codification, as he says: "It is much to be regretted that this branch of the law should not be put into shape and codified by legislative authority."

The American notes by Stewart Rapalje have been selected with two objects in view, first to ascertain and state the true result of the authorities; and second, to arrange and classify these notes, following closely the classification of the author, "so as to produce not merely a rambling mass of digest clippings, but a second. treatise, exhibiting the American Law of Partnership in close juxtaposition with the English law as given in the text."

This purpose has been aided by the preparation of an additional index, referring only to the American notes and cases. The index, by the way, is a very good one in so far as we have tested it.

Judging from a somewhat hasty examination, we would conclude that Mr. Rapalje's claim that "the American law upon any question of partnership can be readily and definitely ascertained," is well born. out by his extensive and systematized anannotation.

JONES ON CHATTEL MORTGAGES.-Third edition. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1888.

Mr. Jones' work on Property Securities of various kinds are already well and favorably known. He has adopted the unique plan of writing on a broad general subject, but by dividing the work up, to treat the various branches of the subject exhaustively in several different treatises. Thus, besides the present work, he has already published treatises on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property, of Railroad and other Corporate Securities, of Pledges and of Liens, Common Law, Statutory

and Maritime, thus making a complete series of works on Property Securities. This method permits a very exhaustive examination of the subject, and this opportunity Mr. Jones has utilized to the very best advantage. The subject is one that is in many of its branches at best a very perplexing one, and we think great credit is due the author for his especially clear and satisfactory discussions of mooted and doubtful questions. We can best express our own opinion of the book by quoting a sentence from the Albany Law Journal's criticism of it: "We feel no hesitation in commending this work as in a very high degree comprehensive, succinct, clear, and trustworthy."

AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, Vol. II.-Containing the cases of general value and authority subsequent to those contained in the "American Decisions" and the "American Reports," selected, reported Banand annotated by A. C. Freeman. craft-Whitney Company, San Francisco, 1888.

This is the second volume in a series of six, which appear during the year, containing all the cases of general interest decided in the courts of last resort in the several States. The judicious selection of these cases, together with the convenient arrangement, copious notes and crossreferences make this series a very valuable one in the lawyer's library. While it gives one what he practically wants in the line of decisions in all the States, it does so at an immense saving of shelf-room and expense. The present volume contains cases decided in 73 Ga., 76 Cal., 121 Ill., 112 Ind., 72 Ia., 108 N. Y., 97-98 N. C., 115-117 Penn., 15 R. I., 68 Tex., 69 Wis.

We are in receipt of the American Law Review, September-October. Professor Gray writes an interesting article treating of the comparative value of reports and text-books, in the first place to a practitioner and secondly as a means of legal education.

A readable anecdote is given of Webster which shows his power of putting things. A Mr. Tucker retained Webster on a case, but through the long trial Webster did not appear and until the afternoon before he was going to speak, Webster was entirely ignorant of the case. There was

no time for the volumes of details. Tucker gave him the main points and urged on him the importance of thwarting the opposite side from getting a continuance which would mean ruin for their own client. "The other side have dragged out the litigation already," said Tucker, "They took six days to cross-examine one witness." The next morning found Tucker nervous and excited but Webster serene and majestic. "He said nothing that I did not tell him. But how transmitted and transformed. Speaking of the continuance Webster said:

'They ask for a continuance! Why, may it please the court, they have taken at this hearing as much time in the crossexamination as it took the Almighty to create the universe!' create the universe!' That represents the difference between his speech and my talk; my simple six days grew to the colossal figure I have described under the magic touch of his genius, and this instance was characteristic of the whole."

There is no exchange on our list in which we find more profitable reading than the Albany Law Journal. The cases selected are always the best of the current decisions. The leading articles always well written, and the editorals a delight, especially to one who can for a moment cast aside the burdensome part of the law and simply luxuriate in Friend Browne's kindly humor.

Among the exchanges we have received. this month we think particularly worthy of note, the Harvard Law Review, Belford Magazine, the Chicago Law Times and The American Law Register.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Consideration -Public Policy-Grain Swindles-" Red Lyon Wheat' -Commercial Paper—A negotiable note for $75 was given for 15 bushels of Red Lyon wheat, a price well known to be far above its value, and the further

consideration of an agreement by the payee to sell for the maker 30 bushels of the wheat at $15 per bushel on or before a day named, for which the maker was to receive his pay in notes, the payee to receive one-third for commission for sell

ing, each purchaser of wheat to receive a similar bond, and to assist, so far as was in his power, in the sale to others, and the agreement reciting that the transaction was of a speculative character, and not based upon the real value of grain. Held that the consideration of said note, being a contract to further the sale of the wheat at an extravagant price and to defraud others, was against public policy, and the note void.-Davis vs. Seeley, Sup. Ct. Mich., 38 N. W. Rep., 901.

POLICE POWER-Fertilizers-Regulation of Sale of Fertilizers.-The act establishing a department of agriculture (Code Ala., sec. 129 et seq.), and regulating the sale of commercial fertilizers, and guarding the publica gainst worthless compounds, by affording a cheap and reliable method of detecting fraud, is a legitimate police regulation, and constitutional.—Steiner vs. Ray, Sup. Ct. Ala., 4 So. Rep., 172.

VALIDITY―Restraint of Trade-"Trusts” -That a "Trust" is Void as Being in Restraint of Trade.-Certain stockholders agreed to place their stock for three years in the hands of trustees, with power to vote the same at all stockholders meetings, during such time, the stock only to be sold subject to the agreement; and they further agreed to sell to one another in preference to any third person, provided they could obtain the price offered for it by outsiders. Held, that the contract, being a restraint on the alienation of property, could not be enforced in equity.

