state had jurisdiction. When the disputed boundary is adjusted and settled, grants previously made by either state of lands claimed by it, and over which it has exercised political sovereignty, but which, on the final adjustment of the boundary, are determined to be within the limits of the other state, are void unless confirmed by the latter state. Even if such confirmation should be made, it cannot injure the title of the same lands which the latter state itself had previously granted.24 24 Coffee v. Groover, 123 U. S. 10, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5, 31 L. ed. 56. The supreme court of Florida held that grants in a disputed territory, by a government exercising sovereign jurisdiction in such state, were valid and to be sustained, notwithstanding that by a subsequent settlement of boundaries, the disputed territory is conceded to the other contesting sovereign. The supreme court of the United States reversed the judgment, Mr. Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion of the court, saying: "It is no doubt the received doctrine, that in cases of ceded or conquered territory, the rights of private property in lands are respected. Grants made by the former government, being rightful when made, are not usually disturbed. Allegiance is transferred from one government to the other without any subversion of property. This doctrine has been laid down very broadly on several occasions by this court-particularly in cases arising upon grants of land made by the Spanish and other governments in Louisiana and Florida before those countries were ceded to the United States. It is true that the property rights of the people, in those cases, were protected by stipulations in the treaties of cession, as is usual in such treaties; but the court took broader ground, and held, as a general principle of international law, that a mere cession of territory only operates upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction, including the right to the public domain, and not upon the private property of individuals which had been segregated from the public domain before the cession. This principle is asserted in the cases of United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 8 L. ed. 547; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 86-89, 8 L. ed. 604; Delassus v. United States, 9 Pet. 117, 9 L. ed. 71; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 428, 9 L. ed. 1137; Doe v. Eslava, 9 How. 421, 13 L. ed. 200; Jones v. McMasters, 20 How. 8, 17, 15 L. ed. 805, and Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176, 15 L. ed. 891. In United States v. Percheman, Chief Justice Marshall said: 'It may not be unworthy of remark that it is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights an nulled. The people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modern rule § 276. What are property rights. While there can be no doubt that inhabitants of a ceded territory are entitled to protection in the full enjoyment of their property, the question has sometimes arisen as to what are property rights. Preliminarily, we can do no better than to quote the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, who, in an early case involving the protection given by treaty, said: "The term 'property,' as applied to lands, comprehends every species of title inchoate or complete. It is supposed to embrace those rights which lie in contract; those which are executory, as well as those which are executed. In this respect, the relation of the inhabitants to their government is not changed. The new government takes the place of that which has passed away. 152 An adverse homestead entry will not affect a grant in Michigan territory, which in accordance with the provisions of Jay's treaty is subsequently confirmed by the United States.26 The law, as well as the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, protects titles perfected under Spanish or Mexican grants,27 and grants made by Mexican even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory? Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by the change.' 7 Pet. 86, 87, 8 L. ed. 604. "But whilst this is the acknowledged rule in cases of ceded and even conquered territory, with regard to titles acquired from a former sovereign who had undoubted right to create them, it does not apply (as we shall see) to cases of disputed boundary, in relation to titles created by a sovereign in possession, but not rightfully so. In the latter case, when the true boundry is ascertained, or adjusted by agreement, grants made by either sovereign beyond the limits of his rightful territory, whether he had possession or not (unless confirmed by proper stipulations), fail for want of title in the grantor. This is the general rule. Circumstances may possibly exist which would make valid the grants of a government de facto; as, for example, where they contravene no other rights. Grants of public domain made by Napoleon as sovereign de facto of France may have had a more solid basis of legality than similar grants made by him as sovereign de facto of a Prussian province, derogatory to the rights of the government and King of Prussia." Coffee v. Groover, 123 U. S. 10, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5, 31 L. ed. 56. 25 Soulard v. United States, 4 Pet. 512, 7 L. ed. 938. 26 Sanborn v. Vance, 69 Mich. 226, 37 N. W. 273. "Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644. officers in compliance with the Mexican laws applicable to California are valid.28 § 277. Subsequent acts of Congress. Subsequent acts of Congress confirming Spanish concessions for the shore will not impair riparian rights of lot owners who have bought in accordance with prior acts of Congress;29 but a title to land in Louisiana, which is completed by a grant from the crown of Spain, will overcome a title claimed under an act of Congress.30 It was held that a grant made by the British government is valid notwithstanding the fact that as subsequently established by treaty the land lies within the boundaries of the United States.31 Where a grant has been perfected under Spanish authority, the land affected became private property. Consequently, upon the cession of Louisiana such land did not pass to the United States.32 A change of sovereignty will not defeat the title of Pueblo Indians to lands.33 Until a legislative enactment makes a contrary provision, a ceded territory will retain its system of laws.34 § 278. Property includes every species of title. The term "property" used in treaties of cession includes every species of title, inchoate or complete, legal or equitable, and comprehends rights which lie in contract, executory as well as executed.35 The rights of private property were not impaired by the cession of California to the United States, and the act of Congress to ascertain and settle private land claims in that state was passed for the purpose of assuring to the inhabitants of the territory ceded the benefit of the rights of property which the treaty secured to them. This act recognized both legal and equitable rights, and the court held that it should be administered in a liberal spirit.36 All incomplete title acquired in a ceded territory 28 Reynolds v. West, 1 Cal. 326; Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 38. 