the trial, relied upon the limitation of its liability, as provided for in the receipt given the plaintiff.

The court, however, following a Louisiana statute, held that the burden was on the defendant to prove that the loss or damage had been occasioned by accidental and uncontrollable events, and gave the plaintiff judgment for $863.75 and in

terest.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing the judgment of the Louisiana court, held that the defendant's limitation of its liability. was valid, whatever might be the law of the state in cases within its control, and constituted a defense to liability beyond $50.

In its opinion the court said:

"Under the law of the United States governing interstate commerce the stipulation constituted a defense to liabil

ity beyond $50, unless the plaintiff should prove some facts that took the case out of the protection of the contract. It had that scope in whatever court it came up. The local rule applied as to the burden of proof narrowed the protection that the defendant had secured, and therefore contravened the law."

Receipt Requiring Claim for Loss or
Damage to be Made Within
Four Months

Apostolou v American Ry. Express Co.,
Supreme Court of New Hamp-

shire, 122 Atl. Rep. 226

On October 9, 1920, the defendant, the American Railway Express Co., received from the plaintiff at Manchester, N. H., goods consigned to him at Carditza, Greece, agreeing to deliver the goods to the express station nearest the destination. A receipt signed on behalf of the plain

tiff and accepted by him required that that in case of loss, as a condition precedent to recovery, a claim should be made in writing to the originating or delivering carrier within four months after delivery of the property, or, in case of failure to make delivery, within four months after a reasonable time for delivery. had elapsed.

The plaintiff went to Greece and upon inquiry at the station nearest Carditza discovered that the goods had not arrived. He remained near Carditza until July, 1921, when he returned to Manchester. Thereafter he made several inquiries at the defendant's office for the lost goods, but the only written communication referring to them. was a letter written on March 17, 1922.

In an action to recover for the loss of the goods it was held that, in the absence of evidence tending to show either that the provision in the receipt relative to a claim for loss was unreasonable or that there had been an attempt to comply with it, such provision was valid under the statute requiring common carriers subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act to establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting the issuance, form and substance of receipts and bills of lading.

The plaintiff's argument to the effect that the defendant's failure to notify him of the arrival of the goods at the destination was notice to it of the loss of the goods and that, therefore, the presentation of the claim within four months was unnecessary was held to be untenable. The court further held that the plaintiff's contention that proof of

delivery to and acceptance of the goods by the defendant and the failure of the latter to make delivery at the destination established a prima facie case and imposed upon the defendant the burden of proving that the loss resulted from a cause for which it was not responsible was no answer to the defense that he had failed to make a claim for loss within four months after a reasonable time for delivery had elapsed, in compliance with an express condition precedent to his right of action.

INSURANCE

Insured Having no Knowledge of Warranty in Policy Held Not Bound Thereby

Collum v. National Fire Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 195 N. W. Rep. 333

The plaintiff held an automobile truck under a conditional sales contract. The defendant insurance company, through an agent, issued to the plaintiff a policy insuring the truck against fire. The policy contained a warranty that the truck was fully paid for by the insured and was not mortgaged or otherwise incumbered.

It appeared that the insured made no written application for the insurance, and at no time represented to the agent that there was no incumbrance on the truck. Furthermore, the insured never read the policy and did not know that it contained the warranty referred to above.

The truck was burned during the life of the policy, but the insurance

company refused to pay the amount of the insurance because of a breach of the warranty concerning the ownership of the truck. In an action on the policy the company contended that the plaintiff was required to know the terms of his policy and that by his retention of the policy he became bound by the warranty in question.

It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the policy as he had not been guilty of any fraudulent or intentional concealment of the conditional nature of his title to the truck. Accordingly a judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed.

Recovery on Insurance Policy Reduced by Failure of Insured to Give Notice of Change of Occupation

Berry v. Merchants Life & Casualty Co., Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 195 N. W. Rep. 335

In an action brought by the plaintiff to recover on a health and accident insurance policy issued to her husband by the defendant, the Merchants Life & Casualty Co., in which she was named as beneficiary, it appeared that the insured in the application, a copy of which was made part of the policy, gave his occupation as that of a farmer and his duties in that occupation "only farming, not for hire."

