contra bonos mores, and, indeed, there cannot be such a thing as a succession or heir, whilst the testator or ancestor is living. (a)

"Si hereditas venierit ejus qui vivit, aut nullus sit, nihil esse acti: quia in rerum naturâ non sit quod venierit." (b)

Such sales were interdicted by the law of France. (c)

By the coutume of Normandy the children or descendants were, during the lifetime of the parent, prohibited from making any disposition by sale, mortgage, or gift of that part of the succession or legitime which the coutume gave them.

"La proprieté du tiers de l'immeuble déstiné par la coutume pour le douaire de la femme, est acquis aux enfans du jour des épousailles, et ce pour les contrats de mariage qui se passeront par ci-après; et néanmoins la jouissance en demeure au mari sa vie durant, sans toutefois, qu'il le puisse vendre, engager ne hypotequer; comme en parité les enfans ne pourront vendre, hypotequer ou disposer du tiers avant la mort du père, et qu'ils n'ayent tous renoncé à la succession." (d)

This article of the coutume was subsequently altered. It leaves the contract void only as it affected the heirs. It remained a charge on any other property which belonged to the child. "Le contrat par lequel les enfans du vivant de leur père, ou autre ascendant, ont vendu et hypotequé le tiers à eux destiné par la coutume est executoire sur les autres biens presens et à venir, et non sur ledit tiers, en quelque main qu'il puisse passer, même de l'héritier du fils, ni sur leur personne." (e)

The Code Civil expressly prohibits the sale of the succession of a person still living, even with his consent.

(a) Perez. Cod. lib. 4, tit. 39, n. 1.

(b) Dig. lib. 18, tit. 4, 1. 7. Voet, ad hunc tit. n. 1. Gomez, lib. 2, Var. Res. c. 2, n. 3, 5. L. 13, tit. 5, Part. 5. Feb. b. 2, tit. 4, c. 2, n. 8. (c) Pothier, Tr. de Vente, part 6, c. 3, n. 527. Merlin, tit. Succession, Renonciation de Succession Future.

(d) Art. 399.

(e) Art. 85, Reglements, 1666.

(f) Art. 1600.

Even those codes which adopt the civil law have relaxed the rule, by admitting in marriage settlements contracts respecting the future succession which may devolve on one or both of the contracting parties. (a)

In England the heir of a family, dealing for an expectancy in that family, is distinguished from ordinary cases. An unconscionable bargain made with him is not only looked upon as oppressive in the particular instance, and therefore avoided, but as pernicious in principle, and therefore repressed. (b)

The sale of reversions is discountenanced, inasmuch as it affords facilities for taking an undue advantage of the distressed and necessitous circumstances of the heir, and from its obvious tendency to induce him to shake off his father's authority, and to encourage his extravagance. (c)

The circumstance of the heir being unprovided for will not prevail much in the purchaser's favour: the remoteness or uncertainty of the interest is not material if the terms be unreasonable, nor can much stress be laid upon the purchaser incurring the risk of the loss of his money, in case the heir die before he come into possession; nor will the acquiescence of the seller, during the continuance of the same situation in which he entered into the contract, prejudice him. (d)

The adequacy of the consideration is considered with reference to the time of the contract, and not to the event, and the burden lies on the purchaser in these

(a) 1 Bankton, b. 1, tit. 11, n. 10.

(b) Per Lord Thurlow, 1 Bro. C. C. 10. See Nott v. Hill, 1 Vern. 167, 2 Vern. 27. Berney v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 14. Earl of Ardglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 237. Twisleton v. Griffith, 1 P. Wms. 310. Curwyn v. Milner, 3 P. Wms. 293 n. (C). 1 Sugd. Vend. and Pur. 264.

(c) Sir John Barnardiston v. Lingood, 2 Atk. 133. Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320. Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. C. C. 1. Bernal v. Donegal, 3 Dow, 133. Blakeney v. Bagott, 3 Bligh, N. S. 237. Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. Wms. 290.

1 Sugd. Vend. and Pur. 264.

(d) Gowland v. De Faria, 17 Ves. jun. 20.

cases, to show that a full and adequate consideration was paid. (a)

A court of equity protects even those who are not heirs when selling such reversionary interests. (b) Although such reversionary interests are blended with property in possession, yet if the bulk of the property be reversionary, the whole contract will be set aside. (c)

But a bona fide sale of a reversionary estate cannot be set aside, whether the vendor be an heir or not, (d) unless fraud or imposition be expressly proved, or be implied from the inadequacy of the consideration, or other circumstances attending the sale, (e) although in a late case it was deemed sufficient, to avoid the contract, that the consideration was not equal to the calculated value in the tables. (f) If the bill be delayed for a great length of time, (g) or the vendor, with full notice of all the circumstances, and of his right to set aside the contract, confirm the purchase, the court will not relieve. (h)

Property, which at the time of sale is the subject of a suit which is then pending, and the object of which suit is to vest the property in another person than the vendor, cannot be alienated, so as to exempt the purchaser from being bound by the sentence or judgment which may be ultimately pronounced in that suit.

