer-AssessmentsValidity.-Ground was platted by one who did not have title, and the owner afterwards, in two conveyances, described the land according to the description in the map. He also paid the taxes by such description for a period of about 20 years, without objection: Held, that he could not claim that a sewer assessment by such description was void for defective description.-HARTS V. PEOPLE, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 538.

91. MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS — Adoption of Ordi nance. The adoption of an ordinance, providing that a certain public improvement shall be made by special assessment, is an assertion by the city of its power of eminent domain to procure the property in or upon which the ordinance provides the improvement shall be made.- PEOPLE V. SASS, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 501.

92. NEGLIGENCE OF PARENT-When not Imputed to Child. The negligence of a father, as the driver of a wagon, in which his infant child was riding, in failing to keep a proper lookout for a train at a railroad cross. ing, which contributed to the occurrence of a collision in which the child was injured, is not imputable to the child so as to prevent its recovering for the injury from the railroad company, which was guilty of negligence in failing to properly guard the crossing.-KOWALSKI V. CHICAGO G. W. RY. Co., U. 8. C. C., N. D. (Iowa), 84 Fed. Rep. 586.

Abatement. When, from natural causes only, water accumulates upon land in such

quantities as that, in the process of evaporation, nox. lous and deleterious gases are emitted, which are injurious to the public health, and to the health of persons residing in the community, if the owner has not contributed by his own act to bringing about that result, he cannot be held answerable for the creation or continuance of a nuisance; nor can he be compelled, by order of the magistrates, under section 4760 of the Civil Code, to abate the nuisance resulting from such cause.-ROBERTS V. HARRISON, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 995. 94. PARTITION-Parol Partition-Adverse Possession. -A parol partition of land, followed by 15 years' ad. verse possession of the respective shares, operates as a bar to the claim of one of the original owners upon the other for a share so occupied, or will suffice to maintain an action to recover possession if plaintiff has been illegally deprived thereof.-SLONE V. GRIDER, Ky., 44 S. W. Rep. 384.

95. PARTNERSHIP-Mortgage of Co-partner.-Where a partner mortgaged his half interest in the property of the firm, which consisted of personalty, to secure his individual debt, such mortgage passed only the ultimate share of such partner which would remain, as coming to him, after payment of the firm debts and settlement of the account between the partners.SLOAN V. WILSON, Ala., 23 South. Rep. 145.

96. PLEDGES-Consideration.-A pledge of stock by a stranger to secure a debt past due, without any promise on the part of the pledgee to forbear, is without consideration.-HALDEMAN V. GERMAN SECURITY BANK, Ky., 44 S. W. Rep. 383.

97. PLEDGE-Sale by Pledgee.-The owner of stock, who has pledged the same under an agreement giving pledgees the right to sell at public or private sale, without advertisement or notice, at their discretion, cannot compel an accounting by the pledgees and purchasers of a portion of the stock, or the establishment of a trust with respect to the same, because such stock was sold for less than its value, when, a month prior to the sale complained of, other shares of the pledged stock were sold at the same price, with the consent of the owner, and at the time of the latter sale neither the pledgees nor the purchaser had knowledge of a transaction calculated to enhance its value, and the sale was conducted by the pledgees in good faith, and with regard to the interests of the owner.-SMITH V. LEE, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Iowa), 84 Fed. Rep. 557.

98. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Liability of Principal to Third Parties.-One 8, a member of a firm, was defendants' agent, which agency was distinct from the firm, who were unknown to defendants, although his profits were turned into it. S leased a building in the firm's name, which was used by him as defendants' agent, and also by the partnership. Defendants agreed with S to allow him a stated sum per month as rent: Held, that the liability of defendants for rent was to S, and that the firm could not sustain an action therefor.SAGE V. LIPPINCOTT, Mass., 49 N. E. Rep. 434.

99. PUBLIC LANDS-Conveyances-Validity.-A deed conveying unappropriated public school lands while the title remains in the State, and when the grantor has not acquired a valid claim thereto in conformity with the law governing sales of such lands, is void as against public policy.-RAYNER CATTLE Co. v. BED. FORD, Tex., 44 S. W. Rep. 410.

