owers, n. 42, supra, and to proper report and wait provisions to ass constitutional muster.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

My conclusion may be summarized as follows:

(1) Mountain States Legal Foundation, its members who hold oncompetitive lease applications in the Bob Marshall, Scapegoat, nd Great Bear Wilderness Areas, and the individual plaintiffs in acific Legal Foundation et al., who also hold lease applications, aving standing to institute these actions. Pacific Legal Foundation an or-[1005]ganization lacks standing, but this is immaterial, as ng as any plaintiff in that action has standing to seek the relested relief.

(2) The actions present the necessary adversity and are ripe for ducial review.

(3) The term "withdrawal", as used in the Federal Land Policy nd Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), includes withdrawal of iblic lands from mineral exploration and leasing.

[15] (4) Section 204(e) of the FLPMA did not give the House ɔmmittee on Interior and Insular Affairs the power to direct the cretary of the Interior to withdraw the three wilderness areas til January 1, 1984; and the Committee's May 21, 1981 resolution. permissibly conflicts with section 4(d)(3) of the Wilderness Act of 164, which permitted mineral exploration and leasing activities til that date.

(5) The scope and duration of a withdrawal order under section 14(e) are within the sound discretion of the Secretary of the Interi; to be exercised in accordance with the goals and procedural reirements of the FLPMA, subject to judicial review. The Secrery has the power to revoke, after a reasonable time, a withdraworder made at the request of either the House Committee on Inrior and Insular Affairs or the Senate Committee on Energy and atural Resources.

(6) If section 204(e) were interpreted to permit a congressional mmittee, by majority vote, to direct the Secretary to withdraw lderness areas until January 1, 1984, (in effect amending the ilderness Act), the statute would be unconstitutional under the lding in Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 2d 408 (9 Cir. 1980), and other case law. Under the interpretation section 204(e) set forth above as the conclusion of this court, ere is no constitutional violation.

(7) Legislation of the type of the Baucus bill, requiring action by th Houses of Congress and the President, is a proper method of termining whether section 4(d)(3) of the Wilderness Act should Famended.

(8) The policy and procedures of the Department of the Interior set forth in the letters dated November 19, 1981, from the Secrery to the chairmen of the two congressional committees are apicable to the Bob Marshall, Scapegoat, and Great Bear Wilderss Areas, as well as the other congressionally-designated wilderess areas. The November 20 resolution of the House Committee Interior and Insular Affairs is likewise applicable to the three ilderness areas involved in these actions.

37-21 0 - 82 - 38

VIII. REMEDY

In view of the policy and procedures recently adopted by the Sec retary of the Interior, as set forth in his letter of November 19 1981, to the chairmen of the two congressional committees, and th resolution adopted on November 20, 1981, by the House Committe on Interior and Insular Affairs, it is deemed advisable to retain ju risdiction of these cases until July 1, 1982.44 The Secretary shoul be given an opportunity to consider and process, within his discre tion, the plaintiffs' lease applications under the proper interpreta tion of section 204(e),45 and pursuant to the current policies an procedures of the Department. See Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d a 1105.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Secretary of the Interior is directed to revoke Publ Land Order No. 5952, issued on June 1, 1981 at the direction [100 of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, whic withdrew the Bob Marshall, Scapegoat, and Great Bear Wilderne Areas from mineral leasing until January 1, 1984.

(2) The Secretary of the Interior, acting within his discretio shall determine the scope and duration of the withdrawal of th three wilderness areas.

(3) It is assumed that in the further handling of applications f noncompetitive oil and gas leases in these wilderness areas wi follow the procedures set forth in his letters of November 19, 198 to the chairmen of the House Committee on Interior and Insula Affairs and the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural R sources, for the handling of oil and gas leases on lands within th nation's congressionally-designated wilderness areas.

(4) This court will retain jurisdiction of these consolidated cas until July 1, 1982.

44 It seems probable that by July 1, 1982, the Supreme Court will have decided Chadha. Congress may have acted on the Baucus bill. Moreover, as noted above, it seems probable that the Secretary of the Interior will comply with the request of the House Committee ta frain from issuing mineral leases in congressionally designated wilderness areas until June 1982.

45 As set forth above, the Secretary has taken the position that while he questioned the st tory and constitutional power of the House Committee to direct the issuance of Public La Order No. 5952, he was required to withdraw the lands pursuant to the Committee's direct without exercising any discretion as to the duration of the withdrawal. This was based on incorrect interpretation of section 204(e).

93 F.R.D. 11 (1981)

WILLIAM P. TAVOULAREAS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,

V.

PHILIP PIRO, DEFENDANT.

WILLIAM P. TAVOULAREAS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,

V.

