37, where an action of this same general nature was in substance supported.

The great question in cases like this is "what is the nature of a father's duty, if any, to support his minor children." There is no greater conflict of opinion among the authorities on any subject than on this simple question.

In England after considerable dispute, they came at last to a well-settled and now thoroughly established doctrine to the effect that it cannot be said that the father's moral duty amounts in and of itself to a legal duty by common law. The relation between a father and child is different from that between husband and wife. There is a continuing contract existing between husband and wife and he is bound by its conditions. On the other hand, in regard to parent and his child there is nothing of this nature. The mere fact of having brought the children into the world is not sufficient to throw upon him a legal obligation to support them. Therefore a father is not accountable under ordinary conditions. But if the child, in incurring obligations, act as the father's agent, the father would be liable on the ground of agency; and there may be agency by implication. That is a reasonable and consistent theory in itself and if somewhat difficult of application in certain cases is in accordance with certain principles well defined.

When we come to this country we find great diversity of opinion. Some States support the English doctrine, while in other States it is main. tained that the father's moral duty does amount to a legal duty.

Now so far as the weight of authority is concerned so far as we have adjudication bearing directly upon this question-the English doctrine seems to be preferred in this country. The contrary doctrine, though now directly upheld in Ohio is in general asserted in dicta rather than sustained by actual decisions. There is a late decision in Indiana, also an earlier one in Vermont which distinctly adopts the English law and refuses to adopt any such opinion as that moral duty implies legal duty. (See White vs. Mann, 110 Ind, 74.)

Now which of these shall we deem preferable. If we consider the cases upon which the Ohio judge relies, they hardly sustain his conclusions. Thus Finch vs. Finch, 22 Conn., 411, seems to be so utterly in conflict with the earlier case of Stanton vs. Wilson, that the latter is now of very doubtful authority.

The English case of Cazely vs. Forder, L. R. 3 Q. B., 559, was not a case of total divorce, but a partial divorce so that the wife still remained wife, and the ground of the decision was that she had authority to act as agent.

The reasoning was that under the circumstances the wife still retained the husband's credit and her right to order necessaries for herself upon his credit practically included the right also to order additional necessaries for the support of the young child in her custody. This case, therefore, does not declare it to be the father's general legal duty to support his minor children.

In Finch vs. Finch it was decided that the wife could not sustain an action of book debt against the divorced husband for the children's support.

In New York the case most directly bearing on this subject is Burritt vs. Burritt, 29 Barb., 124. The judge qualifies every expression but finally holds in that case that the right of recovery by a divorced wife does not exist. So far, therefore, as we have practical adjudication on this point, the judge in the Ohio case is hardly sustained in his conclusions.

It seems on the contrary, proper conclusions to deduce from the authorities and from principle, that a cause of action like the present is not maintainable.

The question, however, suggests itself to the mind whether there is no method provided by law for the maintenance of the children in such cases. There are statutes generally to be found in the States, whereby the court besides awarding alimony to the wife, may make a further decree of a sum of money for the support of the children.

In the case before us no such award was made at the time. When a decree is made for an allowance of alimony in connection with a divorce suit, it is held in New York that alimony should be awarded then; if not awarded no application afterwards can be made for an increased allowance or for an allowance if none had previously been made. The reason is that the courts deem this to be constrained by our statutes; so they hold that one decision upon the subject of alimony is final and cannot afterwards be reconsidered.

Our New York Statutes are not so restricted as to making an award for the support of children. It is held now by our Court of Appeals that if no such allowance was made, nevertheless in years afterwards application may be made to the court to grant an allowance and the court has power to consider such applications, and in a recent

This definition permits of no contingency in the direction to pay, nor does it allow anything but money to be paid; nor does it allow a direction to pay from a particular fund in the hands of a drawee. All contracts of this kind having such elements would be withdrawn from the class of bills of exchange and placed in some other class of contracts.

A promissory note is a promise by one person called a maker to pay to another person called a payee or to his order or bearer a sum of money absolutely and at all events. In this form it is negotiable. If the words order or bearer are both omitted, it is non-negotiable. Neither of these instruments must in general have a seal. A seal attached would make them specialties and not simple contracts, although there is an exception in modern times in the case of many corporate instruments under seal which are treated as negotiable instruments, although they are under seal.

Chapter XXXI. Bankruptcies are divided into voluntary and involuntary. In voluntary bankruptcy the debtor having a certain amount of indebtedness prescribed by law, presents a petition to the court that he may be discharged from his debts. He is expected to file a schedule of his liabilities and an inventory of his assets. These liabilities

do not include personal torts, such as battery or slander, nor do these, if he has any such claims, form any portion of his assets, nor can he be discharged from liabilities as a trustee in this way. It is a general principle that he will be discharged from all the liabilities stated in his schedule, providing they come within the law, and from all others that do not come within the law he cannot be discharged. As to all those liabilities as to which the bankrupt law does not extend he remains per

sonally liable as before. Another leading proposition is that his assets with certain exceptions are to be distributed proportionately among his creditors. A fundamental principle of the bankrupt law is proportion or equality, and this principle is derived from a great maxim of equity jurisprudence that equality is equity.

This is a very different principle from that which prevails when the debtor is not a bankrupt, as there one creditor can obtain an advantage over another by increased. diligence, but diligence has no effect in bankruptcy.

The exceptions to this rule are that if a person has a mortgage or other like lien on the debtors property he has a preference to the extent of his mortgage. There are also usually some preferential claims stated in bankrupt acts, as debts due the United States, small amounts for servants' wages, and the like.

