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are in accordance with the course of common law." When the special powers conferred are brought into action according to the course of that law, that is, in the usual form of common law and chancery proceedings, by regular process and personal service, where a personal judgment or decree is asked, or by seizure or attachment of the property, where a judgment in rem is sought, the same presumption will usually attend the judgments of the court, as in cases falling within its general powers, (1) but where the special powers conferred are exercised in a special manner not according to the course of the common law, or where the general powers of the court are exercised over a class not within its ordinary jurisdiction, upon the performance of prescribed condition, no such presumption of jurisdiction will attend the judgment of the court. The facts essential to the exercise of the special jurisdiction must appear on the record."

After the inferior court has been shown to have had jurisdiction of the cause and parties, there is no distinction between the conclusiveness of its judgment and of a judgment of a superior court. Each is alike binding collaterally.

If the court-whether inferior or superior -was of competent jurisdiction, no mere error or irregularity, however patent, will effect its judgment in a collateral proceeding. (2)

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late courts of law, or by injunction in equity.

And such a judgment is also binding upon all strangers except those, such as creditors, sureties, etc., who at the time the judgment was pronounced, had a legal right to insist upon its fairness. If injury is done to these latter, inasmuch as they may not proceed directly by appeal, etc., they may avoid the judgment collaterally by showing the fraud. (1)

But in a collateral proceeding in chancery, fraud or any other circumstance which would make it unconscionable to enforce the judgment, may be used to prevent it from having-in that proceeding—its usual binding obligation. (2)

And where the reformed procedurecombined law and equity-obtains, all such matters may be pleaded by parties as equitable defenses to an action upon the judgment. (3)

The object of the legislature and of the court is to settle, if possible, the entire question in the one suit..

II. FOREIGN JUDgments.

"It is conceded that the legislation of every country is territorial; that beyond its own territory it can only affect its own subjects or citizens." (4) Hence every foreign judgment or decree-whether in rem or in personam-may be shown to be void on the ground that the court pronouncing it had not obtained jurisdiction over either the parties or subject matter in a method internationally recognized, or had exceeded its jurisdiction. (5)

The foreign judgment, no matter how authenticated, is not conclusive as "record" evidence of the jurisdictional facts

(1.),2 Wall., 398; 25 Ind., 455; 102 Pa. St., 78: 12 Vt., 619; 9 Mo., 784.

(2) 3 Cl. & Fin., 479, 510; 11 How., (U. S.) 437; 72 Ind., 374; 28 Conn., 557.

12 N. Y, 156; 68 N. Y., 543; 70 N. Y., 253: 84 Ind., 380. 4 Crch., 279.

(3.

(4

(5.) Id.

recited, but is only presumptive and rebuttable by parol evidence.

In an action upon a foreign judgment, where a foreign judgment is pleaded as a defense, it may be impeached and overthrown by showing either that jurisdiction was acquired through fraud, or that the court was mislead and the judgment obtained by the fraud of the opposite party. (1)

As to the conclusiveness of the foreign judgment upon the merits, a distinction was formerly drawn between proceedings in rem and in personam. It was early an accepted rule in all countries that an in rem judgment is universally conclusive upon the whole world as to rights and titles decreed by it in relation to land or other immovables within its jurisdiction. And evidently this must be, since no other country can have jurisdiction over such property. (2)

The above rule was also applied to in rem proceedings against movables properly within the court's jurisdiction. (3)

It is the general rule that a valid foreign divorce (including divorces of sister State courts) is valid everywhere, if the plaintiff had had a bona fide domicil in the foreign state, and if the court had jurisdiction over the defendant, obtained either by personal service of notice within the State or by the voluntary appearance. (4)

But in Phillips vs. Hunter (2 H. Bl'k, 410), the rule as to a foreign judgment in personam was said to be that it is conclusive upon the merits, when called in question incidentally, or by a plea in bar; but that when sued upon as a cause of action it is only prima facie evidence of a consideration, and is examinable upon the merits. The great inconvenience of this

(1.) 10 2 B. D., 295; L. R., 8 Ch., 695; 8 Sim., 279. (2.) Story Comfl of Laws, p. 494.

(3.) 4 rch., 434: Id 241.

