Opinion of the Court. courts of a State extends to all cases "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity." The argument of the defendant in this connection is that as the title to the lands did not pass by the treaty, which contained only an agreement to convey, the proviso ceased to be operative when the patent was issued in 1843; that the same restriction upon alienation contained in the patent was one which the Supreme Court of Illinois had considered; and that their construction, that no title passed from Robinson and Horton for want of permission of the President of the United States, could not be reviewed by this court. There are two sufficient answers to this contention. First, the proviso in the treaty did continue by its express terms to be operative, so long as the land was owned by the grantees or their heirs, and the object of carrying this proviso into the patent was merely to apprise intending purchasers of the restrictions imposed by the treaty upon the alienation of the lands. Second, the case raised the question of the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, viz.: the authority of the President to approve the deed thirteen years after its execution, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois was against its validity; so that the case is directly within the words of the statute. 2. So far as the main question is concerned, we know of no reason why the analogy of the law of principal and agent is not applicable here, viz.: that an act in excess of an agent's authority, when performed, becomes binding upon the principal, if subsequently ratified by him. The treaty does not provide how or when the permission of the President shall be obtained, and there is certainly nothing which requires that it shall be given before the deed is delivered. Doe v. Beardsley, 2 McLean, 412. It is doubtless, as was said by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Harmon v. Partier, 12 Sm. & Marsh. 425, 427, "a condition precedent to a perfect title" in the grantee; but the neglect in this case to obtain the approval of the President for thirteen years, only shows that for that length of time the title was imperfect, and that no action of ejectment Opinion of the Court. would have lain until the condition was performed. Had the grantee the day after the deed was delivered, sent it to Washington and obtained the approval of the President, it would be sticking in the bark to say that the deed was not thereby validated. A delay of thirteen years is immaterial, provided, of course, that no third parties have in the meantime legally acquired an interest in the lands. If, after executing this deed, Robinson had given another to another person, with the permission of the President, a wholly different question would have arisen. But so far as Robinson and his grantees are concerned, the approval of the President related back to the execution of the deed and validated it from that time. As was said by this court in Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, 338: "The ratification operates upon the act ratified precisely as though authority to do the act had been previously given, except where the rights of third parties have intervened between the act and the ratification. The retroactive efficacy of the ratification is subject to this qualification. The intervening rights of third persons cannot be defeated by the ratification." See also Fleckner v. Bank of the United States, 8 Wheat. 338, 363. In Ashley v. Eberts, 22 Indiana, 55, a similar act of the President approving a deed was held to relate back and give it validity from the time of its execution, so as to protect the grantee against a claim by adverse possession which arose in the interim between its date and the confirmation. "Otherwise," said the court, "a mere trespasser by taking possession after a valid sale and before its consummation, would have power to defeat a bona fide purchaser." This case was approved in Steeple v. Downing, 60 Indiana, 478, 497. In Murray v. Wooden, 17 Wend. 531, a conveyance of land by an Indian which, subsequent to its date, had been ratified by a certificate of approbation of the surveyor general in the form prescribed by law, was held to be inoperative upon the ground that, previous to the granting of such certificate, the Indian had conveyed to a third person, and the deed to such person had been approved in the mode prescribed by law previous to the endorsement of the certificate of approbation of the deed first executed. This was a clear case of rights intervening Opinion of the Court. between the execution of the first deed and its approval. In Smith v. Stevens, 10 Wall. 321, the right to convey the lands reserved for the 'benefit of the Indians was expressly vested in the Secretary of the Interior, upon the request of any one of the Indians named, and it was held that there being no ambiguity in the act which had provided the way in which the lands could be sold, by necessary implication it prohibited their being sold in any other way. "The sale in question not only contravened the policy and spirit of the statute, but violated its positive provisions." In that case there was no pretence that the requirements of the act had been fulfilled. Nor do we consider it material that the grantee had in the meantime died, since, if the ratification be retroactive, it is as if it were endorsed upon the deed when given, and enures to the benefit of the grantee of Horton, the original grantee — not as a new title acquired by a warrantor subsequent to his deed enures to the benefit of the grantee, but as a deed imperfect when executed, may be made perfect as of the date when it was delivered. This was the ruling of the court in Steeple v. Downing, 60 Indiana, 478. The object of the proviso was not to prevent the alienation of lands in toto, but to protect the Indian against the improvident disposition of his property, and it will be presumed that the President, before affixing his approval, satisfied himself that no fraud or imposition had been practised upon the Indian when the deed was originally obtained. Indeed, the record in this case shows that the President did not affix his approval until affidavits had been presented, showing that Pickering was the owner, and that the amount paid to Robinson was the full value of the land, and that the sale was an advantageous one to him. We are constrained to differ with the Supreme Court of Illinois in its view of the treaty, and to hold that, so far as this question is concerned, plaintiff's chain of title contained no defect. The judgment of the Supreme Court is, therefore, Reversed, and, the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Syllabus. FELIX v. PATRICK. