v. Stuhl, 32 Neb. 94 (48 N. W. 882); State v. Railroad Co., 45 Iowa, 139; Scheimer v. Price, 65 Mich. 638 (32 N. W. 873); Gregory v. Knight, 50 Mich. 61; Fox v. Virgin, 11 Ill. App. 513; State v. Horn, 35 Kan. 717 (12 Pac. 148); Watrus v. Southworth, 5 Conn. 304; Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51; Epler v. Nimal, 5 Ind. 459; Hanum v. Belchertown, 19 Pick. 311; Shellhouse v. State, 110 Ind. 509; South Branch Ry. Co. v. Parker, 41 N. J. Eq. 489; Blummer v. Ossipee, 59 N. H. 55; Herhold v. Chicago, 108 Ill. 467; State v. Mitchell, 58 Iowa, 567; Waltman v. Rund, 109 Ind. 366 (10 N. E. 117); Commonwealth v. Railway Co., 14 Gray, 93; Davis v. Clinton, 55 Iowa, 549 (10 N. W. 768).

III. An owner in fee simple who holds under a paper title and is in possession of a part of the premises, has constructive possession of the whole, and the public entering thereon, not having legal title, but under an alleged color of title (assuming that the defective road proceedings constitute such color of title) will be restricted to the part actually occupied for such highway as against such real owner: Bar rett v. Love, 48 Iowa, 115; Gates v. Kelsey, 57 Ark. 527 (22 S. W. 162); Tyler, Eject., p. 904; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33; St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (77 Am. Dec. 586); Schultz v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 310; DeGraw v. Taylor, 37 Mo. 310; Seymour v. Cresswell, 18 Fla. 29; Kincheloe v. Tracewell, 11 Grat. 587; Archibald v. Ry. Co., 157 N. Y. 154 (52 N. E. 567); Labory v. Orphan Asylum, 97 Cal. 273; McCormick v. Sutton, 97 Cal. 373-8; Ozark Plateau Land Co. v. Hays, 105 Mo. 143 (16 S. W. 957); Colterman v. Schiermeyer, 111 Mo. 404 (19 S. W. 484); Garrett v. Ramsey, 26 West Va. 351; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333-69; Isley v. Wilson, 42 West Va. 757 (26 S. E. 551); Semple v. Cook, 50 Cal. 26.

IV. The public may lose its rights in a highway by adverse user. The statute of limitations would run against the public and the right of the public to use a highway:

Grady v. Dundon, 30 Or. 333; Steel v. Portland, 23 Or. 176 (31 Pac. 479); Knight v. Heaton, 22 Vt. 480; Beardslee v. French, 7 Conn. 125 (18 Am. Dec. 86); Rowan's Executors v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Weber v. Chapman, 42 N. H. 326 (80 Am. Dec. 111); Cornwall v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 87 Ky. 780 (7 S. W. 553); Ostrom v. City of San Antonio, 77 Tex. 345 (14 S. W. 66); Meyer v. City of Lincoln, 33 Neb. 566 (50 N. W. 763); City v. Church, 8 Ohio, 298 (32 Am. Dec. 718); City v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 594; Armstrong v. Dayton, 4 Dev. 568; Dudley v. Frankfort, 12 B. Mon. 610; Orr v. O'Brien, 77 Iowa, 253 (14 Am. St. Rep. 277); Vincent v. City of Kalamazoo, 111 Mich. 230 (69 N. W. 501); Galveston v. Menord, 23 Tex. 349; Company v. Powell, 22 Mo. 525 (66 Am. Dec. 637); City v. Johnston, 56 Ill. 45; City v. Poe, 24 Grat. 149; City v. Schoels, 24 Iowa, 283 (95 Am. Dec. 729); Fort Smith v. McKibben, 41 Ark. 45 (48 Am. Rep. 19); Clements v. Anderson, 46 Miss. 581; City v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36; Shock v. Falls City, 31 Neb. 599 (48 N. W. 468); Attorney General v. Revere Copper Co., 152 Mass. 444 (25 N. E. 605, 9 L. R. A. 510); St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 387 (48 N. W. 17, 34 L. R. A. 184); Smith v. Cornell, 81 Iowa, 218 (46 N. W. 992); Village of Wayzata v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 50 Minn. 438 (52 N. W. 913); Lewis v. Barker, 39 Neb. 639 (58 N. W. 126); McAlberts v. Pickup, 84 Iowa, 65 (50 N. W. 556); Watkins v. Mores, 113 N. C. 527 (18 S. E. 339) ; Terrill v. Town of Bloomfield (Ky.), 21 S. W. 1041; Flynn v. Detroit, 93 Mich. 590 (53 N. W. 518); Bice v. Town of Walcott, 64 Minn. 459 (67 N. W. 360).

For respondent there was an oral argument and a brief by Mr. Alfred S. Bennett.

I. The record of the proceedings attempting to establish a county road, though invalid, was admissible as color

of title: Jones, Easmts, § 464; Elliott, Roads and Sts., p. 136; Upper v. Lowell, 7 Wash. 460; State v. Auchard, 22 Mont. 14 (55 Pac. 361); R. R. Co. v. Cogsbill, 85 Ala. 456 (5 South. 188); Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450 (19 Atl. 858, 9 L. R. A. 94, with note); R. R. Co. v. Deveny, 42 Miss. 555; Sprague v. Waite, 17 Pick. 309.

