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Acting Architect of the Capitol as a defendant in a civil action, and advising the House that he had, pursuant to 28 USC 8516, requested the Department of Justice to represent him in the action. 116 CONG. REC. 28502, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., Aug. 12, 1970.
$ 12.14 The Speaker announced that he had been served in his official capacity with a summons and complaint naming the House of Representatives and others as defendants in a civil action in a federal district court and that he had, pursuant to 2 USC § 118, requested the U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut to represent the House in the action. 120 CONG. REC. 1188, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., Jan 29, 1974 (Andrew J. Melechinsky et al v Richard M. Nixon et al.)
$ 12.15 The Speaker announced to the House that the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Minority Leader, and Chairmen of the Committees on Ways and Means and Rules each had been served with a summons and complaint in a federal civil action, and inserted in the Record the Clerk's letter to the U.S. Attorney requesting representation for all named defendants in the action pursuant to 2 USC $118. 120 CONG. Rec. 21723, 21724, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., June 28, 1974 [Robin Ficker v U.S. House of Representatives). Note: under title 2, USC § 118, a committee chairman is technically not an officer of the House in the constitutional sense, but where a proper officer of the House is also named, that officer has also requested representation for a named committee chairman but not formally for individual Members under the theory that a chairman is an "officer of the House.
$12.16 Note: When the Clerk received a summons and complaint naming the House as a defendant in a federal civil action seeking to enjoin impeachment proceedings pending in the House, the Clerk and the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary determined that representation by the appropriate U.S. Attorney pursuant to 2 USC § 118 should not be requested, based upon the doctrine of separation of powers and upon the conferral of the sole power of impeachment on the House by the Constitution. See 120 CONG. REC. 16496, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., May 28, 1974.
$12.17 The Speaker laid before the House a communication from the Clerk advising that he (the Clerk) had been served with a summons and complaint as a defendant in a federal civil action, and advising that he had, pursuant to 2 USC § 118, requested the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to represent him in the action. 120 CONG. Rec. 31124, 31125, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., Sept. 16, 1974 [Socialist Workers 1974 National Campaign Committee, et al. v W. Pat Jennings, Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, et al.).
$ 12.18 The Speaker laid before the House a communication from the Clerk, informing the House of the receipt of a summons, naming the Clerk as a defendant in a civil action in a federal district court, and advising the House that he would, pursuant to 2 USC § 118, request the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to represent him in the action. 121 CONG. REC. 33, 34, 94th Cong. 1st Sess., Jan. 14, 1975 [Buckley, et al. v Valeo et al.].
$ 12.19 The Speaker, having been served with a summons and complaint in his official capacity as a defendant in a federal civil action, advised the House that he had, pursuant to 2 USC § 118, requested the appropriate U.S. Attorney to represent him in the
action. 121 CONG. Rec. 8483, 94th Cong. Ist Sess., Mar. 25, 1975 [Kathryn M. Deats v Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives).
$ 12.20 Where the Sergeant at Arms was served with a summons and complaint as a defendant in the federal civil action (brought by a Member of the House as plaintiff seeking to test the validity of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 and of the Executive Salary Cost-ofLiving Adjustment Act as they related to Members' compensation), the Sergeant at Arms advised the Speaker that he had, pursuant to 2 USC § 118, requested the U.S. Attorney to represent him in the action. 122 CONG. Rec. 14926-28, 94th Cong. 2d Šess., May 20, 1976. In this instance the summons and complaint were printed in the Congressional Record for the information of Members, since the validity of their cost-of-living salary adjustments was to be litigated (See Pressler v Simon, discussed in Ch. 7 $ 4, supra.) In connection with the same litigation, the Chairman of the Committee on House Administration called up a resolution reported from that committee, authorizing the Sergeant at Arms to employ a special counsel to represent him and providing for the payment from the contingent fund of expenses to employ such counsel, and asked unanimous consent for its immediate consideration (since the committee report thereon had not been available for three days as required by Rule XI clause 2(1)(6)). The House adopted the resolution with an amendment recommended by the committee authorizing the Sergeant at Arms to employ such counsel with the approval of the Speaker and the chairman of the committee, and providing for the payment of attorney's fees, within a certain monetary limit, from the contingent fund. 122 Cong. Rec. 28937, 94th Cong. 2d Sess, Sept. 2, 1976 (H. Res. 1497). Note: The resolution would have been privileged for consideration after the report thereon had been available for three days, under Rule XI clause 4(a) and under Rule IX, since it raised a question of the privileges of the House and also provided for payment of expenses from the contingent fund.
$ 12.21 A resolution was reported from the Committee on House Administration and called up as privileged, authorizing its chairman to intervene as a party in a pending civil action in the U.S. Court of Claims (where the court had upheld the constitutionality of a one-house congressional veto), and (inter alia) authorizing the chairman, with the approval of the Speaker, to employ special counsel. The resolution authorized payment from the contingent fund of expenses for such employment, not to exceed the unexpended sum on an outstanding contract between the House and a designated attorney, on vouchers signed by the chairman and approved by the Speaker. 123 CONG. Rec. 13949, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., Nov. 2 1977 [H. Res. 884, authorizing the committee to retain counsel to intervene in the case of Atkins v U.S.). Note: The privilege of the resolution is drawn partly from its status as a funding resolution and partly as stating a question of the privileges of the House.
$ 12.22 Note: Where in judicial proceedings issues are raised re lating to the validity and effect of subpenas of House committees or subcommittees, the authority to intervene in such proceedings and to employ counsel gives rise to a question of the privileges of the House, and resolutions granting such authority may be called up as privileged. 122 CONG. REC. 27858, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., Aug. 26, 1976
(H. Res. 1420, authorizing retention of and participation by outside counsel on behalf of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in any judicial proceeding concerning certain subpenas). In the case in question, United States v AT&T, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had granted summary judgment for the United States on July 30, 1976 (Civ. Action No. 76-1372), enjoining AT&T from transmitting documents requested in a subpena from the oversight committee, without prior authorization of the executive branch. Since the interest of the Justice Department was adverse to that of the House in this instance, the retention of outside counsel by the House was considered necessary. See also 123 CONG. Rec. 13949, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., May 9, 1977 [H. Res. 334, providing for continuation of appointment of a special counsel to represent the House and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in the case of United States v AT&T).
INDEX TO CASES
Page 398 395
228 204 191 165 221 306 271
281 172 187 355
Allen v. Department of Defense ......
Broadcasting Companies, Inc
tianity v. Central Intelligence Agency ......
tianity v. Fraser
cations Commission .....
184 306 345 102 257
333 145 193 286 230 306 286 157
401 366 116 129 19 56 78 142