presents an immediate field of action to the ambitious and the turbulent; whereas improvements in Political Economy open only those distant prospects of general utility, which, however they may interest the calm benevolence of speculative men, are not likely to engage the passions of the multitude, or to attract the attention of those who aspire to be their leaders. I before observed, that the mistaken notions concerning Political Liberty which have been so widely disseminated in Europe by the writings of Mr. Locke, have contributed greatly to divert the studies of speculative politicians from the proper objects of their attention. On this subject I beg leave to refer to the remarks I offered on Locke and his followers, when treating on the foundation of the duty of Allegiance ;* and I have only to add at present, that the conclusion to which these and other observations of the same kind lead, is, not that the share of political power vested in the people is of trifling moment, but that its importance to their happiness depends on the protection and support it provides for their civil rights. Happiness is, in truth, the only object of legislation which is of intrinsic value; and what is called Political Liberty, is only one of the means of obtaining this end. With the advantage of good laws, a people, although not possessed of political power, may yet enjoy a great degree of happiness; and, on the contrary, where laws are unjust and inexpedient, the political power of the people, so far from furnishing any compensation for their misery, is likely to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to improvement, by employing the despotism of numbers in support of principles of which the multitude are incompetent to judge. On the other hand, it is no less evident, that the only effectual and permanent bulwark against the encroachments of tyranny, is to be found in the political privileges which the Constitution secures to the governed. This, indeed, is demonstrated by the history of all those arbitrary establishments in which the condition of the subjects is decided by the personal character of the Sovereign; and hence the jealousy with which, * [Miss Stewart, in her transcript says:-"I fear this chapter on Allegiance is lost."] under better constitutions, every encroachment on these privileges has been watched by the enlightened friends of freedom. The want of them, however, does not, like that of civil liberty, necessarily affect the happiness, nor impair the natural rights of individuals; for their value is founded entirely on considerations of political expediency; and, therefore, the measure of them, which a wise man would desire for himself and his fellow-citizens, is determined, not by the degree in which every individual consents, directly or indirectly, to the laws by which he is governed; but by the share of power which it is necessary for the people to possess, in order to place their civil rights beyond the danger of violation.-In so far as this object is attained under any establishment, the civil liberty of the people rests on a solid foundation; and their political power accomplishes completely the only purpose from which its value is derived. Nor must it be forgotten, how often it has happened in the history of mankind, that a people, by losing sight of the end, in the blind pursuit of the means, have forfeited both the one and the other. These considerations, added to what was formerly stated, appear fully sufficient to justify my general position, that of the two branches of Political Science, (the Theory of Government and Political Economy,) the latter is that which is most immediately connected with human happiness and improvement; and which is therefore entitled, in the first instance,* to the attention of the student. But this is not all. Some knowledge of Political Economy is indispensably necessary to enable us to appreciate the different Forms of Government, and to compare them together, in respect of their fitness to accomplish the great ends to which they ought to be subservient: whereas Political Economy may be studied without any reference to constitutional forms; not only because the tendency of laws may be investigated abstractedly from all consideration of their origin, but because there are many principles of Political Economy which may be sanctioned by governments very different in their constitutions; and some so essentially con* [See note, p. 21.] nected with the happiness of society that no Government can violate them, without counteracting the very purposes for which Government is established. In contrasting, as I have now done, the study of Political Economy with that of the Theory of Government, I think it necessary for me once more to repeat, (before concluding this Lecture,*) that I do not mean to deny their very intimate connexion with each other. I have already said that it is only under equitable constitutions that we can have any reasonable prospect of seeing wise systems of policy steadily pursued; and it is no less true, on the other hand, that every improvement which takes place in the internal policy of a State, by meliorating the condition and the morals of the great mass of the people, has a tendency to prepare society for undergoing, without any shock or convulsion, those gradual alterations which time produces on all human institutions. These observations may appear at first view to be contradicted by a passage in the Historical Fragment