THE WASHINGTON POST CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Civ. A. Nos. 80-2387, 80-3032

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 10, 1981

A libel action was brought against newspaper arising from arties which allegedly suggested that plaintiff used his position as resident of a company to set up his son as a partner in another >mpany and to assure the success of that venture, and various moons were brought. The District Court, Gasch, J., held that: (1) de'ndants' motion for a jury trial would be granted; (2) chairman ad chief executive officer of company which published newspaper ould not be held liable for the alleged defamation; (3) plaintiffs' otion to compel defendants to reveal sources of newspaper arties would be denied without prejudice to its renewal at an approriate time in the future; (4) to the extent that plaintiff sought tesmony from congressional staff members relating to the disseminaon of documents to newspaper, subpoenaes did not impinge upon legislative privilege, but inquiry into what motivated congressionI staff members to investigate the matters at issue was not a perissible subject of examination; and (5) information pertaining to le salary and income of plaintiffs was sufficiently relevant to be scoverable where plaintiffs' complaint sought damages for, nong other things, loss of business reputation.

Motion by defendant in defamation action for jury trial would be ranted despite defendants' failure to make timely jury demand ue to oversight, where granting of motion would not delay the ction or prejudice the rights of other parties, and where issues hich would be presented were appropriate for jury resolution. ed.RulesCiv.Proc. Rules 38, 39, 39(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

. Libel and Slander 74

Chairman and chief executive officer of company which pubshed newspaper could not be liable for alleged defamatory articles ublished in newspaper where chairman was far removed from ay-to-day operations of newspaper, and where plaintiffs had not ndicated any specific facts which would support conclusion that

chairman participated in any form of preparation or publication of the articles which were basis of the action.

A news reporter may be required to disclose confidential sources in face of a civil litgant's showing that he has a non-frivolous claim, he has no reasonable alternative sources for the information he seeks, and information is sufficiently important to presentation of his case to warrant its disclosure.

4. Federal Civil Procedure 1272

When question of privileged protection of news reporter's confi dential sources arises in libel action and successful assertion of the privilege will effectively seal defendant from liability, equitie weigh somewhat more heavily in favor of disclosure; nevertheles assertion of a nonfrivolous libel claim does not automatically war rant compelled disclosure of a reporter's sources over a claim o privilege.

In libel action brought against newspaper, plaintiff's motion seeking an order requiring news reporters to reveal individual who were sources for the stories in question [12] would be denie without prejudice to its renewal at an appropriate time in th future where end point of discovery had not yet been reached and many potentially fertile areas of discovery remained unexplored and where it did not appear that plaintiffs had yet exhausted alter native sources for such information. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.

Speech or debate clause confers on legislators immunity from ju dicial process requiring them to answer questions relating to pel formance of their legislative duties, and such privilege applies wit equal force to activities of congressinal staff; while clause's prote tion is limited by its terms to speeches and debates, protection i construed broadly to reach any activity that can be characterize with the regular course of the legislative process. U.S.C.A Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.

Motion by staff members of subcommittee of House of Repre sentatives to quash subpoena served on them by plaintiffs in libe action brought against newspaper would be denied to the exten that plaintiffs sought testimony relating to dissemination of docu ments and other information to newspaper reporters, in that t such extent subpoenas did not impinge upon the legislative privi lege; inquiry into what motivated staff members to investigate mat ters involved in the case was not a permissible subject of examina tion, however, but inquiry into apparent motivation of reporters 1: bringing the matter to the staff's attention would not be similar precluded. U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.

8. Federal Civil Procedure 1272

In libel action brought against newspaper concerning allegedly lefamatory statements which involved complex business dealings undertaken through a large number of entities, defendants were entitled to have plaintiff respond to discovery request based on deendants' definitions of three of the business entities involved in he transactions relevant to the litigation.

. Federal Civil Procedure 1634

In libel action brought against newspaper, one plaintiff's objecion to defendants' request for documents which suggested that the Fould only produce documents that were within his personal conrol failed to provide an adequate response to defendants' reques to roduce documents which were in his personal control or which he ad a legal right to control or obtain, and thus court would order hat plaintiff produce the requested documents to defendant or how in detail that he had made a good-faith effort to do so and hat that effort had been unavailing. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 34, 8 U.S.C.A.

In libel action brought against newspaper based on allegedly deamatory statements concering business transactions, information ertaining to salary and income of plaintiffs was sufficiently releant to be discoverable by defendants where plaintiffs' complaint ought damages for, among other things, loss of business reputaion.

In libel action brught against newspaper based on articles which uggested that one plaintiff used his position as company president > set up his son as a partner in a company and to assure success of hat venture information about son's school and employment histoy was relevant for purposes of discovery and was to be produced y plaintiff since both reputation and qualifications of son were at

sue.

2. Federal Civil Procedure 1272

In libel action brought against newspaper based on articles conerning plaintiffs' business dealings, information pertaining to the se of company aircraft by plaintiffs was discoverable, in that in>rmation regarding personal use of company assets was relevant > the question of plaintiffs' reputation.

3. Federal Civil Procedure 1272

In libel action brought against newspaper based on newspaper rticles regarding business transactions, queston of who was bearng plaintiffs' legal expenses was not [13] sufficiently relevant or alculated to lead to relevant information to be discoverable.

In libel action, motion to quash subpoena for deposition testimoy of witness insofar as it sought testimony and documents which