V. The principle only applies to instruments on their face complete. Not to instruments incomplete in form and in part reduced to writing, e. g., the hiring of a horse, the only writing being that within the quotation marks "six weeks for two guineas" is incomplete, and the residue of the contract may be supplied by extrinsic evidence.

VI. The exclusion in case of contracts applies only as between the parties to the contract. Third persons are not affected by it. Dempsey vs. Kipp, 61 N. Y., 471. A parol agreement between A and B that the latter should procure for the former a right of way over land of C can be shown, as it is not between the parties who are to grant and obtain the right.

VII. Oral or extrinsic evidence may be resorted to, to explain an ambiguity. A distinction was formerly taken between a latent and a patent ambiguity, and it was thought that the latter could not be explained. This doctrine is now discarded. An ambiguity in this sense means the case where the words are clear enough, but they may have two or more applications.

VIII. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to remove an uncertainty in the person or thing intended, e. g., "the most worthy soldier in a regiment." Under this rule, blanks can not be filled by parol evidence. Uncertain or inaccurate matter may be rejected from view, when enough. remains to identify the object or person intended.

IX. There are cases in which artificial presumptions are raised by law against the natural meaning of the words in which parol evidence may be introduced to overturn the presumption and uphold the

natural signification, e. g., where two legacies of the same sum are given in a will to the same person. It is otherwise when

the presumptions are in accord with the ordinary meaning. These cannot be rebutted by parol evidence.

X. The existence of a written instrument may be attacked by parol evidence. There are always two questions possible as to every instrument. Ist. Is there an instrument? 2nd. If so, what does it mean? It is only the second question that is affected by the rule under consideration.

XI. Omissions and errors in a contract may be rectified by an action in a court of equity. The error in such a case must be mutual. The court is said to reform the instrument. This rule does not in general apply to a will, as there is no consideration. Under present practice, an action may be brought to reform and also for relief.

XII. The rule does not extend to receipts for money or goods unless in substance a contract. Nor to passenger railway tickets, &c.

XIII. The rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence that the contract has been modified or discharged. The reason of the rule fails in this case. There are three cases.

A. Discharge of parol or written contracts in general. These may be discharged by mere word of mouth. B. Contracts required to be in writing by statute. Here an absolute discharge may be made by word of mouth, but not a new agreement, since the new agreement must itself be in writing. Noble vs. Ward, L. R., 2 Ex., 135; Goss vs. Lord Nugent, 5 B. and Ad., 65.

Object of and Rules governing production of

Nature and

Principles of

5. Coincidence.

Relevancy.

Hearsay.

(not admitted.) (Except.)

Unwritten.

Written.

Primary-Documents.

1. Evidence must correspond to allegation and be confined to issue. 2. It is sufficient if substance only of issue be proved. 3. Burden of proof is on party which affirms. 4. The best evidence of which the case is surceptible in its nature must always be produced.

Competency, everybody but

Methods.

[1. Counterparts. 2. Copies.

Secondary

3. Abstracts.

5. Declarations or testimony of a deceased witness when same point is in issue between same parties as in former case.

6. Admissions and confessions.

1. Parties and persons having a pecuniary interest in suit. 2. Persons deficient in understanding.

3. Persons insensible to the obligation of an oath. Testimony given vive voce in open court.

to vary the terms of a valid written instrument.

Before a person acting under commission of court or authority of law. 1. In chief or direct. Examination] 2. Cross of witness.

To prove another agree.
ment not mentioned in
the writing.

Except. 5. To prove a condition pre-
cedent to the attaching
of the instrument.
6. Subsequent agreements.
Discharge of the contract.
8. To annex incidents, as a
known and established
usage.

5. Certified Copy.-Not admissible at common law. 2. Method of proving. 3. Admissibility and effect.

G, 18. Under such circumstances some courts infer not an intent to murder, but only an intent to kill, and whether it shall be deemed murder or manslaughter is to be determined by the jury from all the circumstances of the case (67 N. Y., 218.)

G, § 28. When a wife commits a felony in presence of her husband, the presumption of compulsion is a disputable one. A child under 14 years is presumed incapable of rape, but this presumption is disputable in New York and Ohio.

