Opinion of the Court. if the party have issue or children at the time when the devise is made, they will take estates for their lives jointly with their parent, but if he had no issue at that time he takes an estate tail, the court said that under the above statute Mrs. Lewis took only an estate for her natural life, and at her death, in default of heirs of her body, the heirs at law of the testator took the estate in fee. But, in view of the admitted facts, it was held that the defendants were protected by the statute of Illinois, prescribing the periods within which actions for the recovery of lands may be brought. Much of the elaborate argument submitted by counsel is devoted to an inquiry as to the nature of the estate that Mrs. Lewis took under the will of her husband; the plaintiffs insisting that the court below correctly interpreted the will of the testator in connection with the statute. The defendants insist that the devise to Mrs. Lewis and to the heirs of her body was intended to be a devise to her and to the children of herself and the testator as a class of persons to take at the death of the testator, and that she as the only survivor at his death, of that class, took the whole estate absolutely. The defendants further insist that, even if the estate did not wholly vest at the death of the testator in Mrs. Lewis as the survivor of the class of persons who were the declared objects of his bounty, the fee did not remain in abeyance until her death, but vested at his death in those who were then his heirs at law, although such estate was liable to be divested on the birth of an heir to the body of the life tenant. These questions have been discussed by counsel with marked ability. But it will not be necessary to pass upon them, if, as is contended, these actions, under any construction of the will, are barred by the statute of limitations of Illinois. To this question of limitation we will, therefore, direct our attention. The statute just referred to, as it appears in the Revision of 1845, title Conveyances, provides: "§ 8. Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements, under claim and color of title made in good faith, and who shall, for seven successive years, continue in such possession, and shall, also, during said time, pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, Opinion of the Court. shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such possession, by purchase, devise or descent before said seven years shall have expired, and who shall continue such possession, and continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as to complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section." " 10. The two preceding sections shall not extend . . to lands or tene ments when there shall be an adverse title to such lands or tenements, and the holder of such adverse title is under the age of twenty-one years, insane, imprisoned, feme covert, out of the limits of the United States, and in the employment of the United States or of this State: Provided, Such person shall commence an action to recover such lands or tenements so possessed as aforesaid, within three years after the several disabilities herein enumerated shall cease to exist, and shall prosecute such action to judgment, These provisions first appeared in the act of March 2, 1839, entitled "An act to quiet possessions and confirm titles to land," and are preserved in the act of April 4, 1872, title Limitations. Purple's Real Estate Stat. Ill. p. 426; Rev. Stats. 1845, p. 104, c. 24, § 8; Rev. Stats. 1872, p. 674, c. 83, § 6; 2 Starr & Curtis, p. 1539. Considering the different objects of sections eight and nine, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Dunlap v. Daugherty, 20 Illinois, 397, 403, said: "By the eighth section the person must be in possession under claim and color, and may pay taxes, under such claim and color of title for the required period of time; while by the ninth section he is not required to have possession, nor permitted to hold or pay taxes under a person having color, but must himself have the color of title and pay the taxes. This section does not permit a person claiming under color to rely upon the statute. But the eighth section, by its phraseology, does permit the person claiming under the color of title to hold the possession and to pay the taxes for his claim and possession, and the color of title when united make the claim and color of title and the possession required by the statute. .. Justice would require more protection should Opinion of the Court. be given to the actual occupant, who expends his money and labor in improving the soil, and pays the taxes for the required period, than to the person who only pays the taxes, without occupation, for the same length of time." See also Cofield v. Furry, 19 Illinois, 183; Darst v. Marshal, 20 Illinois, 227; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Illinois, 376. Under the stipulations of the parties, and the findings of fact, there can be no doubt as to the nature of the possession of the respective defendants. It was an actual, continuous possession under bonds and conveyances, promptly recorded, accompanied by the payment of all taxes assessed on the lands during the period of such possession. If, within the meaning of the statute, such possession was "under claim and color of title made in good faith," then the cases before us come within the very words of the statute, and the defendants, respectively, are entitled to be adjudged legal owners of the lands according to the purport of their respective paper titles, unless, as contended, limitation did not run against the plaintiffs until after the death of Mrs. Lewis. That the defendants have been in actual possession for the required time, under claim and color of title made in good faith, is