(4) 76 N. Y., 78; 101 N Y., 23.

rule caused its speedy overthrow, and in England it is now firmly established that exclusive of questions of jurisdiction and fraud, the foreign judgment is binding upon the parties; (1) and even if the face of the record show it to have been decided through a mistake as to English law. (2) The English courts also recognize and enforce the decrees in chancery of foreign tribunals. (3)

The early American cases naturally enough followed the earlier English doctrine; but quite a number of States, led by New York, have emerged into the broader and more modern principle, giving foreign judgments their proper effect; (4) and in the other States the strong tendency is in the same direction.

Mr. Justice Story, in his "Conflict of Laws," § 607, clearly and forcibly presents the advantages of this rule. Under the former doctrine, through lapse of time or change of circumstances, etc., witnesses may have died or documentary evidence been lost, so that the party actually in the right may be unable to establish his claim upon the second investigation of the merits.

Accordingly, without regard to the great saving in time and expense, it is evident that as a general thing, justice is promoted by the enforcing the judgments of courts having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and which were in position to thoroughly inquire into the

merits of the cases in their freshness.

It is, however, held that a foreign judg ment does not merge the cause of action, as does a judgment of a sister State. The successful plaintiff may bring his action either upon the foreign judgment or on his original claim

(1.) 11 Ad. & El, 179; 4 Eng. L & Eq, 252. (2.) LR, 6Q B, 139; L. R., 4 H. L., 414 (3.) 3 Sim., 458. 26 N. Y 28; S. C., 55, Id.,

148: 49 N. Y, 571; 5 Hamm., 545 54 Me., 389

III. JUDGMENTS OF THE SISTEr States.

In respect to the law of judgments, as in many other respects, the American commonwealths were considered "foreign" to one another; and as we have seen, while the in rem judgment was conclusive, the in personam judgment of one State was only presumptive evidence in another. To avoid the difficulties of this rule, it is provided in the Constitution of

the United States (Art. 4, Sec. 1) that "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State, to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. And Congress may by general laws prescribe Congress may by general laws prescribe

the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof." In pursuance whereof by law of 1790 (U. S. R. S., § 905), Congress provided that such proceedings shall have "such faith and credit in every other court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are or shall be taken."

After considerable controversy as to the exact effect of this act, it was decided in Mills vs. Duryee (7 Crch., 481), that "nil debet" could not be pleaded in an action upon a judgment of another State in which State "nul teil record" alone was the proper plea; that the simple merged in the record debt, and that the judgment was conclusive upon the merits.

Some States carried and still carry the doctrine of this case to the extreme, and allow no inquiries to be made into the jurisdiction of the court which could not have been made collaterally in the sister State itself." (1.) But this is obviously going too far. Prior to 1790, international law among the States was that a citizen of one State could not be bound by the judgment of a court of another State, except as to (1.) 65 Pa. St., 106; 27 Vt., 26; 70 Ill., 223; 5 S. & M., 210; 13 Ind., 83.

property within that State, or unless he was personally served with process within its jurisdiction or voluntarily entered his appearance in the action. (1) There was no evil experience in this respect for which a remedy was intended. Mr. Justice Story, who pronounced the decision in Mills vs. Duryee, well says (Confl. of Laws, § 609): "They (judgments of sister States) are therefore put upon the same footing as domestic

judgments. But this does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court dered to pronounce the judgment; nor an in which the original judgment was reninquiry into the right of the State to exercise authority over the parties or the subject matter. * * * The Constitution did not mean to confer any new power effect of their acknowledged jurisdiction upon the States, but simply to regulate the over persons and things within their territory."

And this point was directly decided in Thompson vs. Whitman (18 Wall., 457) ; and it is now also well settled in most of the States that the jurisdiction of the court may always be attacked, and even direct recitals in the record of jurisdictional facts may be overthrown by parol evidence; and if the record show appearance by an attorney, his authority may be questioned. (2) No State will compel its citizens to go into the other State and proceed directly against such void judgments.

Substituted service by publication—or in any other manner-upon a non-resident defendant will not bind him personally at least beyond the limits of the State of the forum. (3)

However, in case of a superior courtbut not of an inferior court or a superior court exercising special powers, etc. (4)

(1.) 11 How., (U. S.), 165.

(2.) 106 U. S., 350; 9 Mass., 468; 41 N. Y., 272; 5 Wend., 148; 9 Wisc., 328; 24 Tex 551 22 la., 328 51 Mo, 69; 107 Mass, 501; 2 Yerg, 493; 8 How.. (U. S.) 495; 15 Lea, 589. (3) Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U S.