G, § 34. When a person is in the possession of the fruits of crime, the presumption of his guilt is, in New York, a presumption of fact for the jury to decide on all the circumstances of the case (Stover vs. People, 56 N. Y., 315.

G, § 45. Corroboration of an accomplice's testimony is absolutely necessary to sustain a conviction in New York, (Code Crim. Pro., 399.)

com

G, § 102. Now that parties are petent witnesses, the declarations of a party injured, made some time after the injury that he is suffering pain, are not competent as evidence, at least when not made to a physician in professional attendance. But evidence may still be given if groans, screams or exclamations indicative of present pain and suffering. 105 N. Y., 294; 99 N. Y., 136.

S, § 52, N. 1. As to offers of compromise, See 102 N. Y. 660; 95 N. Y., 428; 108 N. Y., 428.

S, Art. 23, Ill. (G). Still good law generally, but not if at the time, he was under arrest for the crime, 103 N. Y.,

211.

S, Art. 115. Bacon vs. Frisfie, 80 N. Y., 394, is a leading case on privileged communications between lawyer and client.

G, § 291. First case cited still good law; next three are unsound, as to admitting parol evidence of oral statements of intention by the testator.

G, § 310. An expert will meet the requirements of a subpoena if he appears and gives impromptu answers to such questions as may be put to him, but it could not require him to examine the case, nor to attend, hear and consider the evidence given, so as to qualify him to form an opinion. 13 Abb. Pr., N. S., 207.

But in Indiana it is held that an expert is entitled to compensation for his professional opinion and may refuse to testify without it, 59 Ind., 1 & 15.

The contrary is held in Alabama, 12 Am. L. Rev., 589.

G, § 367. If it appears to the trial judge that the child does not sufficiently understand the nature and obligation of an oath, it is within his discretion to permit it to be properly instructed, provided it is of sufficient age and intellect to receive the instruction, 142 Mass., 577.

G, § 569. Unless subscribing witnesses are necessary to the validity of the instrument, a writing may be proved without calling the subscribing witness to it, in the same way as it might be proved if it had no such witness, (N. Y. Laws of 1883, c. 195.)

G, § 579. Comparison of a disputed writing may be made by witnesses with any writing proved to the satisfaction of

the court, to be genuine. Such writings and the testimony therein may be submitted as evidence, (N. Y. Laws of 1883, c. 36; Laws of 1888, c. 555; 95 N. Y., 73.) St., Art. 131. As to impeaching one's own witness, See 108 N. Y., 628; 104 N. Y., 394; 63 N. H., 128.

St., Art. 134. The last sentence in this Article needs to have the word "probably" omitted since the recent decision in 18 Q. B. D., 481.

St., Art. 137. As to refreshing memory, See 101 N. Y., 637; 102 N. Y., 572; 119 U. S., 99.

MILLS ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN. Second Edition by Henry E. Mills and Augustus L. Abbott, of the St. Louis Bar. St. Louis, The Gilbert Book Co., 1888.

The importance of the subject of eminent domain, and the thorough discussion it has received, especially of late years in our courts, by reason of our great internal development, has made it desirable that the well known work of Mr. Mills on this subject should be brought down to date, and this is done in the volumne of which we are about to speak.

Recognizing the importance of this single title, the author has held himself strictly to that subject, and has not sacrificed the clearness and conciseness of his work to a desire to wander in the alluring field of such kindred subjects as acquirements of rights in real property by dedication, assessments of benefits for local improvements, &c. After distinguishing his subject from what it is not, Mr. Mills. treats of the uses that are public and not private, of what constitutes a taking, of the impairment of rights secured by contract or charter, of the extent of the

authority and the power of delegation, of the interests affected, of the method of taking, of the practice and proceedings from the time of condemnation down to the final award of damages. He also has chapters on the Mills acts, drainage and

This book is intended to be a supplement to the 7th edition of the revised statutes of New York. The time that has elapsed since the date of the publication of that edition has been sufficiently long to allow a great accumulation of new and amendatory statutes, which are here carefully collected, and referred page by page to the 7th edition. This of itself would make the book a valuable one, but it contains in addition, references in their proper places to all the decisions of all the New York courts during this period. This gives the book great additional usefulness, and renders it not so likely to be antiquated by the appearance of the long promised eighth edition of the revised statutes.

THE PRACTICE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS in the COURTS OF RECORD OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.