For the purpose of disposing of the assets and distributing them the property goes to an assignee, usually selected in some form by the creditors, under supervision of the court. The assignee is in fact a trustee for the creditors, and the general principles governing his duties. and powers may be obtained from the law of trusts in equity jurisprudence. After realizing a certain amount of money a dividend is commonly made, which is really a percentage paid upon the debts, and then another dividend, and so on. The final step after everything has been regularly conducted is a discharge.

The effect of a discharge is to relieve the bankrupt from all debts properly within his schedule, so that, no matter how much property he afterwards acquires, he is not obliged to pay except that if he subsequently promises to pay, the old debt will be a sufficient consideration in law to hold him on his new prom

ise. As to other debts he still remains

personally liable. Fraud in the proceedings will vitiate them, and the bankrupt will remain liable.

Proceedings under a strict bankrupt law are always in a United States court; at present the United States District Court. Where there is no strict bankrupt law resort must be had to State tribunals under State laws. One or two proceedings, somewhat analogous to bankruptcy,

should be noticed, the main distinction being that in these now to be referred to the debtor acts voluntarily and not under compulsion of the court. One is a composition deed. This takes place where two or more creditors enter into an arrangement with the debtor to reduce the claim, as, for example, to pay fifty cents on a dollar.

Such a paper entered into in writing is called a composition deed. The consideration for such a deed is the mutual promises of the creditors. Another very favorite mode at the present time is an assignment by the debtor to a trustee. to pay his debts. This is of two kinds, preferential and non-preferential. Preferential assignments, as the name imports, take place where the debtor prefers some creditors to others. That is, has them paid in full before others are paid anything. This is valid in the absence of statute. Some States have abolished it by statute.

It still remains in New York, but is regulated by statute. Here again the law of trusts is invoked to govern the conduct of the trustee. Non-preferential assignment is much more just, as it aims to provide for all creditors on some fixed proportion. Both of these would disappear if the United States bankrupt laws were in operation and forbade them.

A preferential assignment is plainly opposed to the policy of our bankrupt law.

A word may now be said of involuntary bankruptcy. This was the old form of bankruptcy, and still exists. It prevailed under the last United States bankrupt law. The grand distinction here is that the debtor is forced into bankruptcy without his will when he has committed certain acts mainly such as are fraudulent. There is a preliminary question whether he has committed the acts. If he denies that he has done these acts the question will be tried usually by a jury. If it turns out that he has committed the acts in question he is adjudged a bankrupt, and from that time forward the proceedings will be substantially the same as in voluntary bankruptcy.

NOTES ON PARSONS ON CONTRACTS.

Seven leading implied contracts are: Ist. Quantum meruit for services rendered without agreement as to price.

2d. Quantum valebant, where goods are sold and the price not fixed. 3d. Money lent.

4th. Money paid to the use of the defend

ant

5th. Money had and received. This action may be brought in cases where it would be contrary to conscience and justice for one to retain the money of another, such as where money is paid on a mistake of fact, or is obtained through extortion or oppression, or by duress and the like. It would not include cases where a payment was voluntary; that would be supposed to be substantially a gift. This doctrine is comparatively recent, and was imported into the common law from the principles of equity jurisprudence.

6. Account stated. This is a case where parties have looked into their accounts and come to a common view that one owes the other so much money, out of this will

spring an implied promise to pay the

money.

7th. One more may be added, growing out of the letting of land where there is no express promise to pay a particular amount of rent, or perhaps the rent is due. Then the landlord may proceed upon an implied promise called for use and occupation.

or

The word obligation The word obligation

Bond, obligation, covenant, agreement, contract, promise. The first three words refer to sealed instruments. Any instrument for the payment of money for the performance of an act with a seal attached is a bond. as a technical word also means an instrument under seal, but is not so well defined as a bond. It is more general. A covenant is a single promise in a sealed instrument. There may be a series of covenants in one instrument; for example, in a deed for the conveyance of land there are frequently six covenants.

The other three words are appropriated to simple contracts and promises. The word promise is the most generic word and may even be applied to engagements without consideration or wholly on one side, sometimes called unilateral promises. The words contract and agreement are substantially the same in meaning and imply mutual promises or a consideration. Therefore, to make the word promise equivalent to contract, we must put before it the word mutual or some other term indicative of consideration.

Chapter III. Agents. The most important aspect in which a general agent may be regarded is not his authority to act merely for the particular principal in question, but the fact that he follows a line of business which embraces the act under consideration. Thus, with the consent of his principal, he holds himself out to the community as being ready to do at class of acts of a particular kind, and these

are commonly attended with commercial or trade usages. There are many wellknown agencies of this kind; examples are, cashiers and tellers of banks, auctioneers, factors, brokers of various sorts known as cotton, grain, sugar and insurance brokers and the like. Now, in all these cases there are usages of the business, and any third person dealing with the agent may fairly assume that he has the power accorded to him by the usage, unless such third person has notice to the contrary. Accordingly, if the agent violates special instructions in opposition to the usage, the principal will still be liable to the third person acting in good faith, and the remedy of the principal will be against his agent for his misconduct. This proposition has no application to special agents. The principal in that case is only bound by the authority given to him, the agent.

In applying these statements already made, an important case has arisen in regard to the power of a transfer agent of a corporation to bind his company by fictitious transfers of stock N. Y. & N. Haven Ry. vs. Schuyler 34 N. Y., 30. In this case the court of appeals held that when the transfer agent, having power to issue genuine certificates, in fact issued those that were fictitious to persons acting in good faith, the railroad company was responsible, and that its remedy was against its agent. This rule, however, is not universally adopted, and is disapproved in England. See the 18 Q. B Div., 718.

A greatly controverted question has arisen as to the power of a master of a ship considered as agent for the owner to sign bills of lading for goods not on board. the ship, so as to bind the ship owner to persons taking the bills in good faith. On the one hand it is argued that the