ted Pharaoh's magicians, by working miracles which they could not work, they might reafonably have difputed it with him, who had been the true prophet; but when he did works plainly above the power of their magic and the devil to do, then they fubmitted, and acknowledged, that there was the finger of God. So like. wife, though a perfon work a miracle, which ordinarily is a good evidence that he is fent by God; yet if the doctrine he brings be plainly contrary to thofe natural notions which we have of God, this is a better objection against the truth of this doctrine, than the other is a proof of it; as is plain in the cafe which Mofes puts, Deut. xiii. which I mentioned before. Upon the fame account no man can reasonably believe the doctrine of tranfubftantiation to be revealed by God; becaufe every man hath as great evidence that tranfubftantiation is falfe, as any man can pretend to have that God hath revealed any fuch thing. Suppofe tranfubftantiation to be part of the Chriftian doctrine, it must have the fame confirmation with the whole; and that is, miracles. But of all doctrines in the world, it is peculiarly incapable of being proved by a miracle: for if a miracle were wrought for the proof of it, the very fame affurance which a man hath of the truth of the miracle, he hath of the falfehood of the doctrine; that is, the clear evidence of his fenses for both. For that there is a miracle wrought to prove, that what he fees in the facrament is not bread, but the body of Chrift, he hath only the evidence of his senses; and he hath the very fame evidence to prove, that what he fees in the facrament is not the body of Christ, but bread. So that here arifeth a new controverfy, whether a man fhould believe his fenfes giving teftimony against the doctrine of tranfubftantiation, or bearing teftimony to the miracle which is wrought to confirm that doctrine? for there is just the fame evidence againft the truth of the doctrine, which there is for the truth of the miracle. So that the argument for tranfubftantiation, and the objection against it, do juft balance one another; and where the weights in both fcales are equal, it is impoffible that the one should weigh down the other; and confequently tranfubftantiation is not to be proved by a miracle; for that would be be, to prove to a man, by fomething that he fees, that he does not fee what he fees. And thus I have endeavoured, as briefly and clearly as I could, to give fatisfaction to the first inquiry I propound. ed, viz. How we may difcern between true and counterfeit revelations and doctrines? I proceed now to the II. To whom this judgement of difcerning does appertain; whether to Chriftians in general, or to fome particular perfon or perfons, authorised by God to judge for the rest of mankind, by whofe judgement all men are concluded and bound up? And this is an inquiry of no fmall importance; because it is one of the most fundamental points in difference between us and the church of Rome. And however, in many particular controverfies, as concerning tranfubftantiation, the communion in one kind, the fervice of God in an unknown tongue, the bufinefs of indulgences, the invocation of faints, the worfhip of images, they are not able to offer any thing that is it to move a reasonable and confiderate man: yet in this controverfy, concerning the judge of controverfies, they are not deftitute of fome fpecious appearance of reafon, which deferves to be weighed and confidered. Therefore, that we may examine this matter to the bottom, I fhall do these three things. 1. Lay down fome cautions and limitations, whereby we may underftand, how far the generality of Chriftians are allowed to judge in matters of religion. 2. I fhall reprefent the grounds of this principle. 3. Endeavour to fatisfy the main objection of our adverfaries against it; and likewife to thew, that there is no fuch reason and neceffity for an univerfal infallible judge as they pretend. 1. I fhall lay down fome cautions and limitations, by which we may understand, how far the generality of Christians are allowed to judge in matters of religion. If, Private perfons are only to judge for themselves, and not to impofe their judgement upon others, as if they had any authority over them. And this is reafonaule; because if it were otherwife, a man would deprive others of that liberty which he affumes to himself, and which he can claim upon no other account, but because it belongs to others equally with himself. 2dly, This liberty of judging is not fo to be understood, as to take away the neceffity and ufe of guides and teachers in religion. Nor can this be denied to be a reasonable limitation; because the knowledge of revealed religion is not a thing born with us, nor ordinarily fupernaturally infused into men; but is to be learned as other things are. And if it be to be learned, there must be fome to teach and inftruct others and they that will learn, must be modest and humble; and in those things of which they are no competent judges, they must give credit to their teachers, and truft their skill. For instance every unlearned man is to take it upon the credit of those who are skilful, that the fcriptures are truly and faithfully tranflated; and for the understanding of obfcure texts of fcripture, and more difficult points in religion, he is to rely upon those whofe proper bufinefs and employment it is to apply themfelves to the understanding of these things. For in thefe cafes every man is not capable of judging himfelf, and therefore he must neceffarily truft others: and in all other things he ought