to the other of its intention to terminate the same. The Senate added this amendment: "This convention shall not take effect until the same shall have been approved by the Congress." Ratifications were exchanged on March 31, 1903, at which time Congress was not in session, but Congress was convened in special session November 9, 1903, and on December 17, 1903, passed an act to carry into effect the convention, which provided in section 1: "That whenever the President of the United States shall receive satisfactory evidence that the Republic of Cuba has made provision to give full effect to the articles of convention between the United States and the Republic of Cuba, signed on the eleventh day of December, in the year nineteen hundred and two, he is hereby authorized to issue his proclamation, declaring that he has received such evidence, and, thereupon, on the tenth day after exchange of ratifications of such convention between the United States and the Republic of Cuba, and so long as the said convention shall remain in force, all articles of merchandise being the product of the soil or industry of the Republic of Cuba, which are now imported into the United States free of duty, and all other articles of merchandise being the product of the soil or industry of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States shall be admitted at a reduction of twenty per centum of the rates of duty thereon, as provided by the tariff act of the United States approved July twenty-fourth, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, or as may be provided by any tariff law of the United States subsequently enacted. The rates of duty herein granted by the United States to the Republic of Cuba, are and shall continue, during the term of said convention, preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries; Provided, That, while said convention is in force, no sugar imported from the Republic of Cuba, shall be admitted into the United States at a reduction of duty greater than twenty per centum of the rates of duty thereon, as provided by the tariff act of the United States approved July twenty-fourth, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, and no sugar the product of any other foreign country shall be admitted by treaty or convention into the United States while this convention is in force at a lower rate of duty than that provided by the tariff act of the United States approved July twentyfourth, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven; And provided, fur 33 Stats. at Large, 2136. ther, that nothing herein contained shall be held or construed as an admission on the part of the House of Representatives that customs duties can be changed otherwise than by an act of Congress originating in said House." The President issued his proclamation on the day of the passage of this act, setting forth the treaty and the act of Congress, and declaring that he had received satisfactory evidence that the Republic of Cuba had made provision to give full effect to the articles of the convention, and declaring and proclaiming "the said convention as amended by the Senate of the United States to be in effect on the tenth day from the date of this, my proclamation." 10 § 89. Question before the court.-The question before the court was whether a certain quantity of sugar imported between the 12th of June and the 28th of September, 1903. should be charged with full duties under the tariff act, or was entitled to a reduction of twenty per cent prescribed by that act, under the treaty and the act of Congress. The solution of the question depended upon the date when the treaty became effective. The court held that the reduction of twenty per cent in the duties imposed by the tariff act did not become operative until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the President of the United States and the President of the Cuban republic for the commencement of the operation of the treaty.11 § 90. Reasoning of the court. In the lower court the view taken was that owing to the language of the treaty as to the time at which it should take effect, it was intended to have a retroactive operation, and was intended to relate to merchandise imported from Cuba ten days or more after the exchange of ratifications. 12 The supreme court of the United States said, however, that between the treaty and the amendment there was an emphatic difference. "The date at which the instrument should go into effect was changed. It cannot be said that the treaty 10 33 Stats. at Large, 2136. 11 United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U. S. 563, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717, 50 L. ed. 1149; FrankI'n Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 202 U. S. 580, 26 Sup. Ct. 12 American Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 136 Fed. 508. The provision related to time and the amendment to sanction merely, and adopted the time of the treaty. To do this would be to interpret the words of the treaty one way and the same words in the amendment another way. We start, then, with the proposition that not the treaty, but the act of Congress, was to fix the date that the treaty should take effect. What date Congress fixed is the question to be considered. It was certainly competent for Congress (with the consent of Cuba) to have given the treaty retrospective, immediate, or prospective operation.' court said that there was a presumption against retrospective operation, and that words in a statute should not be so strued unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied." The court admitted that there were words in the act of Congress which, if not in themselves, yet in connection with events, might be said to look to a retrospective operation. The words of the act of Congress refer manifestly to an event to occur, which had, apparently, already occurred, and it was contended that upon the happening of such event, the treaty by its own terms and by the act of Congress