State, who are directly interested in the amount of an estate and entitled to know its extent and value for the purposes of an inheritance tax, have no right to call upon a court to enforce their laws. If the inventories had been filed as required by law, the representatives of the People might have been satisfied with the amount represented thereby as the taxable value, but in the absence of the inventories it was necessary to endeavor to ascertain, by means of witnesses, what property the estate had. The court erred in declining to make the orders asked for.

It is said, however, by counsel for the appellees, that the judgment ought not to be reversed if the ruling was wrong, for the reason that the People obtained all necessary information through the examination of witnesses. It may be that all the property of the estate was' discovered. and it may be that it was not, and in any event the People were required to take up an unnecessary burden. We can not say that the property was all disclosed, and much complaint is made that the court excluded competent evidence tending to show the amount of the estate. An effort was made to discover assets in the form of loans and mortgages on real estate in Edgar county, and the offered evidence was excluded by the court. Whether the rulings were right or wrong, it cannot be said that it made no difference that the court did not require the executors to make an inventory of all the property which had come to their hands, possession or knowledge, or that an inventory, under oath, by the surviving partners would have been of no use to the People.

There was a large amount of property in the name of Jacob Sholem & Sons employed in the clothing and dry goods trade and other forms of business, and it was claimed by Samuel Sholem and Maurice Sholem that they had been equal partners with their father under that firm name since the year 1873 and together owned two-thirds of the partnership property. The evidence was that the father, Jacob

Sholem, was engaged in business in Paris, Edgar county, in his own name prior to 1873 and had three or four stores and was worth probably $40,000. He took his two sons, Samuel and Maurice, out of school when they were thirteen and fifteen years old, respectively, and put them in his store. About the year 1873 Jacob Sholem agreed verbally with the minor sons to run the different branches of business as one business and as a partnership. He told them the business was theirs and his, and he changed the business sign to "Jacob Sholem & Sons." From that time the bank accounts were kept in the name of Jacob Sholem & Sons and the book accounts were kept in that way and either one of the three wrote checks in the name of the firm. No stock book or record of sales was ever kept and no account was kept with the individual members of the firm. but each one had his living out of the business. There was never any account of profits or any division between the parties and no inventory was ever taken until after the death of Jacob Sholem, when there was a sale in view and an inventory was begun, but the inventory was never completed. surplus it was invested in real real estate paid for with the funds of the partnership was conveyed to Jacob Sholem. When each of the four children were married the father gave them homes and wedding presents which amounted in each case to the neighborhood of $25,000, and this was done by taking money of the firm. Jacob Sholem would draw a check on the firm account for the gifts so made.

sale fell through and the Whenever there was any estate or loaned, and the

Counsel for the People contend that a partnership was not proved, and that Maurice and Samuel Sholem, the surviving partners, who testified to the existence of the partnership and the agreement, were not competent witnesses for that purpose. As they were called and examined on behalf of the People and no objection was made at any time to their competency, the objection cannot be made and

will not be considered. Whether they were competent witnesses or not, there was sufficient other evidence to prove a partnership. Written articles of agreement are not necessary but a partnership may exist under a verbal agreement, and circumstances may be sufficient to raise an inference of an agreement. (Haug v. Haug, 193 Ill. 645.) The fact that the boys went to work in the store would not alone justify such an inference, but the change in the sign and the bank accounts and transacting the business in the name of Jacob Sholem & Sons for a long term of years after the sons reached their majority, together with other circumstances, justify a conclusion that there was a partnership. There was a large amount of real estate standing in the name of Jacob Sholem but bought with the funds of the partnership. There was a resulting trust in the real estate in favor of Samuel Sholem and Maurice Sholem in proportion to their interest in the partnership, which was one-third to each. Crone v. Crone, 180 Ill. 599.

It is urged that the court erred in excluding evidence offered to show the ownership of mortgages by Jacob Sholem or the firm, in the effort to show the existence of property of the estate in the absence of an inventory, but those questions are not likely to arise when an inventory has been filed. Of course, an inventory will not be conclusive, but if it is claimed that property has been omitted the inquiry will be confined to such omitted property, and we apprehend there will be no difficulty, in that event, in making the necessary proof.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the county court for further proceedings in conformity with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

W. C. RITCHIE & Co. et al. Appellees, vs. JOHN E. W. WAYMAN, State's Attorney, et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed April 21, 1910.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-property rights may be regulated under the police power of the State. The right of an individual to labor and to contract with reference to labor is a property right within the meaning of the constitution; but property rights may be limited and regulated under the police power of the State when the public health, safety, morals or welfare so require.

2. SAME-legislation limiting the number of hours women shall work in one day is within police power. Legislation limiting the number of hours a day women shall be allowed to work in such employments as are carried on in mechanical establishments, factories and laundries tends to preserve the health of women and insure strength and vigor in the children they may bear, and falls clearly within the police power of the State.

3. SAME-the Woman's Ten Hour law of 1909 is a valid police regulation. The Woman's Ten Hour Law of 1909, (Laws of 1909, p. 212,) limiting the time to ten hours in any one day in which a female shall be allowed to work in any mechanical establishment, factory or laundry, is a valid and legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. (Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, distinguished.)

4. SAME-Woman's Ten Hour law is not an arbitrary discrimination as between women. The pressure and spur under which women must work in mechanical establishments, factories or laundries where the pace is set by machinery creates a substantial difference between such employments and those where the work is not so driving and the tendency to over-exertion is not so great, and the putting of such establishments in a class by themselves does not render the Woman's Ten Hour law of 1909 invalid, as an arbitrary discrimination between women engaged in manual labor.

5. SAME-Woman's Ten Hour law not invalid as discriminating between men and women. The physical structure and maternal functions of women, and their consequent inability to perform, without effect upon their health and the vigor of their offspring, work which men may do without over-exertion, justify the discrimination between men and women made by the Woman's Ten Hour law of 1909.

VICKERS, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. RICHARD S. TUTHILL, Judge, presiding.

WILLIAM H. STEAD, Attorney General, JOHN E. W. WAYMAN, State's Attorney, and ZACH HOFHEIMER, for appellant John E. W. Wayman:

The "act to regulate and limit the hours of employment of females in any mechanical establishment or factory," etc., (Laws of 1909, p. 212,) is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, is not class legislation, and is not in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, nor of section 2 of article 2 or section 22 of article 4 of the constitution of Illinois. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412; State v. Muller, 48 Ore. 252; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manf. Co. 120 Mass. 383; Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. 5; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Holden v. Hardy, 169 id. 366.

The police power of the State, while not susceptible of exact comprehensive definition, has been described by this court as that inherent or plenary power which enables the State to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society, and may be termed the law of overruling necessity. Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628; Chicago v. Dairy Co. 234 id. 294.

WILLIAM H. STEAD, Attorney General, (SAMUEL A. HARPER, of counsel,) for appellant Edgar T. Davies:

The right to make simple contracts is not a “natural” or an "inalienable" right, as those terms are used in the organic law. I Andrews on Am. Law, (2d ed.) secs. 462, 550, 10, note 45; Mill on Liberty, chap. 5; 2 Bryce on Am. Com. 410; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45; Maine's Ancient Law, (Pollock) 321, 325, 326; Chanier on Roman Law, 4, 156, 160.

The Woman's Ten Hour act is within the police power of the State. Brannon on Fourteenth Amendment, 167