Examination of the full relief sought by plaintiffs shows that the potential inter-branch controversies imagined in the motion to dismiss are illusory. If this court decides in favor of plaintiffs on the merits, entry of a declaratory judgment as to the statute's illegality will provide a clear standard for Members of Congress to follow in using the frank. We will not lightly assume, as defendants and intervenor seem to in their briefs, that high elected officials would deliberately violate such an order. Entry of such an order alone would probably go far toward securing compliance, and reduce inspection problems. If this court should decide to enjoin the operation of the franking statute, there are a number of ways to minimize any problems created by such an order. To begin with, this court might stay its order while Congress enacted a new statute or while the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. The court might also phase in such relief in order to give Members adquate time to familiarize themselves with the decision and its requirements. [Id. at 34-35] Finally, the court dispensed with the two additional grounds for dismissal raised in the Senate's amicus memorandum: lack of ripeness and mootness. It rejected the argument that the plaintiffs should have exhausted their remedies with appropriate Congressional committees before bringing the action because those committees had no power to grant the relief sought: namely, a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. Further, since the plaintiffs asserted that the operation of the statute violated their First Amendment rights on a recurring basis, the court found that their claims were ripe for adjudication. The court also found "utterly devoid of merit" the Senate's contention that the cause of action was moot because of a subsequent change in the Senate rules forbidding the use of the frank for campaign literature. "[I]t is axiomatic that a Senate rule does not amend a statute, and that the Senate may change its rules anytime it chooses." [Id. at 36] Subsequent to the court's order, through February 1981, various procedural orders were entered and discovery continued. The majority of the docketed entries involved pleadings on the plaintiffs' request for admissions. Finally, on March 2, 1981, asserting that the defendants, and the Senate and House intervenors in particular, had failed to respond to their requests for admissions, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an order under Rules 36 and 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with the discovery schedule set by the court. The plaintiffs contended that the various defendants had failed to respond to "more than half" the requests and had unilaterally granted themselves extensions of time in which to respond. Maintaining that the responses had been due on February 17, the plaintiffs asked the court to order that the defendants' responses filed by that date be deemed final and the unanswered requests be found to be admitted. On March 16, 1981, the Executive branch defendants, the intervening House Commission, and the amicus Senate all filed separate oppositions to the plaintiffs' motion for an order under Rules 36 and 37(b). The Executive branch defendants noted that they had filed a timely objection to the requests for admissions on the basis that they had no knowledge of the matters at issue (which involved the workings of Congress). They argued that the plaintiffs appeared to be seeking to have the requests for admissions deemed admitted against the Senate or its individual members, even though they were not parties to the action. Such relief, the Executive branch defendants asserted, was not allowable under Rule 36, which only applied to parties. The intervening House Commission contended that it had complied with the plaintiffs' requests and that the remedy soughtthat the requests be deemed admitted-was "utterly inappropriate." The Commission pointed out that many of the documents which were the subject of the admissions request-Members' newsletters, etc.—were mailed many years previously and were from individuals who were no longer Members of the House. Since it was difficult, even with due diligence, to obtain such documents quickly, the Commission argued, it had complied with Rule 36 by making a "reasonable inquiry" to secure the information and stating in its reponse that whatever had been obtained was insufficient to enable it to admit or deny the request. The Senate, in its opposition, maintained that granting the plaintiffs' motion would result in the court having to decide major constitutional issues on the basis of incorrect or distorted assertions set out in the request for admissions. The Senate also noted that Rule 36 only applied to parties, and the Senate was not a party in the case. Further, the amicus agreed with the House Commission that there were serious practical problems involved in obtaining the material requested by the plaintiffs. Finally, the Senate argued that the Federal Rules did not authorize the "deemed admitted" order the plaintiffs sought. On April 3, 1981, the plaintiffs filed a response to the oppositions to their motion for an order under Rules 36 and 37(b). In sum, they claimed that the court had set a reasonable schedule for compliance with the request for admissions, giving the defendants sufficient time to respond. Since they had not, the plaintiffs asserted, the Federal Rules allowed the court to order that the facts in the request should be "deemed admitted" (Rule 36) or "taken as established" (Rule 37). On April 22, 1981, the Executive branch defendants and the intervening Commission filed a motion for an order compelling the principal officers of Common Cause to answer certain questions objected to at their depositions, primarily relating to the legal contentions of the plaintiffs in the case. This was resisted by the plaintiffs in a motion for a protective order filed on April 29, which characterized the defendants' motion as an abuse of the discovery process and a delaying tactic which sought information that was irrelevant, unnecessary, and protected by the First Amendment. On May 18, 1981, District Judge Pratt granted the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order and denied the defendants' motion to compel. 