Citations for Appellant.

50; St. Clara Female Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Illinois, 375; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Michigan, 214; Diamon Match Co. v. Powers, 51 Michigan, 145.

II. The appellant could not, by its charter, yield up the control of its road, as attempted by this lease, and it is for this reason void. Railroad Co. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 453; 3 Starr & Curtis (Ill.) Stat. 447; Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill. 292; Richeson v. People, 115 Illinois, 450; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Joseph & Denver Railroad, 1 McCrary, 247; S. C. 2 Fed. Rep. 117; Archer v. Terre Haute &c. Railroad Co., 102 Illinois, 493; Great Northern Railway v. Eastern Railway, 9 Hare, 306; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Pennsyl vania Railroad v. St. Louis, Alton &c. Railroad, 118 U. S. 290; Stevens v. Pratt, 101 Illinois, 206; Carroll v. Carroli, 16 How. 275; Foxcraft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner, 170; Lauriat v. Stratton, 6 Sawyer, 339; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595.

III. The lease being ultra vires, and void, it could not be made valid by any lapse of time, acquiescence or ratification by the parties. York &c. Railroad v. Winans, 17 How. 39; Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, 399; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Pennsylvania Railroad v. St. Louis, Alton &c. Railroad, 118 U. S. 290; Oregon Railway v. Oregonian Railway, 130 U. S. 1; Newcastle Northern Railway v. Simpson, 21 Fed. Rep. 533; Tippecanoe County v. Lafayette &c. Railroad, 50 Indiana, 85.

IV. The lease being void, it was the right as well as the duty of complainant to recover its property, and thus place itself again in a position to discharge its public duties. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Story's Eq. Jur. § 298; Pomeroy's Eq. Jurisprudence, § 941; Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves. Sr. 276; Smith v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392; Drury v. Hooke, 1 Vern. 412; St. John v. St. John, 11 Ves. 526; O'Conner v. Ward, 60 Mississippi, 1025; Morris v. McCullock, 1 Amb. 432; Newcastle Northern Railroad v. Simpson, 21 Fed. Rep. 533; Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad, 1 Fed. Rep. 745; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. St. Joseph & Western Railroad, 3 Fed. Rep. 430.

Opinion of the Court.

V. This bill makes a case for chancery jurisdiction, and appellant is not obliged to resort to a court of law. Constitution of Illinois, 1870, art. 11, sec. 10; Iron Mountain &c. Railroad v. Johnson, 119 U. S. 608; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 941; Story's Eq. Jur. § 298; Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves. Sr. 276; Drury v. Hooke, 1 Vern. 412; St. John v. St. John, 11 Ves. 526; Smith v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392; Morris v. McCulloch, 1 Amb. 432; New Castle Northern Railroad v. Simpson, 21 Fed. Rep. supra; Telegraph Co. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 745; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. St. Joseph & Western Railroad, 3 Fed. Rep. 430; Railway Companies v. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 389; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, 717; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad, ubi supra; Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49; White v. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick. 181; Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy Co., 57 Michigan, 146; Foulke v. San Diego Railroad, 51 California, 365; Harriman v. First Baptist Church, 63 Georgia, 186; Davis v. Old Colony Railroad, 131 Mass. 258; Hardy v. Metropolitan Land Co., L. R. 7 Ch. 427; Ernest v. Croysdill, 2 De G. F. & J. 175, 197; Bryson v. Warwick Canal Co., 4 De G. M. & G. 711, 731; Salomons v. Llaing, 12 Beav. 377.

VI. The right to maintain this suit is not barred by laches. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, 183; Alton v. Illinois Transporta tion Co., 12 Illinois, 38; S. C. 52 Am. Dec. 479; Brown v. Buena Vista County, 95 U. S. 157; Rev. Stats. Illinois, c. 83, §1; Medley v. Elliott, 62 Illinois, 532.

Mr. George Hoadly for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The object of this suit between two railroad corporations, as stated in the amended bill, is to have a contract, by which the plaintiff transferred its railroad and equipment, as well as

Opinion of the Court.

its franchise to maintain and operate the road, to the defendant for a term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years, set aside and cancelled, as beyond the corporate powers of one or both of the parties.

