proceeding, the motion granted, on appeal to the General Term the order reversed, on appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the General Term affirmed. In the mean time Ch. 65 of Laws of 1882 was hurried through the legislature, allowing a motion for a new trial to be made at any time before execution before any justice of the Supreme Court or Special Term, if the court before which the trial was had is not in session. Thereupon, under this law, a motion for a new trial was made and granted by a justice of the court, the prisoner there pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree and was sentenced for life. The struggle to save the life of the homicide was successful.

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In a still later case after a confirmation of a judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree by the Court of Appeals, a motion for a new trial was made and granted under the same law, when the prisoner pleaded guilty of murder the second degree. The expenses of a new trial would be so great that in sheer desperation the plea was accepted, although the prisoner was either guilty of murder in the first degree or was irresponsible by reason of insanity.

These cases illustrate the readiness with which interested parties can procure extraordinary legislation. The result is that appeals are given to the court of last resort in a multiplicity of cases, when no good purpose is served. The court is embarrassed by their consideration and business of real importance accumulates. The legislature might well turn its attention to restrictive legislation, which would lighten the useless work of the courts and cause a prompt administration of the law.

The trial courts ought to have greater power and more discretion. At present every judge upon a trial before a jury feels that he also will be tried a little later, and he is scarcely as anxious to do right as he is to keep within all the real and technical rules of law governing his action and the subject of critical review. Why ought not a Circuit judge to have the right to limit in his discretion the examination and crossexamination of witnesses an abuse of such discretion being a proper subject of review? Why may he not limit the number of witnesses to be called on a given point absolutely? Why should he not certify at the close of the trial the questions proper to be reviewed upon appeal? The answer will at once be made that the judge might exercise such power arbitrarily and unjustly. True he might, but the cases in which he would do so would be rare and the injustice arising from such rare cases would be vastly inferior to that which grows out of unlimited exceptions combed out of a reporter's minutes in respect to evidence having little or nothing to do with the verdict of the jury.

My plea is (1) for more restrictive legislation against idle and dilatory appeals, (2) for the disregard, under legislative authority, of errors in the reception or rejection of evidence when it is apparent substantial justice has been done, (3) for more considerate and wise legislation upon subjects touching the administration of the law and the public welfare (4) for a greater power in the trial judge to limit the questions to be considered upon appeal about which at the close of a trial but little difference exists between opposing counsel.

seeing the changes going on around them, might be supposed to be in touch therewith, are completely lost amid the multitude of new regulations. This state of affairs is due to the modern revived activity of life at the University resulting from the general advance of the times in which we live, and the consequent recognition of the need for the addition and development of new branches of study, besides the older studies of mathematics, classics, and theology. Hence the astonishing rise of the Cambridge Natural Sciences Tripos and Medical School, and the scarcely less astonishing rise of the Law School. But amidst the many changes daily taking place hardly sufficient notice seems to have been taken, either at Cambridge or outside, of the great changes which are about to take place in the course of legal education there during the next two or three years. It is not too much to say that the new regulations both for the Law Tripos and Law Special, which have been approved by the Senate, will revolutionize legal education at Cambridge. We propose, therefore, to describe as briefly as possible the nature of these changes for the benefit of those interested in the subject of legal education, or of any who may be going to Cambridge with the intention of reading law, with a few observations thereon by way of comparison with the older regulations.

The new regulations for the Law Tripos come into force next year. In May, 1889, two examinations for the Law Tripos will be held, one for the Tripos of that year, under the old regulations, the last examination to be held under them, and one for the first part of the Tripos under the new regulations, open to men at the end of their second year. The year following The year following (May, 1890) the new regulations will be in full working order, when there will be an examination for both Part I. and Part II. of the Tripos. From what has just been said it will be perceived that the Tripos under the new regulations is to consist of two parts, the subjects of which are to be as follows:

PART I (seven papers). (1) General Jurisprudence.

(2) The History and General Principles of Roman Law.

(3) The Institutes of Gaius and Justinian. (4) A selected portion of the Digest. (5) English Constitutional Law and History.

(6) Public International Law. (7) Essays and Problems.

PART II (six papers).

(1) and (2) The English Law of Real and Personal Property, with the equitable principles applicable to these subjects.

(3) and (4) The English Law of Contract and Tort, with the equitable principles applicable to these subjects.

(5) The English Criminal Law, including Procedure and Evidence.

(6) Essays.

The problems and essays in the first part will have reference to the subjects of that part only, but the essays in the second part may have reference to the subjects of the first part also.

These subjects are substantially the same as those under the old regulations, but the work is spread, so to speak, over

a wider area, more papers being set, so as to give a man who has done the work required conscientiously better opportunities of displaying his knowledge. The Tripos under the old regulations consisted of nine papers, taken at the end of the third year, or at the end of the fourth year if the candidate had previously taken another Tripos, the subject being arranged as follows:

(1) General and Comparative Jurisprudence.

(2) The Institutes of Gaius and Justinian. (3) A selected portion of the Digest. (4) The English Law of Real Property. (5) The English Law of Personal Property, including Contract and Tort. (6) The English Criminal Law, including Procedure and Evidence.

(7) The Legal and Constitutional History of England.

(8) Public International Law.
(9) Essays and Problems.

As to the books recommended for these examinations, a list is published by the Board of Legal Studies and revised from time to time, which is printed in the Calendar. It is too long to give here, and to do so would serve no useful purpose, as the Calendar is easily accessible. The list comprises nearly all the standard textbooks on the various subjects, from which a candidate may select such as he has time, energy, and ability to master. Few students will master all of them; many of the books, indeed, are intended merely for reference or to be read in part.

