2. The Supreme Court of Illinois having held that the ordinance of the
city of Chicago that "no person, firm or corporation shall sell or offer
for sale any spirituous or vinous liquors in quantities of one gallon or
more at a time, within the city of Chicago, without having first obtained
a license therefor from the city of Chicago, under a penalty of not
less than $50 or more than $200 for each offence," is valid, this court
follows the ruling of that court; and further holds that a contract
made in violation of it creates no right of action which a court of
justice will enforce. Miller v. Ammon, 421.

3. The general rule of law is, that a contract made in violation of a statute
is void; and that when a plaintiff cannot establish his cause of action
without relying upon an illegal contract, he cannot recover. Ib.

4. A telegraph company gave to H. & Co. the right to put up at their own
expense and maintain and use a wire upon the poles of the company
between New York and Philadelphia, and to permit four other parties
to use the same with priority of right, the company to have the use of
the wire when not so employed. The company agreed to keep and
maintain the wire when accepted by it, and to bear all expenses of
batteries, etc., connected with its working and to permit such use by
H. & Co. and four other persons for a period of ten years. At the
end of that time the wire was to be the property of the company,
when the company agreed "to lease the same to H. & Co. "for the
use of themselves and such other four persons "for the sum of $600
per annum, payable quarterly, and upon the same terms in all other
respects as if the wire had not been given up" to the company. The
wire was put up by H. & Co. and used by them and "four other
persons" for the term of ten years without compensation, and after
that at the agreed compensation. The company then notified H. & Co.
that the use of the wire by H. '& Co. and the four other persons had
become such as to exclude the company from all use of it, which was
not contemplated by the original contract and that the agreement
would be terminated by the company. H. & Co. filed their bill to
restrain the company from so doing. Held, (1) That H. & Co. and
their licensees, after the expiration of the ten years, were entitled to
the same absolute use of the wire which they enjoyed before the wire
was given up to the company, on payment of $600 per annum, payable
quarterly; (2) That the facts disclosed no hardship which would
justify a court of equity, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, to
refuse the relief asked for; (3) That the plaintiffs were entitled to
such relief in equity. Franklin Telegraph Co. v. Harrison, 459.
5. N. M. was indebted to U. in the sum of $200,000 secured by railroad
bonds and stock and a mortgage on real estate in Boston. The
debtor, desiring to use the bonds and stock held as collateral, proposed
to substitute for them a mortgage on real estate in New York to
secure the bond of E. M., N. M.'s brother, who was indebted to N. M.,
and who gave the bond and mortgage to secure that debt. E. M., at

the request of N. M., in order to enable N. M. to make the proposed
substitution, wrote him a letter to be shown to U., saying, "You are
hereby authorized to assign to U. the mortgage for $250,000 which I
have given you as collateral security for loans made to me." Held,
that while, as between E. and N., the mortgage was to be regarded as
collateral security for loans made to E. by N., the assignment to U.
was absolute as a security for the indebtedness of N. to U., without
regard to the indebtedness of E. to N., and that a suit in equity to
put a different construction upon it was wholly without merit.
Matthews v. Warner, 475.

CORPORATION.

1. The statute of limitations begins to run against an action against a
stockholder in an insolvent corporation, in the hands of a receiver, to
recover anpaid assessments on his stock, when the court orders the
assessment to be made. Glenn v. Marbury, 499.

2. When such a call is made the action, in the District of Columbia where
the common law prevails, must be brought in the name of the com-
pany. lb.

A case should not be withdrawn from the jury unless the conclusion fol-
lows, as matter of law, that no recovery can be had upon any view
which can properly be taken of the facts which the evidence tends to
establish. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cox, 593.

See NATIONAL BANK;
PARTNERSHIP, 1.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

1. Under schedule C of § 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by § 6
of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, (22 Stat. 497,) iron ore was charged
with a duty of 75 cents per ton, and that duty was assessable on the
number of pounds of iron ore reported by the United States weigher,
and not on the ore after the moisture was dried out of it. Earnshaw
V. Cadwalader, 247.

2.' Plain glazed and plain enamelled tiles, imported in February, May and
June, 1886, were subject to a duty of fifty-five per cent as other earthen
ware not specially enumerated. Rossman v. Hedden, 561.

3. The classification of a dutiable article is to be determined as of the date
when the law imposing the duty was passed. Ib.

DAMAGES.

Under the laws of Texas, for the purchase of a portion of its unappropri-
ated lands, an applicant could acquire no vested interest in the land

applied for, that is, no legal title to it, until the purchase price was
paid and the patent of the State was issued to him; but he had the
right to complete the purchase and secure a patent within the pre-
scribed period, which right is designated in the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the State as a vested right that could not be
defeated by subsequent legislation, and is a valuable right, which
would seem to be assignable. The measure of damages for the breach
of a contract for the sale of such a vested right by the purchaser is
the difference between the contract price and the salable value of the
property. Telfener v. Russ, 522.

See MINERAL LAND, 2;

PATENT FOR INVENTION, 9.

DEED.

