reasonable suspicion that a Member of Congress will accept a bribe before offering that Member a bribe. (5) A Member of Congress cannot defend his acceptance of a bribe on the ground that the amount of bribe money offered was so exorbitant that it constituted an unfair temptation. (6) The use of "sting" operations to uncover corruption in public office is not improper. (7) The fact that Government agents may have violated statutes, rules, or guidelines during the course of an investigation does not require the dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant shows that the violation was of a constitutional nature and that it resulted in some adverse effect or prejudice to him. (8) Payments to informants that are contingent upon the successful prosecution of those with whom they deal do not require dismissal of an indictment. (9) The amount of money paid to a Government informant is not a proper subject of judicial review. (10) The conduct of Government agents during the course of an undercover investigation will not be considered to outrageous as to bar prosecution under the Due Process Clause if the individual under investigation was given the opportunity to say "No" to the agents' criminal proposal, or the extent of Government involvement was equal to or less than that in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit.] United States v. Murphy, and United States v. Thompson (criminal), 642 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1980) A Member of Congress who challenges an indictment against him on the ground that the grand jury which returned the indictment improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause will not succeed if he fails to show that the grand jury did not hear significant and sufficient evidence not protected by the Clause. United States v. Myers (civil) (D.D.C.) Issues raised.-As a follow-up to the criminal prosecution and conviction of Rep. Michael O. Myers of Pennsylvania, the Government filed a five count civil complaint against him. Because the only pleading filed as of March 1, 1982 has been the complaint, the issues in this case have yet to be determined. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Myers (criminal) [Not Reported] (E.D.N.Y. 1980 and 1981) (1) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute a ground for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (2) The dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the publicity. (3) Whenever the issue of entrapment is raised by a defendant, the ultimate issue is whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime; the question of guilt or innocence does not depend on whether a Government agent provided the impetus for the crime. (4) The Constitution does not require that the Government have reasonable suspicion that a Member of Congress will accept a bribe before offering that Member a bribe. (5) A Member of Congress cannot defend his acceptance of a bribe on the ground that the amount of bribe money offered was so exorbitant that it constituted an unfair temptation. (6) The use of "sting" operations to uncover corruption in public office is not improper. (7) The fact that Government agents may have violated statutes, rules, or guidelines during the course of an investigation does not require the dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant shows that the violation was of a constitutional nature and that it resulted in some adverse effect or prejudice to him. (8) Payments to informants that are contingent upon the successful prosecution of those with whom they deal do not require dismissal of an indictment. (9) The amount of money paid to a Government informant is not a proper subject of judicial review. (10) The conduct of Government agents during the course of an undercover investigation will not be considered so outrageous as to bar prosecution under the Due Process Clause if the individual under investigation was given the opportunity to say "No" to the agents' criminal proposal, or the extent of Government involvement was equal to or less than that in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit.] United States v. Myers (criminal) 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980) (1) The fact that a grand jury improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not, of itself, sufficient to warrant dismissal of an indictment. However, it is an open question whether dismissal would be warranted in a case where such privileged evidence constituted such a large proportion of the evidence before the grand jury as to raise a substantial question of whether the grand jury had sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause. (2) A Member of Congress whose pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment against him on separation of powers grounds was denied by a trial court has a right to appeal the trial court's ruling before his trial begins. (3) That portion of the bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)) which prohibits a public official from soliciting anything of value in return for his promise to perform an "official act" does not require the Government to prove that the official act was capable of being performed. (4) The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), creating the offense of bribery, including bribery of a Member of Congress, violates neither the Speech or Debate Clause nor the separation of powers doctrine. (5) The Punishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that each House of Congress may punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not deprive the judiciary of jurisdiction to try a Member of Congress on charges that he used his official position for illegal purposes. (6) Although the Speech or Debate Clause prevents the Government from questioning a Member about his legislative acts, it does not prevent a Member from offering evidence of such acts in his own defense at trial, although he thereby subjects himself to cross-examination regarding those legislative acts. (7) Congress has the power to redefine the offense of bribery so as to make non-criminal, in the case of Members of Congress, the acceptance of bribes offered by undercover agents of the Government. United States v. Roth [Not Reported] (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1981) (1) An information charging individuals with disrupting a subcommittee hearing will not be dismissed on grounds of selective prosecution, regardless of the political views or motives of the subcommittee chairman holding the hearing, without a prima facie showing that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for similar conduct. (2) For purposes of the relevant statute governing disuption of Congressional proceedings (D.C. Code 1973, § 9123(b)(4)) it is irrelevant whether the disruption is of proceedings on the floor or at a committee or subcommittee hearing. [This case is on appeal in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.] United States v. Thompson and United States v. Murphy (civil) (D.D.C.) Issues raised.-As a follow-up to the criminal prosecutions and convictions of Reps. Frank Thompson, Jr. of New Jersey and John M. Murphy of New York, the Government filed a seven count civil complaint against them. Because the only pleading filed as of March 1, 1982 has been the complaint, the issues in this case have yet to be determined. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Williams [Not Reported] (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (1) A Member of Congress who challenges an indictment against him on the ground that the grand jury which returned the indictment improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause will not succeed if he fails to show that the protected evidence constituted a substantial portion of the evidence considered by the grand jury. (2) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute a ground for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (3) The dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the publicity. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1981) A Member of Congress who challenges an indictment against him on the ground that the grand jury which returned the indictment improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause will not succeed if he fails to show that the protected evidence constituted a substantial portion of the evidence considered by the grand jury. United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (1) A complaint filed by a private citizen against a U.S. Senator and his aide, which alleges that the Senator authorized payment of the aide's Congressional salary during a period when the aide worked exclusively on the Senator's re-election campaign, does not state a claim under the False Claims Act in view of the absence of any discernible standard or a Congressional policy determination to be applied in considering such allegations. (2) A complaint brought against a U.S. Senator under the False Claims Act will be subject to dismissal if the complaint fails to specify which members of the Senator's staff were involved, what personal services they performed, and when the alleged unlawful activities occurred. [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.] Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 524 F. Supp. 519 (D.D.C. 1981) (1) The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine require dismissal of a complaint brought by Republican Members of the House charging that the assignment of Republican Members to House committees in a ratio which does not reflect exactly the ratio of Republican to Democratic Members in the entire House violates Article I and the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. (2) The allegations of constitutional deprivations and loss of voting power would give the Republican plaintiffs standing to bring such an action. (3) Party caucus deliberations and those of the Steering and Policy Committee are protected from judicial scrutiny by the Speech or Debate Clause as preparatory and integral to consideration of and votes on the subjects on the House floor. [This case is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.] Williams v. Bush [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1982) (1) A Member of Congress, who attempts to enjoin the commencement of expulsion proceedings against him on the ground that the leadership of the particular house of which he is a member has stated that it will recommend that the expulsion proceeding be governed by rules which, in the Member's view, fail to afford the Member fundamental rights, will have failed to present a controversy ripe for adjudication if the entire house has taken no action to formally adopt the recommendations of the leadership. (2) Even if such controversy did become ripe for adjudication, however, the Speech or Debate Clause and the political question doctrine would likely prevent a court from enjoining the commencement of a Congressional expulsion proceeding. |