own use and benefit; (5) that, under these circumstances, F. was
bound to use reasonable diligence in discovering the fraud, and seek-
ing redress; (6) that, conceding that plaintiffs were incapable of being
affected with laches so long as they maintained their tribal relations,
the bill was fatally defective in not setting forth when and how the
alleged frauds were discovered, in order that the court might clearly
see whether it could not have been discovered before; (7) that, in
view of all the circumstances, it would be inequitable to disturb the
disposition made of the case below; (8) that the most which could be
justly demanded would be the repayment of the $150, with interest.
Felix v. Patrick, 317.

2. Land which, at the time of the grant of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365,
c. 217, of public lands to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
was segregated from the public lands within the limits of the grant
by reason of a prior preemption claim to it, did not, by the cancella-
tion of the preemption right before the definite location of the grant
pass to the railroad company, but remained part of the public lands
of the United States, subject to be acquired by a subsequent preëmp-
tion settlement followed up to acquisition of title. Bardon v. Northern
Pacific Railroad Co., 535.

1. The statute of Illinois of February 12, 1855, empowering all railroad
corporations incorporated under the laws of the State to make "con-
tracts and arrangements with each other, and with railroad corpora-
tions of other States, for leasing or running their roads," authorizes
a railroad corporation of Illinois to make a lease of its road to a rail-
road corporation of another State; but confers no power on a railroad
corporation of the other State to take such a lease, if not authorized
to do so by the laws of its own State. St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre
Haute Railroad Co. v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Co., 393.
2. A railroad corporation of Indiana is not empowered to take a lease of a
railroad in another State by the statute of Indiana of February 23,
1853, c. 85, authorizing any railroad corporation of that State to unite
its railroad with a railroad constructed in an adjoining State, and to
consolidate the stock of the two companies; or to extend its road into
another State; or "to make such contracts and agreements with any
such road constructed in an adjoining State, for the transportation of
freight and passengers, or for the use of its said road, as to the board
of directors may seem proper." lb.

3. A lease for nine hundred and ninety-nine years by one railroad corpora-
tion of its railroad and franchise to another railroad corporation,
VOL. CXLV-44

which is ultra vires of one or of both, will not be set aside by a court
of equity at the suit of the lessor, when the lessee has been in posses-
sion, paying the stipulated rent, for seventeen years, and has taken no
steps to repudiate or rescind the contract. lb.

4. The act of the legislature of Kentucky of January 22, 1858, authorizing
any railroad company to lease its road to another railroad company,
provided its road so leased should be so connected as to form a con-
tinuous line, permits the lessee company to take leases of branches
by means of which it establishes continuous lines from their several
termini to each of its own. Hancock v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad

Co., 409.

5. Under the legislation of the State of Kentucky, the right to receive and
vote upon the shares of stock in the Shelby Railroad Company which
were issued upon the subscription of a part of Shelby County became
vested in the Shelby Railroad District of Shelby County as a corpora-
tion quoad hoc. Ib.

6. The obligation upon an employé of a railroad company to take care and
exercise diligence in avoiding accidents from its trains, while in the
performance of his duties about the tracks, is not to be measured by
the obligation imposed upon a passenger when upon or crossing them.
Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 418.

7. In an action by a track repairer against the receiver of a railroad to

recover damages for injuries received from a locomotive and train
while at work repairing the track in a station yard, it is held that
the servants of the receiver were guilty of no negligence; and that if
they were, the plaintiff's negligence contributed directly to the result
complained of. Ib.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE ;

RECEIVER, 2, 3.

REBELLION.

1. Although, under the ruling in Wallach v. Van Ryswick, 92 U. S. 207,
the defendant in a proceeding for confiscation under the confiscation
act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, c. 195, and Joint Resolution No. 63,
of the same date, 12 Stat. 627, had no power of alienating the rever-
sion or remainder which was still in him after confiscation and
sale, still an alienation of it by him by a deed of warranty, accom-
panied by a covenant of seizin on his part, estops him and all per-
sons claiming under him from asserting title to the premises against
the grantee, his heirs and assigns, or from conveying it to any other
parties. Jenkins v. Collard, 546.

2. The general pardon and amnesty made by the public proclamation of
the President at the close of the war of the rebellion had the force of
public law. Ib.

See EQUITY, 1.

RECEIVER.

1. A receiver appointed by order of a court of chancery is obliged to
take possession of a leasehold estate, if it be included within the
order of the court; but he does not thereby become the assignee of
the term, or liable for the rent, but holds the property as the hand
of the court, and is entitled to a reasonable time to ascertain its value,
before he can be held to have accepted it. Quincy, Missouri & Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Humphreys, 82.

