Statement of the Case. cured from some person unknown possession of said scrip, to the amount of 120 acres, and on November 21 made application to the land office at Omaha to locate such scrip, and thereupon, in the name of said Sophia Felix, located the same upon certain described real estate in the county of Douglas and Territory of Nebraska. (These lands are now admitted to be within the limits of the city of Omaha.) That "at the time of said location, the said Sophia Felix had never parted with the title to or any interest in said scrip, and was the absolute owner thereof and sole beneficiary therein, and these facts the said Matthewson T. Patrick at that time and at all times well knew, and the said location enured wholly to the benefit of the said Sophia Felix," although she had no knowledge that Patrick had procured the possession of the said scrip or located the same. That the said Patrick "in securing possession of said scrip procured the same with the intent to appropriate the scrip to his own use and defraud the said Sophia Felix out of the same, and out of all interest therein, and out of all benefits thereunder, and located the same, designing it for his own use and benefit, and with the fraudulent intent to deprive the said Sophia Felix out of all benefit and interest therein." 4. That in the further prosecution of his scheme to defraud, Patrick secured the blank power of attorney and quitclaim deed, and shortly thereafter caused the power to be filled out with a description of the scrip, and of the property located with it, and caused the name of William Ruth to be inserted as the attorney to sell and convey the property, a description of which was so inserted; that he also caused the quitclaim deed to be filled out with a description of the property, and inserted his own name as grantee, making the instrument purport to be a conveyance by Sophia and David Garnelle to himself; that on September 7, 1863, he caused the said power of attorney and quitclaim deed to be filed for record in the recorder's office of Douglas County; and in furtherance of said wrongful designs caused the said William Ruth, named by himself as attorney, to execute and deliver to him a deed of the property, by virtue of his pretended authority, and caused the same to be filed for record. Statement of the Case. 5. That at and before the location of such scrip, defendant Patrick was in possession of the premises, and had attempted to acquire title to the same by preëmption, but in that respect was unsuccessful, and that said scrip was procured and located by him for his own benefit, and to acquire a title which he could not acquire under the preëmption acts. 6. That in furtherance of said scheme, the said Patrick procured the enactment of an act of Congress, approved February 2, 1869, confirming the title to the land in question to the parties holding by deed from the patentee. 7. That the said Patrick never informed the said Sophia or her husband, or any one related to her by blood, "that he had procured and located said scrip, or that he had procured said blank instruments and filled them out, or had caused a deed to be executed conveying to himself the real estate herein before described, or that he claimed any ownership therein; but, on the contrary, fraudulently concealed the same and exercised every precaution to prevent said proceedings coming to the knowledge of said parties;" that, recognizing the frailty of his title, he endeavored for several years to secure the execution of a deed by the said Sophia and her husband without letting them know the character of the instrument whereby they would convey to him in fee the said property, and to that end procured his father to write a letter, a copy of which was made an exhibit; that all the acts heretofore stated were in the execution of an unlawful scheme to wrong and defraud said Sophia out of said scrip and property; that the instruments executed as aforesaid by her and her husband were not intended by them to be used for the purpose of conveying the said property to any person whatsoever, or to authorize such conveyance by any other person, and no consideration was received by either of them for the scrip; but that Patrick has claimed and still claims and asserts ownership in the premises ever since the location of said scrip. 8. That a large part of said land has been platted and recorded, divided into lots, and sold by warranty deed to others, who are made defendants as purchasers from him of particular descriptions given in the bill. Statement of the Case. 9. That these grantees had notice of infirmities, if not actual fraud, attaching to the title of Patrick, since among other things the power of attorney and deed are dated nearly two years prior to the scrip location; that on July 3, 1863, the United States issued to the said Sophia Felix its patent for the premises, which was filed for record on July 25, 1863. 10. That the said Sophia Garnelle died December, 1865, and during her lifetime had no knowledge that Patrick had secured and located said scrip; had no knowledge that the power of attorney and quitclaim deed had been filled out or used in any manner, or placed on record; and had no knowledge as to the disposition made of such scrip, or of the acts of the said Patrick; that the plaintiffs, who are the heirs at law of the said Sophia Felix, had no knowledge whatever of the facts set forth until 1887, when, under a certain treaty with the Sioux Indians, they became citizens of the United States; and that prior to this time they had maintained their tribal relations with the Sioux Indians, and were, by acts of Congress, inhibited and barred from instituting any action in any of the courts, Federal or state, in the United States, were denied access to the said courts, and had no legal standing therein as a party. 