is capable of, and as we could in reafon expect to have fuppofing that he were. For, let us fuppofe there were fuch a being as an infinite spirit, clothed with all poffi ble perfection; that is, as good, and wife, and powerful, &c. as can be imagined: what conceivable ways are there whereby we fhould come to be affured, that there is fuch a being, but either by an internal impreffion of the notion of a God upon our minds, or else by fuch external and visible effects, as our reafon tells us must be attributed to fome caufe, and which we cannot, without great violence to our understandings, attribute to any other caufe, but fuch a being as we conceive God to be, that is, one that is infinitely good, and wife, and powerful? Now, we have double affurance that there is a God; and greater, or other than this, the thing is not capable of. If God fhould affume a body, and present himself before our eyes, this might amaze us, but could not give us any rational affurance that there is an infinite fpirit. If he fhould work a miracle, this could not in reafon convince an Atheist, more than the argument he hath already for it. If the Atheift were to ask a fign in the heaven above, or in the earth beneath, what could he defire God to do for his conviction more than he hath already done? Could he defire him to work a greater miracle than to make a world? Why, if God fhould carry this perverfe man out of the limits of this world, and fhew him a new heaven and a new earth fpring out of nothing, he might fay, that innumerable parts of matter chanced just then to rally together, and to form themselves into this new world; and that God did not make it. Thus you fee, that we have all this rational affurance of a God that the thing is capable of; and that Atheism is abfurd and unreasonable in requiring more.

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IV. The Atheift is unreafonable, because he pretends to know that which no man can know, and to be cer tain of that which no body can be certain of; that is, that there is no God, and, which is confequent upon this, as I fhall fhew afterwards, that it is not poffible there fhould be one. And the Atheist muft pretend to know this certainly for it were the greateft folly in the world for a man to deny and despise a God, if he be not certain that he is not. Now, whoever pretends to be

:

certain

certain that there is no God, hath this great difadvantage, he pretends to be certain of a pure negative. But of negatives we have far the leaft certainty; and they are ufually hardeft, and many times impoffible to be proved. Indeed, fuch negatives as only deny fome particular mode or manner of a thing's existence, a man may have a certainty of them; becaufe, when we fee things to be, we may fee what they are, and in what manner they do, or do not exist. For instance: We may be certain that man is not a creature that hath wings; because this only concerns the manner of his exiftence; and we feeing what he is, may certainly know that he is not fo or fo. But pure negatives, that is, fuch as abfolutely deny the existence of things, or the poffibility of their existence, can never be proved: for after all that can be faid against a thing, this will ftill be true, that many things poffibly are which we know not of, and that many more things may be than are; and if fő, after all our arguments against a thing, it will be uncertain whether it be or not. And this is univerfally true, unlefs the thing denied to be, do plainly imply a contradiction; from which I have already fhewn the notion of a God to be free. Now, the Atheift pretends to be certain of a pure negative; that there is no fuch being as God, and that it is not poffible there fhould be: but no man can reasonably pretend to know this much, but he must pretend to know all things that are lor can be; which, if any man fhould be fo vain as pretend to, yet it is to be hoped, that no body would be fo weak as to believe him..

V. Speculative Atheism is unreasonable, because it contradicts itself. There is this great contradiction in the denial of a God: He that denies a God fays, that that is impoffible which yet he must grant to be poffible. He fays it is impoffible that there fhould be fuch a being as God, in saying that de facto there is no fuch being. For, eternity being effential to the notion of a God, if there be not a God already, it is impoffible now that there fhould be one; becaufe fuch a being as is fuppo, fed to be effentially eternal, and without beginning, cannot now begin to be. And yet he muft grant it poffible, that there fhould be fuch a being; because it is poffible there fhould be fuch a being as hath all pof

fible perfection: and fuch a being as this is that which we call God, and is that very thing which the Atheist denies, and others affirm to be. For he that denies a God must deny fuch a being as all the world defcribe God to be; and this is the general notion which all men have of God, that he is a being as perfect as is poffible; that is, endued with all fuch perfections as do not imply a contradiction; which none of thofe perfections which we attribute to God do, as I have already proved.

Secondly, Speculative Atheism, as it is unreasonable, fo is it a molt imprudent and uncomfortable opinion; and that upon these two accounts: ft, Because it is against the present interest and happiness of mankind; 2dly, Because it is infinitely hazardous and unfafe in the iffue.

1. It is against the prefent intereft and happiness of mankind. If Atheism were the general opinion of the world, it would be infinitely prejudicial to the peace and happiness of human fociety, and would open a wide door to all manner of confufion and diforder. But this I fhall not now infift upon, because I defign a particular difcourfe of that by itself.