The contract, dated February 10, 1868, recites that the plaintiff is a corporation of Illinois, and the defendant a corporation of Indiana; that their railroads connect at the line. between the two States; that it is desirable that the two roads should be operated by the defendant as one road; and that the defendant has "proposed to lease and operate" the plaintiff's road for a period of nine hundred and ninety-nine years. "It is therefore agreed" that, upon the completion of the plaintiff's road to the state line, the defendant "shall take charge of and operate the same with its equipment" for that period, and "shall be allowed sixty-five per cent of the gross receipts from all traffic moved over the line, or business done thereon, and from the property of the company, as a consideration for working and maintenance expenses," and shall appropriate the rest of such receipts to the payment of interest on the plaintiff's mortgage bonds, and pay any surplus to the plaintiff, for the benefit of its stockholders. Within a year afterwards, the contract was modified by providing that the defendant should be allowed seventy (instead of sixty-five) per cent of the gross receipts, "but if the working and maintenance expenses of said road shall be less than seventy per cent of the gross receipts aforesaid, then all of such excess shall be paid over to the" plaintiff. It is further agreed in the contract that the defendant "shall enjoy all the rights, powers and privileges of the" plaintiff, "so far as the same may be needful to maintain and operate said railroad,” and may "impose and collect tolls and rates for transportation, and do all other acts and things, as fully and as effectually as the" plaintiff "could do if operating said line."

In short, by this contract one railroad corporation undertook to transfer its whole railroad and equipment, and its privilege and franchise to maintain and operate the road, to another railroad corporation for a term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years, in consideration of the payment from time

VOL. CXLV-26

Opinion of the Court.

to time by the latter to the former of a certain portion of the gross receipts. This was, in substance and effect, a lease of the railroad and franchise for a term of almost a thousand years, and was a contract which neither corporation had the lawful power to enter into, unless expressly authorized by the State which created it, and which, if beyond the scope of the lawful powers of either corporation, was unlawful and wholly void, could not be ratified or validated by either or both, and would support no action or suit by either against the other. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Pennsyl vania Railroad v. St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad, 118 U. S. 290, 630; Oregon Railway v. Oregonian Railway, 130 U. S. 1; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24.

Upon the question whether this contract was ultra vires of either corporation, this case cannot be distinguished in principle from Pennsylvania Railroad v. St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad, above cited.

By the statute of Illinois of February 12, 1855, all railroad companies incorporated under the laws of the State were empowered to make "contracts and arrangements with each other, and with railroad corporations of other States, for leasing or running their roads, or any part thereof." Illinois Private Laws of 1855, p.304; Rev. Stat. of 1874, c. 114, § 34. By the grammatical and the natural construction, the words "their roads" include roads of Illinois corporations, as well as roads of corporations of other States, and the power conferred on corporations of Illinois to make contracts "for leasing such roads includes making, as well as taking, leases thereof. Such was the opinion expressed in the case just cited, at page 309, and we see no reason for departing from it.

The plaintiff relies on the statute of Illinois of February 16, 1865, (in force at the date of this contract, but since repealed by the Revised Statutes of 1874,) by which it was enacted that "it shall not be lawful for any railroad company of Illinois, or for the directors of any railroad company of Illinois, to consolidate their road with any railroad out of the State of Illinois, or to lease their road to any railroad company

Opinion of the Court.

out of the State of Illinois, or to lease any railroad out of the State of Illinois, without having first obtained the written consent of all of the stockholders of said roads residing in the State of Illinois, and any contract for such consolidation or lease which may be made without having first obtained said written consent, signed by the resident stockholders in Illinois, shall be null and void;" and it was provided "that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to authorize the consolidation of any of said railroads with railroads out of the State of Illinois." Illinois Public Laws of 1865, p. 102.

Although this statute, in terms, declares that any such lease, made without the written consent of the Illinois stockholders, "shall be null and void," it would seem to have been enacted for the protection of such stockholders alone, and intended to be availed of by them only. It did not limit the scope of the powers conferred upon the corporation by law, an excess of which could not be ratified or be made good by estoppel; but only prescribed regulations as to the manner of exercising corporate powers, compliance with which the stockholders might waive, or the corporation might be estopped, by lapse of time, or otherwise, to deny. Zabriskie v. Cleveland &c. Railroad, 23 How. 381, 398; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 42, 60; Davis v. Old Colony Railroad, 131 Mass. 258, 260; Beecher v. Marquette & Pacific Co., 45 Michigan, 103; Thomas v. Citizens' Railway, 104 Illinois, 462.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Archer v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad, 102 Illinois, 493, cited by each party at the argument, does not appear to have any important bearing upon this case. The point there decided was that the contract now in question, not being satisfactorily proved in that case to have been either assented to or ratified by the stockholders residing in Illinois, had no effect, as a lease, to convey title to the defendant, and could be sustained, if at all, only as a contract for the connection of the two railroads, and, in either aspect, did not confer on the defendant any right to maintain a bill in equity against collectors of taxes to restrain the collection of taxes assessed to the present plaintiff. Upon questions discussed in the opinion and not neces