TABLE OF STATUTES CITED IN OPINIONS. (A.) STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. PAGE 1789, Sept. 24, 1 Stat. 78, c. 20.. 447 1801, Feb. 27, 2 Stat. 103, c. 15.. 574 1802, Apr. 29, 2 Stat. 156, c. 31.. 574 1813, July 22, 3 Stat. 21, c. 14 ... 292, 1836, July 4, 5.Stat. 122, c. 357... 241 1838, July 7, 5 Stat. 306, c. 192... 572 1842, Aug. 23, 5 Stat. 516, c. 188. 342 1850, Sept. 7, 9 Stat. 496, c. 76... 371 1854, July 17, 10 Stat. 304, c. 83, 325 1858, May 4, 11 Stat. 272, c. 27, 447, 448 1862, July 17, 12 Stat. 589, c. 195, 552, 553, 554, 556 1863, Mar. 3, 12 Stat. 762, c. 91, 572, 574 1864, July 2, 13 Stat. 365, c. 217, 535, 536 1867, Mar. 2, 14 Stat. 558, c. 196..451 1870, June 21, 16 Stat. 160, c. 141, 572 1875, Mar. 3, 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, 448, 452 572, 573, 574 1880, June 16, 21 Stat. 288, c. 246, 153 1885, Mar. 3, 23 Stat. 443, c. 355, 573, 574 1887, Feb. 4, 24 Stat. 379, c. 104, 275 1887, Mar. 3, 24 Stat. 554, c. 373, 134, 446, 448, 601 1888, Aug. 13, 25 Ştat. 434, c. 866, 446, 448, 601 1889, Feb. 6, 25 Stat. 655, c. 113.. 575 (B.) STATUTES OF STATES AND TERRITORIES, 573 .572, 573 673 .573, 574 PAGE p. 674, c. 83, § 6. Rev. Stats. 1874, c. 30, § 6 § 33 c. 114, § 34 c. 148, § 9 1 Starr & Curtis's Ann. Stat. 2 Starr & Curtis, p. 1539.. Gross's Stat. 1868, p. 108, § 35. .69, 70 1 Sess. Laws, 1869, 260, c. 78 Massachusetts. Stat. 1853, c. 410, § 1 121 Gen. Stat. c. 136, §§ 3, 67 121 121 68 New York. 1885, June 13, Laws 1885, c. 78 Tennessee. 70 Laws of 1849, p. 111, c. 36, 78 Indiana. 1853, Feb. 23, c. 85. ... 404 Rev. Stats. 1881, 490, 491 Acts of 1879, p. 182, c. 141, 489, 490, 491 Laws of 1881, c. 96, §9 $ 16. 20 .20, 21 §§ 3971-3973.. 405 Code of 1858, § 2481 490 Milliken & Vertrees' Code, 490 Texas. 2 Sess. Laws, 1853-54, 453, c. Rev. Stats. of 1879, p. 330, 412 Art. 2257 383 1 Sess. Laws, 1857-58, Art. 4802, tit. 96, c. 1,..384, 386 p. 10 411 Arts. 4813, 4814 390 2 Sess. Laws, 1857-58, 158, c. 412 Arts. 4815, 4816, 4817, 4818, 391 392 Great Britain. 31 H. VIII. c. 1 (C.) FOREIGN STATUTES. 120 .120 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AT OCTOBER TERM, 1891. FICKLEN. SHELBY COUNTY TAXING DISTRICT.. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE. F. and C. & Co. were commercial agents or brokers, having an office in Shelby County, Tennessee, where they carried on that business. In 1887 they took out licenses for their said business, under the provisions of the statute of Tennessee of April 4, 1881, (Sess. laws 1881, c. 96, § 9, 111, 113,) imposing a tax upon factors, brokers, buyers or sellers on commission, or otherwise, doing business within the State, or, if no capital be so invested, then upon the gross yearly commissions, charges or compensation for said business. During the year for which they took out licenses all the sales negotiated by F. were made on behalf of principals residing in other States, and the goods so sold were, at the times of the sales, in other States, to be shipped to Tennessee as sales should be effected. During the same time a large part of the commissions of C. & Co. were derived from similar sales. They had no capital invested in their business. At the expiration of the year they applied for a renewal of their license. As they had made no return of sales, and no payment of percentage on their commission, the application was denied. They filed a bill to restrain the collection of the percentage tax for the past year, and also to restrain any interference with their current business, claiming that the tax was a tax on interstate commerce. Held, (1) That if the tax could be said to affect interstate commerce in any way it did so incidentally, and so remotely as not to amount to a regulation of such commerce; VOL. CXLV-1 1 Statement of the Case. (2) That under the circumstances the complainants could not resort to the court, simply on the ground that the authorities had refused to issue a new license without the payment of the stipulated tax. