Blackstone confounds construction with interpretation. There is a distinction between the two. Interpretation seeks the mere meaning of the words used. Construction seeks to apply it to the surrounding circumstances and the intent of the author. Construction broadens out. Statutes in general are for the instruction of all men; therefore the first rule of interpretation is to take words in their popular and not in their restricted sense. But if the narrow or technical sense must have been intended, as in a tariff law-certain terms used by importers-then they should be. taken in that sense. The second rule is that we must interpret words in connection with the context. This would include also the consideration of similar statutes. If the rules of interpretation do not bring about a rational result, we must strive if the words will admit of it to reach such a result. This is construction. It seeks the intent or spirit of the law. Its maxim is "who adheres to the letter adheres to the bark." In construction we meet with the Cy Pres doctrine, which is a doctrine of approximation to the intent, where that can not be fully, for some sufficient reason, carried out. It is of great importance in construing statutes and wills, but not in contracts.

In some few States the governors are allowed to obtain construction of statutes of a purely public nature from the courts without a regularly presented issue and trial. Outside of this, however, the judges can only declare the law as they apply it to actual cases that come to them for decision.

The decisions of all courts are not binding on all other courts. Decisions are either authority (that is binding) or argument. Thus in New York the decisions of the Court of Appeals are binding on all the lower courts. The decisions of

English courts prior to the battle of Lexington were made authoritative in New York by the State adopting as the law of the State so much of the English common law as was then in force in the colony and had not since been changed. Other States have substantially the same provision. Blackstone finished his commentaries just prior to that time, and it is this that makes them so valuable to the American student.

Customs refer to things to be done. A maxim is a general principle stated in abstract form. It does not so much give us a rule as an abstract principle, to aid us in getting at the rule. Many of our maxims are taken from the civil law. They are of great importance, and may be conveniently studied in Broom's Maxims.

The idea that a court can declare a law void is one unique to this country. In England the whole matter of what laws should be enacted is left to Parliament. In this country a law is void that conflicts with our Constitution. The United States Supreme Court declares laws void that conflict with the United States Constitution. In order that laws may not be too easily declared void, our courts hold that a law shall be declared void only when it is clearly repugnant to the Constitution.

Book I., Chapter I. The clause in the Constitution, borrowed from magna charta, giving the right to a trial by jury, does not apply to petty crimes, as these have always been dealt with in a summary way. A prisoner charged with a crime of an infamous nature is first indicted by a grand jury. The grand jury acts under the advice of the public prosecutor. One is indicted only when a prima facie case is made out against him. If enough evidence for the prosecution is presented to convict-if none was offered by the defense to rebut it-then an indictment is

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Injury to the reputation is either libel or slander. Libel is addressed to the eye, slander to the ear. In law these are not equally wrong. Slander is not so perma. Slander is not so perma. nent nor so extensive in its effects, nor does it show the same deliberation. Libel may be punished both criminally and civilly, while in the case of slander there can only be a civil prosecution. prove slander you must prove one of four things. A false and malicious charge that complainant committed some crime involving moral turpitude; or 2d, has some contagious disease unfitting him for social intercourse; or 3d, is unfit to follow his trade or profession, and 4th, any derogatory words when plaintiff can, in addition to words, show any special pecuniary damage.

With a writ of habeas corpus we may apply under the habeas corpus act to a judge as distinguished from the court. That is, the judge off the bench. He is then said to act at chambers. When the judge has signed the writ of habeas corpus it is served on the person who holds the prisoner in custody. This person may make an answer setting out how and why he holds the prisoner. This is called the return. This return the prisoner may deny, which is called traversing the return. If the prisoner is not held on papers such as a warrant or indictment the judge examines to see if he is rightly held. If he is held on papers the judge merely examines these, and if

they are regular he remands the prisoner, and if irregular he discharges him.