took effect. To this contention the government replied that as Congress was not in session at the time, it was ignorant of the fact that ratifications had been exchanged, and framed its legislation on the view that some further action was required on the part of Cuba. The court on this subject said: "If we may not accept the explanation of Congress' ignorance, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Congress considered it was still open to Cuba to accept or reject the treaty, and to make sure of her acceptance before the treaty should go into effect in the United States. This view satisfies completely the text of the act. We cannot suppose that, if Congress intended to give retrospective operation to the act, it would have used the words that expressed the contrary. The day at which the treaty should operate was important, and would necessarily be ever present in mind, and it was of easy expression. Future time and past time are directly opposite, and by no inadvertence or intention can we believe or suppose that Congress, having in mind and purpose the distinction between the past and the future, should use language that expressed the one while it meant to provide for the other." "Citing United States v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002, 40 L. ed. 82. The court also adverted to what it declared was another important fact: "The treaty was a reciprocal arrangement and intended to go into effect coincidently in the United States and Cuba. The two nations provided for this. On the day the President approved the act of Congress, he issued his proclamation declaring that the treaty should go into effect on the 27th day of December. On the 17th day of December, the President of Cuba also issued his proclamation, stating that Congress had approved the treaty in accordance with the requirements of article II, and declaring that the treaty should take effect in Cuba on the day named on the proclamation of the President of the United States December 27, 1903. This coincident operation is of the very essence of the convention. It would indeed be anomalous if a treaty which provided for reciprocal concessions should be in operation in one nation eight months before it was in operation in the other. And this is not adequately answered as appellee answers it, by saying that the President of Cuba and the President of the United States were both mistaken as to the date of the operation of the treaty, and their mistake could not affect the rights of importers. Certainly not if a mistake could be conceded. But the action of the Presidents is proof against the existence of mistakes. It shows the understanding of the Executives of the two countries, and affords confirmation of the view that Congress contemplated action subsequent to its legislation to put the treaty into effect."' 14 § 91. Effect on individual rights.-But where individual rights are concerned, the rule is that a treaty does not take effect until the exchange of ratifications.15 Upon the cession by Spain of the island of Porto Rico, the Constitution at once extended over it, conferring among other rights that of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions. But as to private rights, the treaty became effective only from the time of the exchange of ratifications, and, therefore, a military tribunal of the United States, established 14 United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U. S. 563, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717, 50 L. ed. 1149. 15 Davis' Notes, U. S. Treaty, Vol. 1776-1887, 1228, citing Davis V. Concordia, 9 How. 280, 13 L. ed. 138; Lessee of Hylton v. Brown, 1 Wash. C. C. 343, Fed. Cas. No. 6982; Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32, 19 L. ed. 571; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 8 L. ed. 547. See, also, Bush v. United States, 29 Ct. of Cl. 144. during the occupancy of the island by the military forces of the United States as conquered territory, had jurisdiction in March, 1899, to try offenses.1 As to the collection of duties on merchandise, a treaty takes effect from the exchange of ratifications.17 16 § 92. Retroactive effect.-Where rights of succession to realty are given to the subjects of a foreign sovereign by a treaty, it is not retroactive so as to affect the succession of a person dying before the treaty.18 But conventions of extradition, where no express limitation is expressed, apply to offenses committed prior to the conclusion of such conventions.19 The constitutional provision against ex post facto laws is not applicable.20 It may be stated as a rule that as to individual rights, the ratification of a treaty must be deemed its date.21 § 93. Authority of courts.-Whether a treaty was properly executed or whether it was obtained by undue influence are not matters into which courts can inquire.22 Courts have no authority to examine or decide whether the person ratifying a treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the authority to enter into the stipulations contained in the treaty. The President and Senate make this inquiry when entering into the treaty.23 Thus it was admitted that certain grants of land were annulled and declared void by the ratification, by the King of Spain, of the treaty by which Florida was ceded to the United States. But whether, according to the constitution of Spain, the king had power to annul these grants is a political, and not a judicial, question, and it was decided when the treaty was made and ratified.24 The court will refuse to pass upon the power of Indian tribes to enter into a treaty.25 Where a treaty with an Indian tribe "Yeaker's Heirs v. Yeaker, 4 Met. (61 Ky.), 33, 81 Am. Dec. 530. "Leighton v. United States, 29 Ct. of Cl. 288. 23 Doe ex dem. Clark v. Braden, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 635, 14 L. ed. 1090. 24 Doe ex dem. Clark v. Braden, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 635, 14 L. ed. 1090. In re Race Horse, 70 Fed. 607. |