Moses vs. Scott, Sup. Ct. Ala., 4 So. Rep. 742.

COPYRIGHT-Pictures-Designs for Trade Labels. Plaintiffs designed a picture, representing a young woman holding a bouquet of flowers, to be printed on labels for cigar boxes, and delivered to the librarian of Congress a description of the picture by the title "Nosegay," and the librarain duly recorded the name of the picture. Held, that this was an attempted evasion of act Cong. June 18, 1874, sec. 3, providing that no prints or labels designed to be used for any article of manufacture can be copyrighted, but authorizing them to be registered as trade-marks; and that plaintiffs' design could not be protected as a copyright.-Schumacher vs. Wogram, U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y., 25 Fed. Rep., 210.

LEGAL ANTIQUITIES.

Working like a horse-A lawyer drawing a conveyance.

Editor Dunleavy of the Clare (Ireland) Independent has been arrested for the theft of a watch. He denies that he stole it and says he took it on tick.

Judges are generally very slow to commit themselves, but they haven't this consideration for other people.

The possible failure of the Constitutional amendment intended to give relief to the Court of Appeals will revive the discussion -How to do it. Two modes are subject to consideration. The first is an increase of judicial force. The second is further restriction of appeals to that court, based, either upon the amount involved, or upon the character of exceptions or orders to be reviewed.

The increase of judicial force can only be had by Constitutional amendment to which there is an apparent hostility, or at least a real indifference in the popular mind fatal to its success. Besides that mode requires, before being realized, a long time, while the necessity is immedi

ate.

The policy of restriction of appeals, based upon the increase of the amount at stake, is resisted by the profession as invidious, and a court so restricted is stigmatized as "the rich man's court." However, the poor man is far more likely

to suffer by an unlimited right of appeal exercised by the rich to the practical distinction of the poor man's rights. Litigation is not a source of profit to the parties, and the poor man, dragged from court to court by appeals of the wealthy and unscrupulous, find his modest recovery exhausted by loss of time, counsel fees and expenses not taxable, to say nothing of vexation of spirit. In this sense unrestricted appeal serves the purpose of the rich and oppresses the needy, who want an end of litigation, and cannot afford the luxury of endless litigation where more blanks than prizes are drawn.

The second mode, by legislative action, may be made available at once. The difficulty lies in deciding where to apply the knife.

It is quite possible, that many appeals from orders are now permitted where the same questions would be presented on appeal from final judgment if essential to a decision upon the merits. The same

may be generally true of interlocutory judgments. Very likely a considerable labor might be saved to the Court of Appeals by weeding out many appeals from orders and interlocutory judgments, which are in reality only dilatory and prevent a prompt determination upon the merits.

A more radical and comprehensive mode of relief would be secured if the provisions of § 1003 of the Code of Civil Procedure, touching errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence, should be made applicable to trial at law as well as to trials in equity. As the law now stands any such error, if it might by possibility have affected the verdict of the jury, will call for the reversal of the judgment and a new trial. Starbird vs. Barrons, 43 N. Y., 200; Baird vs. Gillett, 47 id, 186. The court may be satisfied that justice between the parties has been done; that the judgment is just; that the appellant has not been prejudiced by the error, but so long as the evidence was improperly admitted or rejected and the court can not say "that it might not have biased the jury and influenced the verdict," (using the language of Judge Allen in 47 N. Y., 187), the judgment must be reversed. Why is it not wiser and better to refuse a new trial if the court, at its discretion, shall think that substantial justice does not require it, precisely as in equity cases? Such is the practice in the United States Supreme Court, 100 U. S., R. 37, 14 Wal., 564. And such I understand to be the English practice. Is it dangerous to allow a wise court, in its discretion, to refuse a new trial for a trifling error when satisfied that substantial justice has been done? Is it not more dangerous and unjust to sacrifice the truth and the right upon a rigid rule based upon mere possibilities? Every experienced lawyer can recall

instances when new instances when new trials have been granted for such technical errors, with no other result than more litigation and a repetition of the verdict with a possibility, if not probability of some new error of like character. Indeed in important cases, involving days and perhaps weeks in their trial, it is marvelous if no such trifling mistakes are made, often happily ignored upon appeal.

The result of such a modification of the law would be to discourage appeals except upon points affecting the merits. The system of stenographic reporting has added immensely to the number of such exceptions presented for review. Rulings, to which no importance was attached by the defeated party when taken, are reviewed by the stenographer's minutes and utilized to save a lost cause. I have known a case begun in a justice's court for trespass, removed by plea of title to the Supreme Court, tried at the Circuit with judgment for the defendant, which was affirmed on appeal to the General Term, but reversed in the Court of Appeals, a new trial at the Circuit, judgment again for the defendant, which was affirmed by the General Term and by the Court of Appeals, the costs and expenses of both sides doubtless reaching $2,000. Yet the value of the land, or rather rocks, in dispute did not exceed $50. This may be the outcome of the pure fountain of justice, but the waters are deadly to the litigants all the same.

So after a conviction of murder in the first degree, I have known such proceedings as these: A motion for new trial at the Oyer and Terminer denied; conviction and judgment affirmed on appeal to the General Term; judgment of the General Term affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, a motion for leave to move for a new trial on newly discovered evidence accompanied with a stay of all