The right which a State has to take private property for public use by making just compensation is called eminent domain. Courts will not interfere to control legislatures in doing this so long as they take it for public purposes. They may, however, properly inquire if the purpose is public, and if not, declare the law void. The State does not necessarily exercise this right directly itself. It may delegate this right to towns, counties, railroads, &c. We have general laws under which railroads may obtain land by condemnation

Book I., Chapter IX. The rule of respondeat superior does not in general apply to public officers. But sheriffs and county clerks are an exception to this rule, and are liable for the acts of their deputies. The reason of this exception is that these officers derive their income from the fees taken for the acts of their deputies, and should, therefore, be also liable for their misconduct. The duties of some public officers are purely ministerial, some purely judicial, and some partly. ministerial and partly judicial. Ministerial officers must do exactly as they are commanded or they will be liable for injuries sustained, whereas judicial officers having jurisdiction will not be liable to be sued for an error of judgment, otherwise there would be no judicial independence. The duties of a justice of the peace are both judicial and ministerial. An example of his ministerial duties would be the issuing of a warrant to arrest a prisoner on affidavits, and then if the prisoner remains silent at the hearing, as he usually does, binding him over to await the action of the grand jury.

A question of great importance under poor laws is a person's settlement. This is determined by what is called a legal resi

ment of the child's continues even after reaching majority, until it is shown that he has acquired another residence. In order to so acquire a new residence there must be, ist, capacity; 2d, intent; 3d, the fact, it must actually take place. One in an almshouse, or in jail, or a married woman lacks the capacity to acquire a new settlement.

Chapter X. There is no such thing as a natural right of expatriation The resolution of Congress to that effect, like many other resolutions, amounts to nothing. Expatriation can only be made practical by the consent of the government of the country of which the party who desires expatriation is a member.

A difficult question arises as to criminal responsibility where one charged with crime owes neither natural nor local

allegiance, e. g, a foreigner in a foreign country, as Canada, fires a pistol across the border at a man in the United States and kills him; on what theory can he be tried in the United States if apprehended here, as he owes neither natural nor local allegiance? See People vs. Adams, 1 N. Y., 173, where the doctrine of natural and local allegiance is declared to be an insufficient test of criminal responsibility, and the prisoner was held liable independent of the doctrine of allegiance. This case, however, did not meet the approbation of the English courts when a similar question arose. See the Queen vs. Keyn, reported at great length in L. R. 2 Ex. Div., 63-137; also considered in volume. second of Stephens' History of Criminal Law in England, page 29. There is now an English statute on the subject, 40 and 41 Vic., Chap. 73.

The principal disability of an alien concerns real estate. An alien can, by the common law, purchase real estate and hold it until legal proceedings are taken to withdraw it from him, but he can not take at all by descent. In that case it is said to escheat. When the State desires to obtain the title to land held by an alien, a public officer, usually the Attorney General, brings an action called an inquest of office, which if successful results in an office found. In many States the common law rule has been changed, and aliens are allowed to hold real estate. In New York an alien, after filing papers declaring his intent to become a citizen, may hold real estate.

Before the adoption of the Federal Constitution each State had the power to naturalize. The Federal Constitution gave to Congress the power to make uniform rules of naturalization. The Supreme Court interpreted uniform to mean excluSo that naturalization is a matter sive. of United States law. The great mass, however, of naturalization is done in the State courts. The reason of this is that Congress not only conferred on the United States courts power to act in this matter, but also conferred it upon State courts. The State courts may act or not as they please, as it is optional with them, but when they so act, they are for that purpose a United States court

An adult female alien may become a citizen in any one of three ways, 1st, by regular process of naturalization; 2d, by her husband becoming a citizen; 3d, by marrying a citizen.

Chapter XIV. Apprentices and slaves differ from all other servants. They become servants by a rule of law, all other servants become so by contract. The rules applying to ordinary servants do not apply to apprentices.

The great doctrine of the "entirety of a contract" is illustrated in the case of Daly vs. Howard, 61 N. Y., 362.

There are three classes of cases in contracts between master and servant, considered as to the right of the servant to recover wages, where the servant leaves the employment without cause before his time has expired.

Ist. Where he agrees to work for a round sum, for a specified time, e. g., a year.

2d Where he agrees to work apparently for a fractional sum that can be reduced to a round sum, example for a year at $50 a month.

3d. Where the wages are payable at intervals, e. g., a hiring for a year at $50 per month, payable monthly.

In the first two cases he is not entitled to receive anything. In the last case he is entitled to as many payments as he has worked months, though in this case he may be liable to a counter claim for breach of the contract.

The following will illustrate on what grounds a master and servant may sue for an injury to the latter. A master sues because his servant's relative rights have been violated; a servant because his own absolute rights have been violated.

