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(b.) That it does not specify the value given, or
that any value has been given therefor; (e)
(c.) That it does not specify the place where it is

drawn or the place where it is payable (ƒ).

(a.) This subsection defines the essential requisites of a bill of exchange, the want of any one of which renders the writing not a bill, though it may be capable of being made one, vide § 20. A writing which does not possess these requisites is not necessarily invalid. It may be capable of being enforced as an obligation or document of debt, but it is not entitled to the privileges of a bill, and is not subject to the disadvantages affecting bills and notes, vide Introduction, pp. 6-8.

1. A bill of exchange must be in writing. It need not be holograph of the drawer, and may be either wholly or partly printed, vide § 2, with the exception of the drawer's signature. The writing may be in pencil, Geary v. Physic, 5 B. and C. 234.

2. It must contain an order. No particular form is required, provided that payment be ordered as a right, and not as a favour. This rule is complied with, although the order is expressed in terms of courtesy, but not, if the drawer merely says that he hopes that the addressee will pay, Little v. Slackford, M. and M. 171. An authority to make a payment is not equivalent to an order, Hamilton v. Spottiswoode, 18 L. J., Ex. 393. In this case the writing was expressed thus:"We hereby authorise you to pay on our account, to the order of W. G., £6000, at the following periods, deducting the amount from the quarterly account for types furnished to you, viz., 11th November, &c." The drawee returned the writing to W. G. with this indorsement:-"Sir,— Having received the foregoing authority from A. B., I under take to make you the payments as above stated." It was held to be an agreement and not a bill and relative acceptance.

3. The order must be unconditional. Thus, as provided in subsection (3) an order to pay out of a particular fund—

e.g., out of the proceeds of a particular consignment or $3. remittance, is not unconditional. The right of the payee to demand payment must not be made dependent on any thing to be done by him-e.g., delivery of goods or payment of another bill, or on the occurrence of any event, which is not certain to happen. If the order bear to be unconditional, the document does not lose its effect as a bill, though a separate memorandum, not referred to on the bill, be executed, by which payment is made conditional. Such a memorandum does not qualify the right of a holder in due course to demand payment, but will be a good defence against an action on the bill at the instance of the payee. A promise to pay on a fixed date, or upon any earlier day upon which a sum shall be entitled to be paid off or redeemed according to the printed conditions indorsed on the writing, is not a promissory note, Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England, L. R. 8, Q. B. 374. The addition of the words "as per advice," which indicates to the drawee, that he is not to accept or pay, until the receipt of advice from the drawer, does not make the order conditional, but the drawee is not in safety to accept or pay until the letter of advice has arrived, Chitty on Bills, p. 118; Thomson on Bills, p. 47.

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4. The writing must be addressed by one person, vide § 2, to another, who must be named or otherwise indicated, vide § 6. The only person entitled to accept is the person to whom the bill is addressed, and if there be no address, an acceptance is invalid, vide § 17, Walker's Trs. v. M'Kinlay, 7 R., H. L. 85; 5 Ap. Cases, 754; but an address, where there is not one on the bill, may be written on, vide § 20.

5. It must be signed by the drawer. His signature is probative without witnesses, whether the bill be in re mercatoria or not. It need not be written by the drawer's own hand, but may be written on the bill by a third person by or under his authority, vide § 91 (1). The authority may be proved by parole, vide § 100, but in the case of a person who is unable to write subscription by a notary or a justice of the peace, in presence of two witnesses, in the manner provided in the Convey

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ancing Act, 37 & 38 Vict. cap. 94, § 41 is probative, and the authority to the notary to subscribe does not require to be proved. Subscription by initials was sustained in Thomson v. Shiel, 1729, Mor. 16810, on proof that the party usually subscribed by signing his initials, Bell's Prin. 323, and that he did subscribe the particular writ, and this Act does not seem to alter the common law rule. There is no provision that the name of the drawer is to be signed. Signature by mark with the drawer's name signed by another person was formerly held to be valid on the same proof as in the case of signature by initials, but is now valid under sect. 91 (1). Signature by another person under the drawer's authority, unless it be a notarial subscription, and signature by initials cannot be used as a warrant for summary diligence, vide note (a) on § 98. The Bank of England may sign by impressing the name of their cashier by means of machinery. A corporation may sign a bill by sealing it with the corporate seal, vide § 91 (2), or may authorise its directors or officials to sign negotiable documents on its behalf, Clark on Partnership, i. 231. In the case of companies incorporated under the Companies' Act, 1862-1880, it is provided by 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 47, that a promissory note or bill of exchange shall be deemed to have been made accepted or indorsed on behalf of any company under these Acts, if made accepted or indorsed in the name of the company by any person acting under the authority of the company, or if made accepted cr endorsed by, or on behalf of, or on account of, the company by any person acting under the authority of the company.

