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(iii) Knowledge of Agents and Representatives Plaintiffs have also objected to defendants' instruction for answering interrogatories, which states "[w]here knowledge or information is requested, such request includes knowledge of or information possessed by the party's agents, representatives and, unless privileged, his attorneys." Is is quite clear that defendants' instruction appropriately states the requirements of Rule 33 and should be complied with. See Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 370 (D.D.C. 1973); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts at 427; 4A Moore's Federal Practice 133.26. It may be that as to specific interrogatories the instruction would render the question unduly burdensome or otherwise inappropriate but on the basis of the present record the Court cannot make any further refined ruling than that specified above.

(iv) Use of the Term Affiliates Plaintiffs object to the use of the term "affiliates" in certain requests as being ambiguous. It would appear that the term has a generally understood meaning in the business community and questions employing the term should be answered in accordance with that meaning. If the plaintiffs still feel the term is ambiguous, they should resolve the ambiguity through discussions with opposing counsel and not resort to the Court. 2. Specific Objections

(a) Relevance The vast majority of plaintiffs' objections to defendants' specific discovery requests are based on the claim that those requests seek information which is not relevant to the issues in this litigation. In addressing these issues, it is necessary to bear in mind that the standard of relevance as a limitation on discoverability is distinct from the standard of relevance which governs the admissibility of evidence at trial. Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1335 (D.C.Cir.1968). Pro fessor Wright states the rule of relevance governing discovery as follows:

Discovery cannot be limited to evidence that would be rele-
vant at the trial. The concept at the discovery state is
much broader, as was made specific by a 1946 amendment
to Rule 26(b), stating that it is not ground of objection that
the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testi-
mony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Certainly the require-
ment of relevancy should be construed liberally and with
common sense, rather than in terms of narrow legalisms.
Indeed it is not too strong to say that discovery should be
considered relevant where there is any possibility that the
information sought may be relevant to the subject matter

of the act. C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts at 403 (footnotes omitted). The rule has been stated by the Court of Appeals in this Circuit as pro viding for discovery of information if it "will have some probable effect on the organization and presentation of the moving party's case." Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d at 473.

Applying this rather liberal standard to the issues in this case, the Court has reached the following conclusions.

[22] (i) Information Pertaining to Salary and Income [10] The defendants have requested documents pertaining to the salary and income of both plaintiffs. Given the fact that the complaint seeks damages for, among other things, loss of business reputation, the Court finds that this information is sufficiently relevant to require its production notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments that they have not placed these matters directly in issue because they have not yet claimed any specific loss of income. It is sufficient to say that loss of business reputation might well be expected to be attended by loss of income. The absence of any loss of income might be used to cast doubt on the claim of loss of reputation or as probative of its extent. Furthermore, this information might reasonably be expected to bear on the issue of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statements since in part those statements suggest that company assets and business have been diverted to personal uses. In any event, it is clear that information pertaining to the salary and income of plaintiffs is sufficiently relevant to be discoverable. (ii) Information About Peter Tavoulareas' School and Em

ployment History [11] It seems logical to assume that an individual's reputation will be dictated, at least in part, by his experience both academic and in the workplace. Likewise, an individual's qualifications for a job are largely established through his prior work and academic history. Since both the reputation and qualifications of Peter Tavoulareas are at issue in this case, the requested information is at least relevant for purposes of discovery and should be produced.

(iii) Use of Mobil Aircraft [12] Defendants are seeking certain information pertaining to the use of Mobil company aircraft by plaintiffs. Defendants argue that the information is relevant insofar as it might supply evidence of personal use of company assets. As such misuse would be relevant to the question of plaintiffs' reputations, it would appear relevant to at least one of the issues in this litigation. It is important to note that defendants have a basis for making this request in light of the deposition testimony of Philip Piro, William Tavoulareas former son-in-law, that Tavoulareas used company aircraft for personal purposes. It will be ordered produced.

(iv) Payment of Attorney's Fees [13] The question of who is bearing the legal expenses involved in this litigation, despite defendants' offered justifications, does not appear sufficiently relevant or calculated to lead to relevant information to be discoverable. Accordingly, defendants' motion as to that information will be denied.

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(b) Attorney Work-Product On the basis of the present record, the Court is unable to assess the validity of plaintiffs' assertion that certain information is not discoverable because it is attorney work-product. The parties are instructed to meet to discuss the question of attorney work-product with a view toward resolving the matter amicably or at least narrowing the areas of dispute.

(c) Remaining Issues A less than lucid presentation of the issues remaining in dispute combined with the ongoing supplementation of responses to certain requests has made it all but impossible to discern precisely what issues still remain in dispute. This difficulty has apparently arisen in part as a result of the failure of counsel to meet and discuss the issues with a view toward narrowing the areas of dispute. The Court has made every effort to address all of the remaining issues. The Court is, however, aware of the possibility that issues may have escaped attention. The parties may bring those issues to the Court's attention but they are encouraged to first attempt to resolve the issues by reference to the general views set forth in this memorandum.