97-581 0 - 82 - 17 On May 21, 1981, Judge Pratt, in a one-sentence order, denied the plaintiffs' motion for an order under Rules 36 and 37(b) for failure to comply with a discovery order. On May 22, 1981, the Executive branch defendants and the intervening House Commission filed separate motions for summary judgment as did the plaintiffs. In a memorandum accompanying their motion, the Executive branch defendants argued that they had not acted unconstitutionally, regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs' challenges to the franking statute. They explained: Plaintiffs' initial premise as to why the Postal Service and the Treasury are needed in this action is wrong on both counts. Not only is the Postal Service not acting unconstitutionally in delivering franked mail regardless of the constitutionality of the particular practices which plaintiffs challenge, but also the Postal Service could have no remedial role under statutory or constitutional law which it could properly perform if plaintiffs were to prevail. Congress has invested the power of supervision and enforcement of the proper use of the frank in its committees. The Postal Service has no authority to withhold delivery of the mail. Nor does the Constitution give authority to any Executive Branch agency to pass judgment on what constitutes official business of the Congress. For similar reasons, the Treasury Department is not acting unconstitutionally in issuing warrants for the lump sum appropriation for the official mail of the Congress. A warrant in substance is merely notice that funds have been appropriated and are available for expenditure. Actual disbursement of the funds is under the control of the Congress. The Congress, as beneficiary of the legislative franking privilege, is the body that assures both the Postal Service and the Treasury that users of the frank have complied with the regulations, statutes, and constitutional provisions which govern its use. [Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion by the Defendants Bolger and Regan for Summary Judgment, May 22, 1981, at 2] The Executive branch defendants argued as well that the franking statute was constitutional on its face. The statute did not, they asserted, infringe upon any fundamental First or Fifth Amendment rights, and its impact, if any, on the electoral system was "incidental." Beyond this, they contended, the statute furthered the important governmental interest of informing the public and was not intended to confer an unfair political benefit upon incumbents. The defendants maintained that the particular practices the plaintiffs challenged-specifically the franking of Congressional newsletters and the inclusion in franked mailings of matters purportedly not exclusively related to official legislative business-were in fact related to Congress' official business and were not on their face improper. Furthermore, they argued, "Congress has taken sufficient precautions, through statutory and regulatory prohibitions, to minimize any unfair political effect of the practices, while main taining the right to a free flow of information between Congress and the people." [Id. at 13] In a memorandum filed with its motion for summary judgment, the intervening House Commission argued that: (1) the franking statute and associated rules facilitated necessary communication between Members of Congress and their constituents while preventing any undue electoral effect; (2) the franking statute did not violate the First Amendment since it abridged neither free speech nor the right of political association; and (3) the franking statute did not deny the plaintiffs equal protection since its purpose was not invidious, it did not significantly burden the exercise of fundamental rights, and, in any event, it served a compelling governmental interest. Characterizing the lawsuit as an "attack incumbency itself," the Commission asserted that as long as the political system allowed incumbents to succeed themselves Common Cause would be able to claim that whenever a Congressman communicated officially with his constituents, the effect might be to enhance his prospects for reelection. [Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Intervening Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, May 22, 1981, at 36] The Commission maintained that Members of Congress have historically had a duty to communicate with their constituents and ascertain their views, and that the franking statute played a vital part in this process. The Commission explained: The theme is echoed in the affidavits of Congressmen concerning their use of the frank that are in the record. Congressmen have differing views on the nature of their responsibilities. Some think that they represent constitutents best by voting their own considered judgments based on information that may not have been available to their constituents. A Congressman of that sort believes that the franked newsletter is an important educational tool. Others think the representative has more of a duty to consult and reflect the wishes of those he represents. To such as these, both newletters and questionnaires are vital to the making of informed decisions. And there are gradations. There is a consensus, however, on the benefit to the legislative and representative process of franked mailings to constituents. [Id. at 45] The statute, the Commission argued, struck a fair balance between facilitating these necessary communications between Members and their constituents and limiting any incidental effect on the electoral process. The Commission put particular emphasis on the fact that Congress had placed significant restraints on the electoral effect of the frank by statute and rule: Thus, this Court can premise its judgment concerning the constitutionality of the present-day congressional frank upon the propositions that to take two examples relevant to what Common Cause seems to be complaining about-(1) no more than six postal-patron mailings a year by a Congressman are permitted and no mass mailing is allowed within 60 days of either a primary or general elec tion in which the Member is a candidate; and (2) the frank Congress has placed on itself by statute and rule the sig- Turning to the First Amendment issue, the Commission asserted that the franking statute did not suppress any communication or association but rather promoted contact between Members and their constituents. Moreover, the intervenor argued, the statute did not either directly or indirectly chill First Amendment activities. "Instead, the [plaintiffs'] claim is a novel one, not recognized by the Supreme Court, that the enhancement of the speech of others dilutes the plaintiffs' own speech and somehow impairs their right of political association. There is no merit to the claim." [Id. at 52] Finally, the Commission claimed that the franking legislation did not deny the plaintiffs equal protection of the law. It stated: What plaintiffs' equal protection argument boils down to is that the Congress has an obligation to equalize the resources and the voices of those competing in a congressional race. Equal protection principles impose no such affirmative obligation. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), holding that a state has no duty to use its funds to alleviate the effects of a school financing scheme that prevented students in property-poor districts from receiving the benefit of a per pupil expenditure equal to that of students residing in propertyrich districts. Incumbency, no less than the distribution of wealth, is a condition that Congress need not compensate for in every piece of legislation it enacts. The Constitution does not require Congress to make the world a perfect world by the standards of Common Cause. [Id. at 72–73] The Commission argued that a denial of equal protection was not made out, even in cases requiring the strictest scrutiny, unless the governmental interest involved was less than compelling. In this case, however, the Commission reiterated, the governmental inter |