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, examined and distinguished from this case. This case having been submitted on briefs, the submission was set aside by the court, and an oral argument ordered. When the case was reached neither party appeared by counsel, but an offer was again made to submit on the briefs. The court thereupon ordered the case dismissed for want of prosecution in the manner directed by its previous order; but subsequently this dismissal was set aside on motion, and argument was heard. THIS case was submitted January 4, 1889, under the 20th rule. On the 4th of February, 1889, the submission was set aside, and the case was restored to the docket, to stand for oral argument. On the 6th of November, 1891, it was assigned for argument. When reached on the 24th of that month, an offer was again made to submit on the briefs. The court thereupon ordered the case dismissed for failure to prosecute it in the manner directed by the court. Mr. W. Hallett Phillips, December 21, 1891, on behalf of the plaintiffs, moved the court to rescind the order dismissing the cause, to restore the same on the docket, and to set it down for oral argument, and, in support of the motion, submitted the following statement: "The cause was set down at the present term for oral argument at a day certain. Counsel not then appearing, it was, on November 24, 1891, ordered that the cause be dismissed for want of prosecution in the manner directed. "The court stated as the ground of its action that counsel for plaintiffs in error had declined to comply with its order. "I am requested to state by the counsel referred to that they disclaim any purpose to disregard the order, and to express their extreme regret that the court should have taken a different view. "Counsel, not being familiar with the practice of this court in such matters, supposed that the order setting down the cause for argument was intended to invite an oral discussion and not to direct one. "While their error may not be regarded as a legal justifica Statement of the Case. tion, they trust it may be sufficient to show that their action was not intended as a discourtesy to the court or an intentional disobedience of its authority. "Plaintiffs in error represent that the matter involved is of much consequence to them and others similarly situated. "The case involves an important constitutional question, which it is hoped may receive the final decision of your honors. "Arrangements have been made with counsel to argue the case, if the court, in its indulgence, should accord the opportunity." The cause was thereupon restored to the docket, and was duly argued. The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: This was a bill filed in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, by C. L. Ficklen, and Cooper & Company, against the taxing district of Shelby County, and Andrew J. Harris, County Trustee. The bill alleged that complainants were "commercial agents or merchandise brokers located within the taxing district of Shelby County, where their respective firms rent a room for the purpose of keeping and, at times, exhibiting their samples, and carrying on their correspondence with their respective principals; that they use no capital in their business; that they handle or deal in no merchandise, and are neither buyers nor sellers; they only engage in negotiating sales for their respective principals; they do precisely the same business that commercial drummers do, the only difference being that they are stationary, while the commercial drummers are transitory, and go from place to place and secure a temporary room at each town or city in which to exhibit their samples. That each solicits orders for the sales of the merchandise of their respective principals and forwards the same to them, when such orders are filled by shipping the goods direct to the purchasers thereof in the county of Shelby." It was then averred that all of the sales negotiated by complainant Ficklen were exclusively for non-resident firms, who resided and carried on business in other States than Tennessee, and all the merchandise so sold was in other States than Ten |