[23] It may also be that information which the Court has deemed relevant and discoverable should be subject to some form of protective order. Again the parties are encouraged to seek agreement on the necessity and form of any such relief prior to invoking a ruling from the Court. F. George Comnas' Motion to Quash

[14] The plaintiffs are seeking the deposition testimony of George Comnas. Comnas has made a motion to quash the subpoena insofar as it seeks testimony and documents which Comnas submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The primary basis of the motion is that the information pertains to an ongoing nonpublic investigation by the SEC. Comnas seeks an order that the documents not be subject to discovery prior to the conclusion of the SEC proceedings.

On August 4, 1981, plaintiffs submitted to the Court a letter from John Fedders, Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC. In his letter Mr. Fedders states:

The Commission has conducted a private investigation into possible violations of the securities laws by Mobil Corporation, William Tavoulareas and others. This investigations related generally to allegations that certain filings with the Commission of Mobil were incorrect concerning the influence of Mobil's President, William Tavoulareas, and other senior Mobil executives in establishing William Tavoulareas' son, Peter Tavoulareas, in a business related to a company in which Mobil had a minority interest. Based on facts set forth in the staff's report of investigation, the Commission has concluded no enforcement actions against Mobil Corporation or William Tavoulareas are warranted, and the investigation has been terminated.

As this eliminates the sole basis of Comnas' motion, the motion will be denied. 14 G. Congressional Deponents' Motion for a Protective Order with Re

spect to the Deposition of Comnas, 15 [15] The Congressional deponents seek a protective order limiting plaintiffs' inquiry during the deposition of George Comnas from impinging on the speech or debate privilege. The plaintiffs oppose this motion on two bases: "(1) plaintiffs do not seek discovery of Mr. Comnas into a legislative act because [no legislative act) occurred, and (2) the Congressional Aides' unwarranted extension of legislative privilege to a non-congressional source contravenes established legal principles.” Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Congressional Deponents' Motion for a Stay or Alternatively for a Protective Order at 4.

The first of these contentions has been disposed of in part D, supra, where the Court concluded that the privilege did apply to the matters here in question and roughly outlined its scope.

Turning now to the second contention, the Court has concluded that plaintiffs' view that the speech or debate clause does not extend : to questioning of a third party other than a legislator or his aides is simply a misstatement of the law. In Gravel v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court concluded:

Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any witness, including Rodberg: . . concerning the motives and purposes

behind the Senator's conduct or that of this aides.... 408 U.S. at 628–29, 92 S.Ct. at 2628–29 (emphasis added). In proceedings below, the United States Court of Appeals for the [24] First Circuit had stated, United States v. Johnson (383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966)] holds that any person who dealt with a legislator with respect to speech or debate cannot be inquired of if the object is to attack the legislator's motives in speaking." United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir. 1972).

The holding of Johnson has recently been characterized by the Supreme Court as follows:

A similar inference is appropriate from Johnson where we
held that the Clause was violated by questions about
motive addressed to others than Johnson himself. That
holding would have been unnecessary if the Clause did not

afford protection beyond legislative acts themselves. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2440, 61 L.Ed.2d 12 (1979).

14 Comnas also argues that his SEC testimony is not relevant to matters at issue in the Post litigation. Given the liberal standard of relevance applicable to discovery, see part E2(a), supra, the Court feels that what Comnas told the SEC is sufficiently relevant to the question of what Comnas told the Post reporters to require its production.

18 As previously noted, the Court has granted the Congressional deponents leave to intervene for the limited purpose of making this motion.

The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from those holdings is that the speech or debate clause prohibits the use of judicial process to inquire of a third party about the legislative acts of a legislator or his aides. 16 But as has been indicated in part D, supra, the protection of the clause as applicable in this case has certain limitations. The Comnas deposition should proceed in a manner consistent with the permissable scope of examination as set forth previously with respect to the Congressional deponents.

III. CONCLUSIONS

For the reasons stated in this memorandum, the Court has concluded that (1) the Post defendants' motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 39 for a jury trial should be granted; (2) defendant Graham's motion for summary judgement should be granted; (3) the plaintiffs' motion to compel the Post defendants to reveal their sources should be denied without prejudice; (4) the Congressional deponents motion to quash should be denied but the depositions of Congressional deponents shall be governed by the views set forth in part D, supra; (5) the defendants' motion to compel production of documents and answers to interrogatories should, for the most part, be granted; (6) Comnas' motion to quash should be denied; and (7) Congressional deponents' motion for a protective order with respect to the Comnas deposition should be granted to the extent stated in part G, supra.

16 As noted in part D, supra, the Court does not find a significant distinction in the fact that this is a civil case as opposed to the cited cases, which involved criminal matters. Nevertheless, the conclusion of those cases that third.

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