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CASES

ARGUED AND DETERMINED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

E. N. GILLESPIE, Trustee, Appellee, vs. THE FULTON OIL AND GAS COMPANY et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed February 16, 1910.

1. PRACTICE-general rule where a chancery case is remanded. When a chancery case is remanded by the Supreme Court with directions as to the decree to be entered, the trial court can only carry such directions into effect, and cannot permit the pleadings to be amended or new pleadings to be filed so as to change the issues and require a re-trial upon the facts.

2. SAME when filing an alleged supplemental bill does not reopen the case. Where the Supreme Court has remanded a chancery case with directions as to the decree to be entered, the filing of an alleged supplemental bill reciting the history of the litigation and stating what sort of a decree has been directed to be entered does not re-open the case for a trial of new issues raised by answers to such supplemental bill.

3. SAME when question of homestead cannot be injected into case after remandment. Where the Supreme Court, upon the first appeal in litigation involving an oil and gas lease, holds that the question of the lessor's homestead was not raised by the pleadings, or, if raised, was waived, and upon second appeal directs the entry of a decree omitting all reference to the homestead estate, the question of such homestead cannot be put in issue and tried upon re-instatement of the case.

4. SAME when Supreme Court may modify decree. Where a decree limiting an injunction, in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court, contains a provision which, in effect, nullifies the limitation directed, the Supreme Court may modify the decree by eliminating such nullifying provision therefrom.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Crawford county; the Hon. E. E. NEWLIN, Judge, presiding.

PARKER & Eagleton, George W. JONES, and JAY A. HINDMAN, for appellants.

CALLAHAN, JONES & LOWE, GOLDEN, SCHOLFIELD & SCHOLFIELD, and PARKER & CROWLEY, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE HAND delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a bill in chancery filed in the circuit court of Crawford county by E. N. Gillespie against the Fulton Oil and Gas Company, S. C. Bowman, T. N. Rogers and Walter Hennig, for an injunction, an accounting, and other relief. The litigation arose out of two oil and gas leases executed by Bowman upon fifty acres of land owned by him, located in Crawford county, one lease being made to T. E. Pierce and assigned to Gillespie, and the other to T. N. Rogers. Answers and replications were filed, and upon a hearing a decree was entered dismissing the bill for want of equity, which decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, but upon appeal to this court the decree of the circuit court and the judgment of the Appellate Court were reversed and the case was remanded to the circuit court, "with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill." Upon the case being re-instated in the circuit court a second decree was entered, from which an appeal was prosecuted to this court, and that decree was reversed upon the ground that it was broader in its scope than was authorized by the averments of the bill and the mandate of this court, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court with directions to re-enter the decree but to omit there from all reference to the homestead estate of Bowman in the premises mentioned in the decree, and to limit the injunction prayed for in the bill to the removal from the premises of such per

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