་ Opinion of the Court. No appearance for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. This case involves the single question whether a requirement of a charter that the bonds issued by a municipal corporation shall specify for what purpose they are issued, is so far satisfied by a bond which purports on its face to be issued by virtue of an ordinance, the date of which is given, but not its title or its contents, as to cut off defences which might otherwise be made. We are of the opinion that it is not. It is the settled doctrine of this court that municipal corporations are merely agents of the state government for local purposes, and possess only such powers as are expressly given, or implied, because essential to carry into effect such as are expressly granted; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. section 89; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; that the bonds of such corporations are void unless there be express or implied authority to issue them; Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 625; Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165; Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; that the provisions of the statute authorizing them must be strictly pursued; and that the purchaser or holder of such bonds is chargeable with notice of the requirements of the law under which they are issued. Ogden v. County of Daviess, 102 U. S. 634; Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Northern Bank v. Porter Township, 110 U. S. 608; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120; Merchants' Bank v. Bergen County, 115 U. S. 384; Harshman v. Knox County, 122 U. S. 306; Coler v. Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162; Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674. shall It is certainly a reasonable requirement that the bonds issued express upon their face the purpose for which they were issued. In any event, it was a requirement of which the purchaser was bound to take notice, and if it appeared upon their face that they were issued for an illegal purpose they would be void. If they were issued without any purpose appearing. Opinion of the Court. at all upon their face, the purchaser took the risk of their being issued for an illegal purpose, and, if that proved to be the case, they are as void in his hands as if he had received them with express notice of their illegality. Ordinarily the recital of the fact that the bonds were issued in pursuance of a certain ordinance would be notice that they were issued for a purpose specified in such ordinance, Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86, and the city would be estopped to show the fact to be otherwise. Ottawa v. National Bank, 105 U. S. 342. But where the statute requires such purpose to be stated upon the face of the bonds it is no answer to say that the ordinance authorized them for a legal purpose, if in fact they were issued without consideration, and for a different purpose. In this case, the bonds were not only issued for a purpose not named in the ordinance, viz.: in aid of the Texas and Atlantic Refrigerator Car Company, which had agreed to erect at Denison slaughter-houses, tanks, machinery and other material of the value of $15,000, but upon a consideration which had wholly failed, the company having failed to comply with the terms of the contract; and the bonds, so far as they were known to exist, were cancelled. In Kansas v. School District No. 3, 34 Kansas, 237, relied upon by the plaintiff, the State sued a school district upon certain school district bonds and their coupons. Upon the trial, the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence upon the petition, upon the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the court sustained the objection and dismissed the action. One of the objections urged by the defendant against the petition was that the bonds did not state, as required by statute, the purpose for which they were issued. The court held that the bonds were not void for that reason, because under the allegations of the petition they must be considered as issued in good faith; "that the school district received ample consideration for them; and that the State of Kansas is an innocent and bona fide purchaser of them; for nothing appears to the contrary in the petition, and all the allegations of the petition would tend to indicate this." This ruling, Syllabus. however, is not inconsistent with the idea that if they had been issued for an illegal purpose, the purchaser would have been chargeable with notice of such illegality, by reason of the omission to state on the face of the bonds the purpose for which they were issued. In Young v. Camden County, 19 Missouri, 309, the act required that county warrants should be written or printed in Roman letters without ornament, in order to prevent the issuing of paper by county courts which could be used as a circulating medium. This was held to be merely directory; but the case, though cited by the plaintiff here, is not in point. The court held expressly that all the words prescribed by the statute were in the warrants, and that the introduction of other words did not vitiate them. In view of the circumstances under which these bonds were issued the instruction to return a verdict for the defendant was proper, and the judgment of the court below is, therefore, Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissented. GOODE v. GAINES. