FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 345 U.S. in the statute considered in Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, would by the latter case have been sustained. However, when oblique use is made of the taxing power as to matters which substantively are not within the powers delegated to Congress, the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because designedly, an attempt to control conduct which the Constitution left to the responsibility of the States, merely because Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue measure. Concededly the constitutional questions presented by such legislation are difficult. On the one hand, courts should scrupulously abstain from hobbling congressional choice of policies, particularly when the vast reach of the taxing power is concerned. On the other hand, to allow what otherwise is excluded from congressional authority to be brought within it by casting legislation in the form of a revenue measure could, as so significantly expounded in the Child Labor Tax Case, supra, offer an easy way for the legislative imagination to control "any one of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the States have never parted with Child Labor Tax Case, at 38. I say "significantly" because Mr. Justice Holmes and two of the Justices who had joined his dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, McKenna and Brandeis, JJ., agreed with the opinion in the Child Labor Tax Case. Issues of such gravity affecting the balance of powers within our federal system are not susceptible of comprehensive statement by smooth formulas such as that a tax is nonetheless a tax although it discourages the activities taxed, or that a tax may be imposed although it may effect ulterior ends. No such phrase, however fine and well-worn, enables one to decide the concrete case. What is relevant to judgment here is that, even if the history of this legislation as it went through Congress 22 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. did not give one the libretto to the song, the context of the circumstances which brought forth this enactment-sensationally exploited disclosures regarding gambling in big cities and small, the relation of this gambling to corrupt politics, the impatient public response to these disclosures, the feeling of ineptitude or paralysis on the part of local law-enforcing agencies-emphatically supports what was revealed on the floor of Congress, namely, that what was formally a means of raising revenue for the Federal Government was essentially an effort to check if not to stamp out professional gambling. A nominal taxing measure must be found an inadmissible intrusion into a domain of legislation reserved for the States not merely when Congress requires that such a measure is to be enforced through a detailed scheme of administration beyond the obvious fiscal needs, as in the Child Labor Tax Case, supra. That is one ground for holding that Congress was constitutionally disrespectful of what is reserved to the States. Another basis for deeming such a formal revenue measure inadmissible is presented by this case. In addition to the fact that Congress was concerned with activity beyond the authority of the Federal Government, the enforcing provision of this enactment is designed for the systematic confession of crimes with a view to prosecution for such crimes under State law. It is one thing to hold that the exception, which the Fifth Amendment makes to the duty of a witness to give his testimony when relevant to a proceeding in a federal court, does not include the potential danger to that witness of possible prosecution in a State court, Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 606, and, conversely, that the Fifth Amendment does not enable States to give immunity from use in federal courts of testimony given in a State court. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487. FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 345 U.S. It is a wholly different thing to hold that Congress, which cannot constitutionally grapple directly with gambling in the States, may compel self-incriminating disclosures for the enforcement of State gambling laws, merely because it does so under the guise of a revenue measure obviously passed not for revenue purposes. The motive of congressional legislation is not for our scrutiny, provided only that the ulterior purpose is not expressed in ways which negative what the revenue words on their face express and which do not seek enforcement of the formal revenue purpose through means that offend those standards of decency in our civilization against which due process is a barrier. I would affirm this judgment. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, while not joining in the entire opinion, agrees with the views expressed herein that this tax is an attempt by the Congress to control conduct which the Constitution has left to the responsibility of the States. Syllabus. UNITED STATES v. RUMELY. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 87. Argued December 11-12, 1952-Decided March 9; 1953. Respondent was secretary of an organization which, among other things, engaged in the sale of books of a political nature. He refused to disclose to a committee of Congress the names of those who made bulk purchases of these books for further distribution, and was convicted under R. S. § 102, as amended, which provides penalties for refusal to give testimony or to produce relevant papers "upon any matter" under congressional inquiry. Under the resolution empowering it to function, the Committee was "authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation; and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal Government intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation." Held: The Committee was without power to exact the information sought from respondent. Pp. 42-48. (a) To construe the resolution as authorizing the Committee to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative process, would raise doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment. P. 46. (b) The phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution is to be construed as lobbying in the commonly accepted sense of "representations made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees"; and not as extending to attempts "to saturate the thinking of the community." P. 47. (c) The scope of the resolution defining respondent's duty to answer must be ascertained as of the time of his refusal and cannot be enlarged by subsequent action of Congress. Pp. 47-48. 90 U. S. App. D. C. 382, 197 F. 2d 166, affirmed. Respondent was convicted under R. S. § 102, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 192, for refusal to give certain information to a congressional committee. The Court of Appeals reversed. 90 U. S. App. D. C. 382, 197 F. 2d 166. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 812. Affirmed, p. 48. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the main brief was Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General. With him on a reply brief was Solicitor General Cummings. Assistant Attorney General Murray, Beatrice Rosenberg and John R. Wilkins were on both briefs. Donald R. Richberg argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Alfons B. Landa and Delmar W. Holloman. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent Rumely was Secretary of an organization known as the Committee for Constitutional Government, which, among other things, engaged in the sale of books of a particular political tendentiousness. He refused to disclose to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities the names of those who made bulk purchases of these books for further distribution, and was convicted under R. S. § 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U. S. C. § 192, which provides penalties for refusal to give testimony or to produce relevant papers "upon any matter" under congressional inquiry. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. It held that the committee before which Rumely refused to furnish this information had no authority to compel its production. .90 U. S. App. D. C. 382, 197 F. 2d 166. Since the Court of Appeals thus took a view of the committee's authority contrary to that adopted by the House in citing Rumely for contempt, we granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 812. This issue whether the committee was authorized to |