The insured after the issuance of the policy changed his occupation without notifying the insurance company and began to work for a logging contractor. While so engaged he was killed by a falling tree.

The defendant company contended that although the policy provided

that, if the injuries suffered by the insured should result in death, the company would pay $1,000 to the beneficiary, the plaintiff was entitled to recover only $100, which, according to the classification of risks and insurance rates in effect at the time of the insured's death, was the limit of liability for death to a person employed as a logger or laborer in the woods.

It was held that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for no more than the amount it would have been liable for if the occupation of the deceased had been described in the application as a logger or worker in the woods. The court so held because the policy in question contained a provision reducing the indemnity in case of change of occupation and such provision was printed in bold face type and with greater prominence than any other portion of the text of the policy as required by the laws of Wisconsin. It was also held that, as the defendant company had a license to transact business within the state, it was presumed that the form of the policy had been approved by the insurance commissioner.

A judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000 was reversed.

Maryland, by the Fleet-McGinley Co., which the insurance company had insured against loss by strike.

It appeared that the plaintiff company had been printing the Manufacturers' Record for a number of years and had been receiving a good profit from the work. A strike caused the company to discontinue publication of the Manufacturers' Record for a time. Later the company again secured the publication of it, but the profits derived from the work were less than they had formerly been.

The plaintiff contended that the loss of profits was due to the fact that it received the same remuneration for its work as it had formerly received, whereas it cost more to do the work because of the inefficiency of the plaintiff's workmen and their inability to do the work in the same time it had been done by the workmen employed prior to the strike at the same wages.

In holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for its loss of profits, the court said:

"The company, as we have said, had been doing this work for a long time and had been making a good profit in doing it. It knew, when it took the work back, that conditions were not as favorable as they had been, yet it again resumed the work át a price at which they knew, or should have known, there was no profit. It may have been that it did not wish to lose the job, and was apprehensive about it, but it was not for that reason justified in doing the work at a losing price, expecting to put the burden of the loss upon the insurance company under the supposed terms of the policy."

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Tenant Holding Over After Expira

tion of Lease Held Tenant
for Another Term

De Forest Estate Corporation v. Halpert, Municipal Court of City of New York, 201 N. Y. Supp. 360

On September 4, 1919, the plaintiff, the De Forest Estate Corporation, and the defendant entered into a lease in writing whereby the plaintiff leased to the defendant an apartment for the term of one year, to commence on October 1, 1919, and to end on September 30, 1920. The yearly rent of $1,000 was payable in equal monthly payments in advance on the first day of every month during the term.

The defendant entered into possession under the lease, and after its expiration on October 1, 1920, continued in possession of the premises, paying rent at the same rate as he had previously paid under the lease.

After October 1, 1921, the defendant continued in possession of the premises until June, 1923. During that period he paid the same rent as he had previously paid. He moved out in June, and thereafter when the rent for the months of June and July was demanded, he refused to pay it. The plaintiff, contending that it was entitled to treat the defendant as a holdover tenant for another term on the conditions stated in the original lease, brought an action to recover the monthly payments of rent alleged to be due in the months of June and July, 1923.

the enactment of the emergency rent laws set forth in Chapter 944 of the Laws of 1920 abrogated the rule that where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term, the law will imply an agreement to hold for a year under the terms of the prior lease. The laws in question give the right to a tenant to interpose in an action for rent accruing under an agreement the defense that the agreement is oppressive and the rent unjust and unreasonable. These laws also deprive a landlord of his possessory remedies, that is, the right to recover his property, either by summary proceedings or by action in ejectment.

It was held that the earlier rule was not suspended by the enactment of the emergency laws. In so holding the court said:

"In express terms the emergency laws do not cover the subject of tenures. In fact, there is nothing in any of the I fail to discover anything in these laws emergency laws affecting the subject. which even expressly or impliedly changes the common law rule. The fact that certain remedies of the landlord theretofore available to him are taken from him, and that a certain other new remedy is given the tenant, not here invoked, does not seem to me to change the rule of the common law under consideration. The implication of a tacit consent of both landlord and ing the enactment of the emergency tenant for another term, notwithstandlaws, may be said to arise, subject only to the right of the tenant under these laws to plead that the rent is unjust

and unreasonable.

court's consideration was whether

fore enunciated should apply.

While