to be modeft; and unless it be in plain matters, which every man can judge of, he ought rather to diftruft himself than his teacher. And this respect may be given to a teacher, withouteither fuppofing him to be infallible, or making an abfolute refignation of my judgement to him. A man may be a very able teacher, fuppofe of the mathematics, and fit to have the refpect which is due to a teacher, though he be not infallible in thofe fciences: and because infallibility is not neceffary to fuch a teacher, it is neither neceffary nor convenient that I fhould abfolutely refign up my judgement to him. For though I have reafon to credit him, with the compafs of his art, in things which I do not know, I am not therefore bound to believe him in things plainly contrary to what I and all mankind do certainly know. For example: if, upon pretence of his skill in arithmetic, which I am learning of him, he fhould tell me, that twice two do not make four, but five; though I believed him to be the best mathematician in the world, yet I cannot believe him in this thing : nor is there reason I fhould; because I did not come to learn learn this of him, but knew as much of that before, as he or any man elfe could tell me. The cafe is the fame in matters of religion; in which there are fome things fo plain, and lie fo level to all capacities, that every man is almoft equally judge of them; as I fhall have occafion further to fhew by and by. 3dly, Neither does this liberty of judging exempt men from a due fubmiffion and obedience to their teachers and governors. Every man is bound to obey the lawful.commmands of his governors; and what by public confent and authority is determined and established, ought not to be gainfaid by private perfons, but upon very clear evidence of the falsehood or unlawfulness of it. And this is every man's duty, for the maintaining of order, and out of regard to the peace and unity of the church; which is not to be violated upon every fcruple and frivolous pretence: and when men are perverfe and disobedient, authority is judge, and may reftrain and punish them. 4thly, Nor do I fo far extend this liberty of judging in religion, as to think every man fit to difpute the controverfies of religion. A great part of people are ignorant, and of fo mean capacity, as not to be able to judge of the force of a very good argument, much less of the iffue of a long difpute: and fuch perfons ought not to engage in difputes of religion, but to beg God's direction, and to rely upon their teachers; and above all to live up to the plain dictates of natural light, and the clear commands of God's word; and this will be their best security. And if the providence of God hath placed them under fuch guides as do feduce them into error, their ignorance is invincible; and God will not condemn them for it, fo long as they fincerely endeavour to do the will of God fo far as they know it. And this being the cafe of many, efpecially in the church of Rome, where ignorance is fo industriously cherished, I have fo much charity as to hope well concerning many of them. And feeing that church teaches and injoins the people to worship images, it is in fome fenfe charitably done of them, not to let them know the fecond commandment, that they may not be guilty of finning against so plain a law. Having premifed thefe cautions, I proceed, in the Hh this this principle of our religion, viz. That we allow private perfons to judge for themselves in matters of religion. ift, Because many things in religion, efpecially thofe which are moft neceffary to be believed and practised, are fo plain, that every man of ordinary capacity, after competent inftruction in matters of religion, (which is always to be supposed), can as well judge of them for himfelf, as any man, or company of men, in the world, can judge for him; because in these he hath a plain rule to go by, natural light, and clear revelation of fcripture. And this is no new principle of the Proteftants, but most exprefsly owned by the ancient fathers. "Whatever "things are neceffary, are plain," faith St Chryfoftom. "All things are plainly contained in fcripture, which concern faith and a good life," faith St Auftin. And nothing can be more reasonable, than that thofe things which are plain to every man, fhould be left to every man's judgement: for every man can judge of what is plain; of evident truth and falfehood, virtue and vice, of doctrines and laws plainly delivered in fcripture, if we believe any thing to be fo, which is next to madnefs to deny. I will refer it to no man's judgement upon earth to determine for me, whether there be a God or not? Whether murder and perjury be fins? Whether it be not plain in fcripture, that Jefus Chrift is the Son of God, and he became man, and died for us, and rofe again? So that there is no need of a judge in thefe cafes. Nor can I poffibly believe any man to be fo abfolutely infallible, as not to call his infallibility into queftion, if he determines any thing contrary to what is plain and evident to all mankind. For if he fhould determine that there is no God, or that he is not to be worshipped, or that he will not punifh and reward men, or, which is the cafe that Bellarmine puts, that virtue is vice, and vice virtue; he would hereby take away the very foundation of religion and how can I look upon him any longer as a judge in matters of religion, when there can be no fuch thing as religion, if he have judged and determined right? 2dly, The fcripture plainly allows this liberty to parichlar and private perfons to judge for themselves. And for |