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA. No. 301. Argued April 14, 1892. Decided May 16, 1892. F., a half-breed of the Sioux nation, received in 1857 a certificate of landscrip under the treaty of July 15, 1830, 7 Stat, 328, and under the act of July 17, 1854, 10 Stat. 304, c. 83, which enacted that" no transfer or conveyance of any of said certificates or scrip shall be valid." In March, 1860, she executed a power of attorney in blank, and a quitclaim deed in blank, the name of the attorney, the description of the land, and the name of the grantee in the deed being omitted. These came into the possession of P., on the payment of $150, who inserted the name of R. as attorney, and his own name as grantee, and a tract of 120 acres in Omaha, of which he was already in possession, but without valid title, as the description. The deed was then delivered to him by R. and was put upon record. P. never informed F. of this location, or of the record of these several instruments, but remained in possession of the located tract, either personally or through his grantees. Congress, on the procurement of P., confirmed his title to the tract. 15 Stat. 186, c. 240; 269, c. 21. The half-breed was ignorant of all this until August, 1887, when the Sioux Indians became citizens of the United States by virtue of article 6 of the treaty of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 637. In 1888 the representatives of F., who had deceased, filed a bill in equity against P., setting forth these facts: averring that the power of attorney and quitclaim deed had been fraudulently procured by some persons unknown, and praying that P. should be decreed to have taken the title in trust for F., and that the power of attorney and the quitclaim deed should be declared to be fraudulent and a cloud upon plaintiffs' title, and that the defendants be directed to surrender the estate to plaintiffs. To this the defendants demurred, and the court below dismissed the bill. Held, (1) That P. was chargeable with notice that the power and the quitclaim deed were intended as devices to evade the law against the assignment of the scrip, and that he acquired no title through them; (2) That he acquired no additional rights through the confirmatory acts of Congress; (3) That having no right to locate the scrip for his own benefit, he must be deemed to have located it for F. and as her representative; (4) That this implied trust did not prevent him from taking and holding possession of the land adversely to her and for his own use and benefit; (5) That, under these circumstances, F. was bound to use reasonable diligence in discovering the fraud, and seeking redress; Statement of the Case. (6) That, conceding that plaintiffs were incapable of being affected with laches so long as they maintained their tribal relations, the bill was fatally defective in not setting forth when and how the alleged frauds were discovered, in order that the court might clearly see whether it could not have been discovered before; (7) That, in view of all the circumstances it would be inequitable to disturb the disposition made of the case below; (8) That the most which could be justly demanded would be the repayment of the $150, with interest. THIS was an appeal from a decree sustaining demurrers to a bill in equity filed by the heirs of Sophia Felix against the defendant Patrick and his grantees, for the purpose of having them declared trustees for the plaintiffs of certain lands in the city of Omaha, which, in 1861, he had caused to be entered in the name of Sophia Felix by virtue of certain scrip issued to her as a member of the Dakota or Sioux nation of Indians. The allegations of the bill were, in substance, as follows: 1. That in 1854, Sophia Felix, being a half-breed of the Sioux or Dakota nation of Indians, residing in Minnesota, was under the treaty of July 15, 1830, and the act of Congress of July 17, 1854, entitled to have issued to her scrip for the location of 480 acres of land, as provided by that act. That in 1857 scrip was issued to her for 480 acres, and that before the location of said scrip the said Sophia Felix intermarried with one David Garnelle. 2. That on March 31, 1860, certain persons unknown, "by certain wicked devices and fraudulent means," procured the said Sophia with her husband, said David Garnelle, to execute a power of attorney in blank, also a quitclaim deed in blank, a copy of each of which was attached to the bill. The power of attorney omitted the name of the attorney, the number of the scrip and the description of the land, and authorized the person whose name was to be inserted to sell, and convey, and confirm unto the purchaser thereof the following described pieces or parcels of land, "to be located for us, and in our name," etc. The quitclaim deed also omitted the name of the grantee and the description of the land; but both instruments were otherwise in legal form. 3. That the defendant Patrick in November, 1861, pro |