clearly established. It is true that Mrs. Lewis, under whom the several defendants claim, held under a tax deed, and that such a deed, when relied on as evidence of paramount title, must be supported by a valid judgment for the taxes, and a proper precept authorizing the sale. Holbrook v. Dickinson, 46 Illinois, 285; Gage v. Lightburn, 93 Illinois, 248, 252; Pardridge v. Village of Hyde Park, 131 Illinois, 537, 541; Gage v. Bani, 141 U. S. 344, 351. And it is also true that the records before us do not show any judgment for taxes against these lands, followed by a precept authorizing their sale, and only show a sheriff's deed to Mrs. Lewis, reciting a judgment and precept. But a sheriff's deed for land sold for taxes, regular on its face, and made to one who was under no obligation to pay the taxes, will, as between the grantee and the taxpayer, constitute, without proof of a judgment for the taxes, such color of title as will meet the requirements of the statute of limitations. It has been long settled in Illinois that Opinion of the Court. any deed or instrument in writing, no matter on what founded, if regular on its face, and purporting to convey the title to land of which a description is given, is sufficient color under the limitation act of 1839, although it might be ineffectual to establish paramount title, apart from possession and payment of taxes for seven successive years. Holloway v. Clark, 27 Illinois, 483, 486; Dickenson v. Breeden, 30 Illinois, 279, 326; McCagg v. Heacock, 34 Illinois, 476, 478; Stubblefield v. Borders, 92 Illinois, 279, 284; Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 Illinois, 392; Fagan v. Rosier, 68 Illinois, 84, 87; Hardin v. Gouverneur, 69 Illinois, 140, 143; Lake Shore &c. Railway v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, &c. Railway, 71 Illinois, 38; Coleman v. Billings, 89 Illinois, 183, 190; Stumpf v. Osterhage, 111 Illinois, 82, 88; Baldwin v. Ratcliff, 125 Illinois, 376, 384. In cases 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214 and 1217, respectively, the purchaser from Mrs. Lewis went into possession under a bond for a deed. These bonds did not purport to convey the title, but were executory agreements entitling the purchaser to a deed. If it be said that possession under a bond for a deed, or under a contract for the purchase of land, neither purporting to convey the title, is not possession "under claim and color. of title," within the meaning of the statute, Rigor v. Frye, 62 Illinois, 507, 509; Hardin v. Crate, 78 Illinois, 533, 536, 537; Robbins v. Moore, 129 Illinois, 30, 46; a sufficient answer is that each bond was followed by a deed from Mrs. Lewis, purporting to convey the fee, and that from at least the execution of the latter deed the purchaser was in possession under such claim and color of title as the statute required. And even if we assume that the deed did not have relation back to the date and recording of the bond, so as to give the grantee the benefit of his actual possession under the bond-though the contrary view is asserted on the authority of Snapp v. Peirce, 24 Illinois, 156, 159; Russell v. Mandell, 73 Illinois, 136, 138; Schneider v. Botsch, 90 Illinois, 577, 580- and that possession under the sheriff's deed by Mrs. Lewis was not adverse to those, if any, in remainder, and excluding therefore the entire period during which she held the apparent legal title which that deed conveyed, there was yet more than seven Opinion of the Court. years' actual possession by the defendants, accompanied by the payment of taxes under subsequent deeds duly recorded and purporting in each instance to convey the fee. It results that these actions are barred by the statute, unless it be held not only that plaintiffs were reversioners, but that limitation could not run against them during the life of Mrs. Lewis. The general rule in Illinois, as elsewhere, undoubtedly is that limitation does not run against a reversioner or remainder-man, pending the prior estate, because during that time he has no right of entry. Having no right of entry, he is not deemed guilty of laches in failing to assert his rights during the existence of the life estate. Higgins v. Crosby, 40 Illinois, 260, 262; Dugan v. Follett, 100 Illinois, 581, 589; Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 Illinois, 554, 569; Mettler v. Miller, 129 Illinois, 630, 640; Rohn v. Harris, 130 Illinois, 525, 581. But the case of Dugan v. Follett, just cited, shows that in its application this general rule is not without exceptions in Illinois. In that case it appears that by a decree rendered in a suit in equity brought in one of the courts of Illinois, an administrator was directed to invest certain moneys then in his hands in real estate, (no particular lands being specified,) and to convey the same to the plaintiff, Mrs. Jennings, for her life, with remainder in fee to the named heirs of her late husband. The investment was made, and a deed of that character was executed, November 20, 1850, to Mrs. Jennings. That deed was not put upon record, but the fact of its execution was reported to the court by the administrator, and his report placed among the files of the suit in which the decree, directing the investment, was made. Mrs. Jennings did not die until November 18, 1875. During her lifetime the lands passed into the possession of others under warranty deeds, conveying the title in fee. The dispute was between those parties and the persons in remainder. The evidence showed that those who held under the warranty deeds, and their immediate grantors, were in actual possession, adversely to all the world, without any knowledge that the plaintiffs had any claim as remaindermen to the premises, and paid all taxes assessed on the lands, "thus," the court said, "making out a clear case of possession, |