Opinion of the Court.

the state legislature and state tribunals should not be disregarded in the Federal courts. The decision in the Dennehy Case determines for the people of the State of Illinois that at the time of the transaction in controversy there was this valid ordinance in the city of Chicago requiring a license. Why should not such decision conclude this plaintiff, as all other citizens of the State, in all their dealings within the State? It will be noticed that this is not a case in which a citizen of another State calls upon the Federal courts to ignore the judg ment of the state court, because of some supposed infringement by it upon his rights. It is a citizen of Chicago, and Illinois, who is asking us to disregard the decision of the highest court of his own State. If it be said that there is not simply a question of municipal or police regulation, but also one of contract rights, the reply is that no question of contract rights can arise till after that of the validity of the ordinance is determined; and also that the party who now seeks to raise the question is one who, as a citizen of the State, ought to be concluded by the decisions of its highest court upon this local matter.

There has been no change in the rulings of the Supreme Court on this question. The prior cases referred to contain nothing inconsistent with the Dennehy Case. In Strauss v. Pontiac, the court held that authority in the charter to prohibit "tippling-houses and dram-shops," did not sustain an ordinance to prohibit generally the sale of spirits or beer. In other words, the charter power was directed towards the character of the house, and not to the matter of sales; and the ruling was, that the former did not include the latter. In Wright v. The People, it was held that the dram-shop act applied to sales made by a druggist in good faith and for medical purposes. There is no force in the argument, that because the court in the course of its opinion said that the city council had authority under the charter to grant permits to druggists to sell intoxicating liquors by the retail-it is to be implied that the court intended to decide that the council had no power to grant like permits to sell at wholesale. The statement was simply by way of argument to show that the drug

Opinion of the Court.

gists were within the scope of the dram-shop act, and was by no means a decision that the city council had no other authority than to permit sales by druggists at retail. So that without any contradiction in its rulings, the first and only time that this question was presented to the Supreme Court it held that this ordinance was within the powers granted to the city council; and as this decision was rendered only two months after this sale, and was in affirmance of the decisions of the trial and intermediate appellate court, it is but fair to presume that the decisions of those lower courts had been rendered before this transaction.

It must not be implied from what we have said, that we differ from the Supreme Court of Illinois as to the validity of this ordinance. The charter authority is given in broad and comprehensive terms, "to license the selling or giv

ing away of any intoxicating, malt, vinous, mixed or fermented liquor." There is no limitation or qualification as to the manner of sale, whether at wholesale or retail, or as to the character of the house at which the business is to be carried on, whether a dram-shop, a grocery or a drug store. If it was intended, and doubtless it was, to give to the city council full authority over the sale of intoxicating liquors, words more broad or comprehensive could not easily have been selected. There is no doubtful language in either the charter or the ordinance. Plainly as words can express is full power given by the one to the city council, and as plainly a license of a wholesale dealer demanded by the other.

We do not, however, place our decision so much on this latter ground, nor do we care to follow counsel in their ingenious effort to read into this section of the charter words of limita-. tion. It is enough that the language being upon its face clear, full, and comprehensive, the Supreme Court of the State has decided that it gave power to the council to pass this ordinance, and that it is valid. That decision concluded this plaintiff, a citizen of the State, not only in criminal prosecutions, but also in civil actions, not only in the state, but also in the Federal courts.

Passing to the other question, that must be answered in the

Opinion of the Court.

negative. The general rule of law is, that a contract made in violation of a statute is void; and that when a plaintiff cannot establish his cause of action without relying upon an illegal contract, he cannot recover. Pollock's Principles of Contracts, pp. 253 to 260; Pernn v. Bornman, 102 Illinois, 523; Alexander v. O'Donnell, 12 Kansas, 608; Gunter v. Leckey, 30 Alabama, 591; Kennedy v. Cochrane, 65 Maine, 594; Bank of the United States v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527, 539; Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 546, 549; Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79, 84. In Bank v. Owens, this court said: "There can be no civil right where there can be no legal remedy; and there can be no legal remedy for that which is itself illegal." There are some exceptions to this general rule, and the last two cases cited furnish instances thereof. These exceptions are based upon a supposed intent of the legislature. In Pangborn v. Westlake, it was thus stated how the exception should be determined: "We are, therefore, brought to the true test, which is, that while, as a general rule, a penalty implies a prohibition, yet the courts will always look to the language of the statute, the subject matter of it, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment; and if, from all these, it is manifest that it was not intended to imply a prohibition or to render the prohibited act void, the courts will so hold, and construe the statute accordingly." And in Harris v. Runnels, this court, after noticing some fluctuations in the course of decision, and observing "that we have concluded, before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition and a penalty, or a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, that the statute must be examined as a whole, to find out whether or not the makers of it meant that a contract in contravention of it should be void, or that it was not to be so," added: "It is true that a statute, containing a prohibition and a penalty, makes the act which it punishes unlawful, and the same may be implied from a penalty without a prohibition; but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the act was meant by the legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention of it.

Opinion of the Court.

When the statute is silent, and contains nothing from which the contrary can be properly inferred, a contract in contravention of it is void."

In the light of these authorities the solution of the present question is not difficult. By the ordinance, a sale without a license is prohibited under penalty. There is in its language nothing which indicates an intent to limit its scope to the exaction of a penalty, or to grant that a sale may be lawful as between the parties, though unlawful as against its prohibitions; nor when we consider the subject matter of the legislation, is there anything to justify a presumed intent on the part of the lawmakers to relieve the wrongdoer from the ordinary consequences of a forbidden act. By common consent the liquor traffic is freighted with peril to the general welfare, and the necessity of careful regulation is universally conceded. Compliance with those regulations by all engaging in the traffic is imperative; and it cannot be presumed, in the absence of express language, that the lawmakers intended that contracts forbidden by the regulations should be as valid as though there were no such regulations, and that disobedience should be attended with no other consequence than the liability to the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing in the language of the ordinance or the subject matter of the regulations, which excepts this case from the ordinary rule that an act done in disobedience to the law creates no right of action which a court of justice will enforce.:

For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court will be Reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the answer.

Names of Counsel.

BENSON MINING AND SMELTING COMPANY ALTA MINING AND SMELTING COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF

ARIZONA.

No. 347. Argued and submitted April 28, 1892. - Decided May 16, 1892.

When the judgment in the Supreme Court of a Territory exceeds $5000 this court has jurisdiction of an appeal, although the judgment in the trial court may have been for a less sum and the jurisdictional amount is reached in the appellate court by adding interest to that judgment. When the price of a mining claim has been paid to the government, the equitable rights of the purchaser are complete, and there is no obligation on his part to do further annual work in order to obtain a patent. A person who wrongfully works a mine, takes out ores therefrom, removes them, and converts them to his own use is not entitled, in an action to recover their value, to be credited with the cost of mining the ores.

THE Court stated the case as follows:

On July 25, 1884, appellee, plaintiff below, commenced its action in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the Territory of Arizona to recover of defendant the sum of $25,000 for 210 tons of silver-bearing ore, mined and removed from the Alta mine, situated in the Harshaw mining district, in Pima County, Arizona. A jury having been waived, the case was tried before the court, and a judgment was entered for the plaintiff, on March 22, 1886, for the sum of $4590.06, with interest from that time until paid at the rate of ten per cent per annum. Defendant took the case to the Supreme Court of the Territory, which, on February 17, 1888, affirmed the judgment. From such judgment of affirmance defendant appealed to this court.

Mr. Nathaniel Wilson, for appellant, submitted on his brief.

Mr. T. M. Norwood for appellee. Mr. J. A. Anderson filed a brief for same.