See JUDICIAL SALE, 2;

LOCAL LAW, 1, 4, 5.

DEMURRER.

See PRACTICE, 4.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

See CORPORATION, 2;
PARTITION, 1, 3.

EJECTMENT.

See LOCAL LAW, 3;

TRESPASS.

EQUITY.

1. Payments of bonds secured by a mortgage of real estate in Virginia,
made in that State during the Civil War to the personal representa-
tives of the mortgagee who had deceased, partly in Confederate notes
and partly in Virginia bank notes issued prior to the war, are held to
have been made and received in good faith, and the transactions to
have been known to the children of the deceased, and to have been
accepted and acquiesced in by them for so long a time as to preclude
any interference in their behalf by a court of equity. Washington v.
Opie, 214.

2. When a sale of property is decreed by a court of equity as the result of
a litigation, it is the policy of the law that it shall not be set aside for
trifling causes or matters which the complaining party might have at-
'tended to. Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason, 349.

3. When such a sale is attacked the court will scrutinize all previous action
of the parties during the litigation, which may throw light upon or ex-
plain their action at the sale.
1b.

4. It cannot be tolerated that either party should designedly wait until the

property has been struck off to the other, and then open the bidding
and defer the sale by an increased offer. lb.

5. When a corporation owning real estate is wound up by reason of the
expiration of the term for which it was incorporated, and its real
estate is sold by decree of court under directions of a master, stock-
holders may purchase it, and there is no fraud on other stockholders
if a part of the stockholders combine to purchase it for the benefit of
an adjoining property owned by them. Ib.

6. Litigants prolonging litigation to the extent of their ability in a suit in
equity seeking the sale of real estate, and prolonging their resistance

by having the sale postponed after the decree, cannot complain if it
takes place finally in a time of financial depression. Ib.

7. The court decreed in this case that the assets of the mining company
should be sold at public vendue, that the debts of the company should
be ascertained by a master as a basis for the bid, and that the sale
should take place on the confirmation of his report. Held, that it was
not intended that the sale should be delayed till every claim arising
since the commencement of the suit should have passed to final judg-
ment; but that a mere statement of the amount should be presented
as a basis for fixing an upset price. 1b.

8. No leave of court is necessary to enable a litigating stockholder to bid
at such sale of the assets of the corporation under a decree in the suit
in which he is a litigant. Ib.

9. The provisions in equity rule 83 respecting exceptions to a master's
report do not apply to a report of a mere ministerial matter like a sale,
but only to a report upon matters heard and determined by him. Ib.
10. The master's sale under the decree was advertised to take place in
Michigan on Saturday, January 24. Late in the evening of Friday,
January 23, the master received from M. a telegram from Boston, in
Massachusetts, stating that he was a holder of nearly 3000 shares of
stock, that he had just heard of the sale, that it was to take place on
the Jewish Sabbath, that his Jewish friends wished to buy but would
not attend on the Sabbath, and asking for a postponement. The sale
took place on the 24th as announced, whereupon, on the 26th M. again
telegraphed protesting and making an offer in advance of the pur-
chaser's bid. The master reported this in his report of the sale. The
sale was confirmed. The day after the confirmation M. asked leave
to intervene and have the sale set aside. In the subsequent proceed-
ings no proof was offered that M. was a shareholder, and it appeared
affirmatively that he had no financial responsibility. Held, that if it
had been planned he could not have been more opportunely ignorant
before the sale, or more accurately informed after the confirmation,
and that his intervention was too late. Ib.

See CONTRACT, 5;
MASTER IN CHANCERY;
RECEIVER.

PARTNERSHIP, 2;
PUBLIC LAND, 1;

EVIDENCE.

1. The receiver of a corporation, appointed by a court of New Jersey, hav-
ing recovered in New Jersey a judgment against C. on notes given in
renewal of those specified in the declaration, sued C. on the judgment
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York, and C. sought to give testimony of oral agreements,
whereby the corporation agreed to prosecute some of the claims, to
pay the expenses of such prosecution, and to do various things in
regard to the bonds, and that its failure to do so had caused damages
to C., which he claimed to first apply in discharge of the judgment
and then recover the balance; held, that the evidence was inadmissi-
ble and that it was proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Culver
v. Wilkinson, 205.

2. The intention of a person, when material, may be proved by contempo-
raneous declarations in his letters, written under circumstances pre-
cluding a suspicion of misrepresentation. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillman, 285.

3. Upon the question whether a person left a certain place with a certain
other person, letters written and mailed by him at that place to his
family, shortly before the time when there is other evidence tending
to show that he left the place, and stating his intention to leave it
with that person, are competent evidence of such intention. Ib.
See LOCAL LAW, 1;
PARTNERSHIP, 1.

The court again adheres to its decision in Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276,
touching titles in the Hot Springs Reservation, and holds that there
are no facts in these cases which take them out of the operation of
that decision; but, in view of the delay in commencing these suits,
and the previous acquiescence of the plaintiffs in the possession by the
defendants, it limits the right of an account in equity of the rents of
the premises to the date of the filing of the bills. Goode v. Gaines,
141.