II. A public road may be created by adverse user alone; but it will then be confined to the limits actually traveled, and a convenient distance on each side for the passage of teams and stock: Tilton v. Wenham, 52 N. E. 514; Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah, 341 (44 Pac. 1032, 57 Am. St. Rep. 740); Commonwealth v. R. R. Co., 14 Gray, 93; Jones, Easmts, § 464; Sprague v. Waite, 17 Pick. 309; Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450 (19 Atl. 858, 9 L. R. A. 94, and note).

III. When once a title is established by ten years' adverse use, it becomes at once a valid title for all purposes: Joy v. Stump, 14 Or. 361 (12 Pac. 929); Newell, Eject., p. 719. It follows from this that it would continue a legal road until defeated in some lawful way; and the burden of proof is on the party claiming the abandonment: Elliott, Roads & Sts., p. 658; Lawson, Presump. Ev., p. 163; Jones, Easmts, § 850; Lazzell v. Garlow, 44 W. Va. 466 (30 S. E. 177); Bradley v. Appannoose County, 106 Iowa, 105 (76 N. W. 519).

IV. While a public easement may be lost by adverse possession, in a case where an entire section of the highway is shut off so that public travel is entirely prevented for a long period of time, yet it is doubtful under the authorities whether a mere encroachment of the abutting owner on a small portion of the highway, leaving room for the travel to pass around, could ever give title or narrow the public right: Elliott, Roads & Sts., p. 669; Jones, Easmts, § 539; Watkins v. Lynch, 71 Cal. 26 (11 Pac. 808); So. Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ferris, 93 Cal. 263 (28 Pac. 828); Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 778 (8 N. E. 514); Humphries v. Mayor, 48 N. J. Law, 595 (7 Atl. 301); Brown v. Hiatt, 16 Ind. App. 340

(45 N. E. 481); Webb v. Com'rs of Butler County, 52 Kan. 375 (34 Pac. 973); Town of Sumner v. Peebles, 5 Wash. 471 (32 Pac. 221); Meier v. Port. Cable Ry. Co., 16 Or. 500 (1 L. R. A. 856, 19 Pac. 610).

MR. JUSTICE WOLVERTON, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs' cause of action depends upon whether the oil tank was being placed within and upon a public county road. If it was, the right of recovery is clear, the other conditions being that it must have been the proximate cause of the injury, which must have been special and peculiar,—other and greater than that sustained by the public generally: Milarkey v. Foster, 6 Or. 378 (25 Am. Rep. 531); Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N. Y. 657 (42 N. E. 341).

I. The first question of material moment arises upon the motion for a judgment of nonsuit, and has relation to the competency of the ineffectual road proceedings, as showing color of title in the public. The only way in which the record could serve the plaintiffs is to extend possession constructively to the whole, if there has been occupancy of any part within prescribed boundaries. User by the general public, under a claim of right, adversely, and not by mere permission of the owner, for the period prescribed by the statute as a limitation beyond which actions for the recovery of real property cannot be maintained, will establish an easement in favor of the public. But the use must be continuous and uninterrupted, and substantially by way of a certain and welldefined line of travel, for the entire period: Elliott, Roads & Sts. (2 ed.), §§ 175, 176; Jones, Easmts., § 458; State v. Auchard, 22 Mont. 14 (55 Pac. 361); Shellhouse v. State, 110 Ind. 509 (11 N. E. 484); Manrose v. Parker, 90 Ill. 581; State v. Keokuk, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 139.

2. It is not material to the present inquiry whether such an easement is acquired by prescription, which presupposes

an establishment by competent authority, or by dedication, which implies a grant; for it is clear that such an easement may be acquired by adverse user, by whatsoever name the process of establishment may be called. As a general rule, when the highway depends solely for its establishment upon adverse and continuous user by the general public, its width and extent of servitude are measured and determined by the character and extent of the user, for the easement cannot, upon principle or authority, be broader than the user: Marchand v. Town of Maple Grove, 48 Minn. 271 (51 N. W. 606); Valley Pulp & Paper Co. v. West, 58 Wis. 599 (17 N. W. 554); Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356 (46 N. W. 494); Scheimer v. Price, 65 Mich. 638 (32 N. W. 873); Western Ry. v. Alabama G. T. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272 (11 South. 483); Wayne Co. Sav. Bank v. Stockwell, 84 Mich. 586 (22 Am. St. Rep. 708*, 48 N. W. 174). Other conditions, however, may be effective to extend the exterior limits beyond the thread or course of actual travel, as where inclosures may have been permanently maintained by persons affected with reference to the highway, or the use is referable to a survey and plat recognized and adopted by owners of lands over which the way extends, or was under color of ineffectual proceedings to establish a legal road under the statute: Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah, 34 (57 Am. St. Rep. 740,† 44 Pac. 1032); Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450 (19 Atl. 858, 9 L. R. A. 94‡) ; Sprague v. Waite, 17 Pick. 309;. Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356 (46 N. W. 494). Even where the highway is founded solely upon user, its width or extent of servitude is usually a question of fact for the jury. It would seem that it ought not, where the topography of the locality will permit, to be confined exclusively to the beaten track or thread of actual travel, because of the exigency that

*See note, Highways by User- Discontinuance by Nonuser. †See note of 25 pages, Highways by User.

See note, Right of Public to Use Entire Width of Highway.