11. That Patrick and those claiming under him ought not to be permitted to hold such real estate, but should surrender the same to the plaintiffs, in view of the fact that said scrip, under the treaty of Prairie du Chien, and the act of Congress of July 17, 1854, could not be sold, assigned or transferred directly or indirectly; that Patrick received said scrip in trust for said Sophia, and located the same in trust for her, and holds possession of the land as trustee for her and her heirs, and ought not to be allowed to assume any adverse relation to the plaintiffs; that he ought also to account for the rents, issues and profits of said land for all the time he has had possession thereof, etc.; prayer, that he be declared a trustee; that the power of attorney and quitclaim deed be declared fraudulent and void, and a cloud upon plaintiffs' title, and be cancelled; that the act of Congress confirming Patrick's title to the lands be declared unconstitutional and void; that the defendants VOL. CXLV-21 1 Mr. Shipman's argument for appellants. surrender possession of the land to the plaintiffs; and that the said Patrick account for the rents and profits, etc. There were three separate demurrers filed to this bill by Patrick and several of the other defendants, principally upon the ground of want of equity and laches. Upon hearing in the court below the bill was dismissed, (36 Fed. Rep. 457,) and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Mr. William D. Shipman for appellants, on the question of laches said: The appellees confront us with the claim that, granting the void character of the pretended deeds to Patrick, and the power of attorney in which he inserted the name of Ruth, and the description of the land, still the appellants are entitled to no relief because they delayed their suit for that relief too long. To this defence we answer: (1) This suit was commenced as soon as the fraud practised on these appellants, by the disposition attempted to be made of their property, was discovered by them, and that if the appellants had been white persons, their relief would not be barred on account of lapse of time; (2) That the appellants were, from their birth, down to the 29th of August, 1887, tribal Indians, under such conditions of wardship, pupilage, constraint, dependence and disabilities, that no statute of limitations, or lapse of time, could run against them or bar their right to relief, while those conditions remained. I. The bill alleges that suit was brought as soon as the fraud was discovered. But the appellees, under the second head of demurrer, claim that the appellants did not use due or reasonable diligence in discovering the fraud. That this defence is without merit or validity will appear by recurring to the statute under which this scrip was issued. 10 Stat. 304, c. 83. In a transaction like this, if the victims of the fraud had been white persons, especially if they were ignorant, feebleminded and living far from the place where the land was situated and the fraudulent scheme enacted, they would not be barred of relief by the time which elapsed in this case before suit was brought. Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503. Mr. Shipman's argument for appellants. In Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506, this court refused to apply a bar of the statute or the doctrine of laches where all the facts were known to the complainant more than six years before he commenced his suit. See also Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S. 260, 288; Bryan v. Kales, 134 U. S. 126, 135; Trevelyan v. Charter, 11 Cl. & Fin. 714; Maloney v. L'Estrange, Beatty, 406; Carpenter v. Canal Co., 35 Ohio St. 307; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333, 411; Reynolds v. Sumner, 126 Illinois, 58. In Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481, Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion of this court, said: "It is certainly true that length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established; and in a case where fraud is imputed and proved, length of time ought not, upon principles of eternal justice, to be admitted to repel relief. On the contrary, it would seem that the length of time during which the fraud has been successfully concealed and practised, is rather an aggravation of the offence, and calls more loudly upon a court of equity to grant ample and decisive relief." II. I now proceed to consider the condition of the appellants as tribal Indians. This aspect of the case involves grave considerations, which go to the root of the public policy of the United States in its treatment of the aboriginal inhabitants of this continent. This tribunal has, for more than sixty years, dealt with and often defeated the wrongs attempted against the red man. The condition of the latter appeals now with greater pathos, and with a clearer warrant of justice, for protection against the acts, and especially against the frauds of one of the white race. It is true they retain but a remnant of their former number and greatness; but they are still sufficiently numerous and formidable to call for constant oversight, care and protection by the Federal government. Their care and control absorb the time and attention of a large part of the military force of the nation, and their civil affairs require the constant and exclusive oversight of one of the most important administrative bureaus. The utterances of the courts, both State and National, have so uniformly recognized the disabilities of these people, and |