6. A bill must be made payable either on demand, or have no term of payment expressed, in which case it is held to be payable on demand, vide § 10; or at a fixed time—e.g., at 1st January, 1883, during January, 1883, Macfarlane v. Johnstone, 11th June, 1864, 2 M. 1210, or at Whitsunday, 1883. A bill may be made payable at a determinable future time, vide § 11.

7. The order must be to pay. Any equivalent word may be used. Thus "debit my account has been sustained,

Swan v. Bank of Scotland, 8th Dec.

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1841, 4 D. 210; and

"deliver" or "credit in cash" are equally operative, Chitty on Bills, pp. 110, 111.

But "account" is not equivalent to "pay," Pirie's Reps. v. Smith, 28th Feb. 1833, 11 Sh. 473.

8. The order must be to pay a sum of money. Money means coin. Sums not exceeding one shilling are payable in bronze; not exceeding forty shillings in silver coins, and all sums above forty shillings must be paid in gold, vide 33 Vict. c. 10, § 44.

An order to pay bank notes is not a bill of exchange, ex parte Imeson, 2 Rose, Bankrupt Cases, 225. Where the amount is expressed in a foreign currency, the amount is payable in English currency at the stipulated rate of exchange, or, if no rate be stipulated in the bill, at the rate for sight drafts at the place of payment on the day when the bill is payable, vide § 72 (4); but it is competent to order a sum to be paid only in a foreign currency, or in that of some British possession. It must, however, be clear that payment, except in the prescribed currency, is forbidden.

9. The sum must be certain, vide § 9.

10. The payee must be a specified person, vide § 7, or bearer. A bill issued in the United Kingdom must have the above requisites. The requisites in form of a bill issued out of the United Kingdom, whether payable in the United Kingdom or not, are determined by the law of the place of issue, vide § 72 (1).

A writing which complies with the requisites of this section. is a bill, although it be described by another name, in re General Estates Company ex parte City Bank, L. R. 3, Chan. Ap. 758.

(6.) Mere omission of any of these requisites may be rectified as provided in § 20, and the writing, if not otherwise objectionable then becomes a bill, and in the case of a blank stamped paper bearing a subscription, the want of all the requisites of a bill may be supplied, vide § 20. If, however, the writing contains clauses which do not comply with the requirements of subsection (1), or clauses ordering any act to be done in addition to the payment of money, it is incapable of being made a bill. An instrument, which is not a

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bill in the sense of this Act, may be required to be stamped as a bill as defined in the Stamp Act, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, § 48, vide Appendix. The validity of instruments which do not comply with the requirements of this section depends upon their compliance with the rules of law affecting different classes of instruments, but the rules laid down in this Act have no application to them. Thus in Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England, L. R. 8, Q. B. 374, a debenture which was held not to be a promissory note, vide supra note (a) (3), was held not to be negotiable, and therefore a bona fide holder who had given full value to a thief for the debenture (1), could not sue in his own name for the sum contained in it, and (2), acquired no right to it by delivery, because it is beyond the competency of parties to give in England a right to an assignee to sue in his own name, or to deprive the owner of the debenture of the right to reclaim it from any one to whom a thief has transferred it, even for value. The law merchant, which the courts are bound to notice, may annex the privilege of negotiability to other documents, but recent custom is not sufficient to do so. On the other hand, in Goodwin v. Roberts, L. R. 10, Ex. 76, 337, 1 App. Cases, 476, scrip of a foreign government was held to be negotiable on admissions in a special case, that by the custom of all the stock exchanges of Europe, scrip is negotiable, and passes by mere delivery to a bona fide holder for value. Although parties cannot by agreement make instruments negotiable, which are not negotiable by the law merchant or by statute, yet the granter of obligations payable to bearer may by so doing bar himself from stating defences against a holder for value, which would have been good against the original holder, in re Blakely Ordinance Co., L. R. 3, Chan. App. 154. See also Dixon v. Bovill, 21st February, 1854, 16 D. 619; 29th July, 1856, 3 M'Q. 1; and Merchant Banking Company of London v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company, 5 Chan. Div. 205, as to iron warrants.

(c.) Thus in Macfarlane v. Johnston, 11th June, 1864, 2 M. 1210, the words "in part liquidation of our debt to you of deficiency of 7s. 6d. per £, as per our settlement in December, 1857," were held a mere reference to the cause of drawing, and did not amount to an agreement to pay the

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