When a child is injured in any way the parent recovers on the theory of a loss of service. In the case of the permanent injury of a very young child, the courts in some States allow the parents to recover damages for a loss of prospective damages up to the child's majority.

A master is liable for the act of his servant within the scope of his authority causing injury to a third person on the ground of respondeat superior. We must draw a distinction between servant and contractor. A contractor exercises a separate employment, and is not under the control of the master in performing his

work. The person who sues the master for the act of the servant must be a third person. A co-servant in the same general employment would not be such a third person, though he might recover if the master had been negligent in selecting the co-servant, if the servant injured were free from negligence. This rule rests upon the theory that the risk of injury from fellow servants was taken into account in fixing the rate of wages. This is the common law rule. In some States it is changed by statute. We must distinguish in this connection between a servant and an agent. A servant is employed to do an act; an agent to make a contract.

Chapter XV. Pre-contract did not mean previous marriage. It meant a prior engagement to marry. Such a contract might, at the suit of either party, have been carried out and a marriage compelled by the ecclesiastical courts in England. This has, however, never been the case in this country, and the only redress to be obtained is damages for a breach of promise. Pre-contract, therefore, has never been in this country an impediment to marriage.

In some States the rule is that if one party to a marriage remarries after the prolonged disappearance of the other party, the second marriage is good until decreed void by a court of competent jurisdiction, even though the former husband or wife return.

When an idiot or lunatic enters into marriage it may be declared void either on their application during life or on the application of their heirs or representatives after their death.

Fraud that makes a marriage invalid is not every fraud. It must be fraud that enters into the very essence of the contract. Fraud not as to matters such as wealth, but, for example, as to chastity.

The question whether a priest was necessary to a valid marriage at common law came before the House of Lords in Queen vs. Millis, and it was decided by a divided court of three to three that a priest was necessary. This settles it in England. But a priest means a priest of the established church. No other priest can perform the ceremony unless authorized by statute. If this were the common law in this country, we would have no valid marriages, as we have no established church, and, therefore, no priest in the English sense. But it is not a part of our common law, and consent makes the marriage and a priest is unnecessary.

Because a certain mode of marriage is prescribed in a State and a penalty laid on its infraction, still it does not of necessity make the marriage void.

In the case of a marriage being declared a nullity, it is done for a cause existing prior to the marriage, and the offspring are illegitimate. In the case of a dissolution of marriage the cause arises after marriage, and the offsprings are legitimate. Nullity is a matter of common law, while dissolution is a matter of statute law. Formerly dissolution of marriage took place by a special statute, but now it is usually governed by general legislation. In the case of a marriage being declared a nullity, no permanent alimony is allowed as in a dissolution. Alimony pendente lite to assist the wife in getting her divorce and to support her in the mean time is, however, allowed in both cases.

There were formerly two reasons why husband and wife were not allowed to testify for or against each other, 1st, because they were one in law, and 2d, because their knowledge might have been acquired confidentially. The first of these reasons is now gone, and with it the ancient rule. But they are not obliged

to disclose confidential communications. Blackstone is wrong in stating that the husband has at common law the right to correct his wife by physical punishment.

Chapter XVI. A child born shortly after marriage is legitimate on the ground that the father has, by marrying the mother, tacitly admitted that the child is his.

It was formerly supposed that the duty of the father to support his minor child was parallel with his duty to support his wife. The courts, however, overlooked the patent fact that while the one grew out of contract the other did not. The more reasonable view is that if the father repudiates the obligation the tradesman cannot interfere, though there are many decisions in this country which uphold the right of the tradesman to This doctrine is abandoned in England. The proper way is to proceed under the poor law. But when a father undertakes to support his child in a particular way, as by sending him to college, he becomes liable to support him in that way. If the father, in fact, supplies necessaries, the tradesman is bound to know it.

A stepfather is not bound to support his step-children. He may take them into his family or dismiss them as he pleases. While they remain, however, he is presumed to keep them gratuitously, and they are presumed to serve him in the same way. The same is true of a host and guest.

The common law allows a parent to disinherit his child, but some of the States do not allow him to do this in one way, that is, willing his property away to charitable institutions. In this way only onehalf of an estate may be left to charitable institutions at the expense of the children in New York. The same rule is extended to other near relatives, e g., husband and wife.