100. RAILROADS Receivers - Personal Injuries.-A new corporation, to which railroad property is turned over by receivers, is not liable for personal injuries sustained while the road was in their hands.-ARCHAM. BEAU V. NEW YORK & N. E. R. Co., Mass., 49 N. E. Rep.

435.

children killed on defendant's railroad track by one of its cars, which alleges a custom by the public for 10 years to use the track at the place where the injury oc. curred as a footway, as was being done by the chil dren, and that such custom was known to, and acquiesced in by, the officers of the defendant company is sufficient to require the question as to whether the children were trespassers to be tried and determined as one of fact.-ADAMS v. SOUTHERN RY. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep. 596. 103. RAILROAD COMPANY Personal Injury Willful. ness. A recovery in favor of plaintiff in an action for damages for having willfully caused the death of his intestate can be sustained only on the ground that the injury which caused such death was intentionally in flicted, or was the result of conduct which was willful on the part of defendant, and of such a character that the effects which followed must reasonably have been anticipated as the natural consequences thereof.CLEVELAND, ETC. RY. Co. v. MILLER, Ind., 49 N. E. Rep.

445.

104. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railways-Contributory Negligence.-A plaintiff may recover dam. ages for an injury caused by the defendant's negli. gence, notwithstanding the plaintiff's own negligence exposed him to the risk of injury, if such injury was proximately caused by the defendant's omission, after becoming aware of the plaintiff's danger, to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding the injury to him.-THOMPSON V. SALT LAKE RAPID TRANSIT CO., Utah, 52 Pac. Rep. 92.

105. RAILROAD RECEIVERS-Car Rentals.-When a receiver is appointed for a railroad company holding rolling stock under a car trust lease, whereby title remains in the lessor until the rental has paid the pur. chase price, the lessor is entitled to reasonable com. pensation for the use of such rolling stock by the receiver, even though the cars are afterwards returned to the lessor.-PLATT V. PHILA. & R. R. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep. 535.

106. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Diversity of Citizenship.Where a bill is filed in a State court against a trustee in a mortgage, who is a citizen of the same State as complainant, and others who are citizens of other States, to restrain a sale under the mortgage, a subsequent resignation of the trust by the trustee does not render the cause removable by the remaining defend. ants on the ground of diversity of citizenship.-RUоHS V. JARVIS CONKLIN MORT. TRUST CO., U. 8. C. C., E. D. (Tenn.), 84 Fed. Rep. 513.

107. SALES BY SAMPLE Acceptance Warranty.Sales by sample contemplate an inspection by the buyer, and an opportunity to make the inspection.PONTIAC SHOE MPG. Co. V. HAMILTON, Tex., 44 S. W. Rep. 405.

108. SALE BY SAMPLE Defenses.-Though there may be no difference, in appearance or quality, between goods sold by sample, and the sample itself, yet, where there are latent defects in both the goods and the sample, the buyer, unless he is, by the terms of the contract, or from the nature of the transaction, cut off from so doing, may set up in defense to an action against him for the price of the goods that they are ut terly worthless.-J. A. COATES & SONS V. COOK, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 982.

109. SET-OFF-Usury-National Banks.-Usurious in. terest paid on a note to a national bank cannot be set off against the principal of the note.-COMANCHE NAT. BANK V. DABNEY, Tex., 44 S. W. Rep. 413.

110. SCHOOL MEETING - Illegal Voting.-The power given the legislature by the constitution to provide for establishment of a uniform and general system of common schools carries with it the power to prescribe the qualifications of voters at school meetings and at elec tions for district officers.-STATE V. HINGLEY, Oreg., 52 Pac. Rep. 89.

pointed to vacancies in the office of sheriff shall con. tinue in office until the next general election, one ap pointed to fill the term of sheriff whose term was con ceded to expire in November, 1896, could only hold un. til after his successor qualified at the general election held in August, 1896.-DOWLING V. WHITE, Ala., 23 South. Rep. 133.

112. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Contracts-Partial IIlegality. Where a valid portion of a contract was made in consideration of the invalid part thereof, the contract is not divisible, so that a court of equity will specifically enforce the valid portion.-SOUTH CHICAGO CITY RY. Co. v. CALUMET ELEC. ST. RY. Co., Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 576.