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS. No. 227. Argued April 18, 1892. Decided May 2, 1892.1 The court again adheres to its decision in Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276, touching titles in the Hot Springs Reservation, and holds that there are no facts in these cases which take them out of the operation of that decision; but, in view of the delay in commencing these suits, and the previous acquiescence of the plaintiffs in the possession by the defendants, it limits the right of an account in equity of the rents of the premises to the date of the filing of the bills. 1 With this case were argued at the same-time No. 302, SMITH v. GAINES; No. 303, DUGAN v. GAINES; No. 304, COHN v. GAINES; No. 305, ALLEN v. GAINES; No. 306, MADISON v. GAINES; No. 307, RUGG v. GAINES; No. 308, Statement of the Case. THE Court stated the case as follows: These were bills in equity filed by William H. Gaines and wife, on the 23d of May, 1884, against the appellants, respectively, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, all seeking the same relief, and couched, mutatis mutandis, in substantially the same language. The bill in No. 302, Smith v. Gaines, was as follows: "William H. Gaines and Maria Gaines his wife, bring this suit against John Kubler and George H. Smith, and for cause of action allege that in the year 1851, in pursuance of the instruction of the Secretary of the Interior, plaintiff Maria Gaines, Albert Belding, Henry Belding and George Belding, heirs and legal representatives of Ludovicus Belding, entered, under the preëmption laws of the United States, the southwest quarter of section thirty-three, in township two (2) south, range nineteen (19) west, for which they paid the United States government two hundred dollars, which was advanced by plaintiff Wm. H. Gaines, and which money the United States still retains. At the time of said entry a small portion of said land was occupied by Mrs. Lydia Belding, widow of Ludovicus Belding, and the portion of said land for which this suit is brought was occupied by and in- Wm. H. Gaines, Maria Gaines, Albert Belding, Henry Belding, and George Belding, under the supervision and control of Wm. H. Gaines, brought suit in the Hot Springs Circuit Court against and recovered judgment for the possession of said land, which judgment was afterwards affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas and by the Supreme Court of the United States, and on the day of, 1856, Wm. H. Gaines was, by the sheriff of Hot Springs County, put into the possession of said property by virtue of a writ of possession issued upon the judgment of said Hot Springs Circuit Court in - GARNETT v. GAINES; No. 309, GARNETT v. GAINES; No. 310, RUGG v. GAINES; No. 311, GRANGER v. GAINES; No. 312, NEUBERT v. GAINES; No. 313, SUMPTER v. GAINES; No. 314, LATTA v. GAINES; No. 315, LATTA v. GAINES; all Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The opinion of the court is entitled in all the cases. Statement of the Case. obedience to the mandates of said Supreme Courts, both of the State and of the United States, and said plaintiffs, Wm. H. Gaines and Maria Gaines, his wife, remained in peaceable and quiet possession of said property until the 1st day of June, 1876, when they were dispossessed of said property by a receiver appointed by the Court of Claims of the United States, under an act of Congress entitled 'An act in relation to the Hot Springs reservation, in Arkansas, approved June 11th, 1870. "Plaintiffs entered into possession by virtue of said entry and by virtue of the decisions of said State and United States Supreme Courts and the writs of possession issued in pursuance of said judgments, and continued in possession for a period of about twenty years, until the Supreme Court of the United States, in a suit to determine to whom the patent should issue, decided that said lands were not subject to preemption or entry, and that no claimant was entitled to a patent, but the same was still the property of the United States, which decision was rendered April 24th, 1876. Plaintiff during said twenty years paid taxes on said property and fenced and built houses on the same and otherwise improved the same. "On the 1st day of October, 1870, plaintiff Wm. H. Gaines leased a lot of ground, which has since been laid off into lots and blocks by the Hot Springs Commission in pursuance of an act of Congress and is now known as lot (2) two, in block seventy-seven (77), to John Kubler, which lease was for the term of one year, to be renewed at the election of the lessee from year to year until the title to the Hot Springs quarter section of land was settled, for an annual rent of, payable in monthly instalments of "Said lease also provides that all buildings and improvements erected on said lot by the lessee might be removed therefrom during the continuance of the lease or within thirty days thereafter, but that no buildings or improvements erected could be removed while said rent or any part thereof remained due and unpaid. It also provides that the lessor should have a lien on all buildings and improvements to secure the rent, a |