I fhall at prefent content myself to fhew how uncomfortable an opinion this would be to particular persons. For nothing can be more evident than that man is not fufficient of himself to his own happiness. He is liable to many evils and miseries which he can neither prevent nor redress. He is full of wants, which he cannot fupply; and compaffed about with infirmities, which he cannot remove; and obnoxious to dangers, which he can never fufficiently provide againft. Confider man without the protection and conduct of a fuperior being, and he is fecure of nothing that he enjoys in this world, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for. He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to defire what he is never likely to obtain. Man walketh in a vain fhew, and difquieteth himself in vain. He courts happiness in a thoufand fhapes, and the fafter he purfues it, the fafter it flies from him. His hopes and expectations are bigger than his enjoyments, and his fears and jealoufies more trouble fome than the evils themfelves which he is fo much afraid of. He is liable

to

to a great many inconveniencies every moment of his life, and is continually infecure, not only of the good things of this life, but even of life itfelf. And befides all this, after all his endeavours to the contrary, he finds himself naturally to dread a fuperior being that can defeat all his defigns, and difappoint all his hopes, and make him miferable beyond all his fears. He has oftentimes fecret mifgivings concerning another life after this, and fearful apprehenfions of an invifible judge; and thereupon he is full of anxiety concerning his condition in another world, and fometimes plunged into that anguish and despair, that he grows weary of himfelf. So that the Atheist deprives himfelf of all the comfort that the apprehenfions of a God can give a man, and yet is liable to all the trouble and difquiet of thofe apprehenfions.

I do not fay that these inconveniencies do happen to all; but every one is in danger of them. For man's nature is evidently fo contrived, as does plainly difcover how unable he is to make himself happy fo that he muft neceffarily look abroad, and feek for happiness fomewhere else. And if there be no fuperior being, in whofe care of him he may repofe his confidence, and quiet his mind; if he have no comfortable expectations of another life to fuftain him under the evils and calamities he is liable to in this world, he is certainly of all creatures the most miferable. There are none of us but may happen to fall into thofe circumstances of danger, or want, or pain, or fome other fort of calamity, that we can have no hopes of relief or comfort but from God alone; none in all the world to fly to but him. And what would men do in fuch a cafe, if it were not for God? Human nature is most certainly liable to deIperate exigencies; and he is not happy that is not provided against the worst that may happen. It is bad to be reduced to fuch a condition as to be deftitute of all comfort. And yet men are many times brought to that extremity, that if it were not for God, they would not know what to do with themfelves, or how to enjoy themfelves for one hour, or to entertain their thoughts with any comfortable confiderations under their prefent anguish and fufferings. All men naturally fly to God in extremity; and the moft Atheistical perfon in the world,

when

when he is forfaken of all hopes of any other relief, is forced to acknowledge him, and would be glad to have fuch a friend.

Can it then be a wife and reasonable defign, to endeavour to banish the belief of a God out of the world? Not to fay how impious it is in refpect of God, nothing can be more malicious to men, and more effectually undermine the only foundation of our happiness. For if there were no God in the world, man would be in a .much more wretched and difconfolate condition than the creatures below him for they are only fenfible of prefent pain; and, when it is upon them, they bear it as they can. But they are not at all apprehenfive of evils at a distance, nor tormented with the fearful.profpect of what may befal them hereafter: nor are they plunged into defpair, upon the confideration that the evils they lie under are like to continue, and are incapable of a remedy; and as they have no apprehenfion of thefe things, fo they need no comfort against them. But mankind is liable to all the fame evils, and many others; which are fo much the greater, because they are aggravated, and fet on by the reftlefs workings of our mind, and exafperated by the fmart-reflections and frettings of our own thoughts. And if there be no God, we are wholly without comfort under all these, and without any other remedy than what time will give. For, if the providence of God be taken away, what fecurity have we against those innumerable dangers and mifchiefs to which human nature is continually expofed? what confolation under them, when we are reduced to that condition that no creature can give us any hopes of relief? but if we believe that there is a God that takes care of us, and we be careful to please him, this cannot but be a mighty comfort to us, both under the prefent fenfe of affliction, and the apprehenfion of evils at a diftance. For in that cafe we are fecure of one of thefe three things; either that God by his providence will prevent the evils we fear, if that be befl for us; or that he will fupport us under them when they are present, and add to our strength as he increaseth our burden or that he will make them the occafion of a greater good to us, by turning them either to our advantage in this world, or the increase of our happiness in the next. VOL. I.

D

Now,