"Lite pendente, actiones quæ in judicium deducta

Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. Wms. 290.

(a) Gowland v. De Faria, ubi sup. Evans v. Griffith, Farmer v. Wardell, 17 Ves. 24, cited. Medlicott v. O'Donel, 1 Ball and Beatty, 136. Kendall v. Beckett, 2 Russ. and Myl. 88. 1 Sugd. Vend. and Pur. 264. (b) Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern. 121. (c) Lord Portmore v. Taylor, 4 Sim. 182. (d) Dews v. Brandt, Sel. Ca. Cha. 8; and 1 Bro. C. C. 6. (e) Nicols v. Gould, 2 Ves. 422. Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 512. Portmore v. Taylor, 4 Sim. 182.

Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. C. C. 1. Ryle v. Brown, 13 Price, 758. Lord

(f) Gowland v. De Faria, 17 Ves. 20.

(g) Moth v. Atwood, 5 Ves. 845; but see Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball and Beatty, 330.

(h) Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. Wms. 290. Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. 301, 2 Ves. 549. See Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320. Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355. Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball and Beatty, 330.

sunt, vel res pro quibus actor à reo detentis intendit, in conjunctam personam vel extraneam, donationibus, vel emptionibus, vel quibuslibet aliis contractibus, minimè transferri ab eodem actore liceat; tanquam si nihil factum sit, lite nihilominus peragendâ." (a)

"Litigiosa res est, de cujus dominio causa movetur inter possessorem et petitorem, judiciariâ conventione."(b)

It is not, however, to be inferred from hence that the ́sale is ipso jure void. It depends on the issue of the suit whether the purchaser can retain the property which he has purchased. If the vendor fails in it, the purchaser is bound to deliver it up to the party who has recovered, and no new suit is necessary. The rule is, pendente lite nihil innovetur.

This doctrine prevails on the continent. It is treated of under the title of vitium litigiosum. The jurists of Scotland adopt the terms of the civil law, litigious and litigiosity. (c)

The same doctrine is adopted by the law of England. The mere pendency of a suit will not prevent the defendant from selling the property, the subject of the suit, but the purchase will in no manner affect the right of the plaintiff, except so far as it may be necessary to go against the purchaser, if he obtain a transfer of the legal estate. (d) If, however, the plaintiff have only a defeasible estate, the defendant may exercise his right to put an end to it, notwithstanding the pendency of the suit. Therefore, if a man make a voluntary settlement, and the person claiming under it file a bill against the settlor to have the trusts performed, yet the defendant may defeat the plaintiff's right by selling the estate to a

(a) Cod. lib. 8, tit. 37, 1. 2. Dig. lib. 44, tit. 6, de litigiosis, 1. 3. (b) Cod. lib. 8, tit. 37, 1. 1.

(c) L. 13, tit. 7, Part. 3. Feb. lib. 2, tit. 4, c. 2, § 7. 2 Bell's Com. 152. Muller's Prompt. tit. Res Litigiosa.

(d) Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft, before the Vice Chancellor, Aug. 10th, 1813. See 1 Ves and Beam. 180. 2 Ib. 200. 2 Sugd. Vend. and Pur. 282.

purchaser during the pendency of the suit. The same observation applies to a settlement with a power of revocation. The settlor, the defendant, may revoke the settlement, although a suit is depending for carrying it into execution. (a)

Litigiosity is defined by Mr. Bell to be an implied prohibition of alienation to the disappointment of an action, or of diligence, the direct object of which is to attain the possession, or to acquire the property of a particular subject. (b)

The effect of it is analogous to that of inhibition. It tacitly supplies the place of that diligence in all real actions; and inhibition itself, when begun, but not yet completed, requires the aid of litigiosity to give it effect during such reasonable time as the law deems sufficient for bringing the proceedings to completion. (c)

In the civil law litigiosity did not begin until the litiscontestation, that is, until the parties joined issue in the trial. "Fit autem litigiosa litis contestatione non solâ denunciatione, ne res vendatur, licet creditori interdixerit debitor, ne pignus vendatur, et is tamen vendiderit, nec solâ in jus vocatione, longè minùs solâ libelli oblatione Principi factâ. Jure tamen novo in actionibus realibus inter possessorem et petitorem res litigiosa fit judiciariâ conventione, vel precibus Principi oblatis et judici insinuatis, ac per eum futuro reo cognitis, antiquo jure circa actiones in personam haud immutato." (d)

In England the service of a subpoena is not a sufficient lis pendens, unless a bill be filed, but when the bill is filed, the lis pendens begins from the service of the subpœna. (e) The question must relate to the estate, and

(a) S. C. 2 Sugd. Vend. and Pur. 283.

(b) 2 Bell's Com. 152.

(c) Ib.

(d) Voet, lib. 44, tit. 6, n. 1. Cod. lib. 8, tit. 37, 1. 1, § 4. Dig. lib. 44,

tit. 6, 1. 1. Menoch. de Præsumt. lib. 2, præsumt. 97.

(e) Anon. 1 Vern. 318. 2 Sugd. Vend. and Pur. 283.