As to the time at which a student may present himself for the examinations under the new regulations, he may present himself as a candidate for the first part (always supposing he has passed the Little Go or Previous Examination, including the additional subjects required from candidates for a tripos) if he be in his fifth term, hav

ing previously kept four terms, and not more than nine continuous terms have elapsed since he kept his first term; unless he has previously obtained a place in some other Tripos examination, in which case not more than twelve terms must have elapsed. As to the second part, he may be a candidate for it if he be in his eighth term, having previously kept seven terms, and not more than twelve continuous terms have elapsed since he kept his first term, provided he has previously obtained honours in the first part or in some other Tripos examination. The practical effect of these provisions is for the average man, who enters at the proper time (October) and keeps all his termsneglecting bye-term men, who are very few in number-that he may take the first part at the end of his second or third year, and the second part at the end of his third or fourth year, as suits him best.

A student who passes both parts of the Law Tripos, or one part of any other Tripos and either part of the Law Tripos, will be entitled to the degrees of B. A. and LL. B. in honours, and may take both or either of them, and he may pass on to the LL.M. degree without further examination. But the first part alone is not to confer a degree, though taken at the end of the third year, but only to excuse the General Examination. In this respect the regulations differ from those for the Natural Sciences Tripos.

The examinations are to be held as before in May, the first part about a fortnight before the second, and the names of the successful candidates in each part are to be arranged as before in three classes.

On comparing the new regulations with the old, the most striking feature is at once seen to be the division of the Tripos into two parts, to be taken separately at different times. This, in itself, we cannot

but regard as a distinct advance upon many grounds. The subjects of legal study readily lend themselves to such a division, and it will be found that those subjects assigned to the first part are all of a purely theoretical or historical character, while those assigned to the second are of a much more practical character. A student will thus be enabled, after having passed the first part, to devote himself almost exclusively to the study of English Law, without having at the same time to carry in his mind the additional burden of the details of Roman Law, International Law, and Jurisprudence. This, to many men who do not happen to be the fortunate possessors of prodigious memories, will be an immense relief. It will thus promote more thorough study and tend to the suppression of cram and superficiality. Moreover, although it must not be forgotten that the object of the Law Tripos is not to turn out a "complete lawyer," but to give a man a sound groundwork inthe theory, history, and principles of law, together with a training in the modes of legal thought and reasoning, so as to fit him to enter a barrister's chamber or a solicitor's office well prepared to make the most of his opportunities there, yet it is highly desirable that the reading of English Law, which will in most cases be of the greatest value to the student hereafter, should come last and be most complete and accurate in regard to detail. In dividing the Law Tripos into two parts, those who have promoted the change and had the framing of the new regulations have simply followed in the wake of other branches of study, mathematics, classics, and natural sciences, in regard to which the scheme has been found to work admirably. There is no reason why even now a really industrious and earnest student should not take both parts and

get his degree in three years. True, the amount of work is increased, but he has the advantage mentioned above, of being able to dispose of the scientific subjects before taking up the special study of English Law, and he has not, as hitherto, to carry the details of all the subjects in his head till the end of the third year. But it will practically be impossible in the future for a man to take both parts of the Law Tripos and any other Tripos examination, unless he be an exceptional man who comes up very well prepared, after having previously read law elsewhere, and takes the first part of the Law Tripos at the end of his second year, the Historical Tripos (say) at the end of his third, and the second part of the Law Tripos at the end of his fourth year, a well-nigh Herculean task and a very risky undertaking for any but a very strong man. The new scheme somewhat resembles that of the examinations for the Law Degree of the University of London, and will fit in well with the work for those examinations if a student is running the two courses side by side, as some now do. Candidates for the studentships of the Council of Legal Education also will have exceptional opportunities in preparing for them while reading for the first part of the Tripos.

Criticising the subjects of each part, the first point which strikes anyone who took the Tripos under the old regulations is the change in the nature of the paper on General Jurisprudence. Hitherto the peculiarity of the paper on Jurisprudence in the Law Tripos at Cambridge has been that it was devoted to some special part of Austin (generally Lectures i., v., and vi., and one of the three other parts into which Austin's great work is divided-viz., (1) Lectures xii. to xxvii., (2) xxviii. to xxxix., or (3) xl. to lvi.). This part was

taken and literally dissected. It was got up with the utmost minuteness and accuracy, together with the mass of criticism clustering round it. Whatever else they knew, the first-class men of each year usually knew that part of Austin which was set in their year almost as well as they knew the Lord's Prayer. How powerful an intellectual exercise this was, those who have read Austin will know. In the opinion of good judges it has been held to be second only to the reading of Euclid. The paper exemplified at once the traditional narrowness and thoroughness of Cambridge teaching. If we may judge from the paper set at the May's (annual college examination) this year for the candidates for Part I. of the new Tripos, all this is to be changed. future the paper will be of a much wider and broader character. No special part of Austin or any other author will be set, but we presume Austin will still form the basis of this as of all other examinations in Jurisprudence for some time to come. The paper set in the future will rather resemble that set for the studentships at the Inns of Court, and will involve a much wider range of reading--viz., the works of Austin, Maine, Bentham, Holland, Markby, Clark, &c., but more particularly Lectures i., v., and vi. of Austin, Holland, Markby, and Maine's Ancient Law.

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The next point worthy of note is the importance attached to Roman Law. No less than three papers are assigned to this subject, a thing without parallel, so far as we are aware, in any legal examination, University or other. Roman Law is, indeed, the piece de resistance of this part of the Tripos. The importance attached to the subject is, however, warranted by its intrinsic value. The time has gone by when it was necessary to adduce arguments to prove the great utility of a