114. STATE Liability for Torts of Agents.-The State acts in its sovereign capacity, and does not submit its action to the judgment of courts, and is not liable for the torts or negligence of its agents.-KINNARE V. CITY OF CHICAGO, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 536.

115. TAXATION-Erection of Armory-Use of National Guard. The erection of an armory for the use of the national guard is a general purpose of the State, and taxes to be devoted to that purpose must, in obedience to the requirement of section 2 of article 12 of the constitution, be levied by a uniform rule upon all the tax. able property within the State.-HUBBARD V. FITZSIM. MONS, Ohio, 49 N. E. Rep. 477.

116. TAXATION-Licenses.-An ordinance imposing a license tax upon the business of publishing a newspaper does not abridge the freedom of the press.-CIT OF NORFOLK V. NORFOLK LANDMARK PUB. CO., Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 959.

117. TAXATION-School Tax - Validity of Levy.Where a certain school district was in charge of a board of education, a certificate of levy of a school tax, signed by the members of such board as "directors," is a fatal error, under 3 Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 3706, par. 203, authorizing directors to issue certificates of the amount of tax, and page 3692, par. 166, cl. 1, giving boards of education in districts where they have suc ceeded the board of directors the same power.-CHI. CAGO & A. R. Co. v. PEOPLE, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 489.

118. TAX DEED-Validity-Recitals.-A tax deed recited that the described parcel of land was "offered for sale at public auction, and at such sale C was declared the purchaser of the whole of the herein before described property, who paid the full amount of said unpaid delinquent tax, together with the costs and charges; that said sale was conducted in the manner prescribed by law:" Held, that the deed did not show that the land was offered only as a whole, contrary to Pol. Code, § 3773, providing that the person who will take the least quantity of land and pay the taxes and costs is the purchaser.-HAYES V. DUCASSE, Cal., 52 Pac. Rep. 121.

119. TAX TITLES-Validity.-Where a tax purchaser has actual and open possession, this fact puts original owner under notice of necessity of bringing his action within the time fixed, in default of which the bar of the statute applies.-RUSSELL V. LANG, La., 23 South. Rep. 113.

120. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Assumption of Mort gage. Where the owner of land is not personally liable to a mortgagee for a mortgage thereon, and his grantee purchases relying upon that fact, and does not intend to become surety for the mortgagor nor per sonally liable for the debt, a recital in his deed that he assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage does not inure to the benefit of the mortgagee, nor give him a right to a personal judgment against said grantee in a suit to foreclose.-WARD V. DE OCA, Cal., 52 Pac. Rep. 130.

priator of water can hold only the maximum quantity which he has devoted to a beneficial use at some time within the period by which his right would otherwise be barred for non-user.-SMITH V. HAWKINS, Cal., 52 Pac. Rep. 139.

122. WATERS - Obstruction of Surface Water.-When land is not permanently injured by the construction of a railroad through it, but the damages to crops from the overflow of water, caused by the construction of the railroad and the negligent maintenance by the defendant road of ditches, recur at frequent intervals, the right of action for such damages is in the lessee of the land at the time of the injury, and not in the per son who owned the land at the time the road was constructed.-BALTIMORE & S. P. R. Co. v. HACKETT, Md., 39 Atl. Rep. 510.

123. WATER POWER-Rights of Tenants in Common.A bill by one tenant in common of a water power, against others, alleging the number of inches that each is entitled to, and that by reason of the drought there is not water enough to furnish the full amount called for by their conveyances, and alleging that defend. ants, by using the water continuously, are using, not more than the number of inches they are entitled to, but more than their proportionate part of the water then running, and praying that they be enjoined from using the water nights and Sundays, cannot be main tained till the rights of the parties are established by an action at law.-W. H. HOWELL CO. v. CHARLES POPE GLUCOSE CO., Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 497.

124. WILLS - Charitable Bequests - Uncertainty.-A bequest in a will providing for the establishment of a school at W for the education of boys, residing in the State, between the ages of 12 and 18 years, who are un able to educate themselves, is a valid charitable be quest, and not void for uncertainty, under St. 43, Eliz. ch. 4, which is in force in this State.-GRAND PRAIRIE SEMINARY V. MORGAN, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 516.

125. WILL-Charities.-A devise for masses for the re pose of the soul of testator, and the repose of the souls of other named persons, is valid as a charitable use.— HOEFFER V. CLOGAN, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep, 527.