29 Abbots v. Kennedy, 5 Ala. 396. 30 Hall v. Root, 19 Ala. 386. 31 Little v. Watson, 32 Me. 214. 32 Roussin v. Parks, 8 Mo. 539. 33 United States v. Lucero, 1 N. Mex. 429. 34 Browning v. Browning, 3 N. Mex. 467 (371) [659], 9 Pac. 677; Bar nett v. Barnett, 9 N. Mex. 205, 50 Pac. 337; Chavez v. Chavez, 7 N. Mex. 69, 32 Pac. 140. 35 Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S. 179, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407, 28 L. ed. 908. 36 United States v. Moreno, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 400, 17 L. ed. 633. Cited in Town v. De Haven, 5 Saw. 149, Fed. Cas. No. 14,113; Crystal etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, 76 Fed. 153. prior to a treaty is such a property interest as can be transferred by mortgage or reached by judicial process.37 Spain, while in possession of territory afterward ceded, had power to make grants founded on any consideration, and had absolute discretion to impose any restriction.38 Property rights were not devested by the revolutions in Texas.39 § 279. Copyrights, patents and trademarks.-Copyrights and patents may be protected under treaties of cession, though the law of the United States may not give similar rights. It was provided in article XIII of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, that the rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines should be respected. A patent or license had been granted on July 11, 1898, to a Spaniard for the manufacture of hemp by steam in the Philippines for a period of five years. In the opinion of the attorney general of the United States this patent was protected by the treaty if it was valid under Spanish law, as the laws of Spain concerning industrial property were in the contemplation of the framers of this article of the treaty. In the English copy of the treaty, article XIII provided that: "The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba, and in Porto Rico, the Philippines, and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected," while in the Spanish copy the article, instead of "rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards," reads, "the rights of property, literary, artistic, and industrial, acquired by Spaniards. ST Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S. 179, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407, 28 L. ed. 908. See, also, Doe v. Latimer, 2 Fla. 71. United States v. Clarke, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 228, 10 L. ed. 946. Trimble v. Smithers, 1 Tex. 790; Ortiz v. De Benavides, 61 Tex. 60; Sabriego v. White, 30 Tex. 576; Maxey v. O'Connor, 23 Tex. 234; Jones v. Montes, 15 Tex. 351. 40 treaty in Spanish, like the law of 1878, speaks of industrial property. It concerns only Spanish rights acquired under Spanish laws; and the framers of it must be presumed to have known something of those rights and laws of which they were treating, and to have had in mind such laws as that of July 30, 1878, corresponding to our laws relating to patents. In English, the words 'industrial property' become 'patents.' I think it reasonable The treaty between Spain and the United States of December 10, 1898, protects rights of property in trademarks in Cuba and the Philippines, as they are included in the term "property of all kinds." Where trademarks had been registered prior to the execution of the treaty in the international registry at Berne, they are entitled to the same recognition and protection from the military governments of Cuba and the Philippines as are trademarks which have been registered in the national registry at Madrid, or in one of the provincial registeries of the islands.41 § 280. Loss of trademarks by laches.-The treaty between the United States and Hungary did not abrogate the right acquired by the public through the laches of a Hungarian merchant to use his trademark and trade name, when such trademark and trade name are secured to him in Hungary by the operation of a subsequent law of that country. The fact that such a merchant sold his entire product to a single person, allowing him to distribute the goods to the trade, cannot defeat the imputation of knowledge on his part as to the conditions governing the protection of trademarks.42 "If he wished to hold on to his trade name and trade label in this country," said Judge Lacombe, "he should either have taken steps to advise himself as to the situation, or should have seen to it that his selected vendee, who shared with him in his monopoly, took proper action to maintain his rights." 43 to infer from these things that the article was drawn up with a view to embracing property recognized by the Spanish laws which correspond with our patent laws, even if that property was not identical with that recognized by our laws. I see nothing in the nature of the right claimed, in that it might be objected to as a monopoly, to cause a different interpretation of the treaty or to prevent that article of the treaty from being constitutional and obligatory." " Mr. Magoon, Law Officer, Division of Insular Affairs, War Department, March 27, 1901, Magoon's Rep. 305. 42 Saxlehner v. Eisner, 63 U. S. App. 139, 33 C. C. A. 291, 91 Fed. 536, affirming 88 Fed. 61. A rehear ing was denied, 91 Fed. 539, 63 U. S. App. 145, 33 C. C. A. 291. Longcontinued delay or acquiescence will defeat the right. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143, 32 L. ed. 526. 43 Saxlehner v. Eisner, supra. On rehearing the court said: "We are unable to assent to the proposition that the provisions of the treaty are to be construed so as to hold that when the public in this country has acquired, through the owner's laches, the right to use a trade name and a |