the * recognized modes of transferring title against the [* 359] consent of the owner, to which we have alluded.

Interests in Expectancy.

First, it would seem that a right cannot be considered a vested right, unless it is something more than such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general laws it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand made by another. Acts of the legislature, as has been well said by Mr. Justice Woodbury, cannot be regarded as opposed to fundamental axioms of legislation, "unless they impair rights which are vested; because most civil rights are derived from public laws; and if, before the rights become vested in particular individuals, the convenience of the State procures amendments or repeals of those laws, those individuals have no cause of complaint. The power that authorizes or proposes to give, may always revoke before an interest is perfected in the donee."1 And Chancellor Kent, in speaking of retrospective statutes, says that while such a statute, "affecting and changing vested rights, is very generally regarded in this country as founded on unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void," yet that "this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not impair contracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just and reasonable, and conducive to the general welfare, even though they might operate in a degree upon vested rights." 2

And it is because a mere expectation of property in the future is not considered a vested right, that the rules of descent are held subject to change in their application to all estates not already

1 Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 213. See Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304.

v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 91; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 15 Conn. 492; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Gil

2 1 Kent, Com. 455. See Briggs man v. Cutts, 23 N. H. 376, 382.

passed to the heir by the death of the owner. No one is heir to the living; and the heir presumptive has no other reason to rely upon succeeding to the property than the promise held

out by the statute of descents. But this promise is no [* 360] * more than a declaration of the legislature as to its present view of public policy as regards the proper order of succession, — a view which may at any time change, and then the promise may properly be withdrawn, and a new course of descent be declared. The expectation is not property; it cannot be sold or mortgaged; it is not subject to debts; and it is not in any manner taken notice of by the law until the moment of the ancestor's death, when the statute of descents comes in, and for reasons of general public policy transfers the estate to persons occupying particular relations to the deceased in preference to all others. It is not until that moment that there is any vested right in the person who becomes heir, to be protected by the Constitution. An anticipated interest in property cannot be said to be vested in any person so long as the owner of the interest in possession has full power, by virtue of his ownership, to cut off the expectant right by grant or devise.1

If this be so, the nature of estates must, to a certain extent, be subject to legislative control and modification.2 In this country estates tail have been very generally changed into estates in feesimple, by statutes the validity of which is not disputed. Such. statutes operate to increase and render more valuable the interest which the tenant in tail possesses, and are not therefore open to objection by him. But no other person in these cases has any

1 In re Lawrence, 1 Redfield, Sur. Rep. 310. But after property has once vested under the laws of descent, it cannot be devested by any change in those laws. Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171. And the right to change the law of descents in the case of the estate of a person named without his consent being had, was denied in Beall v. Beall, 8 Geo. 210. post, p. 379 and notes.

See

2 Smith on Stat. and Const. Con

struction, 412.

held in Massachusetts that statutes converting existing estates in joint tenancy into estates in common were unobjectionable. They did not impair vested rights, but rendered the tenure more beneficial. Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 567; Miller v. Miller, 16 Mass. 59; Anable v. Patch, 3 Pick. 363; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick. 534.

Moreover, such statutes do no more than either tenant at the common law has a right to do, by conveying his interest to a stranger. See

8 De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch. Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, 11 S. & R.

192; Wildes v. Vanvoorhis, 16 Gray,

56.

4 On the same ground it has been 147.

vested right, either in possession or expectancy, to be affected by such change; and the expectation of the heir presumptive must be subject to the same control as in other cases.1

The cases of rights in property to result from the marriage relation must be referred to the same principle. At the common law the husband immediately on the marriage succeeded to certain rights in the real and personal estate which the wife then possessed. These rights became vested rights at once, and any subsequent alteration in the law could not take them

*

away. But other interests were merely in expectancy. [* 361] He could have a right as tenant by the courtesy initiate

in the wife's estates of inheritance the moment a child was born of the marriage, who might by possibility become heir to such estates. This right would be property, subject to conveyance and to be taken for debts; and must therefore be regarded as a vested right, no more subject to legislative interference than other expectant interests which have ceased to be mere contingencies and become fixed. But while this interest remains in expectancy merely, that is to say, until it becomes initiate,— the legislature must have full right to modify or even to abolish it. And the same rule will apply to the case of dower; though the difference in the requisites of the two estates are such that the inchoate right to dower does not become property, or any thing more than a mere expectancy at any time before it is consummated by the husband's death. In neither of these cases does the marriage alone give a vested right. It gives only a capacity to acquire a right. The same remark may be made regarding the husband's expectant interest in the after-acquired

3 Hathorn v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93; Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. And see the cases cited in the next note.

4 Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 57; Moore v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 4 Sandf. 456, and 8 N. Y. 110; Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 103, note. A doubt as to this doctrine is intimated in Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 340.

personalty of the wife; it is subject to any changes in the law made before his right becomes vested by the acquisition.1

Change of Remedies.

Again: the right to a particular remedy is not a vested right. This is the general rule; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases in which the remedy is part of the right itself. As a general rule, every State has complete control over the remedies which it offers to suitors in its courts. It may abolish one class of courts and create another. It may give a new and additional remedy for a right or equity already in existence.

it may abolish old remedies and substitute new; or [* 362] even without substituting any, if a reasonable remedy still remained. If a statute providing a remedy is repealed while proceedings are pending, such proceedings will be thereby determined, unless the legislature shall otherwise provide ; 2 and if it be amended instead of repealed, the judgment pronounced in such proceedings must be according to the law as it then stands.3 And any rule or regulation in regard to the remedy which does. not, under pretence of modifying or regulating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.1

But a vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract, or from the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away. And every man is entitled to a

give a lien on property for a prior debt, where no contract would be violated in doing so. In Towle v. Eastern Railroad, 18 N. H. 546, the power of the legislature to give retrospectively a remedy for consequential damages caused by the taking of property for a public use was denied.

1 Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N. Y. 558; Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361; Parker v. Shannohouse, 1 Phil. (N. C.) 209.

2 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492; Ludlow v. Jackson, 3 Ohio, 553; Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281; Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cranch, 329. If an act is repealed without any saving of rights, no judgment can afterwards be taken under it. French v. State, 53 Miss. 651; State v. Passaic, 36 N. J. 382; Menard County v. Kincaid, 71 Ill. 587; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, &c. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677. But it is well said in Pennsylvania that before a statute should be construed to take away the remedy for a prior injury, it should clearly appear that

Chalker

it embraces the very case.
v. Ives, 55 Penn. St. 81. And see
Newsom v. Greenwood, 4 Oreg. 119.

3 See cases cited in last note. Also Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney, 601; United States v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 151; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 21 N. Y. 99; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272; Rathbun v. Wheeler, 29 Ind. 601; State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195; Bristol v. Supervisors, &c., 20 Mich. 95; Sumner v. Miller, 64 N. C. 688.

4 See ante, pp. *287-*292; Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361.

5 Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477; Streubel v. Milwaukee and M. R. R. Co., 12 Wis. 67; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H 386; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 211; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; Ward v. Brainerd, 1 Aik. 121; Keith v. Ware, 2 Vt. 174; Lyman v. Mower, 2 Vt. 517; Kendall v. Dodge, 3 Vt. 360; State v. Auditor, &c., 33 Mo. 287; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385; Terrill v. Rankin, 3