of Mr. Fox, of which, in consideration of the high authority of that eminent person, I think it necessary for me to take some notice. Speaking of the reign of Charles II., and particularly of the spirit of Government in the year 1675, he observes: "It is to be remarked, that to these times of heat and passion, and to one of those Parliaments which so disgraced themselves and the nation, by the countenance given to Oates and Bedloe, and by the persecution of so many innocent victims, we are indebted for the Habeas Corpus Act, the most important barrier against tyranny, and best framed protection for the liberty of individuals, that has ever existed in any ancient or modern Commonwealth." "But the inefficacy of mere laws in favour of the subjects, in case of the administration of them falling into the hands of persons hostile to the spirit in which they had been provided, had been so fatally evinced by the general history of England ever since the grant of the Great Charter, and more especially * [This parenthesis is deleted in the transcript from which Miss Stewart copied, and is omitted by her.] by the transactions of the preceding reign, that the Parliament justly deemed their work incomplete, unless the Duke of York were excluded from the succession to the Crown." To the same purpose he has elsewhere said, that "the reign of Charles II. forms one of the most singular as well as one of the most important periods of history. It is the æra of good laws and of bad government. The abolition of the Court of Wards; the repeal of the Act De Heretico Comburendo; the Triennial Parliament Bill; the establishment of the Rights of the House of Commons in regard to Impeachment; the expiration of the License Act; and, above all, the glorious Statute of Habeas Corpus, have therefore induced a modern writer of great eminence [Hume,] to fix the year 1679 as the period at which our constitution had arrived at its greatest theoretical perfection; but he owns, in a short note upon the passage alluded to, that the times immediately following were times of great practical oppression. What a field for meditation does this short observation from such a man furnish! What reflections does it not suggest to a thinking mind, upon the inefficacy of human laws, and the imperfection of human constitutions! We are called from the contemplation of the progress of our constitution, and our attention fixed with the most minute accuracy to a particular point, when it is said to have risen to its utmost perfection. Here we are then, at the best moment of the best constitution that ever human wisdom formed. What follows? A time of oppression and misery, not arising from external or accidental causes, such as war, pestilence, or famine, nor even from any such alteration of the laws as might be supposed to impair this boasted perfection, but from a corrupt and wicked administration, which all the so-much admired checks of the constitution were not able to prevent. How vain, then, how idle, how presumptuous is the opinion that laws can do everything! And how weak and pernicious the maxim founded upon it, that measures, not men, are to be attended to."† The sentiments of an eminent Scotch Judge with respect to *[A Iistory of the Early Part of the Reign of James II., Chap. I. p. 38, orig. ed.] + [Ibid. p. 22, seq.) the Act 1701, (which has been called the Habeas Corpus Act of Scotland,) may be quoted as a supplement to this citation. from Mr. Fox. "The Habeas Corpus in England was passed in the reign of Charles II., and you may remember what Mr. Hume says, that that Act for securing the personal liberty of the subject, rendered the constitution of England the best the world had ever seen. The Habeas Corpus Act, however, was rendered altogether nugatory and unavailing in the infamous government which followed, and which produced the Revolution 1688. The Revolution also took place in this country; but there had been no Habeas Corpus Act here, and it was found necessary to pass the Act 1701. In England personal liberty was unavailing without political freedom; and in Scotland, political freedom was discovered to be nugatory without personal liberty. The Act 1701, was meant to consummate the Revolution."1 What is the moral to which these reflections lead? Not, certainly, that laws are of little moment to national felicity; or even that they are of less moment than the theoretical plan of the government, but that without the vivifying spirit of an enlightened people, jealous of their rights and determined to preserve them, the wisest political institutions are little better. than a dead letter. Delolme has made some judicious remarks on this subject, when treating of the Censorial Power exercised by the people of England over the conduct of government by means of the press. "Whoever considers," he observes, "what it is that constitutes the moving principles of what we call great affairs, and the invincible sensibility of man to the opinion of his fellow-creatures, will not hesitate to affirm, that, if it were possible for the Liberty of the Press to exist in a despotic government, and (what is not less difficult) for it to exist without changing the constitution, this liberty of the press would alone form a counterpoise to the power of the Prince. If, for ex 1 Speech of Lord Gillies in the case Duncan v. His Majesty's Advocate, as reported in the Scotsman, February 8, 1823. [This marks a date, after which the context was written.] |