act on the ground that mining, as conducted by them, if not actually a part of interstate commerce, was so closely connected therewith, that a tax on such mining would burden or interfere with interstate commerce. This argument was based on the ground that only a small percentage of the iron ore mined in Minnesota was used in that state and that almost the entire quantity mined was used to fill contracts calling for shipment to other states.

In affirming decrees dismissing the actions the court held that the ore did not enter interstate commerce until after the mining was completed, and that, therefore, a tax imposed on the occupation of mining was not an interference with interstate commerce. In discussing the question, the court said:

The chief contention is that mining as conducted by the plaintiffs, if not actually a part of interstate commerce, is so closely connected therewith that to tax it is to burden or interfere with such commerce, which a state cannot do consistently with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.

The facts on which the contention rests are as follows: The demand or market within the state for iron ore covers only a negligible percentage of what is mined by the plaintiffs. Practically all of their output is mined to fill existing contracts with consumers outside the state and passes at once into the channels of interstate commerce. Three-fourths of it is from open pit mines and one-fourth from underground mines. At the open pit mines empty cars are run from adjacent railroad yards into the mines and there loaded. Steam shovels sever the ore from its natural bed and lift it directly into the When loaded the cars are promptly returned to the railroad yards, where they are put into trains which start the ore on its interstate journey. The several steps follow in such succession that there is practical continuity of movement from the time the ore is severed from its natural bed. The operations within the mine and the movement of the cars into and out of the mine are conducted by the plaintiffs. The subsequent transportation is by public carriers.

cars.

At the underground mines the plaintiffs dig the ore, bring it to the surface through shafts and put it in elevated pockets where it readily can be loaded into cars. The subsequent movements are much the same as at the open pit mines, but their continuity is not so pronounced. Some of the ore from both kinds of mines-between 10 and 20 per cent.-is concentrated by washing or beneficiated after coming out of the mine and before starting out of the state, but our conclusion respecting the usual operations renders this deflection immaterial.

Plainly the facts do not support the contention. Mining is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a local business, subject to local regulation and taxation. Its character in this regard is intrinsic, is not af

fected by the intended use or disposal of the product, is not controlled by contractual engagements, and persists even though the business be conducted in close connection with interstate commerce.

The ore does not enter interstate commerce until after the mining is done, and the tax is imposed only in respect of the mining. No discrimination against interstate commerce is involved. The tax may indirectly and incidentally affect such commerce, just as any taxation of railroad and telegraph lines does, but this is not a forbidden burden or interference.

The plaintiffs further argued that the tax was in violation of the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the state constitutional provision that "taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects". The court held, however, that the Legislature might tax those engaged in one class of business and exclude other classes, provided that all similarly situated were brought within the class, and all members of the class dealt with according to uniform rules. The court further held that the tax in question satisfied these requirements.

State Statute Affecting Operation of Motor Vehicles on Its Highways Held Constitutional

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LTHOUGH the power to regulate interstate commerce is by the Constitution delegated to Congress, a state may, in the case of local matters, prescribe regulations concerning subjects which Congress has not seen fit to regulate. The right of the states to make such regulations is discussed in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. In those cases, the court said:

The grant in the Constitution of its own force, that is, without action by Congress, established the essential immunity of interstate commercial intercourse from the direct control of the states with respect to those subjects embraced within the grant which are of such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, their regulation should be prescribed by a single authority. It has repeatedly been declared by this court that as to those subjects which require a general system or uniformity of regulation the power of Congress is exclusive. In other matters, admitting of diversity of treatment according to the special requirements of local conditions, the states may act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act; and, when Congress does act, the exercise of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation.

In George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Malory, 123 Atl. Rep. 61, case recently decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, it was held that a state has the right to require anyone wishing to operate a motor vehicle for the transportation of merchandise or freight over a specified route to obtain a permit, and that it also has the right to refuse such a permit, even though the specified route forms part of an interstate route. The facts of the case were the following:

The plaintiff, the George W. Bush & Sons Co., operated a line of motor trucks in the transportation for hire of goods and merchandise from points in Maryland to Wilmington and other points in Delaware. While so operating its line of transportation it was notified by the Public Service Commission of Maryland that it would have to obtain from the commission permits before it could lawfully operate its truck lines in Maryland over the routes upon which it was then operating. The plaintiff thereafter applied for the permits, but they were refused by the commission on the ground that the granting of them would be prejudicial to the welfare and convenience of the public. In refusing the permits the commission acted in accordance with a Maryland statute empowering the commission to investigate the expediency of granting a permit to the owner of a motor vehicle applying therefor, and to grant or refuse such permit.

Subsequently the plaintiff brought this action against the members of the commission for an injunction restraining the commission from prosecuting it for any violation of the law or any order of the commission prohibiting the operation by it of its motor trucks. The plaintiff contended that the Legislature of the state had no right to enact the law requiring the owner of a motor truck line to procure a permit to operate such line between points in Maryland and points in some other state, because such law is a violation of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The court held, however, that the Legislature had the right to enact the law in question. In so holding, it said in part:

The public highways over which the appellant seeks to operate its motor trucks, as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, were either built or owned by the state or the counties traversed by them.

It was the duty of the commission under the statute, upon the receipt of the appellant's application for permits to operate the motor truck lines named in the application, "to investigate the expediency of granting said permits, the number of the motor vehicles to be used and the rate to be charged"; but, as stated by the statute, if the commission deemed the grant

ing of such permits prejudicial to the welfare and convenience of the public, they were not only empowered and authorized to refuse the granting of the permits, but it was their duty to do so.

A statutory regulation of this character is essential not only to the protection of the above mentioned highways built at great expense to the state and counties, but also to the safety of the public who travel upon them. The roads and highways are subject to great damage and injury when used by very large motor vehicles equipped without regard to the effect their use will have upon the roads, and, of course, the injury or damage is greater when large numbers of them are operated thereon; consequently the number of them used for profit and gain in the transportation of freight or passengers should be restricted to the public need or convenience, and, when the number is in excess thereof, their use becomes prejudicial to the welfare and convenience of the public.

The operation of motor trucks upon these highways in most, if not in all, cases is a great convenience to the public, especially to those persons living along the route on which they are operated. It is therefore important that the use of the highways shall be so regulated as to assure the enjoyment of this right to the public, which right ..ay be seriously affected by the failure of those to whom the privilege is granted to give proper service caused by their inability to operate with a profit, resulting from the excessive number to whom such privilege is granted. The object and purpose of the act is to restrict to the needs of the public the number of motor vehicles used in the transportation of freight or merchandise upon any one route, and thereby avoid the additional injury and damage to the roads or highways, and the danger to persons traveling thereon, that would result from the use of a greater number than the needs and conveniences of the public require. It must be that the safety of the traveling public is lessened by the increased number of motor trucks operating upon the roads.

It is admitted that Congress has enacted no legislation undertaking to regulate the instrumentalities here involved for carrying on interstate commerce, and thus it would seem that this case falls within the class of cases which are controlled by the principles enunciated in the Minnesota Rate Cases.

Digest of Recent Business Decisions

Below are given, in digest form, recent decisions of the State and Federal Courts affecting business. The decisions are grouped under appropriate headings, alphabetically arranged. At the beginning of each decision is given the title, the court by which it was decided, and the reporter citation

Traveling Salesman Has No Power To machines was given, whereby it was