Justice is of two kinds, and these are confounded together in the scheme of satisfaction. In one sense, justice gives the power, or right of doing a thing; and in the other, it requires a thing to be done. If a man has injured you, it is just that you should exact reparation; nevertheless, if you are disposed to forgive the injury, or to pass it over without any consideration, justice does not oblige you to make such a demand. But if you have injured another person, justice calls on you for a full reparation; you can claim no right or privilege by which you can be absolved, unless you are forgiven by the injured party. In other words, justice obliges every man to render to another his strict due, but does not compel him to claim all his own. Hence, God may pardon the sins of his creatures upon any terms, which he thinks proper, without exacting satisfaction to his justice.*

justice demanded, even the whole debt was paid." History of Redemption, p. 198.

This writer makes the following distinction between the satisfaction and the merits of Christ. "All is done," he observes," by the price that Christ lays down. But the price that Christ laid down does two things. It pays our debt, and so it satisfies; by its intrinsic value, and by the agreement between the Father and the Son, it procures a title to us for happiness, and so it merits. The satisfaction of Christ is to free us from misery, and the merit of Christ is to purchase happiness for us." Ibid. p. 175.

This distinction reminds one of the schoolmen. It is evidently a distinction without a difference; for whoever is freed from misery, must in the nature of things enjoy happiness. Hence satisfaction and merit, as used by President Edwards, do not signify two things, but the same thing.

* In remarking on these distinctions, Emlyn observes, that justice is "either quod fieri potest, what lawfully may be done; or quod fieri debet, what ought to be done." Works, Vol. ii. p. 49. Now as it is lawful or right, for God to

If you deny this, you take from God the power to forgive; for what kind of forgiveness is that, which is granted after the demand of the law is entirely satisfied? Would you commend a magistrate for his lenity and forgiving temper, who should refuse to release his prisoner, till he had suffered in full measure the penalty of the law? You could not, it is true, accuse such a magistrate of any wrong, because he has been no more than strictly just; and it is equally certain, that you could not talk of his forgiveness, for he has forgiven nothing. And on the other hand, forgiveness implies a relinquishment of justice. God cannot be said to forgive a single sin, the penalty of which has been withheld by reason of a satisfaction to his justice, or for any other cause.*

We hence perceive on what a slender support this whole system hangs. Its very first principle is

punish transgressors of his law, it is therefore just; but this proves no injustice in declining to exercise this right. Justice, in this case, is what may be done, but not what, by any necessity, ought to be done.

* To preserve consistency in one part, some have been contented to run into extremes and absurd consequences in another. Hence to keep up the notion of the inflexible nature of divine justice, which is the root and branch of the whole system of satisfaction, they frankly and boldly confess, that God does not forgive sin. Mr. Stockell, a most zealous defender of the popular doctrine, says, "In a strict and proper sense, the infinite God doth not forgive sin, for it is readily granted by all, who are sound in the faith, that Jesus Christ hath given full satisfaction to divine justice for all sin, and hath fully paid the debt of the church. And if Christ has satisfied the justice of God for all the sins of his people, how then can it justly, or with propriety of speech be said, that God pardoneth our sins and transgressions? Sure I am, that debt can never be forgiven, which is paid." Redeemer's Glory Unveiled, p. 157. See also, Wright's Anti-Satisfactionist, Chap. i.

assumed, incapable of demonstration, and opposed to the divine nature. It makes God a severe, inflexible judge, who is obliged and disposed to exact entire satisfaction from his creatures, before he will show them mercy. If we were arguing the subject, we might say without hesitation, that this simple view of the nature of justice were sufficient to place this doctrine on a ground perfectly untenable. At present, it is enough to infer, that a system, which is held together by a principle so radically and obviously erroneous, and which takes from God the power of granting mercy and forgiveness to his creatures on such terms as he may choose, cannot be expected to have any special efficacy in giving us just conceptions of the divine attributes, or inspiring us with that respect and reverence, which are due to a perfectly holy, wise, and benevolent God.

As to the anger, or wrath of God, which Calvinists usually connect with their view of the divine justice, it seems unreasonable to presume so much on the common sense and good feelings of mankind, as to inquire what is contained in such a representation, which can cause us to love God, or to magnify and revere his moral perfections. An angry being of infinite power, who seeks to inflict his vengeance on the feeble creatures of his own workmanship, is most certainly not a being, who can be regarded with much depth of love, or warmth of piety, or purity of devotion, by the creatures themselves, whom he is ready to destroy with the devouring flames of his anger. And especially, if with this doctrine you connect to

tal depravity, which is an equally important link in the calvinistic chain, it would seem absolutely impossible, that any love, or gratitude, or any other good affection can find a place in the breast of man.

How can you love a being, who has all power over you, and who is not only angry with you, and refuses to show any mercy till a full satisfaction be made to his justice, but who has created you with such a nature, as to render it impossible for you to avoid breaking his laws, and incurring his displeasure? Add still further, that he will not be satisfied by any returns you can make, or any sufferings you can endure. As you are not able in your finite nature to answer the demands of his insatiable justice, he seizes upon an innocent victim, on whom he pours out all the vials of his wrath. He then professes himself appeased, and hesitates no longer to open the arms of his mercy. Such is the character, which the doctrine of satisfaction finds in the Deity; and, let me ask you, what is here to indicate the loving kindness, compassion, goodness, long suffering, forbearance, readiness to forgive, and perfect holiness, which our Saviour has taught us to reverence in the everliving God, and which alone can be the object of a pure love, pious gratitude, and ardent devotion? If God were the angry, vindictive being, represented in this system, it would be impossible to love, and impious to adore him.

Another sustaining principle of this doctrine is the imputation of sin and righteousness. Christ is said to have taken upon him the sins of men, and they are

saved by receiving his righteousness. This notion is as ill founded, as that concerning justice. Sin is a transgression of a law by an intelligent, moral agent, and it pertains to him alone, who commits the transgression. Guilt is the consciousness of having transgressed. Neither of these things can be transferred; you cannot be conscious for another, nor can you sin, or be guilty for another. If then, neither the deed, nor the guilt of the deed, can come upon you, how can you suffer the penalty? The same thing holds on the other side; righteousness consists in obedience to the law of right, and innocence is a consciousness of this obedience. As one being can neither act, nor be conscious for another, so the righteousness of one being cannot be the righteousness of another. This is irresistible in the nature of things, and God has expressly asserted it by the mouth of the prophet. "The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." Until this declaration can be proved false, the imputation either of sin, or of righteousness, must be deemed a fiction.

But let this inconsistency be passed over, and take it for granted, that the notion of imputed sin is true, as set forth in the scheme of satisfaction. In what light does it exhibit the character of God? Where is the justice, to say nothing of the goodness and mercy, in making the innocent suffer for the guilty? Could any but a cruel, capricious, tyrannical being resort to such an expedient for repairing the breach of his law? While God has all power in his hands,