126. WILLS-Description of Property.-A testator devised to his son 62 1-2 acres "off of the east side" of a certain quarter section of land. He owned but 62 1-2 acres in the quarter section, which consisted of the east 80 acres, less the right of way of a railroad which ran through it from north to south, and a part of a town site taken from the south end of the 80. The son owned the land adjoining the 80 acres on the west, and the testator devised him that adjoining it on the east: Held, that the words quoted should be rejected from the description, and the devise applied to the 62 1-2 acres owned by the testator, and which it was his evi dent intention to devise.-HUFFMAN V. YOUNG, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 570.

127. WILLS-Nature of Estate-Testamentary Power. -Where a testator bequeathed property to a trustee, to invest, and use the income to support a son, the lat ter to have power to dispose of the property by will in the family; and, if not so disposed of, the whole sum remaining on the death of the son to be divided among testator's other children, the latter took a vested remainder, subject to be devested by the execution of the power.-PRESIDENT & FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE V. BALCH, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 543.

128. WILL-Devise-Rule in Shelley's Case.-Where a testator devised property to one for life, with remainder in fee-simple to his heirs, the legatee takes the absolute fee in the property, under the rule in Shelley's case.-BROWN V. BRYANT, Tex., 44 S. W. Rep. 399. 129. WILL-Execution - Validity.-A paper, intended as a last will, but which was attested by only one wit ness, is void as a will, and is not entitled to probate and record as such, and a judgment ordering its pro bate gives it no effect as a will in any proceeding where its validity may be called in question.-GAY V. SANDERS, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 1019.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 29, 1898.

The opinion of Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Holden v. Hardy, involves constitutional questions of especial interest regarding what is known as the "eight hour" law applicable to workingmen. The substance of the decision is that the Utah statute forbidding the employment of workingmen for more than eight hours per day in mines and in the smelting, reduction or refining of ores or metals, is within the police power of the State, and not an unconstitutional interference with the right of private contract or a denial of due process of law or the equal protection of the laws, within the inhibition of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

This amendment was first called to the attention of the supreme court in 1872, in an attack upon the constitutionality of a law of the State of Louisiana, passed in 1869, vesting in a slaughter house company therein named the sole and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on a live-stock landing and slaughter-house business within certain limits specified in the act, and requiring all animals intended for sale and slaughter to be landed at their wharves or landing places. Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36. While the court in that case recognized the fact that the primary object of this amendment was to secure to the colored race, then recently emancipated, the full enjoyment of their freedom, the further fact that it was not restricted to that purpose was admitted both in the prevailing and dissenting opinions, and the validity of the act was sustained as a proper police regulation for the health and comfort of the people. A majority of the cases which have since arisen have turned, not upon a denial to the colored race of rights therein secured to them, but upon alleged discriminations in matters entirely outside of the political relations of the parties aggrieved. These cases are divided by Mr. Justice Brown into two classes: First, where a State legislature or a State court is alleged to have unjustly discriminated in favor of or against a particular individual or class of individuals,

as distinguished from the rest of the community, or denied them the benefit of due process of law; second, where the legislature has changed its general system of jurisprudence by abolishing what had been previously considered necessary to the proper administration of justice, or the protection of the individual. Among those of the first class, which, for the sake of brevity, may be termed "unjust discriminations," are those wherein the colored race was alleged to have been denied the right of representations upon juries (Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Virginia v. Rives, Id. 313; Ex parte Virginia, Id. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904), as well as those wherein the State was charged with oppressing and unduly discriminating against persons of the Chinese race (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275), and those wherein it was sought, under this amendment, to enforce the right of women to suffrage, and to admission to the learned professions. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.

To this class is also referable all those cases wherein the State courts were alleged to have denied to particular individuals the benefit of due process of law secured to them by the statute of the State (In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191; Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023), as well as that other large class, wherein the State legislature was charged with having transcended its proper police power in assuming to legislate for the health or morals of the community.

Cases aaising under the second class, wherein a State has chosen to change its methods of trial to meet a popular demand for simpler and more expeditious forms of administering justice, are much less numerous, though of even greater importance, than the others. A few of such cases are Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480; McMillan V. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Davidson v. New Or