2. The Wabash Company controlled 3600 miles of road, made up by the
consolidation and leasing of many different railroads, upon nearly
every one of which there existed one or more mortgages. Among
them was the Quincy road, 77 miles in length, which was leased by
the Wabash in August, 1879, for a term of 99 years, with privilege of
renewal, acquiring with the lease a majority of the stock. The Quincy
road at the time of the lease had issued mortgage bonds to the amount
of $2,000,000, on which there was a large amount of interest in arrear.
To provide for this and other floating debts, and to extend the road,
a new issue of mortgage bonds were provided for as part of the
arrangement, which were issued, and the road was completed, and
entered into and formed part of the Wabash system. In May, 1884,
the Wabash company filed a bill in equity, alleging that it was insol-
vent and could not procure the means to pay its floating debts and.
interest due, and praying the court to take possession of its property
and administer it as a whole. Receivers were thereupon appointed,
who took possession. They were directed to pay out of the income
which should come into their hands rental which had accrued or which
might accrue upon all the company's leased lines, but to keep accounts
showing the source of income and revenue with reference to expendi-
ture. In June, 1884, the trustees under a general mortgage, which
the Wabash company had made of its whole system, filed a cross-bill
praying for the foreclosure of their mortgage and the appointment of
receivers; but the court declined to appoint receivers other than those
already appointed. On the 26th of January, 1884, the receivers
informed the court of their inability to pay interest falling due on
certain classes of bonds and interest on certain stocks, and made a
statement in regard to several of the consolidated and leased roads
from which it appeared that the earnings of the Quincy road had at
no time since its acquisition been sufficient to pay its operating ex-
penses, the cost of its maintenance and the interest upon its mortgage
bonds. The receivers further petitioned the court for its advice, and
they were thereupon ordered to keep separate accounts of the earnings,
incomes, operating expenses, cost of maintenance, taxes, etc., of each
of such lines, and to make quarterly reports thereof. These reports,
when made, showed, as to the Quincy Company, that in May, 1885,
there was a deficit of $20,251.09 in nine months' working. The court
thereupon made a general order, as to all the properties, which pro-

vided in substance that where there was no income, rental claims were
not to be paid by the receivers. On the 15th of July, 1885, the
trustees of the Quincy mortgage petitioned the court to direct the re-
ceivers to transfer that road and its rolling stock to them, and an order
was made to that effect. No possession was taken under that order,
but the leased property was retransferred before the sale under the
foreclosure of the general mortgage of the Wabash Company. The
proceedings under the cross-bill resulted in a decree for such fore-
closure on the 6th of January, 1886. No surplus was realized from
the sale under that decree. The receivers' accounts on surrendering
the property showed the net earnings to be $3,304,633.61 less than the
amount of the preferred debts with whose payment they were charged.
On the 8th of December, 1885, the intervening trustees of the Quincy
mortgage filed a petition praying the court to order the receivers to
pay arrears of interest, taxes, cost of repairs, and rental, aggregating
$114,380, and to decree them to be liens superior and paramount to
all mortgages on all the property of the Wabash Company. On the
19th of March, 1888, the court denied this prayer and dismissed this
petition from which decree the Quincy Company and the trustees
took this appeal. Held, (1) That the occupation of the Quincy road
by the receivers under the order of court created no relation which
obliged them to pay rent therefor under the lease; (2) That no
equities existed which called upon the court to divest the proceeds of
the sale or the net earnings of the property while in the receivers'
hands, and apply them to the payments prayed for by the intervenors.
(3) That the action of the court in appointing receivers on the appli-
cation of the mortgagor could not be successfully challenged in this
appeal. Ib.

3. Following Quincy, Missouri & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Humphreys, ante, 82,
it is, with regard to the lease of the St. Joseph and St. Louis Railroad
Company by the Wabash Company, now Held, (1) That, the circum-
stances in the latter case being similar to those in the former, the
receivers were entitled to a reasonable time to ascertain the situation
of the leased railroad before they could be held to have assumed the
lease; (2) That the time taken by them in deciding not to assume it
was a reasonable time; (3) That the course pursued by the court
below towards the various independent roads which made up the
Wabash system was equitable and just and will not be disturbed in
this case.
St. Joseph & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Humphreys, 105.

See CORPORATION, 1;
JURISDICTION, B, 2, 3.

REVERSIONER.

See LOCAL LAW, 1.

RULES.

See ADMIRALTY, 1;
EQUITY, 9.

STATUTE.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

See CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS, 1, 2;
CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1;

INDIAN;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION, A, 6; B, 1, 2;

PARTition, 1, 3;

PATENT FOR INVENTION, 3, 5, 10, 22;
PUBLIC LAND;

REBELLION, 1.

When both parties in an action to try title to real estate claim under a
common source of title, it is unnecessary to consider whether the deed
under which the common grantor claimed was valid. Cox v. Hart, 376.

TRUST.

See PUBLIC LAND, 1.

ULTRA VIRES.

See RAILROAD, 3.

WILL.

See LOCAL LAW, 1.