(4.) 26 Conn., 273; 5 Fost., 313; 2 Wall., 313.

here is a strong presumption in favor of its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and parties, especially if the record recites the facts necessary to give such jurisdiction. (1)

Citizens of a sister State are bound by its laws.

Hence a judgment against them -jurisdiction having been legally acquired, as, e. g., by substituted servicemay be binding and enforceable in another State, when it would not have been if against a citizen of the latter State. (2)

It is generally held that the judgments of those courts only which are so organized as to be able to authenticate their proceedings in the prescribed manner are conclusive upon the merits; the judgments of other courts, e. g., justice of the peace courts, being only prima facie evidence. (3)

Fraud. The judgment of a court of a sister State may be impeached collaterally by showing that the jurisdiction was acquired through fraud. (4)

But between the parties in a collateral proceeding at law the fraudulent obtaining of such judgment may not be shown to overthrow it. (5) However, it is held that an injunction will lie in equity when any fact is shown which "clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not avail himself at law or from utilizing which was prevented by fraud, accident or mistake unmixed with any fault or neg ligence of himself or his agents. (6)

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matter, e. g., the fraudulent or collusive procuring of the judgment, as an equitable defence to a bill in equity, (1) based on a judgment or decree of a sister State, or to a civil action thereupon in States which have adopted the reformed procedure and amalgamated law and equity. (2)

In conclusion we may briefly summarize as follows: If the court had jurisdiction, in the absence of fraud, all judgments are binding collaterally upon the merits, even if irregular.

Domestic Judgments, in collateral proceeding at law: no judgment impeachable for fraud by parties or privies-but is by strangers whose rights were violated thereby. For want of jurisdiction :—a judgment of a superior court exercising its general powers, is only avoidable when the record shows such fact; if exercising special statutory powers, is avoidable if the record does not show jurisdictional facts; judgment of inferior court may be avoided even by contracting recitals on the face of the proceedings.

In collateral proceedings in Equity or under the Code, all judgments may be avoided-and record contradicted-for lack of jurisdiction, fraud or other similar

matters.

Foreign Judgments, avoidable for absence of jurisdiction or fraud; record, only prima facie evidence.

Judgments of Sister States may be impeached for want of jurisdiction, and record recitals overthrown by parol evidence; may not at law be avoided by parties for fraud, but may in Equity or under the Code.

1. 22 N J. Eq., 116

(2 12 N. Y, 156; 21 la. 58.

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As a

One of the most striking facts in our political history is the prominence held by the legal profession in public life. rule it is a lawyer who lives in the White House; lawyers who sit in the Senate; lawyers who swarm in the House, and it is so through all the offices of the government. Not only do they predominate in numbers but in ability and influence. It is not to be wondered at that the young lawyer should be lured by hopes of political preferment nor strange that the law student is fired with ambition for a public life. While it might be said that almost all lawyers make good politicians, for we would expect this from his training and know it from the facts, yet the converse of this is not true. There have been many striking exceptions. There will always be men of genius who can achieve distinction in both

callings, but for most men prominence at

the bar and success in politics are to be reached by diverging paths. And it is

more difficult to combine these now than it was in the time of Webster and Choate. While the law is becoming more intricate and reports more cumbersome, politics has become almost a profession of itself. He who would become a politician must spend the greater part of his time in doing that which is but for the advantage of the day. He must give over his time to visiting and button-holing, committees and caucuses, "repairing his fences" and holding. "his grip." He must in short spend his time in a way incompatible with becoming learned in the law. An established lawyer with the garnered wisdom of a lifetime to rely on may turn his thoughts to such things, but in the great majority of cases the young attorney when he does this must turn his back on law. There is much to be said of politics as an advertising medium for the "briefless barrister," but while newspaper notice may bring acquaintances yet there is marry a legal necessity that they cannot bring. We are not speaking of participating in politics as a citizen but in politics as a politician.

It is not surprising that in accordance with all precedents of their choosen profession the members of the Law School were enthusiastic at the call of patriotism to abandon the students lamp for the campaign torch and to leave the lectureroom for mass-meetings and parade. And in proportion as they were enthusiastic to desert they must ex necessitate be enthuiastic to return to their mistress the law. In the long quiet that will follow, the law student will have time to ponder on the question that probably occurred to him during this political activity of the past month. Shall I travel the road that leads to the Chief Justiceship or the White House? It is a question every young

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